Just a quick housekeeping note to start. First, I’d like to thank everyone for their patience this week. Basically my work schedule for the foreseeable future has changed as I moved from the project I just finished to the next one. Last week was me beginning to adapt to it. I think, for a while, I’ll be doing the full updates you’re used to Fridays, Saturdays, and Sundays with slightly shorter ones Monday through Thursday. Occasionally, depending on my schedule, they may just be one really important item and your daily Patron. And they should be up no later than/around 10 PM eastern.
I’m not sick, I was just a bit tired and time compressed. So I appreciate the concern and well wishes, but all is good. Maybe send coffee!
And, as always, you are all most welcome for these update posts. I look forward to not having to do them anymore because Ukraine has defeated the Russian invaders. I’m sure you do too!
Also, I’m numbering tonight’s update 170 because for some reason the Ukrainian MOD is stating today is day 170 in their operational update even though yesterday should have been day 170. Their country, their defense of their country, they get to decide what day it is!
Let’s begin with President Zelenskyy’s address from earlier this evening. Video below with the English transcript after the jump (emphasis mine).
Dear Ukrainians!
And today I would like to address the residents of Nikopol, Marhanets, Enerhodar, Kryvy Rih, Zaporizhzhia and all our other cities and communities of Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia regions.
The occupiers are trying to intimidate people in an extremely cynical way, using the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant. They actually hide behind the plant to fire at Nikopol and Marhanets. They arrange constant provocations with shelling of the territory of the nuclear power plant and try to bring their additional forces in this direction to blackmail our state and the entire free world even more.
If someone over there in Russia thinks that it can give them something, then they are wrong. Russian blackmail only mobilizes even more global efforts to confront terror. Every day of the stay of the Russian contingent on the territory of the Zaporizhzhia NPP and in the neighboring regions of our country increases the radiation threat to Europe so much that even at the peak moments of the confrontation during the Cold War, this did not happen.
Of course, there should be a robust response to this. Ukrainian diplomats and representatives of partner states will do everything to ensure that the new sanctions against Russia necessarily block the Russian nuclear industry.
And absolutely all officials of the terrorist state, as well as those who help them in this blackmail operation with the nuclear power plant, must be tried by an international court. It will definitely be. And every Russian soldier who either shoots at the plant, or shoots under the cover of the plant, must understand that he is becoming a special target for our intelligence, for our secret service, for our army.
I am especially grateful to everyone who defends this direction, who withstands the pressure of Russian terrorists and protects Ukraine and the world from the nuclear threat created by the occupiers. I am grateful to all our energy workers who support the stable operation of the energy system of Ukraine and the Zaporizhzhia plant itself.
And we are doing everything possible to restore peace and security to this part of our state, and to all other cities and other regions of our beautiful Ukraine.
Fierce fighting continues in Donbas. The hottest points of the front in this direction remain unchanged – Avdiyivka, Maryinka, Pisky, Bakhmut and the entire relevant area. Russia sent there a simply colossal amount of its military resources – artillery, equipment, people. All our defenders there are simply heroes.
Ukrainian defense is strong in Kharkiv region, and the invaders’ attempts to attack all the time fail.
The struggle in the south of the country gives good news about the destruction of the forces and means of the Russian army. We do not lose a single day – we reduce the potential of the occupiers.
It is very important that the export grain initiative gives results. Since the start of its implementation, a total of 16 vessels with grain for seven countries on three continents have left Ukrainian ports. These are Europe, Asia, Africa. Almost half a million tonnes of agricultural products were on board: corn, wheat, sunflower oil, soybeans and other goods absolutely necessary for the global market.
This has already made it possible to reduce the severity of the food crisis, and has given some hope of peace to the countries that consume our agricultural products. And in the long run, it can help to completely remove the food crisis from the global agenda. Of course, if the partners ensure the implementation of the security part of the initiative and prevent Russian provocations and terror at sea or against our ports.
The first vessel to be loaded within the framework of the UN World Food Program has already arrived. It is the supply of grain, in particular for Ethiopia, where the situation with hunger is particularly severe. Now the vessel is being prepared for departure from the Pivdenny port.
For Ukraine, this has significant benefits. In less than two weeks, three of our ports – Odesa, Chornomorsk and Pivdenny – managed to export such a volume, which is equal to the entire agricultural export by road for July and more than two-thirds of the export by rail for the past month.
I want to emphasize once again: these are jobs for our people, these are the funds needed for our sowing season next year, and these are the revenues of our state budget.
Increasing economic activity is a necessary element of the path to victory.
I am grateful to everyone who defends our country!
Grateful to everyone in the partner countries who help fight against terror!
Glory to Ukraine!
Here is today’s, whichever day that actually is, operational update from Ukraine’s MOD:
The operational update regarding the russian invasion on 06.00, on August 13, 2022
Glory to Ukraine! The one hundred seventy first (170) day of the heroic resistance of the Ukrainian people to a russian military invasion continues.
The enemy is concentrating its efforts on establishing full control over the territories of the Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts, maintaining the temporarily captured areas of the Kherson oblast and parts of the Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhya, and Mykolaiv oblasts, creating favorable conditions for resuming the offensive in certain directions, as well as blocking Ukraine’s maritime communications in the Black Sea.
There are no major changes on the Volyn, Polissya, and Siversky directions. The enemy shelled the territory near Senkivka and Hremyach of the Chernihiv oblast and Basivka and Kindrativka of the Sumy oblast with barrel artillery.
In the Kharkiv direction, the enemy continued to attack targets in the areas of Kharkiv, Udy, Dementiivka, Ruski Tyshki, Cherkaski Tyshky, Velyki Prohody, Prudyanka, Protopopivka, Petrivka, Stary Saltiv, Verkhniy Saltiv, Mospanove and Korobochkyne settlements in the Kharkiv direction. It carried out airstrikes near Stary Saltiv and Mospanove.
In the Slovyansk direction, shelling was recorded near Dolyna, Brazhkivka, Nortsivka, Dibrivne, Mazanivka, and Bohorodychne. Enemy aircraft again operated near Zalyman.
In the Kramatorsk direction, the enemy shelled the districts of Kramatorsk, Verkhnyokamyansk and Hryhorivka with barrel and jet artillery.
