The Ukrainians were quite busy today. There is no way to capture all of it, but we’ll do our best.
Here is President Zelenskyy’s address from earlier this evening. Video below, English transcript after the jump:
Dear Ukrainians, I wish you health!
We have good news from the European Union. The provision of EUR 5 billion of macro-financial assistance to our state has been approved. It’s very important.
And secondly, there is a decision of the Council of the EU to suspend the visa facilitation agreement signed by the EU and Russia. This decision will be effective from Monday. And there are specific recommendations of the European Commission regarding visa restrictions for citizens of Russia.
This is the protection of Europe, it will make it difficult for those who do not want to change anything, do not want to fight against the war, but just want to consume and have fun, as if nothing is happening in Europe, as if there is no Russian terror.
United Europe is the second target for Russia after our state, our independence. And it is right that Europe defends itself.
Today in Kyiv, I discussed this topic with our friends – the President of Latvia and the Prime Minister of Poland, who arrived on a visit.
Of course, the recommendations at the pan-European level are very important. However, there is legal scope to go further to do more. As the Baltic states and Poland did. A terrorist state can hardly be regarded as a source of tourism or any business visits.
We also talked today about our bilateral cooperation with EU countries. In particular, this concerns the mitigation of procedures at our border. We must remove the barriers that still hinder our citizens and companies. Peoples who together defend European freedom should be as close as possible.
It is known that there are certain difficulties and queues at the Ukrainian-Polish border. I discussed this with the Polish Prime Minister today – we agree on how to solve this problem.
The Prime Minister of Ukraine and his Polish counterpart will agree on all technical details. So today, we discussed the issue of joint customs control, expansion of border crossing points, facilitation of postal exchange between Ukraine and the EU countries – I turned to Mr. Prime Minister of Poland with a proposal to lower the price of postal items. This is important for our people, for everyone who needs special support now.
And one more important aspect: Poland asked us to help in the energy sector, in particular with the export of electricity. Of course, we will provide it. We will always help the Polish brothers who have been helping us since the first day.
Two more plaques appeared on our Alley of Courage in Kyiv today – with the names of Mr. Levits, the President of the Republic of Latvia, and Mateusz Morawiecki, the head of the Polish government.
We will gradually note all the leaders of politics, culture, sports and business, who personally visited Kyiv during the most difficult half-year from February 24 to August 24, and personally participated in the defense of our state.
Today, I had the honor of presenting state awards to representatives of the media who were honored on the occasion of Independence Day this year.
These are reporters, operators, producers, editors, and presenters… They all made a significant contribution to our victory in the media confrontation with Russia, to break through Russian propaganda and spread simply the truth about the war, about our independence.
A moment of silence was observed for representatives of the media whose lives were taken by this war. As of today, they are 38 people – not only citizens of our country, but also foreigners who came to Ukraine for the truth and died from Russian weapons.
Our army, intelligence, the Security Service of Ukraine continue active actions in several operational areas. They continue successfully.
I want to once again appeal now to some bloggers, who are sometimes in a hurry to announce the results of certain active actions of our troops on the front lines… Please do not hurry with the reports, do not complicate the task for our army with your haste. Please do not report the specific details of the defense operation earlier than the official representatives of our state will say about it.
At this time, the Armed Forces of Ukraine liberated and took control of more than 30 settlements in Kharkiv region. In part of the villages of the region, actions to check and secure the territory continue, we are gradually taking control of new settlements – everywhere we are returning the Ukrainian flag and protection for all our people.
I am asking Ukrainians from the liberated territory: please give the representatives of our forces any information known to you about the crimes of the occupiers on Ukrainian land.
Units of the National Police are returning to the liberated settlements of Kharkiv region.
And I want to thank today our intelligence, our secret services, who once again showed themselves very effectively in throwing the enemy out.
Many thanks to the soldiers of the 14th separate mechanized brigade named after Prince Roman the Great – the commander in the Kharkiv direction especially noted the heroic actions of the guys from this brigade.
We do not forget about other directions. Fierce battles continue both in Donbas and in the south of our country.
I’m thankful to the Marines of the 503rd Battalion for their courage in Donetsk region.
My thanks to the intelligence of the 131st Separate Reconnaissance Battalion who, risking their lives, are the first to come forward and ensure the performance of the assigned tasks by the combined military units in Kherson region.
I’m thankful to all our boys and girls, men and women who are fighting for Ukraine!
I signed new decrees on awarding our soldiers. 293 combatants were given state awards.
And today in Kyiv I held a meeting with Haluk Bayraktar – a person whom Ukrainians do not need to introduce. The context of the meeting is clear, and the results will be clear. We are strengthening our state.
I presented Mr. Bayraktar with the Order of Merit of first class – it was truly deserved.
Glory to everyone who helps us!
Glory to Ukraine!
Earlier today, theUnder Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, Dr. William A. LaPlante, and the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Sasha N. Baker, held a for attribution press conference with Q&A.
STAFF: Hi. Good afternoon, everyone. Happy Friday, as well. Joining us today is Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, Dr. Bill LaPlante and Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Ms. Sasha Baker. Dr. LaPlante and Ms. Baker will each open with a statement, and then we’ll take questions from the room and the phones for Q&A. We’ll have about 30 minutes, so we’ll do our best to get to as many questions as we can.
And with that, I’ll turn it over to Dr. LaPlante.
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WILLIAM A. LAPLANTE: OK, thank you, Sabrina, and before we dive into the questions, I want to quickly provide a couple of updates on recent and anticipated contracting actions mostly related to Ukraine.
