Let’s start tonight with President Zelenskyy’s address to Ukraine from earlier this evening. Video below, English transcript after the jump: (emphasis mine)
Ukrainians!
All our defenders!
Exactly 10 years ago, this day marked the start of EURO 2012, the European Football Championship, which brought together all Ukrainians, Ukrainians and Poles, Ukrainians and the vast majority of Europeans.
The opening ceremony was in Warsaw, the final ceremony was in our capital, Kyiv. The matches were hosted in different cities of our two countries and in particular in Donetsk, at the Donbas Arena. Only 10 years have passed – and it seems that it was in another world.
Just today, the occupiers announced the absolutely crazy news that they are preparing to unite some football clubs from all occupied territories into one pseudo-championship – from Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, Melitopol, Crimea, and even part of Georgia. It’s just a mockery of the occupiers over people who remember everything well.
10 years ago our Donetsk was a strong, proud and developed city. And then Russia came. Brought ideas of just such an inadequate level. And now it is a ghost town that has lost most people, thousands of lives and absolutely all prospects.
Only the return of Ukraine, which will definitely happen, only our flag and only Ukrainian law will mean a normal life for these territories, for these cities – again. The life that was there. Peaceful, safe, open to the world. And of course – new matches of world-class teams at the Donbas Arena.
I am grateful to President of Poland Andrzej Duda, a friend of all Ukrainians, for the fact that he has now started a special trip to European countries to support the European perspective of our country. This June we are to get a decision on the candidacy. And all our friends, all our diplomats are now working for this, working in full.
President of Slovakia Zuzana Čaputová was to go with Andrzej – such a joint initiative of the two leaders was planned. A positive COVID-19 test hindered it. Well, these are the conditions of our life now. I wish Zuzana a speedy recovery.
I spoke today with German Chancellor Scholz. About the decision in favor of Ukraine on the candidacy as well, which, in fact, will be a decision in favor of Europe. We talked about defense support. And about food security, guaranteeing which is really a global interest already. Because no one can be interested, except the Russian state, in the global food crisis.
I addressed today the participants of the investment conference organized to discuss the economic prospects of our state. Representatives of the world’s largest funds were among the participants. Although the event was not public, it was still very important and powerful. I invited them to invest in Ukraine. Invest.
I also talked to members of the community of leaders of major American companies. This is the 133rd such summit, and this year it brought together the leading forces of global business. We discussed how business can help Ukraine withstand. I urged them to leave the Russian market and not to support this war with their taxes.
It is very important for me to see that such an audience – and these, I emphasize again, are representatives of the most influential part of American business – believes that sanctions against Russia should be strengthened. Therefore, it would be right for politicians to hear this position. Leading business and the majority in American and European societies believe that there is still not enough pressure on the Russian Federation to end this war.
According to the results of this day, the 105th day of the full-scale war, Severodonetsk remains the epicenter of the confrontation in Donbas. We defend our positions, inflict significant losses on the enemy.
This is a very fierce battle, very difficult. Probably one of the most difficult throughout this war. I am grateful to everyone who defends this direction. In many ways, the fate of our Donbas is being decided there.
I also signed decrees on awarding our heroes. 285 combatants were awarded state awards, 68 of them posthumously.
Eternal memory to all who gave their lives for Ukraine!
Eternal glory to our heroes who defend the state!
Glory to Ukraine!
Still no operational update from the Ukrainian MOD today. Nor was their a DOD backgrounder.
Here’s today’s update from Britain’s MOD:
The Russians have been trying to consolidate control in Kherson. The good people of Kherson are not exactly supportive:
New poster in Kherson:
“We will find all the scum who have tortured our people in basements, fired rockets, or directed artillery strikes. You will never be safe on our land. Death to the occupiers.” pic.twitter.com/OtsIrY7dHl
— Business Ukraine mag (@Biz_Ukraine_Mag) June 8, 2022
Here’s today’s updated map from Britain’s MOD:
Things are still a slow grind. No big movements.
From The Kyiv Independent:
The Battle of Sievierodonetsk in Ukraine’s Donbas is an emotional see-saw, in which doom and gloom change to joy and hope constantly.
As Russia continues its massive offensive, there has been a seemingly inevitable possibility of the local Ukrainian grouping of nearly 10,000 troops being surrounded and defeated.
There have been calls for withdrawal for the sake of saving Ukrainian troops before it’s too late.
At one point, Russian troops were just a step away from cutting off the grouping’s key supply line. They pushed forward through the streets, rapidly advancing to the center of Sievierodonetsk.
In the first days of June, it seemed the battle was close to its tragic ending.