With offensive and assault actions, the enemy units tried to advance in the directions of the Lysychansky Refinery – Ivano-Daryivka and Mykolaivka – Vyimka. Fighting continues in the direction of Spirne – Ivano-Daryivka.
In the Bakhmut direction, enemy artillery and tanks hit the Chasiv Yar, Berestove, Bakhmut, Bakhmutske, Pereizne, Soledar, Spirne, Rozdolivka, Yakovlivka, Vershyna and Zaytseve areas. Airstrikes were recorded near Yakovlivka, Vesela Dolyna, Zaitseve, Bakhmut and Soledar. The enemy carried out assaults in the directions of Pokrovske – Bakhmut, Vidrodzhenya– Vershyna, Vuglehirska TPP – Zaitseve, had no success, withdrew.
In the Avdiyivka direction, the occupiers fired from barrel and rocket artillery in the areas of Kurakhove, New York, Nevelske, Pervomaiske, Opytne, Maryinka, Vodyane, Krasnohorivka and Novobakhmutivka settlements. Assault aircraft hit near Maryinka.
The invaders waged offensive battles in the direction of Novoselivka Druha – Krasnohorivka and Spartak – Avdiivka, they were unsuccessful and were pushed back. Fighting continues on the Donetsk-Pisky and Novoselyvka-Olexandropil directions.
On the Novopavlivske and Zaporizhzhia directions, the enemy shelled positions from barrel, jet artillery and tanks in the areas of Volodymyrivka, Pavlivka, Prechistivka, Vuhledar, Bohoyavlenka, Novopilla, Zaliznychne, Hulyaipilske, Olhivske, Shevchenko, Burlatske, Novosilka, Drozhnyanka, and Novodanilivka settlements. It carried out an airstrike in the Novosilka region.
In the direction of Storozhove – Novosilka, our soldiers successfully stopped the enemy offensive and pushed the invaders back.
In the South Buh direction, the enemy fired tanks and artillery in the areas of Posad-Pokrovske, Stepova Dolyna and another 27 settlements.
The enemy tried to conduct an offensive battle in the direction of Sukhy Stavok – Lozove, but was unsuccessful and retreated.
Carried out airstrikes near Osokorivka and Andriivka.
It continued conducting aerial reconnaissance of the UAVs.
Two sea-based cruise missile carriers are ready for use in the waters of the Black and Azov Seas.
The threat of missile strikes on military facilities and critical infrastructure facilities on the territory of Ukraine remains. Do not ignore the signals of air alarms and trust only verified sources of information.
We believe in the Armed Forces of Ukraine! Together we will win!
Glory to Ukraine!
Here is today’s updated assessment from the British MOD:
They did not post an updated macro level map today.
Here is former NAVDEVGRU Squadron Leader Chuck Pfarrer’s updated map and analysis for the battle going on in Kherson:
THINGS TO COME: UKR Partisans continue to supply accurate targeting data for RU HQs and ammo dumps. This stresses both RU command and control and, more critically, logistics and supply. This combination degrades RU combat effectiveness. pic.twitter.com/MnhiVLYaMY
— Chuck Pfarrer (@ChuckPfarrer) August 13, 2022
Yesterday a Senior Defense Official did a press backgrounder. The transcript is below (emphasis mine):
STAFF: Hey, good afternoon, everybody. This is [omitted] at the Pentagon. Thanks for joining us.
We’re here today for a background briefing with our Senior Military Official. For your identification purposes, our — our Senior Military Official again today is [omitted], who is the [omitted]. We are — so this — all of the information from this call should be attributed to a Senior Military Official.
[Senior Military Official] will have some brief opening comments and then we’ll open up to your questions. We’ve got about 30 minutes, so we’ll get to it. [SMO], over to you.SENIOR MILITARY OFFICIAL: Thanks, [Staff]. Hi, everybody, good afternoon. So 170th day of Russia’s illegal and unprovoked large scale invasion of Ukraine. Let me just give you a quick rundown of what we’re seeing from north to south on the battlefield in particular.
So, you know, across the — across the area of operations, Russia is continuing to employ artillery and indirect fires indiscriminately. I’ll talk on that here in a minute. In the north, in Kharkiv, we’re actually seeing some Ukrainian gains. Again, these aren’t — these aren’t large gains but they’re — they’re certainly gaining, and in — in many cases, have the Russians on their — on their heels.
As you travel a little further south, Siversk, Bakhmut, the Russians continue to throw a bunch of things against the Ukrainians in an attempt to continue to gain ground in Bakhmut, and although they have made some gains, they’re very small and — and those gains have come at a pretty decent cost for the Russians. Very similar to what we saw in terms of those impacts on the Russians up in Severodonetsk and Lysychansk, I think, six weeks ago or so, in terms of the impact that those very small gains are having on the Russians.
I would point out, as I was kind of alluding to earlier, since the last time I talked to you, the UN — the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights estimates 600 civilians that have been killed over the course of that time period. And again, that’s largely due to the indiscriminate bombing or bombardment that — that the Russians conduct, and that — there’s — that number is probably higher, quite honestly.
In Zaporizhzhia, no particular updates on the nuclear power plant. It is under Russian control and I’d just point you to the IAEA’s comments in terms of, you know, there’s — there’s no immediate threat to nuclear safety, but that could change at any moment.
In vicinity of Kherson, we have seen Ukrainian offensive efforts. We assess that they’re continuing to — to press hard on the Russians in — in Kherson. We know recently, as an example, that they continue to inflict damage on — on bridging of the Russians. And — and, you know, again, I’d — I’d comment very similar to how they’re working in the north, have the Russians on the defensive.
And then in Crimea, other than, you know — and I — and I know you’ll likely want to talk about the — about what happened in Saky. I, quite honestly, like you, don’t have any answers for that, any — any particular answers. I — I can tell you that it was not an ATACMS, because we have not given them ATACMS. But — but as you do know, they — it was a pretty significant impact to — to Russian air and — and air personnel.
In the maritime environment, about a half dozen ships underway right now in the Black Sea, including some (inaudible)-capable ships, and — and, you know, we, like the rest of the world, have been pleased to see that the grain shipments are — continue to flow out of Odesa and then south to — to a good portion of the world that needs that grain.
So I will — I’ll hold there and I’m happy to answer any questions.
STAFF: Sir, thanks very much. And we’ll start with Lita Baldor from the Associated Press. Lita?