To meet Ukraine’s evolving requirements, we’re continuing to work every day with our allies and partners to provide key capabilities. Secretary Austin announced yesterday in Ramstein that President Biden approved the 20th drawdown of equipment from DOD inventories for Ukraine, and that’s the 20th since August of 2021. This package, valued at over $675 million — or up to — excuse me — includes additional Guided Multiple Launch Rocket Systems, sometimes called GMLRS, 105 mm howitzers, artillery, ammunition and more.
As we work with industry to accelerate production on both replenishment systems and direct procurements under the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, or USAI, we’re using a number of tools to get the funding moving and the contracting happen quickly. These include using contracting mechanisms called — things like undefinitized contracting actions, sometimes called UCAs. What that allows you to do deliberately is to get industry working on initial contract before we definitize it. And you can put a UCA together within a week, and we’re doing that.
We also are making use of indefinite delivery indefinite quantity contracts, or IDIQ. If you have IDIQs — and we have many of them — what you can do is just add task orders to them very quickly to get equipment on contract. To date, approximately $1.2 billion is already on contract of the $4.8 billion committed through USAI. And then for replenishment, an additional $1.2 billion is on contract of the over-$7 billion that is notified to contract — Congress — excuse me.
Throughout the remainder of the month, we expect to announce several additional awards. We remain committed to getting things on contract as quickly as possible, ultimately to send that clear and persistent demand signal to our partners in industry.
As Secretary Austin also announced yesterday, I will be chairing a meeting of the National Armaments Directors to discuss how the global Defense Industrial Base can continue to support Ukraine in the near-, mid- and long-term. This special session on industrial production will be conducted under the auspices of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group, which includes more than 50 countries. I look forward to discussing how we can continue to work together to ramp up production of key capabilities and resolve supply chain issues and increase interoperability and interchangeability of our systems.
With that, I’ll turn it over to Ms. Baker.
DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE SASHA N. BAKER: Thanks, Bill, and thanks, everyone, for joining us today. As Dr. LaPlante said, yesterday, the secretary announced that the department will provide an additional $675 million in security assistance for Ukraine, and again, as Bill mentioned, this represents the 20th drawdown package we’ve provided to Ukraine. It includes equipment, as Bill described, that the Ukrainians have already demonstrated, in many cases, that they can use to great effect.
With this announcement, our total commitment to Ukraine comes to $15.2 billion in security assistance, and that includes $14.5 billion that’s been provided since February. We think this underscores our unwavering support for Ukraine as it continues to defend its sovereignty in the face of Russian aggression. We believe, at the end of the day, that Russia’s efforts have not succeeded and will not succeed, and when it comes to helping Ukraine to defend itself and when it comes to making sure that there is significant pressure on Russia to end this conflict, when it comes to making sure that our own alliance is as strong and as resolute as it can be to deter Russian aggression, I think what you’re seeing now is real unity in action, as represented by the contact group meeting earlier this week, and incredible resolve from our allies, from our partners, and from the Ukrainian people, in particular, at — really, at every level.
So with that, I’ll turn it back, Sabrina, to you for any questions.
STAFF: Great, thank you. Our first question we’re going to take from Lita Baldor from AP. I believe you’re on the phone.
Q: Hi, yes. Thanks so much. One sort of detail and then a broader question.
Of all the funding that you’ve outlined, including on the chart that you all sent out, does any of that or how much of it would expire at the end of the fiscal year — so the end of the month — or is the bulk of it sort of two year or multi-year funding?
And then the broader question — can you address — you talked a little bit about supply chain issues and some efforts to expand or accelerate production by investing in some of the industrial base. Can you provide a little bit more granularity on that? Give us some — maybe some examples on where you see the challenges are. So where you are — where do you see the need for investing in the industrial base in order to meet some of this demand?
Thank you.
DR. LAPLANTE: Well, thank you. I’ll take the question and see if there’s anything more that Ms. Baker wants to comment on.
I think the answer to the first question is pretty straightforward — it does not expire at the end of the year, it’s two-year money, I’m pretty sure, in all cases.
The answer to the second question, which is a more complex question, of course, which is about getting into supply chain industrial base and how we — how we accelerate production, how we build that up — well, it — really, it’s all — it’s a lot of different ways.
To start with, most production lines that are active can have some capacity to increase their capacity, to increase production but not all. And the question is how quickly can they increase the capacity?
Typically, what happens is you run into some type of an obstacle — maybe it’s a supplier, maybe it’s a part, it’s something else — that you have to work. And sometimes, we found — in many cases, we found solutions very quickly. I can give examples. I think on the Stinger, we had some issues with obsolescence when we started that production line back up in the spring, and we, working with the contractor and with the Army, were able to find basically other ways to get around the obsolescence of some of the parts.
So every time you look at a supply — a production line and what it takes to get it to go to higher numbers, you come up with a different answer, and that’s not a bad thing because typically — let’s say — let’s take the case of the 155s. Right now, the 155 munitions are at about 14,400 a month. And we have plans, working with the contractor, to get that in increments up to — ultimately, up to 36,000 a month by about three years.
So it’s going to be in steps and each step takes it to another level. For example, when we get to the next step of casing, then we can get the production, say, from 14,000 up to 20,000. What do we need to get to — it from 20 to 25? So it’s usually a combination of things.
The other piece I will just point out is that a lot of times in a production line, the prime who’s at the production line, that’s not the bottleneck. The bottleneck will be a supplier or something that’s a sub-contractor.
MS. BAKER: And the only thing I might add, just on the first question — Bill’s exactly right, the funding is two-year funding, so it does not expire. The authority to do drawdown is typically provided — so those are two separate pieces — typically provided on an annual basis. I think we have no reason to expect that that would change.