But by June 2, nearly 48 hours into Russia’s advance, a series of Ukrainian strikes had pushed Russian troops back to the city’s east. Ukrainian forces then retook the city’s southwestern suburbs, likely scrapping many of Russia’s costly gains.
Contrary to expectations, the Ukrainian military opted to reinforce the Sievierodonetsk garrison and continue holding the ground in costly urban warfare, where Russia struggles to maintain its combat advantage over Ukraine.
According to experts, the successful Ukrainian counterattacks are a new indication of declining Russian combat power, despite the Kremlin’s massive concentration of forces in the area.
But heavy fighting continues — and while Russia is running out of steam, the situation in the area remains very close to critical.
The Battle of Sievierodonetsk in Ukraine’s Donbas is an emotional see-saw, in which doom and gloom change to joy and hope constantly.
As Russia continues its massive offensive, there has been a seemingly inevitable possibility of the local Ukrainian grouping of nearly 10,000 troops being surrounded and defeated.
There have been calls for withdrawal for the sake of saving Ukrainian troops before it’s too late.
At one point, Russian troops were just a step away from cutting off the grouping’s key supply line. They pushed forward through the streets, rapidly advancing to the center of Sievierodonetsk.
In the first days of June, it seemed the battle was close to its tragic ending.
But by June 2, nearly 48 hours into Russia’s advance, a series of Ukrainian strikes had pushed Russian troops back to the city’s east. Ukrainian forces then retook the city’s southwestern suburbs, likely scrapping many of Russia’s costly gains.
Contrary to expectations, the Ukrainian military opted to reinforce the Sievierodonetsk garrison and continue holding the ground in costly urban warfare, where Russia struggles to maintain its combat advantage over Ukraine.
According to experts, the successful Ukrainian counterattacks are a new indication of declining Russian combat power, despite the Kremlin’s massive concentration of forces in the area.
But heavy fighting continues — and while Russia is running out of steam, the situation in the area remains very close to critical.
Sudden counterstrike
Russia’s dangerous progress in a bid to close the Sievierodonetsk-Lysychansk salient was prevented, at least for the foreseeable future, by late May.
A breakthrough near Popasna, a ruined town at the pocket’s southern edge brought Russian forces alarmingly close to the T1302 Bakhmut-Lysychansk highway (nicknamed “the road of life”).
Russian troops gained leverage on higher ground along the highway road, particularly near the town of Vasylivka on the border between Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. But fresh Ukrainian reserves managed to stop the advance nearly one kilometer away from the road and prevent Russians from cutting off a key Ukrainian ground line of communication.
There’s another road for supplies running to the north via the town of Siversk, but it is much less effective and is also under Russian threat.
From the north, Russia’s forces were unsuccessful in their attempts to cross the Sieverskiy Donets River and go southward to meet up with the Popasna axis. Doing so would have ultimately clamped the Sievierodonetsk trap down.
As of June 7, Russians had not made any tangible progress on either axis, even though Russia captured the town of Lyman just north of the riverside as far back as May 26.
Without surrounding the Ukrainian grouping first, Russian troops, for want of a better decision, launched an all-out frontal attack on Sievierodonetsk, threatening their earlier success in the city’s eastern edge.
Russia likely did so to meet the purely symbolic, political goal of “liberating” the whole of Ukraine’s Luhansk Oblast as quickly as possible.
According to Ukrainian intelligence, Russian dictator Vladimir Putin reportedly ordered seizing of the whole of Luhansk Oblast by June 1 and the whole of Donetsk Oblast by July 1 so the Kremlin could present at least some sort of major “victory” in its prolonged war in Ukraine.
There seemed to be little to no resistance as Russian forces very quickly proceeded to Sievierodonetsk’s center and farther to the city’s industrial zone, which constitutes close to half of the city’s territory.
But starting on June 2 and over the weekend of June 4-5, Ukrainian forces counterattacked and recaptured parts of the city. This was also confirmed by Britain’s Defense Ministry in its June 7 intelligence report on Ukraine.
According to Ukraine’s Defense Ministry, the counteroffensive went as far as driving Russian troops out of the town of Metolkino southeast of Sievierodonetsk on June 3.
The fog of war and the constantly changing situation, with districts changing hands all the time, make it extremely hard to estimate the control of terrain, creating confusing reports in the media.
But on June 7, the local administration’s head Roman Vlasenko asserted that Ukrainian forces had firm control of the city’s industrial zone, particularly the large chemical plant Azot, and a portion of residential districts.
This may constitute between 40-50% of the city’s territory.
The Ukrainian counterattack, which some observers have even called “the miracle of Sievierodonetsk,” has changed the agenda from expectations of a large Ukrainian withdrawal and a lost city to confidence in continuing the struggle — as well as preparing a new line of defense in neighboring Lysychansk.