Q: Hi, thank you for doing this. I realize you probably don’t — aren’t able to take too much on the airbase, but is the U.S. able to assess or confirm that indeed this was a Ukrainian strike of some kind? And is there any way for you to tell if it came from the air or if it was some sort of ground attack?
And then secondly, you talked about Ukrainian gains around Kharkiv. Can you just give us a little bit more on that? What — you said they’re — they have Russians on their heels, they’re gaining. Are they — give us a little bit bigger picture on what exactly is happening there.
Thank you.
SENIOR MILITARY OFFICIAL: Yeah, sure, Lita. On the first one, you all are looking at the same picture as we are and — and we haven’t been able to make any determination as to was it some — something that was fired or something that was detonated on the ground.
What we can tell you is exactly what you all are — are reporting, as well, is that, again, there were a number of — of Russian aircraft, fighters, fighter bombers, I think a surveillance aircraft, that were destroyed, in addition to a pretty significant cache of munitions for — or ammunition dump, which my guess is led to, you know, the — the worst part of that, and then some structures.
I think the — the airfield was damaged, as well, certainly an impact to the Russians’ ability to prosecute any kind of air activity out of that portion of the airfield, but again, those were all the things that — you know, I’m seeing the same things you are in that regard and, you know, I — so I don’t have anything more on that.
And then on your second one, I’d just — I’d give you an anecdote — and I — so I got this — this is open source that I got, as well, and I was — I was reading about the Ukrainian gains up to the east of Izyum, in a town — and I’ll — I’m going to — I’ll butcher this — but a town of Velyka — and I think that’s spelled V-E-L-Y-K-A — Komyshuvakha — and that’s K-O-M-Y-S-H-U-V-A-K-H-A. So if — if — if you’re of Ukrainian descent, I’m sorry if I just butchered that.
Anyways, what — the open source I saw was that the Ukrainians had attacked Russian positions at that location — it was an outpost located at the intersection of two — two main roads — and that the Ukrainians had isolated and surrounded the Russian position and that the Russians were unable to get any kind of artillery support.
I think what you’re finding is you — you’ve got Ukrainians who — they are — they are, you know, across the — the area of operations, working to take it to the Russians. And as we’ve talked about in the past, you know, you — the things that are going against the Russians, which is, as, you know, we all know, a pretty large force, the things going against the Russians are the continued impacts on their morale, their ability to sustain themselves, all of which have been impacted by the Ukrainians’ ability to — to get after command and control, ammunition locations, sustainment or logistics locations, all — all really significant and I think that’s having a large effect on the Russians on the front lines.
And I’ll stop there.
STAFF: Thank you, sir. Next, we’ll go to Idrees Ali of Reuters. Idrees?
Q: Thank you. Two quick questions. Just to make sure that I understand correctly, it’s not that you can’t tell us who carried out the attack on the airbase, you just don’t know?
And secondly, just on the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, can you say definitively — or — or maybe differently — can you say that you — you are not aware of any Ukrainian strikes in or near the nuclear power plant in recent days?
SENIOR MILITARY OFFICIAL: So on the first one, I don’t know. I just flat out don’t know. But if — if you all find out and report it, I’ll be happy to hear it.
The — on the Ukrainian piece down in — in — at the nuclear power plant, I think there are — I mean, there were certainly reports of — of indirect fire around to the –sort of landed in the vicinity, the — the power plant. We — we know that the Russians have been there for some time. We also know that the Russians have fired artillery, I think specifically, rockets from around the power plant.
I don’t have any belief that the Ukrainians, who know very well what the impacts of hitting that power plant would be, have an interest in hitting the power plant. It just doesn’t make any sense. They — you know, they, as — as you know, if you go back, you know, I — I — back to the only major nuclear power plant issue in that part of the world, they’re the ones that paid a huge price for that before. They certainly know the impacts of a nuclear disaster. So I’ve got to believe that the Ukrainians have no interest in doing anything that would cause any kind of disaster around the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant.
STAFF: Thanks. Next, we’ll go to AFP. Sylvie, over to you.
Q: Hello, thank you. The — so I would like to go back to the — the — the Russian base in Crimea. You said that it was not an ATACMS missile. Would it be a problem if this base in Crimea had been struck by an American weapon? Would it be a problem for U.S.?
SENIOR MILITARY OFFICIAL: Well, we haven’t — we haven’t provided anything that allows — or that would — would enable them to strike into Crimea. You know, as I mentioned, I — I say ATACMS very particularly because there’ve been a lot of questions about ATACMS, and — and again, I’d just tell you, we’ve — you know, we haven’t given them to them so…
I — I think, you know, what we want the Ukrainians to do is fight the — the — the fight against the Russians the way that they would fight it. And you know, we don’t have — we’re not telling them how to — how to do business. They’re making it a choice as to how they want to fight. We — we have told them in the past that we have given them munitions that allow them to fight Russians in Ukraine, and — and you know, other than that, this is a Ukrainian war, so they’re the ones that select the targets.
STAFF: OK, thanks, next we’ll go to Jeff Seldin of VOA. Jeff?
Q: Thanks very much for — for doing this. It seems, like, from a — the last couple of briefings that we’ve done that, you know, the situation in some ways is kind of steady. Would it be fair to characterize the war as a stalemate? And if so, what more does Ukraine need from the U.S. and other allies to start tipping this more in its favor? Also curious if you have any updated assessments of Russia’s use of cyber operations to support its efforts in Ukraine, or any new information on Russia’s use of filtration camps. Thank you.
SENIOR MILITARY OFFICIAL: On the last, I — I’d tell you, no. I — I don’t have any information on the filtration camps or the — or Russian use of cyber. And — and I — you know, I — I mean, I hate to say I’ll direct you to the Ukrainians, but I think the Ukrainians would probably be able to answer that better.
In terms of what they need, I — I think, you know, the Ukrainians – and, you know, they — I — I saw that it was reporting today on the — on the session that was — that’s ongoing in Europe right now in Copenhagen. As is the case when — in our work with the Ukrainians and our allies work with the Ukrainians, they’re — they’re telling us what they need based on how they want to prosecute the war. And — and we’re hopeful that we can meet those needs to help them in that regard. So other than what we have been — we’ve been asked for up to now, I — I don’t know of — of other things that they currently need.