DR. LAPLANTE: Yeah, that’s a good point, that the authority is different but the funding itself of what we’ve already had is two-year money.
STAFF: Great, thank you. With that, we’ll go to the room first. Yeah, Oren, go ahead.
Q: A question for each of you — just more specifically on the 155 millimeter, you’ve provided about 800,000 rounds of ammo roughly, give or take, over the last six months. Given current inventories and production rates and the expectation that Putin’s not ending this war anytime soon, are — are you able to provide that same number over the next six months or does there need to be a change in — in production rates or …
DR. LAPLANTE: Well, without giving a number, any one number, because we’re still learning a lot, I would say that we’re continuing both to provide them to ourselves and to the Ukrainians. What we’re learning — this is a great example of learning in 155s — the United States is not the only country that makes 155s. So we were able to — two weeks ago, the Army contracted with several production companies around the world to purchase 250,000 rounds of 155. So we have a variety of ways that we are looking at the 155.
I would say it — the other piece of it, as I just said earlier, we are producing at 14,000 a month as we speak, so.
Q: But — but that doesn’t come close to matching another 800,000 over the next six months, not domestically and it sounds like not globally either.
DR. LAPLANTE: It may or may not. I think you — you’d be — I think we’re learning still about the global production lines on 155. But you’re right, 800,000 is a lot, that’s right.
STAFF: Great, thank you …
(CROSSTALK)
Q: … and then I had a question for Sasha as well.
STAFF: Oh, I’m sorry. OK.
Q: You talked about sort of the U.S. leading the effort to put — and I’m looking for your wording here — making sure there is significant pressure on Russia to end this conflict. Do you think the efforts to create that pressure have changed Putin’s calculus in any way?
MS. BAKER: I — you know, I think it’s clear that Putin’s invasion is not going exactly as he anticipated and the Russians have thus far failed to achieve their strategic objectives, I think they’ve failed to achieve even their reduced objectives.
So certainly, you know, as you’ve heard from the Secretary and others, our goal is to support the Ukrainians in defending their territory and putting them in the strongest possible position both to preserve and regain, in some cases, their sovereignty, and then, you know, should they choose to, go to the negotiating table to have the strongest possible hand.
Dan, do you have a question?
Q: Two questions. One is, are you at all considering providing Gray Eagle drones to the Ukrainians? And if not, why not? And because in the past there has been some weapons and munitions that initially the administration chose not to provide and then over time your view evolved.
DR. LAPLANTE: I’ll defer to Sasha.
MS. BAKER: Yes. It’s certainly — we are aware that the Ukrainians have indicated an interest in Gray Eagle. And we’re looking at it I think is the short answer, you know, to — for questions of technology security, for questions about survivability of the platform in the contested environment in Ukraine. And of course for the readiness impact that it would have for us, specifically for the Army. So that is an ongoing conversation within the department. No decision has been made at this point.
Q: And then as you talk about all of these weapons and ammunition moving to Ukraine, how do you see the Ukrainians putting them to use at the moment? And what is your assessment of the state of the counteroffensive now as the Ukrainian government is saying they’ve gained some — made some significant gains in the east?
MS. BAKER: Yeah, of course, we’re watching the progress on the counteroffensive quite closely, as you can imagine. I would say, and I think you heard this from the chairman yesterday in Europe, it’s early days, so probably too soon to have a definitive assessment. They launched the counteroffensive on the first of the month, so we’re a little over a week in.
I think we’ve seen some encouraging signs, and certainly, even in just the last day or two. But again, you know, the Russians are a formidable adversary and they, you know — there’s a — I think a long fight ahead.
As it relates to how the Ukrainians are using the capabilities that we’ve provided to them, I think we agree that they’ve been able to do so to great effect, and that they’ve been very creative in integrating capabilities not only from the United States, but from partners and allies around the world into their order of battle, which I think this is quite an impressive accomplishment.
We, of course, now have an SDO DATT on the ground in Kyiv, General Harmon, who — that I think has just in the past couple of weeks provided us even more visibility and into what and how the Ukrainians are operating, and as another layer in sort of the communication that’s happening between the United States and Ukraine at all levels.
STAFF: Great, thank you. I’m going to go to Lara, and then I’ll come back over there, OK?
Q: Yeah. Yeah, so one for each of you. Dr. LaPlante, can you just clarify? You said that none of the money expires, but — so does the PDA — do you have to re-up that when the fiscal year ends?
DR. LAPLANTE: Yeah. I’ll try to do the best job I can to explain it, but then I’ll have my more wise colleague correct me.
So the way I think about it, there’s three — kind of three pots — three buckets, if you want to call it, of money and authority that we typically talk about. One is the drawdown itself, which is presidential drawdown. That’s an authority, so they’ll give an authority up to a certain amount of dollars, OK? That is what I believe is what Ms. Baker was saying may have to be redone again with the new fiscal year.
But then there’s the other two pots — that are actually pots of money. One is a replenishment. The replenishment is as best as we can, try to do one-for-one for what we’ve given in the drawdown, and that’s about roughly the same amount of money as in the drawdown — slightly more to take into account inflation. And then the other pot is what we mentioned earlier, USAI, OK? So again, in the replenishment money and the USAI, that’s the two-year money. The drawdown authority itself may — and I’ll defer to Ms. Baker about that.
MS. BAKER: Yeah, you got it. I would just say, look, the drawdown authority has existed long before Ukraine…
DR. LAPLANTE: Yeah.
MS. BAKER: … and has for many, many years, received broad bipartisan support. We don’t have any reason to expect that would change.
Q: Do you need to spend the remaining money that’s in there by the end of the fiscal year before you re-up it, or does — is it just you’re re-upping the authority?