Ukraine continues to draw fresh reserves to Sievierodonetsk, which includes International Legion troops, regular Armed Forces, and National Guards units.
Both sides are exhausted, even though Russia has made capturing Sievierodonetsk a top priority. According to Ukraine’s command, Russia has committed close to 50% of its overall combat force in Ukraine, close to 100 battalion tactical groups, to the Sievierodonetsk-Lysychansk area.
Meanwhile, Russia has struggled to collect high-quality reserves and has had to abandon its stalled axes in Zaporizhia Oblast and Izium. According to international monitors, Russia’s progress in the area has already been very costly, and its forces have already consumed much of their overall ability to continue with offensive operations.
Russia’s drive in Donbas has gradually run out of steam over the last several days.
The Ukrainian command has likely decided to draw the Russian military into grinding, close combat urban warfare, where Russia is short of highly-skilled infantry and where its supremacy in terms of artillery and air support is seriously diminished. As previous months of the war have demonstrated, Russian progress in heavy urban warfare is extremely difficult.
Chances are high that the Ukrainian command opted to continue exhausting Russia’s military in the city for as long as possible. In doing so, Ukrainian forces have once again chosen a dense industrial zone as their defensive base.
But Ukraine is not ready to give up on Sievierodonetsk that easily.
According to the Kyiv Independent’s sources in Ukraine’s command, the military also decided to throw its weight behind the Sievierodonetsk defense because the city has been the Luhansk Oblast capital since the Russian occupation of Luhansk in 2014. Besides, due to local terrain, Sievierodonetsk would be very hard to take back from Russia in a counter-offensive.
Therein lies another side of Ukraine’s defensive operation: the twin city of Lysychansk just to the west.
The Ukrainian military is also fortifying this city, which stands on higher ground as compared to Sievierodonetsk, making it a more advantageous defense point.
The twin industrial cities are also divided by the Sievervskiy Donets riverside, another natural barrier. The Lysychansk bank stands on higher ground and is rather varied, which again gives a bonus to Ukrainian defense and makes it harder and more dangerous for Russia to install pontoon crossings and gain a foothold on the other side.
Heavy fighting in the city, which has already been heavily ruined, continues.
But Russia, according to the Ukrainian command, is also continuing with its attempts to sever the Bakhmut-Lysychansk lifeline and close the pocket. And it is concentrating more and more power on these efforts.
If Russia is successful, a large Ukrainian debacle may be inevitable.
More at the link!
I want to draw everyone’s attention to this interesting and from my professional opinion spot on analysis:
/thread/ I want to use this article as an example to show how (for example) foreign policy folks often stretch their work too beyond what they know (at which point they should consult with specialists in that area).
cc @LianaFix @mkimmage – feedback is welcome https://t.co/gAYCJ5AOlL
— Jakub Janovsky (@Rebel44CZ) June 8, 2022
- “In recent days, many Western observers of the war in Ukraine have begun to worry that the tide is turning in Russia’s favor. Massive artillery fire is yielding incremental Russian gains in eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region, and Russia is bringing in new forces.”
- Even without looking at the big picture, this IMO is a poor or misinformed argument, since Ukraine has depended on defense-in-depth since the start of the war – this means a gradual retreat while buying time and inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy.
- “Russia is bringing in new forces” isn’t a good argument for anything, since those new units are not even enough to replace losses or allow current units to be rotated back home.
- “The Kremlin likely intends to occupy eastern and southern Ukraine indefinitely and to eventually move on Odessa” Russia isn’t able to capture even Mykolayiv, let alone “move on Odessa” so not sure why this fantasy is being mentioned.
- “Any Ukrainian victory will only spur more Russian intransigence in its wake. As soon as it can rebuild its military capacity, Russia will use a narrative of humiliation to stir domestic support for a renewed effort to control Ukraine.”
- Here authors miss what Ukraine winning the war would mean – the Russian Army in Ukraine being militarily defeated with huge manpower and material losses. To rebuild and reform its military after that would likely take Russia about a decade (if not longer).
- Meanwhile, Ukraine would only get better armed and more integrated into the western political and military structures – which would make any new invasion by Russia even harder and riskier. The memory of Russian war crimes would also make resistance even more determined.
- “The combination of military setbacks and punishing sanctions might eventually induce Moscow to moderate its goals, and a meaningful cease-fire might become achievable.” This is delusional because a ceasefire is not acceptable to Ukraine unless it also involves a Russian retreat
- “A small Ukrainian victory in, say, the fall of this year might well be followed by another Russian invasion in 2023”
- I am sorry, but anyone who thinks that the Russian military can fully recover from current losses and those taken in another 4-5 months of fighting (and losing in this scenario), reform, and get new capabilities +capacity in just a year is clueless.