Much more Q&A at the link! Also, I’ll just note that the Senior Defense Official indicated that yesterday was the 170th day of the war…
This thread has great open source satellite imagery analysis of the strikes on the Russian air base in Crimea:
Comparison of August 9th and August 10th imagery show very large craters, many destroyed aircraft, and destroyed buildings. It looks like a direct hit on the building on the left, so whatever it was seems accurate. pic.twitter.com/QyLn86PUjw
— Eliot Higgins (@EliotHiggins) August 10, 2022
One way to interpret those craters is precise strikes from a long range munition, which suggests it's a pretty good time for Russian holiday-makers in Crimea to make use of the Kerch Strait Bridge while they still can.
— Eliot Higgins (@EliotHiggins) August 10, 2022
Just measured the craters best I could, they seem about 20-25m wide, which would mean a pretty big munition.
— Eliot Higgins (@EliotHiggins) August 10, 2022
I’m not an impact analysis subject matter expert, hopefully one of our veterans who have some experience with this sort of thing will provide further explanations in the comments.
Here’s a bit more of this imagery from Politico‘s Christopher Miller:
New sat images conitnued, via 📸: @Maxar. Pic 1, infrared view of damaged Russian aircraft; 2, close-up of aircraft before (May 16); 3, natural color close-up of destroyed aircraft yday; 4, infrared close-up of damaged aircraft. pic.twitter.com/AfIppTQKgS
— Christopher Miller (@ChristopherJM) August 11, 2022
As part of the fallout from the attack, Putin has fired and replaced the admiral in charge:
[2] The Osipov's replacement is a Vice Admiral Viktor Sokolov, 59. Former chief of Rus. Naval Academy in St. Pete. Remember how everyone laughed at the heavy smoking Russian air carrier / cruiser Admiral Kuznetsov in the Mideterranean? He led that group of ships to Syria. pic.twitter.com/eXM2ddwxqT
— Viktor Kovalenko (@MrKovalenko) August 13, 2022
Ukraine’s attack on the Russian air base in Crimea was as much a psychological operation as an actual artillery or sabotage by Ukrainian forces and/or partisans within Russian occupied Crimea. And it has had the intended effect. The Russians are much, much, much jumpier than they were a week ago. If they know what was used to blow up the base, they’re not saying. And the Ukrainians, as we’ve discussed, are being strategically ambiguous. Lieutenant Commander Ivanova sums up the current mental status of the Russians in the Ukrainian territory they’re occupying:
Radio Free Europe/Radio Free Liberty is reporting that the Ukrainians were able to destroy an advancing column of Russian infantry. Who were actually some of Prigozhin’s private military contractors commonly called the Wagner Group:
In other news from Crimea, Igor Gurkin, aka Igor Strelkin, who kicked off the Russian invasion and occupation of Ukraine in 2014, has been arrested in Crimea:
He was reportedly arrested in Crimea — let’s see if we have any reliable details behind these claims among Russian collaborationists in Ukraine.
— Illia Ponomarenko 🇺🇦 (@IAPonomarenko) August 13, 2022
Girkin was arrested today in the occupied Crimea after criticism on Putin who, in his opinion, wasn’t tough enough on Ukraine.
— olexander scherba🇺🇦 (@olex_scherba) August 13, 2022
And a bit of feel good as we finish for tonight:
Proud to share that with our partners, 2 more Fury's, 5 Ares, 1 Bug and 8 Proteus training drones have been delivered! We're working towards sending more, visit https://t.co/hFg9PUMlGa to help make this possible. Together l we can help out friends at the front! #SlavaUkraini pic.twitter.com/ggUIMgys8s
— Mriya Aid (@MriyaAid) August 13, 2022
Your daily Patron!
Wanna see me preparing for a space expedition? Join my Patreon 😋https://t.co/U5SKtrKTfK pic.twitter.com/KYhOJV7XiP
— Patron (@PatronDsns) August 7, 2022
And a new video from Patron’s official TikTok:
@patron__dsns Посилання на мій офіційний мерч у шапці профілю🙈 #патрондснс #песпатрон #славаукраїні
The caption translates as:
Link to my official merch in the profile header🙈 #patrondsns #песпатрон #славаукраїни
Gotta move that Patron merch! Always be selling! Here’s the link to Patron’s official shop!
Finally, finally: Leto sent me this image puzzle video for tonight’s post:
Open thread!
Spanky
It’s Day 171. The Uk MOD muddies the issue with a typo:
Alison Rose 💙🌻💛
[insert “this is fine” dog gif]
Why do I feel like “dismissed” is a massive euphemism when it comes to a russian commander? I mean…I just assume putin enjoys killing so much, he’ll have it done at any given opportunity.
I’m glad that what had been wearing you down a bit is something good, and best of luck in the new phase. I look forward to your Ukraine updates no matter the length, so thank you as always, Adam.
Mallard Filmore
What? No artillery support? How odd. Is that where the Wagner guys left their dead behind?
Chetan Murthy
This might be a Q for G&T, though others here with Ukrainian ancestry and cultural roots might be able to answer. I want to be respectful here, and so will try to ask very gingerly, b/c this is a very important and sensitive subject. So ….
In pictures of the graves and burials of Ukrainian heroes and victims of RU forces, I’ve noticed that the graves are ….. decorated (?) in a manner that is different from what I’m used to from the US (and maybe other parts of Western Europe?) The only way I can describe it is that the decorations appear to resemble butterflies at rest, wings drooping. And I wondered whether there were descriptions of these decorations and the accompanying cultural traditions ?
OK, that’s my question. I hope I asked it in an appropriate way. I don’t mean to be in any way disrespectful. I only wish to …. learn a little.
Ryan
Hooray a B5 reference!
SiubhanDuinne
I love the five pigs puzzle! Wonderful!
Emma from Miami
@Chetan Murthy: in many Christian folk beliefs, butterflies are symbols of the soul’s rebirth. Also butterflies as ferrying the soul to heaven. This might not apply here but it’s the closest I can think of.
Geminid
So Russia is letting grain shipments through the Black Sea. I doubt if they really want this, and they wouldn’t do it just on the UN’s say so.
I suspect Turkish President Erdogan’s influence here. He has enabled Russia to evade sanctions through his country’s collaboration. But Erdogan is stuborn as a mule and I think Russia is afraid to cross him on the grain shipments. We’ll see in the coming weeks.