MS. BAKER: So you know, this is a conversation we’re having with Congress, and I don’t want to get ahead of that. But the hope is — and expectation is, that that will roll over, either roll over or will be re-authorized in the coming year.
Q: But you’re discussing that with Congress, yeah. OK, I see.
And then just to follow up on what you said about, you said there was an SDO DATT on the ground in Kyiv. Can you all say, what does that acronym stand for? What does that mean?
MS. BAKER: Sorry. Defense attaché at the embassy, or in Kyiv. So this is a one-star which we had previously announced and he’s there on the ground helping to facilitate the communication between the Ukrainian MOD, Ministry of Defense, and our team.
Q: And has he been there before, or did he just arrive?
MS. BAKER: I don’t know the exact date when he arrived. I believe it was about a month ago.
DR. LAPLANTE: It was a month ago.
MS. BAKER: Yeah.
Q: OK. And what is the significance of having him there?
MS. BAKER: Well, I mean, look, we have defense attachés with most of our — in most of our embassies around the world, and particularly, I think it’s important with partners and allies where we have this kind of close security cooperation ongoing. It provides us an additional level of eyes on the ground, of oversight and an ability to get sort of real-time information about what the Ukrainians are seeing and experiencing, and what they might need.
STAFF: Great. I’m going to go to Luis Martinez over there.
Q: Hi. Mr. LaPlante, you — earlier this week, you brought up the issue of Harpoons…
DR. LAPLANTE: Yeah.
Q: … and the improvised system and the training and all that. Can you talk some more about that? And also, can you talk to us about the additional two systems that I think were going to be…
DR. LAPLANTE: Sure.
Q: … produced domestically, and what is the status of that?
And then I — if I can ask both of you, how does the ebb and flow of the battlefield affect the supply chain plans that you have here? So for example, when you talk about ramping up, let’s say, HIMARS up to 12- to 14,000, I think, a year? I mean, is it safe to assume that most of that is going to go for replenishment, or are we talking about it being — continuing to flow to Ukraine as needed?
DR. LAPLANTE: So let me try to answer the questions in reverse, and I’ll try to remember them.
On the HIMARS’ production increase, it’s really anticipating all of the above. Number one, we know we have to replenish some of the ones we’ve provided, but we also know that foreign military sale requests are coming in for them, too. So it’s sort of, this is what — this is why it’s sort of difficult, because you have to kind of make your prediction about two, three years from now what we think the likely demand is going to be, because that’s what we’re really talking about here. But it’s really for a replenishment, and because of the expected foreign military sales for HIMARS.
Let me go back to your first question, as I remember, your first question. Yeah, the Harpoon example was really what I was making the point of, is about the timeline. It wasn’t — the training was not done in this country; the training was done somewhere else. It was done by the vendor. But the point I made was about the timeline. It was the middle of May when the idea was first brought forward to do this. The training happened over — at the end of that month, which happened, of course, in this country, the end of Memorial Day, but it wasn’t in this country. And then they were provided operationally the next week to the Ukrainians.
Now, I would say the bigger picture that this points out is training overall as we — is going to end up being increasingly a bigger endeavor by the enterprise. And I’d point out, training is a multinational effort. It’s not one country. It’s not one vendor, and we are putting a lot of effort into that, and what we call generally sustainment.
I think your middle question was something about the supply chain.
Q: With the ebb and flow of the battlefield.
DR. LAPLANTE: Yeah, I would say the way I’d say it is more, its prediction. I don’t know who would have predicted 10 years ago we would have needed Stingers in 2022.
I was with a colleague on the Joint Staff who was a Navy aviator, and she said when we were talking on the Hill, had you asked her 10 years ago, “What weapon would you like to have 10 years from now?”, she would have described a highly-precise weapon with low collateral damage that would work in the desert.
So part of it is, it’s not — the ebb and flow; it’s about, you don’t know which weapons are going to end up being effective, depending on where the ebb and flow of the battle goes and what Ukrainians are able to use. That’s the harder part.
MS. BAKER: Yeah, I agree completely. The only thing I might add is, you know, we are seeing and we’re in ongoing conversations with a number of partners and allies around the world who are seeing some of the capabilities that Bill described, HIMARS being one of several put to use in Ukraine, and are newly, in some cases, interested in thinking about whether that might be a capability that they want to acquire.
So again, these are, you know, potential future FMS cases. The — this is a process that moves relatively slowly, but I think we see the beginnings, at least, of a pretty substantial interest amongst non-Ukraine countries.
STAFF: Great. I’m going to go back to the phones quickly. Steven with Defense News?
Q: Hi. My question was already answered. Thank you very much.
STAFF: Great, thank you. Alex Horton, Washington Post?
Q: Hey, thanks for doing this. I was curious, from this latest contracting package, what it has to do with hardware for training, for example, Javelin trainers, simulators, that sort of thing? Thank you.
DR. LAPLANTE: We include in some of these packages, then the drawdowns, as well, provisions for training, provisions for supplies and the rest. So it’s all included in the package. Now, we continue to evaluate, based upon the use, based upon the need, how easy the training is going and whether we have to adjust those.
And so I would say one thing that we’re doing in USD A&S is we have the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment, Mr. Chris Lowman with the Joint Staff J4. They’ve stood up a whole sustaining the fight, sustaining the force group, looking at Ukraine.
So this is going to be a long haul on sustainment and keeping these parts going and keeping the equipment working.
MS. BAKER: And I would just add to that — that’s consistent with our broader approach to security assistance not only for Ukraine but around the world, that when we offer security assistance or offer a particular capability to a country, it comes with an offer of training and of sustainment because we’re trying to provide a wraparound package, such that this is something that will endure and not just get used and forgotten.