- If authors depended on Russian equipment in deep storage, they have no idea how hard IRL it is to reactivate equipment that has been in storage for 30-50 years – likely with minimum maintenance. And that HW would be far inferior to lost modern HW.
- “For the Western powers, a theoretical solution would be to offer Ukraine security guarantees in exchange for Ukrainian neutrality.” This sentence is simply an FP hot garbage. After what happened with Budapest Memorandum, there is no way Ukraine would accept vague promises.
- And sufficiently firm Western security guarantees would mean an indirect NATO membership (not neutrality).
- “Another risk is that even a small Ukrainian victory might be preceded or followed by nuclear threats from Putin.”
- In what universe are authors living if they don’t know that Russia has been using vague nuke threats (mostly towards countries in central and eastern Europe) on pretty much a monthly basis for decades?
- “Finally, even if Ukraine wins small, Kyiv and its partners would have to prepare for years of continued conflict.” As defined, “small victory” would mean pushing Russia back to January borders – in that case, Russia would lack the capacity and a reason to continue the war.
- Russia continuing a low-level war would make no sense when the cost would be a continuation of current harsh sanctions. Instead, Russia would in that scenario need to rebuild and reform its forces – which would take far longer than the authors predict. /end/
I think that’s enough for tonight.
Your daily Patron!
Spa day!!!!!!
Open thread!
mapaghimagsik
Thanks for posting all this, and the analysis. Its hard to find good information that doesn’t turn into a propaganda fest.
Another Scott
Relatedly, … SFGate – Another USMC Osprey crash, today in California.
:-(
Thanks for the updates, Adam.
Cheers,
Scott.
Alison Rose
Part of me loves seeing Zelenskyy out in the streets, because it’s like “Yeah I’m still here, fuckers” but then another part of me is like GO INSIDE PLEASE DEAR GOD.
Patron is very well behaved during his bath. My old doggie was not so poised about it.
Thank you as always, Adam.
Grumpy Old Railroader
Excellent report and a new source (for me) of information. Muchas Gracias
bbleh
I do kinda wonder about endgame here. Granted that Putin can portray pretty much any reasonably probable outcome as a victory to a domestic audience, it seems like the range of possibilities has narrowed sharply, and what’s left is (1) an impressively well-armed and highly motivated Ukraine cemented firmly to the West, even if technically not a member of NATO, (2) Russian occupation of some minor percentage of Ukraine that will be either fiercely restive (and supported by the rest of Ukraine) or riven by civil strife between rival loyalists, both of which are recipes for economic ruin, and (3) what amounts to a nasty cancer in the Russian military due to its failure in almost every way to live up to its political masters’ (and its own?) self-images in a conflict that everyone supposed would be a cake-walk. Given all that … what?
For this (among MANY other reasons), Dog forbid TFG or anyone like him takes power in the US.
N M
Thanks for yet another great post Adam!
Carlo Graziani
It seems to me that the Kyiv Independent reporting confirms the view that the UA is deliberately and mindfully drawing the Russians into the urban meat grinder of Sieverodonetsk, knowing that they can afford the losses entailed by that kind of retail warfare far better than the Russians can. And in my opinion that is an absolutely brilliant trap. Far better than fighting artillery duels in open countryside. Exploiting Putin’s blind spot for symbolic success to create a killing zone for scarce Russian army manpower is a stroke of genius.
Mathguy
Reading the summary and criticism of the FP article makes me think that the author of said FP article needs a meeting with Drs. Dunning and Kruger.
YY_Sima Qian
@Carlo Graziani: I agree, but the Russians also seems to have learned the lessons of Mariupol & is now sending LNR/DNR/Chechen cannon fodder into urban meat grinders. I don’t think Putin values the LNR/DNR/Chenchen lives anywhere near Russians ones, & I don’t think he values Russian lives all that much but at least he has to pretend w/ the latter to keep up domestic appearances.
One of the questions for the future is how quickly LNR/DNR separatists & Chechens start to balk at being used as fodder & desert or rebel.
YY_Sima Qian
@Carlo Graziani: But the Kyiv Independent reporter is also uncertain about the ultimate outcome of taking a stand at Sieverodonesk. There are always risks associated w/ maintaining a protruding salient position.
James E Powell
@bbleh:
I’m getting the impression that endgame is much further off than most people expect or want.