Grumpy Old Railroader
Me too! But after a brief Google search for “Ukrainian Tombstone butterfly” I stumbled on a document that had this about death in Ukrainian Folk Lore about the afterlife:
Also what @Emma from Miami: said
Kent
So what is the legal status of Wagner mercs captured in Ukraine? Are they legit combatants?
Urza
Props for a Babylon 5 reference. The Earth Alliance descent into fascism was a warning to everyone prior to the Bush years, and still relevant, sadly probably always will be. And the future episode reminding that even after we win the peace, the descendants will forget and try to do it all over again.
JMG
@Geminid: Erdogan is a bad guy, but he is astute at playing both sides to his own advantage. The animosity between Russia and Turkey goes back to the halcyon days of the Ottoman Empire (many wars), so he can’t get too far over his skis siding with a fellow authoritarian.
Omnes Omnibus
Damn. Crater analysis. That’s FM 6-50 stuff, but we only spent a day or so on it. There are guys who do it for a living though.
ETA: Here is a link to the Appendix J of FM 6-50.
planetjanet
Adam, I am glad you are taking time for yourself and seeking balance. We all need to. Your postings are a must for me and I am still grateful for your efforts.
Jinchi
I don’t really understand the posts on Girkin. He fought on the Russian side in 2014 and is now voluntarily fighting for them again… but he was arrested by Russia? Was he a fugitive from his own government?
They”re reportedly offering deals to Russian criminals to join the fight. Would they really refuse the help of an experienced radical because he complained about the obvious poor performance?
It seems they’d be happy to push him to the front.
Geminid
@JMG: I think it is in Turkiye’s economic and national security interests to have Ukraine as a viable and independent state. Erdogan also views his country as a major regional power and wants to demonstrate this.
Erdogan has been patching up frayed relations with neighbors like Israel and the Arab Gulf States in the past year. An interesting development, perhaps spurred by economic and political trouble at home.
Ken
@Omnes Omnibus: I have a copy of The Effects of Nuclear Weapons with the “Nuclear Bomb Effects Computer” (circular slide-rule gizmo) in the back. Based on the absence of a crater-size setting that small, I’ll go out on a limb and say these were not nuclear detonations.
Omnes Omnibus
@Kent:
The general rule is that mercenaries are not legal combatants. That being said, there are cases were the organization is closely associated enough with a government that its people are functionally under government control. Then it can get murky. I would always suggest treating people as combatants subject to Geneva Convention protections. Mine is probably a minority view.
Omnes Omnibus
@Ken: And they are bigger that most of what artillery crater analysis looks at. So probably not conventional tube or rocket artillery.
I am not sure we narrowed anything down.
Geminid
@Omnes Omnibus: The craters are large and very similar in shape. That’s why some observers think they might be from a salvo of the Grim, or Hrim, ballistc missiles that Ukraine was developing before the war. Wikipedia tells me that the Grim is designed to deliver a 500 kg. warhead, and its date of service is “TBA.”
The Kiev Post had an article this week speculating about this, but very tentatively. If these missiles were in fact used in the airfield strike, the U.S., Russia, and Ukraine know it and are not saying so.
Adam L Silverman
@Jinchi: He’s been openly critical of Putin and how Russia has fought the war. Both of which are illegal under Russian law.
Bill Arnold
@Geminid:
The wikipedia page pre-Russian invasion looks about the same as the current page. (I only sampled the page history; didn’t look hard at it for propaganda activities.)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hrim-2
The purported max range (500km) would reach Moscow (with a 500KG warhead) from the NE Ukraine border if not intercepted. (Threats and counter-threats, plus strategic ambiguity.)
Bill Arnold
@Geminid:
Does anyone here know of a public source for recent historical weather data in Crimea? (Particularly temperature/humidity time series.)
Andrya
@Adam L Silverman: As always, Adam, heartfelt thanks.
I do have this observation/question: earlier in the war, putin tolerated russians saying “we should be more aggressive!”- even on TV. If putin is now arresting people for precisely that, that says to me that he’s running scared- that he’s at least worried about how many are backing him within russia. If Adam or anyone cares to comment, I’d be most interested/grateful.
counterfactual
I’m gonna put out a hypothesis to be laughed at: the Saki airbase explosion was a happy accident. Most of the videos I’ve seen show a rapidly dissipating small cloud, then two near-simultaneous fireballs, as if there was an initial bang so everyone had just enough time to bring up their phones to catch the big bangs. So, hypothesis is that the initial explosion (special forces or mysterious missile) ruptured a pair of fuel tanks spreading jet fuel meters away, which evaporated in the Crimean sun until it hit an ignitions source, which caused two accidental thermobaric explosions.
counterfactual
@Andrya: I’ve seen a Twitter thread somewhere arguing that Girkin was a mouthpiece for the FSB line on the war. He may have been arrested by Army officials as part of a power struggle.
Adam L Silverman
@Andrya: It’s not that he said be more aggressive, it’s that he personally blamed Putin for the Russian army’s failures.
eddie blake
maaaan, ivanova! ivanova is god.
damn, i love b5.
Another Scott
@Bill Arnold: Here’s some graphic data, maybe a table is buried in there somewhere.
HTH.
Cheers,
Scott.
Bill Arnold
@Another Scott:
Thanks. So low humidity (25%) the afternoon of the attack. (reported to be 9 Aug 2022 3:20 p.m. local time) [1]
I do not have the background to interpret this, but e.g.
Effect of Humidity on Transonic Flow. (2008)
“The condensation shock wave was only observed when the relative humidity was greater than 0.40”, “For humidity levels ranging from 0.30 to 0.25 (Figs. 5c and 5d), the condensation shock wave was not observed.”
(This is re Carlo’s comment about supersonic warheads.)
[1] “Tuesday, 9 August 2022, 12:00 — 18:00, 33 / 31 °C, Passing clouds, Humidity:25%, Barometer:1012 mbar, ENE, Wind:21 km/h”
Chetan Murthy
@Bill Arnold: Ooh, it’s nice having technically-trained people from many different specialties on this comment section! Thank you! So maybe it *was* big-ass missiles!
Carlo Graziani
I’m going to walk back the “can’t be a rocket warhead” thing that I’ve been banging on about. It’s true that no trails are visible above those fireballs in the footage, and I certainly would have expected some. But I’ve been reviewing footage on YouTube of various rocket artillery strikes, both live-fire exercises and in combat with Ukrainian units, and damned if I can see the incoming before the kaboom, or even any sign of the path that it took after the fact. The trails made by those warheads probably show up in IR, but they are invisible to the naked eye.