STAFF: Great, thank you. We’re going to take a few more before we have to wrap. So, Joe, over to you.
Q: Hi, great to see you for a second time in a week — hi. I have a question for each of you.
One is more of a follow up. You know, as you were talking about the meeting of armaments directors — underneath this, is there any concern about — you know, we’re talking about the health of the U.S. industrial base — what’s the level of concern about the health of the industrial bases in the member countries? And I know they span a range …
DR. LAPLANTE: Well, I think a couple of things. I don’t know that I have a lot of insight. I’ve been to — when I — about a month after I got in the job, I went to a contact group — sorry, a NATO meeting with the armaments directors and we compared notes at that meeting.
And I think people are sort of in the same position we are but I should remind everybody the scale of the United States defense enterprise is just something very different than what our partners and allies have. So think about everything that we have but on a smaller scale.
And so I think that that’s — but we’re going to find out. I think that’s one of the topic areas, is to compare notes and see where people are. And also, hopefully people will be able to reveal, because part of this is revealing your own situation. And so I — that’s part of the reason to have the meeting.
Q: Thanks. And my question is about the foreign military financing that got notified by State. What’s — what do you anticipate the — kind of the knock-on here is going to be and what kinds of demand are you expecting to see from Eastern European countries, for what types of weapons will — because I assume they’ll be working with DOD to — on what — on their — what their needs are?
MS. BAKER: Yeah, and I think this is relevant to Bill’s earlier point and to what I was just saying about partners and allies seeing some of these capabilities in action and expressing interest in acquiring them for themselves.
We cooperate and coordinate closely with the State Department on this. So the announcement that they made yesterday, you know, we, of course, had an opportunity to provide some input into and we’ll be responsible, in large part, for fulfilling, and those are ongoing conversations that we have with State, that we have with the countries in question, that we have with our own industrial base about what is possible to provide on what timeline.
I don’t think we know yet exactly what each of these countries might be asking for. This is sort of the starting gun for that process. But, you know, I think certainly they’re looking to learn lessons from what they’re seeing in Ukraine and apply them for their own security.
STAFF: Thanks. We have time for one more. Ellee, did you have a question? If not …
Q: I was just going to ask in general have — has the U.S. promised to backfill any of the equipment that other countries have already sent into Ukraine? Have there been any specific pieces of equipment the U.S. has promised?
DR. LAPLANTE: Yeah, I don’t know that we’ve promised to backfill. What we have — what has happened is it’s leading to — it’s what Ms. Baker was just talking about — is leading to a lot of conversations about FMS cases.
So country X may have provided some capability to the Ukrainians and then they want to replenish their own with the next generation of it, which may be a U.S. FMS case. That is — that’s kind of the conversations that are happening that Ms. Baker referred to, that we believe is coming at us, but that’s all I know.
MS. BAKER: Yeah, and I think, you know, the conversation with each — I think that’s largely right. I can’t at least recall any specific instances where we’ve made commitments of that nature. But the conversation with each country is unique.
So some countries are looking for one-for-one replacements, right, where if they give a particular item to Ukraine, they just want another from someone else, whether that’s us or industry or a — another partner. There are some countries I think who see this as an opportunity to upgrade. And, you know, both of those are entirely valid approaches and we’re going to look to support as many of our partners as we can.
STAFF: Great, thank you all. I think we’re going to leave it there. It’s time and enjoy your Friday. Thanks, all.
DR. LAPLANTE: Thanks.
Just a quick note regarding the SDA/DATT question. As Deputy Under Secretary Baker explained we have a Defense Attache (DATT) in almost every embassy. He or she is a member of the country team. The country team is made up of the ambassador, deputy ambassador/charge de affairs, a number of foreign service officers from State and some from USAID, the Regional Security Officer, and then a bunch of personnel detailed from other US government agencies. This can include an FBI and/or DOJ rep, someone from DHS, someone from DEA or Customs, someone from the Department of Agriculture, etc. Depending on the size of the embassy and what country it is in, in addition to the Defense Attache, who is almost always a US Army Foreign Area Officer (FAO) with the rank of lieutenant colonel or colonel (usually the latter), there is often an Air and Naval Attache, with equivalent ranks to the DATT. The DATT is the Secretary of Defense’s official representative to the host country. And while he or she has to coordinate with the ambassador and deputy ambassador and work with the rest of the country team, the DATT answers only to the Secretary of Defense. A Senior Defense Official is when a general officer is sent rather than a colonel or a senior, and most likely promotable, lieutenant colonel. Some embassies always have a SDO, others only get them during times of crisis in the host country or in the region in which the host country is located. That’s a super simplification of a country team, a DATT, and/or a SDO, but I hope it makes that part of the briefing make more sense for those who don’t have a lot of experience with the military.
Here’s the British MOD’s assessment for today:
They did not post an updated map today.