Jay
According to various open source groups Russia has deployed 1950’s era T62 tanks to Ukraine, still with their storage markings,
Another Scott
@bbleh: Others have made the point that VVP really, really wants to break the US and Western international order. He probably figures he can keep breaking Ukraine, causing international food crises, causing international refugee crises, messing with the oil markets, etc., etc., longer than the US and the EU can oppose him.
I think he’s wrong this time, but only determination to keep supporting Ukraine no matter how long it takes will prove it.
My $0.02.
Cheers,
Scott.
Gin & Tonic
@YY_Sima Qian: “Separatists” are russians. There is not now and has not been since 2014 any organic Ukrainian separatist movement. Without direct russian command and control there are no DNR/LNR.
YY_Sima Qian
@Jay: The guys at the Austrian Military Academy thinks the Russian Army are using the old T-62s as assault guns to attack fortified positions, which they believe is a viable use case, & not necessarily suggestive that the Russians are running out of more modern armor. They are still seeing evidence of Russia sending modern kit to the eastern theater, but likely husbanding them for tactical maneuvers if there is a breakthrough somewhere.
YY_Sima Qian
@Gin & Tonic: Point taken, certainly applies to the leadership, but I think most of the LNR/DNR militia members are still drafted local levies, & not re-uniformed Russians?
dmsilev
@Carlo Graziani: Ironically, that Ukrainian strategy is evocative of what the Soviets did to the Germans at Stalingrad. Hitler was fixated on capturing ‘Stalin’s city’, far beyond its actual strategic worth, and the mother of all meat-grinder battles ensued.
YY_Sima Qian
@dmsilev: But at Stalingrad the Germans were the ones in a salient. The question is how much more combat power the Russian Army can still bring to bear there to breakthrough & encircle the defenders.
Carlo Graziani
@YY_Sima Qian: While it’s undoubtedly true that the Russians have a ledger in which they keep a hierarchy of the value of their imperial troops lives, in the end infantry manpower is essentially fungible. What they lose in Chechens and D/L colonials, they still have to make up in beet-fed Russian boys.
The reason they resort to gimmicks such as these colonial troops, or the Wagner goons, is that they wildly underestimated their manpower requirements a decade ago, and never prepared an emergency mobilization plan. There is absolutely nothing that they can do to correct that error on a useful timescale now. Facing an army that has an essentially infinite reservoir of trained reservists to feed into battle alongside new draft-age recruits, the Russians are well and truly screwed. Every casualty is a casualty that they cannot afford.
kalakal
@Another Scott: I think that is now his only possible win. A straight military victory for him is no longer a realistic prospect. Instead he’s banking on decreasing Western interest as the war drags on . His useful idiots, stooges and fellow travellers are already at work. The GOP fanbois would love to abandon Ukraine.
dmsilev
@YY_Sima Qian: Another possibility I saw some analysts types raise is that the Russians had, prior to the war, separate refurbishment pipelines for reactivating mothballed T-62s and T-72s, because they were shipping some of the older units to places like Syria. Deploying the older tanks to Ukraine might then be an indication not so much that they’re running low on mothballed T-72s but instead are butting up against the rate at which those can be reactivated.
Carlo Graziani
@YY_Sima Qian: In my opinion, the salient is a side-issue. The battlefield casualties are the main issue. Ukraine can afford them. Russia cannot.
Jay
@YY_Sima Qian:
a bunch of the open source ppl think the T62’s are for internal security in occupied zones. They have already found their first dead T62, which seems to have blown up it’s engine, in a road march, then was abandoned.
Given the poor repair state of even $14.5 million dollar Pantsirs, pulled out of active armouries and inventories, plus corruption, ( cheap Belorussian tire clones, of Chinese Michelin clones),
Does not look good.
Redshift
@Carlo Graziani:
@YY_Sima Qian:
YY_Sima Qian
@Carlo Graziani: Sure, at the highest level. However, trading space for time should not involving letting 10K battle hardened troops get surrounded, & something the Ukrainian Army should not risk. Leaving aside for the moment whether the Russian can still muster enough forces to achieve encirclement.
YY_Sima Qian
@dmsilev: That is an interesting possibility.
Quiltingfool
I am in the process of putting together all the cat and sunflower blocks I’ve made for a donation quilt for an Ukrainian charity and, boy howdy, it will be an eyeful! Now I have lots of cat patterns, but no dogs. But I think this quilt should have one dog – Patron. I think I can make an appliqué block, I’m going to give it a go. The cats won’t mind sharing space.
YY_Sima Qian
@Jay: Yeah, that aspect of “friction” from reality is one the Russians really failed to account for.
YY_Sima Qian
@Redshift: The way the Russian Army fight urban battles is to use massive artillery to reduce everything to rubble, & then send in relentless waves of determined infantry fodder, supported by assault guns, to clear out the remaining resistance. The open question is whether the Russians can still manage the “relentless” & “determined” aspects.