So, maybe rockets/missiles. I still don’t like it though, and I doubt that they were fired from 300 km away. There are residential city streets less than a km away from those craters are.
Marc
“Transonic Flow” generally refers to between Mach 0.8 and 1.2. This would not apply to short range ballistic missile warheads, as terminal velocity will be more in the Mach 2 to 4 range. I doubt a warhead would show a visible trail, assuming it had properly separated from the first stage. A 3 or so foot long warhead may well be too small to resolve from the distances those videos appear to have been taken from. ICBMs are a different story, as terminal velocity is Mach 20 or above and the warheads have ablative heatshields which burn off forming a visible plasma trail.
It still looks to me like something delivered a bunch of sub-munitions (perhaps the modern guided kind that can seek aircraft/vehicle outlines), followed shortly after by HE warheads to the primary targets.
Gary K
That’s an update of a venerable puzzle. My father-in-law had a yellowing 5 pigs puzzle which when folded up revealed Adolf Hitler. We must still have it lying around somewhere.
Carlo Graziani
Another thing about that video: the attack was actually spaced out over several minutes in time, I think, or at least two.
The time between the appearance of the fireballs and the arrival of their booms is about 10s. So the videographer’s window is about 3.5 km away. The smoke plume that is already in evidence at t=0 is already quite large, rising and spreading downwind from left to right, and denser near a point left of the center of the frame, probably a fire. I would guess it’s angular extent is about 6-8 degrees (?), so it’s maybe 500 m wide when the action starts. Call it a 15 mph wind (24 km/hr) more or less as per Scott’s data, that comes out to about a minute prior to t=0.
At t=2 we have two more fireballs near the source of that smoke (at the left of the frame). Then at 20s there’s a cut in the video, we don’t know for how long, but it must be a while, because the two big mushroom clouds that are prominent just before the cut are totally dissipated after it. A minimum of another minute, if the largest cloud on the right is the last remnant of a mushroom, otherwise longer. Call it X. Then, at t=20+X+8 there’s another fireball, this time near the middle of the frame.
So, a big explosion at maybe t=-60s, two more at t=+2s, and another at t>88s. I don’t know what to make of that pacing. It makes all theories seem dumb to me.
YY_Sima Qian
@Marc: I tend to agree w/ your take. An MRBM or IRBM warhead re-entering at Mach 8 – 12 should have left a visible trail, but a SRBM warhead re-entering at Mach 2 – 4 might not have. While the US may not have provided Ukraine w/ any ATACMS, perhaps another NATO country did w/ US acquiescence. Or the US helped Ukraine to finish the development of the Hrim-2 by providing the guidance package. After all, the US developed the Phoenix Ghost drone specifically for Ukraine, so there is precedence for such programs.
The fact that the individual craters are similar in diameter/depth suggests standardized munitions, rather than ammo storage blown up. The structures struck by the unitary warheads appear to be maintenance sheds, not ammo storage. Above ground munitions storage would not be sited near the revetments sheltering aircraft, would be closer to the parking apron where munitions are typically loaded before missions, & should be surrounded by sloped embankment to deflect blast if it is set off, whatever the cause. I too strongly suspect use of sub-munitions, in addition to unitary warheads. The sloped revetments should have protected at least some of the destroyed aircraft from the blast waves of the unitary warheads.
It seems the Ukrainian Armed Forces & the US DOD are being purposefully coy here. Maybe we will see something leaked to the press in the weeks or months ahead.
YY_Sima Qian
Glad to see so many B5 fans here! Easily the best SciFi on TV in the 90s & 00s, & I say this as a staunch Star Trek fan (well, pre-JJ Abrams ST). Too bad the 4th season was far too rushed due to uncertainty about a 5th season. Then a 5th season was approved, & the result felt like a series of below par fillers.
Marc
Your t>88s could be a secondary explosion. IIRC, the two biggest craters seem to be dead center in their respective targets. Some sort of precision guided weapon, say 500kg or larger warhead. That’s not something that can be transported or launched from the back of a car or small truck. More likely air or surface launched missile from somewhere in Ukrainian held territory/airspace. Damage to aircraft (which I conjecture is related to the early smoke plumes) is selective, some planes burned while those in adjacent revetments appear to be untouched. Possibly sub-munitions, more likely delivered by cruise missile (or aircraft) than ballistic missile.
I’m skeptical about the Hrim-2, it still sounds quite early in development. It takes a lot more rocket science (and money) to get a newly designed precision guided ballistic missile right than does adapting/reproducing an existing cruise missile, given they already know how to manufacture the engines.
Or, maybe Iran offered them a good deal.
lowtechcyclist
By the time I read Adam’s posts, the UK Defense Ministry’s intelligence update for the following day is usually up. So here’s a link to the August 14 update.
Argiope
@Carlo Graziani: I was told there would be no math.
Seriously though, I love seeing all of you knowledgeable commenters putting your heads together re the mysterious kabooms.
Geminid
@Marc: The Hrim-2 has been in development for a while now. One was test fired in 2018, and a large mobile platform designed for it was shown in a military parade three years ago. There has been little divulged about ls development since then, but the projected date for readiness was 2022.
An August 12 Kiev Post article written by Stefan Warshack is titled “Evidence mounting that weapon used in Crimea airfield strikes is Ukraine-made missile system.” It’s conclusions are ambiguous. The author does note that the Hrim program is considered a “state secret,” and that the Yuzhmash company facility where the missile is being developed is a Cold War-era hardened, underground factory.
So use of the Hrim-2 is a possibility, and would account for the deep, closely matched craters.
Carlo Graziani
@Marc: Possible. It s difficult to judge the displacement between that fireball and the previous two, because the focus of the video keeps changing, so the subtended angle in the scenes is not the same. They could be close.
I’m trying to pin down the source of my intense dislike for the missile hypothesis. It comes down to a hinky feeling that there’s a lot that’s not right here.