Here is former NAVDEVGRU Squadron Leader Chuck Pfarrer’s most updated assessment of the battle for Kharkiv:
KHARKIV/ 2300 UTC 9 SEP/ Late reports on 9 SEP indicate that some UKR task units have engaged Russian armor within the city limits of Izium. At present, UKR artillery commands the only road entering or leaving Izium, the 0-211437. This will seal the urban battle space. pic.twitter.com/6PcvR9xaV4
— Chuck Pfarrer | Indications & Warnings | (@ChuckPfarrer) September 9, 2022
And his earlier one from this morning:
FLASH TRAFFIC/ KHARKIV /1440 UTC 9 SEP/ UKR forces have reached the Oskil River south of the important transport and rail center of Kupiansk. RU units are in increasing disarray with the capture of RU Lieutenant General Andrei Sychevoi, who was the frontal commander. pic.twitter.com/ccfrF4eHdI
— Chuck Pfarrer | Indications & Warnings | (@ChuckPfarrer) September 9, 2022
Here is his latest update regarding the battle of Kherson:
KHERSON/0130 UTC 9 SEP/ UKR continues to identify and strike logistical & ammo depots on the S bank of the Dnieper. Often Partisans identify ammunition and fuel convoys as they arrive at crossing points; these depots are rapidly interdicted by UKR precision strike artillery. pic.twitter.com/KgroILqfjI
— Chuck Pfarrer | Indications & Warnings | (@ChuckPfarrer) September 9, 2022
As you can see from Pfarrer’s most recent assessment, which is not much more than an hour old, Ukrainian units have engaged Russian armor in Izium! That’s enormous news!!!! Belingcat’s Eliot Higgins highlighted the problem earlier today by referencing what pro-Russian sources are saying:
Pro-Russian mapmakers tracking the fighting around Kharkiv are showing a really significant problem for Russia unfolding rapidly. pic.twitter.com/QVxY18ac5A
— Eliot Higgins (@EliotHiggins) September 9, 2022
The Russian lines in Kharkiv were either eggshell thin, just completely collapsed, or, most likely, a combination of the two.
Here is The Kyiv Independent‘s Illia Ponomarenko’s assessment of the differences between yesterday and today in Kharkiv:
Yesterday vs Today pic.twitter.com/jLFk2A8IIj
— Illia Ponomarenko 🇺🇦 (@IAPonomarenko) September 9, 2022
That is just absolutely, stunningly amazing!
And, as a result, the Ukrainians are continuing to push!
If Ukraine is capable of moving out and isolating Melitopol as well now, the Russian war is absolutely done.
— Illia Ponomarenko 🇺🇦 (@IAPonomarenko) September 9, 2022
He also recommends these folks for a detailed map of the battlespace:
Many of you guys ask where you can find a good online map showing the Ukraine situation.
I strongly recommend using this service — these guys’ work is very helpful, and they are very careful with the data they verify and publish.https://t.co/CWT2e9ymP1— Illia Ponomarenko 🇺🇦 (@IAPonomarenko) September 9, 2022
I’ve taken a look and it looks like good geo-spatial analysis.
He’s also reporting that the M270 MLRS have been seen in the Kharkiv battlespace and he highlights their effective range:
M270 MLRS has already been seen in recently-liberated Balakliia — note their effective range against Russian groupings in Kupyansk and Izium, as well as Russia’s ground lines of communications in the region.
Pretty much the whole of the sector is in Ukrainian crosshairs. pic.twitter.com/FexWs3UOYv— Illia Ponomarenko 🇺🇦 (@IAPonomarenko) September 9, 2022
Kupyansk:
— Illia Ponomarenko 🇺🇦 (@IAPonomarenko) September 9, 2022
Shevchenkove:
Shevchenkove pic.twitter.com/hOwmZgtUbz
— Illia Ponomarenko 🇺🇦 (@IAPonomarenko) September 9, 2022
As you can imagine, there are some cracks and fissures opening up among Russia’s supposedly allies in occupied Luhansk:
Very chaotic conversation, but we could hear some interesting things. "LNR" soldiers are not satisfied that:
– they fight for 7 months without rotation;
– officership loot everything. pic.twitter.com/AVBCnGTY4X— Volodymyr Tretyak 🇺🇦 (@VolodyaTretyak) September 8, 2022
I expect as word of the Russian collapse in Kharkiv spreads, it will have a significant effect on Russian military morale in other parts of occupied Ukraine. Which will make it easier for the Ukrainians to succeed in places like Kherson.
My take right now is that Ukraine will continue to advance with speed in Kharkiv and consolidate gains there, while Kherson will continue to be a slower campaign. But, the Russian losses in Kharkiv could speed things up for the Ukrainians in Kherson.
Expect to see more of the above and this:
Amazing video of a Russian T-72 fleeing Ukrainian troops, discarding men and then crashing into a tree. pic.twitter.com/0hqrQtJ09S
— Cᴀʟɪʙʀᴇ Oʙsᴄᴜʀᴀ (@CalibreObscura) September 9, 2022
These cracks aren’t being seen just among the Russian forces in Ukraine. We’re finally seeing some movement within Russia. Not a lot, but because it is among government officials we should note it. on 7 September seven deputies from the Smolninskoye municipal council in St. Petersburg accused Putin of treason and demanded his removal from office. I bet you can’t guess what happened today? Can you guess?They were arrested. Meduza has the details:
In St. Petersburg seven deputies from the Smolninskoye municipal council were summoned by the police for “discrediting” the Russian army. Deputy Dmitry Palyuga spoke to Mediazona about it.
According to a message from the Ministry of Internal Affairs of St. Petersburg’s Central District, which was received by deputy Nikita Yuferev, the deputies’ actions come under the Russian Federation’s Code of Administrative Offenses for “actions aimed at discrediting the current government.”
According to police, the deputies carried out these actions on September 7 at 1 Odesskaya Street, where the Smolninskoye municipal council administrative building is located.
In addition to Yuferev, police charged deputies Dmitry Baltrukov, Dmitry Palyuga, Ivan Chebotar, and Anna Kisleva. Two others were released without charges.
More at the link!
The children of Kharkiv safe in exile in Lithuania:
Children who evacuated to Lithuania from Kharkiv recount stories.
These are not stories little kids should tell, not memories they should have.
Hope and believe they will have a lot of happy memories.
So grateful to everyone helping our kids and families.