Bill Arnold
@Another Scott:
Russian armed forces are losing(wasting) (by UKR accounts at least) the lives of about 300 sons of Russian (Federation) mothers per day, with about triple that with seriously damaged bodies and/or minds.
These are younger males, not the larger numbers of mostly-elderly lost to the atrocious Russian COVID-19 response.
The Russian Federation cannot sustain this or the concurrent large losses of military equipment.
Internally, the Russia Federation will not be able to sustain their fiction of low casualties.
James E Powell
@Carlo Graziani:
Can you expand on that? Why isn’t Russia, with the larger population, more able to afford casualties?
kalakal
@YY_Sima Qian: Another difference to Stalingrad is that the flanks of the Stalingrad salient were held by the second rate troops ie the poorly equipped and motivated troops of the Axis minor powers and it was these the Soviets turned their major firepower on . Salients are as you said are always vulnerable to being nipped out but I get the impression the UA is holding the flanks very strongly indeed while being prepared to stage a contested withdrawal from the tip to already prepared and manned defensive positions. The Germans were not on the defensive until the Soviets launched Operation Uranus.
Redshift
@Gin & Tonic:
Point taken, did not mean to imply they were anything but russian forces. Just that according to reports, the units there are poorly trained and armed troops pressed into service from those regions, likely because they’re considered even more disposable than regular troops. Another on a long list of war crimes.
Jay
@YY_Sima Qian:
it’s a mix. In 2014 a bunch of the DPR/LPR were “Russian Economic Migrants” from the broken former USSR and “colonists” from the Soviet days. Some were “Little Green Men”, some “War Junkies”.
In the criminal/bandit kingdoms and chaos that became the DPR/LPR, Russian Security Services eventually took charge through “buyouts”, falls out of windows, car bombs and missile strikes.
Redshift
@YY_Sima Qian: But not using heavy artillery once they’ve sent in the troops, right? That was my point; their grinding successes in the past couple of weeks have been primarily with artillery, and most of their troops in the east (reportedly) are now tied up in a fight where they can’t make much use of that advantage.
YY_Sima Qian
@Redshift: I think their tactic is if the infantry meet resistance, then pull back & pound some more w/ heavy artillery. I don’t think Sieverodonesk is the kind of heavily fortified citadel designed from inception that the Mariupol steel plant was.
2liberal
when should we expect the NATO/US provided heavy weapons to show up in the field, and what effect do you expect?
Nettoyeur
I think it is worthwhile to point out the similarity between the UKR defense in depth strategy and that of General Kutuzov in defeating Napoleon’s invasion in 1812. UKR strategy is also somewhat similar to that used by the Soviet Army against the Nazis in WWII. On both cases, the invader facedogistics problems and stubborn citizen defenders of their homes who continually devised tactics to harry and wear down an apparently superior enemy and ultimately send them packing. The irony is remarkable: today’s Ukrainian leaders and fighters are more Russian than the Russians.
Omnes Omnibus
@YY_Sima Qian: You don’t use tanks from the 60s and 70s if you have modern equipment available.
Jay
Carlo Graziani
@James E Powell: It’s a preparation issue.
Russia attempted to design a force structure that is mostly based on volunteer (“contract”) personnel, who outnumber draftees, the idea being to replicate the success of the professionalized Western armed forces. They neglected to create any kind of real reservist training for either their retired contract soldiers or their (1-year service) draftees. As a result, they have no real basis for rapid expansion of their existing manpower base. Attrition simply grinds them down faster than replacements can be supplied.
Ukraine, on the other hand, has been preparing for this war since 2014. They have universal male conscription with 18-month service, and all personnel who complete their service enter an active reserve, receiving periodic training, and are subject to mobilization at any time until they age out. As a consequence, they have an inexhaustible supply of trained and highly motivated personnel already on-file and ready to be mustered to replace casualties as existing units requisition replacements.
As a result, a completely paradoxical situation now exists in this war, in which the smaller power actually has the opportunity to exert a preponderance of numbers over the larger power, if only situations such as the battle of Sieverodonetsk can be created, where casualties can be traded at retail scale. It is as if the Ukrainians are in the position to adopt the attrition strategy of Lincoln and Grant in the US Civil War, or, ironically, of Stalin and Zhukov in World War II.
Jay
YY_Sima Qian
@Nettoyeur: In general terms, yes. However, during WW II the Red Army suffered major disasters at Kiev, Minsk, Smolensk & 2nd & 3 rd Battles of Kharkov. The Ukrainian Army needs to avoid these kinds of reverses.