For one thing, the Biden administration is denying all knowledge of what happened. In my opinion, that is totally inconsistent with what would be happening by now had US satellites, aircraft, and ground- and sea-based IR and radar assets picked up the missile, which they certainly would have. Mr Military Official would certainly not stand up at a DOD press backgrounder and say things like “…we haven’t been able to make any determination as to was it some — something that was fired or something that was detonated on the ground.” By now the Washington Post would have surely secured a leak that it was missiles launched from Ukrainian territory.
Another thing is that missile development requires testing. Where are the tests? These things allegedly flew over 200 km and struck targets with a circular error probable (CEP) of a few meters, no more than ten, less than a kilometer away from a residential area. Would you pull a suspended missile program out of mothballs, re-fund it, find the machine parts, propellants, guidance electronics, warhead etc, slap the whole thing together in 6 months under wartime pressure and heave a few (2? 3?) at that kind of target, without a single test? Untested rockets have a tendency to fly unstably, when they don’t blow up on the launch pad, and acquiring the technical expertise to surmount such problems takes time and money and hard-to-find personnel. In this particular case, if you almist succeed you might destroy a Crimean suburb by mistake, and then your propaganda victory turns to ashes, as you have just been shown to be morally no better than the Russians.
[By the way, is that CEP plausible for the guidance of the alleged Ukrainian missile? I don’t actually know.]
Then there’s target selection and purpose of the operation. The value of this operation was, as Adam keeps pointing out, psychological. The military value was not negligible, but not that great either — a few easily replaceable aircraft, a few craters — none on any runway — and some lost buildings in an airbase that is clearly still operational. If the tempo of Russian air operations over Ukraine was slowed by this operation, it is very likely healed by now. So how is that military benefit suitably proportioned to the development cost of this weapon? It would be a different matter if Ukraine had somehow pulled off the magic trick of standing up an industrial production line of the damn things, capable of delivering a few per week. Then they could close that base permanently. I don’t think that’s the case, though. They had 2-3, and decided that the best use of them was a psy-ops terror show for Crimea. I don’t know about you, but I can’t see a senior general with that kind of weapon at his disposal, usable by surprise, but only once, deciding that this operation yields the optimal military benefit. A C3 strike at the most senior Russian headquarters within reach coincident with a counteroffensive opener would be a much better bet.
I take it we’ve now dismissed cruise missiles? I’m pretty sure that’s right, you’d think there would be hundreds of Russian eyewitnesses reporting that they saw at least one of them heading in to the base by now…
Looking at this thing from the other end, it clearly is, first and foremost, a psy-op. Adam is spot-on about this. Premeditated, and masterfully orchestrated, designed to embarrass Putin, plant doubt about the Special Military Operation in the public, and discredit the military in the eyes of the siloviki, among other benefits. If that’s what you want to achieve, and SOF is what you have to work with, maybe you don’t need a ballistic missile program. That’s the thread that I’ve been trying to pull at with the “potato gun in a trash truck” idea. If you wanted to create the effect of a missile attack, and could steal a truck and get within less than 1km of the base on residential streets could you develop a reasonable munitions delivery system for a fraction of the cost of a missile development program?
I think you could, and that it’s more likely that the Ukrainians did.
Geminid
@Carlo Graziani: What is your basis for saying the Hrim-2 program was suspended and would have had to be pulled out of moth balls? I’ve seen no reporting that the program was dropped. The Ukrainians had good reason to continue it.
Carlo Graziani
@Geminid: Sorry, I sit corrected, having misread and/or misremembered the information posted here, and the off-again on-again development described at Wikipedia. But, in any event an R&D program, and not a production weapon. You’ve read more about it than I have. Have you come across reports of successful testing, especially recently? It would have to be recent, since we are allegedly witnessing first deployment now, instead of at the outset of the war, so presumably it would have taken this long to get the R&D program to a production model on a crash schedule. Again, it would be utterly foolhardy to launch such a weapon without some testing, and extremely risky to do so without a comprehensive engineering validation test process.
Also, is anything known about the alleged CEP of this thing?
Geminid
@Carlo Graziani: I don’t know what a CEP is.
The one acknowledged test of the Hrim-2 was in 2018. There may have been others. As to why Ukraine would not use them when the war started it could be that they weren’t ready then but were later. Tbe Neptune cruise missile was not used right away either.
I’m not arguing that it was Hrim missiles that hit the airbase, just that it could have been. That would explain the big craters.
I Iooked up “Hrim-2 news” and there seem to be serious people discussing the possibility. A couple of the articles were in French, though.
Marc
It’s funny, we agree that something seems off here, but I don’t trust the SOF/partisans stories any more than you trust the missile hypothesis. Remember the earlier ammo/fuel dump attacks that were allegedly by helicopter-born SOF? I don’t remember reports of anyone seeing or hearing helicopters before those attacks, despite helicopters being distinctly noisy as hell. Would people be any more likely to see, correctly identify, and report small very low altitude high-speed jet aircraft flying near an active military airfield during daytime hours? Particularly if the flight paths were otherwise almost entirely over water?
My feeling is that this is more of a political problem. That’s why I keep mentioning Iran, they have the technology, what they don’t have is the capability to manufacture large quantities of suitable engines. Ukraine has the engines. Even if it’s not Iran, there are other countries with appropriate technology, ones that may also be subject to various “international” sanctions, so the US/NATO might prefer to look the other way. I have no idea what is going on in Russia.
Carlo Graziani
@Geminid: Sorry. “Circular Error Probable” a measure of the expected accuracy — radius of a circle in which 50% of the warheads would strike if they were all aimed at the center, statistically. “Expected accuracy” is just as good a term, though, CEP is a nerd habit left over from my worrying about ICBM days.
Based on the grouping of those craters, the expected accuracy of the missile would be on the order of about 10 m, definitely less than 20 m. That’s a very impressive guidance system on a 500 km range artillery rocket.
So, a Ukrainian high-technology missile program that was in R&D when it went dark, whose funding was resumed in 2021, which at last report according to Wikipedia was supposed to deliver products in 2021 had schedules not slipped, for which at the moment no successful testing program is ascertained by us, either
(1) Did deliver successfully months ago but the UA decided to wait, through the siege of Kiev, through the loss of Kherson, the counteroffensive at Kharkiv, the race to the Donbas and subsequent artillery meat grinder across the Donets basin, the outrage at Mariupol, the continuing faints at Kherson, the constant Russian missile attacks on Ukrainian cities, until the time was ripe for…a psy-op terror strike of negligible military value; or
(2) Just managed to get out of R&D now, into some form of highly limited production and the Ukrainian military decided to use it for…a psy-op terror strike of negligible military value; or
(3) Was shelved, because in wartime governments make budget resource commitment decisions based on what is likely to either help win the war or help survive the war over short time horizons — 6 months, a year perhaps more, depending on the available resources and the desperation of the circumstances. This was the reason that Nazi Germany never made a serious investment in a nuclear weapons program: Hesienberg could not make a case to Speer that such an investment would result in a practical weapon by 1945.