🎥: posluchay/TikTok pic.twitter.com/47Cb5mHT19
— Anton Gerashchenko (@Gerashchenko_en) September 8, 2022
Two more from Kharkiv:
Meanwhile the Ukrainian troops in Balakliya wasting no time tearing down Russian propaganda posters about how Ukrainians and Russians are one nation pic.twitter.com/wjYaxerei4
— Matthew Luxmoore (@mjluxmoore) September 9, 2022
These women are Russian speakers:
Another clip from Balakliya. The women offer a meal to the men, who warn them: “Stay in the basement, the city can still be shelled. But don’t worry, we are here now”
Months under Russian control make some lose hope of liberation. So timing of the Ukrainian offensives is crucial https://t.co/dSBMNi8rf2
— Matthew Luxmoore (@mjluxmoore) September 9, 2022
I think that’s enough for a stormy Friday night.
Your daily Patron!
I like to share. I share gifts from brands and fans as toys and yummies with animals from shelters. If you also enjoy of sharing, we created a separate page for my "bowl" with @UAnimalsENG .There, I collect money for food for animals affected by the war. https://t.co/zDg6a1YHP1
— Patron (@PatronDsns) September 9, 2022
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Also, you know what to do!
And a new video from Patron’s official TikTok:
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Open thread!
Omnes Omnibus
This map is absolutely nuts. For this to happen in a day looks like a complete collapse of Ru forces in that area. I truly doubt that it was a strategic withdrawal.
ETA: They may be brutal and willing to throw a lot of iron downrange, but they are terrible soldiers.
dmsilev
Wow. Amazing to see how quickly things have evolved over the last week or so. I guess one question is what would Russia have to do to reverse the direction that things are going? And, as an obvious follow up, how likely is it that the Russian forces have whatever capabilities that are needed.
Omnes Omnibus
@dmsilev: IMO a collapse like this would be devastating to morale which wasn’t that high to begin with. Good troops could turn it around, but I don’t know that Ru has any.
jackmac
If President Biden is traveling to London for Queen Elizabeth’s funeral, what are the odds he’ll also try for a quick trip to Ukraine? It would seem to offer the opportunity for a huge morale boost to Ukrainians and a major statement on U.S. support.
Thanks Adam for all you do. Your thorough and insightful reports put most of the major media outlets to shame. Please keep up the good work!
Dan B
The progress by the Ukrainians is stunning. Thank you so much for the myriad details in this post. I’m hoping that they have captured detailed Intel from the General – and that really is the general.
dmsilev
@Omnes Omnibus: So, if you had good troops, you’d do what? Pull back in some vaguely controlled fashion to a new defensive line set by geography and supply lines, and try to blunt and then reverse the offensive? Seems challenging to pull off with a bunch of tired disgruntled draftees.
bbleh
From my distinctly unprofessional POV, that they have reached the river at Kupyansk is even more significant (not to mention somewhat amazing) than the progress at Izyum.
I had seen earlier that there was a significant salient, but these maps suggest FAR more progress.
This would be double-plus-ungood for the Russians.
Damn!
Anonymous At Work
2 Questions for the armchair here:
Omnes Omnibus
@dmsilev: Find a defensible line. Stop and regroup to hold it. Then counterattack.
kalakal
This is turning into a rout. The Russians must have had minimal morale to begin with, they’ll have zero now. There’ll be pockets of organised resistance but overall it looks like there’s no overall cohesion, just a panicked mess. This is looking like O’Connor and Beda Fomm. When/if the Russians stabilize the situation they’ll have no offensive capacity left.
Another Scott
I hope Belarus stays out – or doesn’t get more involved than they already have been. All we need is for russia to get nearly routed in the north east and VVP demanding that Lukashenko invade Ukraine to take stress off VVP’s forces in the south around Crimea.
A few months ago there was some long thread by that guy who posts the huge threads on Twitter about russian history, etc. (… this one by Kamil Galeev) that Lukashenko is a savvy survivor who wanted to take over after Yeltsin. I would hope he’s smart enough to not save VVP from his folly, but who knows…
Cheers,
Scott.
Anoniminous
The Ukrainian news service Tpyxa reporting Ukrainian forces have entered Izyum from the north and are fighting Russians in the city. They also showed video from the bridge across the Oskil River at Kupyansk.
Upshot: at least 10,000 Russian troops (~12 Battalion Tactical Groups) are surrounded, only have the logistics on-hand, and will have to eventually surrender. Last time that large a number of Russian soldiers were compelled to give it up was von Manstein’s ‘Back Hand Blow’ in the late winter/spring of 1943.
kalakal
@Another Scott: I think Lukashenko is too smart to join in. Also he’s going to need his armed forces to keep the lid on at home, espescially of Big Bad Vlad’s army is too busy hanging on by it’s fingernails to back him up
counterfactual
I’m seeing Twitter rumors that the Ukrainians intercepted a relief column headed towards Izium, capturing 3000 soldiers and their equipment.
https://twitter.com/OzymandiusUK/status/1568263853032767489?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1568263853032767489%7Ctwgr%5E83a148463e3a1d3efbf200bd068d8dc9352bb9a4%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.dailykos.com%2Fstory%2F2022%2F9%2F9%2F2121852%2F-Ukraine-update-Izyum-Kupyansk-Lyman-all-under-attack-as-Ukraine-doubles-size-of-liberated-area
Enhanced Voting Techniques
Hmm suddenly a 1917 style collapse of the Russian army doesn’t seem that impossible now.
moops
Kupyansk is huge news. It is the cross roads of the two main rail lines in the entire region (think tall skinny X and Kupyansk right at the spot it marks), and all the highways pass through there. Russia is big on rail for logistics. Even if Kupyansk doesn’t fall in this offensive, the location will be a killzone for Russian logistic support. It is several months before the ground freezes enough for overland transportation.