BTW, I am not suggesting that the Ukrainian Army is headed toward disaster at Sieverodonesk, far from it, but I think we should not get too caught up in the daily tactical shifts in momentum (1 way or the other, it’s a slow grind either way) & dismiss such risks out of hand.
YY_Sima Qian
@Carlo Graziani:
@James E Powell:
If Putin declared a national mobilization, the equation might have changed.l, but it seems he has calculated that he does not have the domestic political space to take such a step, which is fortunate for the Ukrainians.
YY_Sima Qian
@Omnes Omnibus: As assault guns, they are perfectly adequate. Not every army has the wasteful budget of the US military. We have to see how the Russians are actually using such equipment.
YY_Sima Qian
@kalakal: Yes, I agree w/ your assessment. However, I am a little concerned by the reports that TDFs are being deployed on the frontlines. Hopefully not at the shoulders of the salient. I would actually deploy the TDFs to the urban fight in Sieverodonesk, out of admittedly cynical & coldblooded calculations.
Omnes Omnibus
@YY_Sima Qian: If you say so…. I still think that it does not indicate anything positive on the Russian equipment front.
Jay
https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/low-fast-and-dangerous-a-firsthand-account-of-ukraines-secret-helicopter-rescue-missions
YY_Sima Qian
@Omnes Omnibus: Oh, it says nothing positive about the Russian military, but we should be careful inferring how negative.
Jay
@YY_Sima Qian:
TDF’s are equivalent to Canada’s Militia Forces. Regional Part Time Soldiers and Reservists.
some arn’t actually “deployed”, deployed means you are sent somewhere else, opposed to RU forces are attacking your neighbourhood.
They are the 4th rate forces for weapons, support and training, and are some of the “best” UA forces, because it’s their homes, families and communities they are defending.
.
YY_Sima Qian
@Jay: I am not so concerned w/ locally TDFs, but Adam has posted an article (from NYT or WP) about TDFs raised in western Ukraine & deployed to the frontlines in Donetsk w/ at least perceived inadequate support. Those kinds of reports I find disturbing, & I certainly hope such units are not manning positions on the shoulders of the Sieverodonetsk salient.
I would deploy locally raised TDFs to the urban fight for precisely the qualities you stated.
Jay
@YY_Sima Qian:
in the Canadian system, our equivalent of TDF’s aren’t deployed.
volunteers, , from the Militia, join Regular Army forces for a short term, ( 6 months), spend 2 months training up, then deploy.
In Ukraine, they are much closer to the Idea of “a well regulated militia”,
Ruckus
@Another Scott:
With reports that vlad is ill and terminal (OK those could be total BS – but still possible) this may be a last stand for him to go out a winner – at all costs. The sanctions have already cost him a lot and will continue to cost him and the entire country. There are a few guys who have become ultra wealthy, in a country where very few are doing well at all and if they see it all falling apart because of vlad, they may not take it very well. There have been rumors of vlad being removed, which would have to be forceful I’m sure but at some point it will be obvious to most that he’s fucked up everything, the gig the inner circle have going, the life that’s somewhat better than prior russian leaders provided and the male population of the country, which seems to be shrinking daily. IOW vlad stepped on himself, with golf spikes on and it hasn’t gotten better.
Let’s say he wins the military battle. Do the sanctions go away? If not he’s still screwed. Let’s say he loses – an actual possibility – he’s then a loser of epic proportions.
My point in all of this is vlad has fucked himself pretty badly here, and at a massively huge cost in life and property. He’s thrown away a rather large country and a not insignificant portion of his citizens for his ego and right now has jack and shit to show for it. And pretty much destroyed another country. And I don’t see it getting any better for him.
Ruckus
@YY_Sima Qian:
Those old weapons may be useable but if they are just stored haphazardly that is highly unlikely. They likely use different ammo and while the supplies may be there the weapons are very likely less efficient and therefore far less effective. They also require operators who are familiar with them and if they haven’t been used in the lifetime of the people operating them, that’s an issue. I was in the military 50+ yrs ago and we did the same thing. On the other side of the pier we tied up to was a WWII destroyer that had seen far better days, with equipment that was way out dated, without enough people available with knowledge to repair it and it needed a lot more repairs than the 8 yr old ship I was on. At the end of the day it’s a losing proposition.
YY_Sima Qian
All good points. The Soviets always had a program of keeping retired equipment in mothball, just in case they need to be re-activated for the Great Patriotic War redux. I assume Russia inherited such a program, but how effective it is is anyone’s guess. It would mean a low percentage of the equipment nominally in storage might be serviceable in reality, but I would not assume any that are actually sent to the front is completely useless.