I like (3). Ukraine was, and is, so resource-constrained that a bespoke missile development program in the middle of this struggle for survival would be an irresponsible waste of resources. Their armaments program is rightly outsourced to the West. After they win they can create their own armaments industry.
But that’s just me. YMMV.
Geminid
@Marc: Ukraine is as capaple of building missiles as Iran, maybe more so.The Saudis thought enough of Ukraine’s capabilities in this area that they invested $40 million in the Hrim-2 program when was started in the last decade. The shorter range export version of the Hrim-2 probably was designed with the Saudis in mind.
I don’t expect the Iranians would sell Ukraine anything. Iran is reliant on Russia’s support and would have a hard time doing something like this and keeping the news from Russian intelligence.
Chetan Murthy
Since you guys are still talkin’, I had another question: we see lots of reports about the NNth “separate” blabla-brigade. What does the word “separate” mean in such titles ? Anybody know?
YY_Sima Qian
The country w/ the most experience developing & fielding ballistic missiles w/ precision terminal guidance (for all ranges) is actually China. Chinese ballistic missiles (even at medium & intermediate ranges) are supposed to have CEPs of 10 m or less, & some versions are capable of hitting moving ships at sea.
I highly doubt China aided Ukrainian missile development after the start of the current war, but the two countries had 3 decades of intense collaboration in military hardware (platforms & munitions) since the end of the Cold War. Thousands of Ukrainian scientists & engineers from its defense industry ended up going to China to work on Chinese weapons programs. The relationship soured bit w/ the US pressuring Ukraine to halt the sale of Motor Sich (the major Ukrainian aviation engine manufacture) to a Chinese entity after 2014. Nevertheless, I would not be surprised if a Chinese missile manufacturer sold some technology to Ukraine to help its program along. The losers from competitions for tenders of PLA weapons programs tend to try to sell them for export, & China historically is not picky about who to sell weapons to, w/ companies having a lot of latitude to close deals.
The major factor mitigating against the Hrim-2 being used is the fact that I do not recall the system every being tested before. I find it hard to believe Ukraine would try to use a completely unproven system operationally, w/o any testing to achieve a minimum level of confidence that they will work. Tests of ballistic missiles cannot be hidden.
Anonymous At Work
If the battle for Kherson is less a battle against Russian defenses and more of a siege, I have questions about how this siege would operate. “Traditional” sieges have the civilian and military population on the same side. Are there good resources or reading for protracted modern siege situations where the civilians and military are at odds? Could there be a worry of Russian troops attempting to massacre civilians for supplies? What effect would the partisan and embedded spec ops forces have?
Marc
@Geminid: I agree, I’m just skeptical that they have working homegrown precision guided ballistic missile technology. Maybe in a few years, not now. More likely someone else supplied longer range ballistic missiles. Homegrown long range GPS-guided cruise missiles are easier, quicker, and cheaper to develop/produce in small numbers, if you can build the engines.
As for Iran, what their government chooses to do is one thing, what the Revolutionary Guard chooses to do is often something else entirely. There is a connection there (the mystery KH-55s) and Iran has been working on cruise missile technology for longer than Ukraine has. Iran considers themselves non-aligned. I doubt they would stress much about supplying weapons to both sides in this conflict. Of course, Turkey and/or Israel would also have reasons to keep quiet about passing along various items.
Geminid
@YY_Sima Qian: The only acknowledged test of the Hrim-2 was in 2018. They might have tested one this year. There’ve been a lot of ballistic missiles flying around that area. The U.S. would know, and the Russians would as well but what could they do about it?
Carlo Graziani
@Anonymous At Work: It can’t really be a siege, because the city of Kherson is on the North (West) bank of the Dnipro river, while the bulk of the Russian forces are on the other side. The Ukrainian artillery has been assiduously targeting the road and rail bridges because once those are gone, the Russian forces on the North bank can no longer be resupplied, and must either withdraw across the river — and hence from Kherson — or get kebabed by the Ukrainians.
The real danger is that once across, the Russians will flatten Kherson with artillery out of spite. I hope that the Ukrainians are still warning civilians to get out or get underground.The capability that I have most wished NATO could supply to Ukraine, to no avail, is abundant and effective counter-battery.
Anonymous At Work
@Carlo Graziani: Not a traditional siege in being surrounded and the walls battered down with catapults, but a modern siege where incoming military supplies are interdicted, leading to rationing. I don’t see Russia abandoning Kherson for a ton of reasons, starting with appearance/morale.
Second, Kherson is the only real stronghold on the west side of the Dnipro River, a major natural boundary. Combine with HIMARS and Russian forces will have to displace tens of kilometers back from the river, allowing for repairs and bridging operations to move further into Russian held-space with the Crimean Isthmus being first and the Kersch Strait Bridge being the ultimate target.
Next, HIMARS seems quick enough that Russian forces might have to chose between flattening Kherson and allowing HIMARS strikes against artillery and supply depots. That is, if Russian forces have the artillery pieces and ammunition for such a barrage and are willing to bring them up the front lines. Whatever long range precision weapon was used in Crimea should scare Russian commanders about risking ammunition, transportation, and artillery pieces.
Finally, pulling back would expose Russia’s 42nd Army to effective destruction as a cohesive unit. Also, their egress routes horrible, either parallel to and just behind the front lines or through the Crimea, which will get jammed and was already within missile strike range. Lose of an entire Army group won’t be spinnable; troops retreating through the front lines have light fingers and a way of attracting deserters. Oh, and the leaders of retreating Armies in Russian history have been, at best, given the chance to kill themselves if they want a quick death.
I really don’t see a retreat from a siege/assault attempt unless I a missing something or wrong about this. I’m just armchair, but Russian advantage in artillery pieces and troop numbers aren’t well served by a retreat but by forcing Ukrainian ground forces into confrontations in urban zones, the real meat-grinders.