Winston
So if you’re making preparations for a nuclear war, where would you want to be? In the USA.
NotMax
‘@Winston
In order of preference,
1) a distillery
2) a winery
3) a brewery
4) American Samoa.
;·)
NotMax
FYI.
Moscow’s chief rabbi in exile after refusing to back Ukraine invasion, relative says
Winston
@NotMax: So, Louisville, Napa, Brookings and then AmSamoa. Got it.
debbie
@Quiltingfool:
So long as Patron gets the space of honor!
Carlo Graziani
@YY_Sima Qian:
The claim that Russia has a national mobilization option ha been an unexamined assumption in much media and blog discussion, including in Russia. In my opinion there is no realistic basis for assuming that this option exists as a practical means of expanding the army’s manpower pool in a useful timeframe.
In the historical experience of nations that have launched national mobilizations in wartime emergencies, the nations in question have anticipated the contingency years in advance, and planned for it accordingly, including preparing the institutional and logistical and training framework for the mobilized conscripts and volunteers. Prominent examples are the European powers during the two world wars.
Absent such preparation, it is absurd to imagine that a “mass mobilization” could accomplish anything constructive. For example, the United States still has a “Selective Service System” that registers all male citizens as they turn 18 in the eventuality of a draft, but which is universally recognized to be a purely political exercise, having the vestigial value to US military combat readiness that an appendix has to a human body. If a draft were in fact proclaimed in the US, there would be no weapons, uniforms, training centers, transportation, unit assignments, etc. etc. The political backlash would be a secondary consideration to the sheer uselessness of the exercise.
Thus “Russian mass mobilization.” It would amount to millions of draft-age men standing outside their homes in civilian clothes, looking at their newly-arrived draft cards with puzzled expressions, having nowhere to go and nothing to do.
I believe that this is the real reason that it hasn’t happened. The Russians are so starved for manpower that if they could get it by stoking up a war hysteria and following it up with universal conscription, they would have done so already. If they want that, they need to find an oil lamp and rub it.
RaflW
Apparently Russia has accepted that sanctions are going to bite and stay in place over a long term. I don’t really know how these airframers are going to get the parts to actually build these orders (I’m assuming, but suspect that the designs up to now have relied at least somewhat on western parts in the assemblies).
I note that Sukhoi has been working on a “Russified” Superjet 100 since 2018 (previous version was over half western components). I suppose if this below can come to fruition it would provide a boost to the sagging internal economy of Russia. But good luck ramping up – Boeing can’t seem to find its ass with both hands these days, and Aeroflot is banking on three different domestic plane builders? Huh.
Russia’s Aeroflot plans $3 billion cash injection, said to eye big jet order
LONDON, June 7 (Reuters) – Under heavy pressure from Western sanctions and airspace bans, Russian state flagship airline Aeroflot plans to raise up to 185.2 billion roubles ($3 billion) in an emergency share issue, it said on Tuesday.
Aeroflot, controlled by the Russian state, said shareholders at its annual meeting had approved the issuance of 5.42 billion new shares that could be bought at a price of 34.29 roubles each under an open subscription.
The airline also plans to order 300 aircraft from United Aircraft Corporation, which is majority owned by Rostec, Russia’s state aerospace and defence conglomerate, the Vedemosti business newspaper reported.
The paper, citing two sources, said Aeroflot was eyeing the Irkut MS-21 medium-range plane, also known as the MC-21, which can carry more than 200 passengers and is due to enter service this year.
Aeroflot also wants the Sukhoi Superjet 100, Russia’s main domestic-made passenger jet, which typically seats just under 100 passengers. A smaller number of orders would be made for the Tupolev Tu-214, which seats around 200 people, it said.
With passenger numbers still down by a third compared with pre-coronavirus levels at the start of the year, the company has since been severely hit by Western sanctions.
The European Union, United States, Britain and Canada have shut their airspace to Russian planes, cutting Aeroflot off from lucrative flights to Western markets.
Bill Arnold
@Winston:
Traditionally (e.g. in 70s-era survivalist literature), Southwest Oregon to minimize chances of getting a lethal dose of fallout in the first several days both to you and game wildlife. Northern Maine also is also good probabilistically, though cold in the winter. There are some other locations, e.g. parts of Southwest Texas, that might work.
US Nuclear Target Map
This is the author’s distilled map; looks about right.
Regions with better chances to survive nuclear war
Starvation will be a concern after your stockpiles run out. Plan accordingly. (I’d go for climate good for farming and have some basic artisanal-scale agricultural equipment (e.g. big rototiller) and plenty of spare parts and seeds in cold storage, and community preparation.)
Best to do what you can to prevent thermonuclear war, though.