All I can think is that this area was left with a skeleton force and the rest got dumped into Kherson to hold that foothold.
and now the RU forces in Izium are cut off. They will have to surrender or be pulped by artillery.
Major failures of RU forces. One more bad day like today and Ukraine might end this thing in a month.
kalakal
@Anoniminous: One good thing is there is no way the Russians can pull a Manstein on the Ukraninians. They simply don’t have the troop quality and command & control capability. On the other hand the Ukranians seem to be channeling Guderian
Alison Rose 💙🌻💛
Honestly…I know things are far far far from over, but I’m almost in tears over how amazing the updates have been the last couple of days. Ukraine and its soldiers are just…incredible doesn’t even begin to cover it. The gains they’ve made are astonishing, and seeing the relief and joy on the faces of those in liberated towns and villages has me all verklempt.
Also too watching that russian tank made me CACKLE WITH GLEE.
Thank you as always, Adam. Hope you are well.
Poptartacus
Wonderful videos of liberation. Happiness abounds.
moops
What should RU do if they could coordinate and had a better army?
aggressive retreat, possibly all the way to their own border. Draw the Ukraine army into longer logistic scenarios as they eager march to the border thinking they can end the war, then pound their supply lines with air force coordinated attacks and then counter attack an over-extended front line and capture a lot of soldiers. Then settle back in while RU gets resupplied. push back into previous held territory.
AnotherKevin
Those soldiers are not just falling off that tank. There are Ukranian soldiers on both sides of the road taking pot shots at them. You can see them in the ditch on the near side about half way through, and on a couple of the truck beds on the far side.
Dan B
My partner was watching PBS. They didn’t mention anything except they had a picture of Zelensky and a few words he said. Useless but extremely so in comparison to what Sdam Silverman presents to us!
Villago Delenda Est
This is turning into a rout. It’s like 1941 all over again for the Russians.
Wag
How does one say “Brave Sir Robin” in Russian?
YY_Sima Qian
This is extraordinary development! I think hoped for but not really expected. The Ukrainian Army is headed toward a major victory in Izyum w/ relatively low losses. As Adam said, this will certainly make a Ukrainian victory in Kherson more likely & at lower cost.
This embarrassment is short on the heels of the major exercises Russia held w/ China, India & others in the Russian Far East. Will further erode Russia’s credibility as a conventional military power to its peers. Chinese social media still has plenty of people wishing for Russia success, drowning themselves in wishful thinking. However, pro-Ukrainian sentiments (or at least Russia-skeptic) are becoming more prominent. The more serious military enthusiasts are becoming more forthright in their derision of obsolescence of Russian Army organization, doctrine & training. I am seeing claims that the 2022 exercises have further consolidated the view from previous exercises in 2018 that PLA’s reforms have left their Russian counterparts behind.
Makes for interesting conversation between Xi & Putin (& between Modi & Putin) during their meeting on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Summit in Uzbekistan next week. Publicly, of course, Xi & Modi will still give Putin as much face as they can. After all, China & India are purchasing dirt cheap energy from Russia.
bbleh
@moops: this
Anoniminous
@kalakal:
Historically Russian “tactics” (sic) consisted of lining everybody up, shouting “Ur-RAH!, and charging into interlocking machine gun fire while mortars and artillery rained down up them. And I am not joking. That’s what the idiots did all the way up to and through World War II. Why they had 22,610,148 total estimated military casualties with 8,668,400 dead. In the last year of the war when the Wehrmacht was mostly old men and boys and no supplies the Russians still lost ~800,000 dead and ~2.3 million wounded.
Martin
I wonder how much of Russia’s forces are trapped north of the river in Kherson.
I’m a bit disappointed by the talk of the 155 production. 36K a month in *3 years*. We’re fucked if our contractors can’t move faster than that. 155s can’t be *that* complicated. Dangerous to make, yes, but not difficult to make.
Modern precision manufacturing is in the millions of units per month. iPhones? 20 million a month. Not dangerous to make, but can’t be any less difficult than a 155 round. It’s certainly got tighter tolerances than a 155.
HumboldtBlue
This clip pretty much sums up Russia’s summer in Ukraine.
oldster
Thanks, Adam!
The torrent of good news today has been disorienting. War never brings unalloyed good news, so with every new success I find myself flinching in anticipation of a setback.
But I hope and pray for the continued success of Ukraine in driving out the invaders. Let victory come soon!
moops
I think it will eventually be revealed that the USA was the biggest ally here. The most needed weapons when needed, and total information domination of RU. Ukraine moves as if they have completely situation awareness of RU forces. I’ve never seen a conflict with this effect.
Wombat Probability Cloud
Amazeballs!
I agree that the soldiers are being shot off the tank. I assumed they were just falling until I saw the vid a second time and it became clear.
Wondering how much force constraint UKR will exercise to avoid civilian casualties in Izyum. Hopefully, mass surrenders will make this moot.
Martin
I thought it was brilliant for Ukraine to murder the queen to provide information cover for their offensive. That’s some big brain thinking there.
Another Scott
@HumboldtBlue: They were doing fine until they, er, flooded it.
Slava Ukraini.
Cheers,
Scott.
Anoniminous
@HumboldtBlue:
Ah yes. The well known and dreaded* BMP-3 Submersible. It actually can float along IFF the crew maintains the water tight seals. Seeing how Russians don’t “do” the maintainence thing …
* by it’s crew
Wombat Probability Cloud
@Martin: I thought we weren’t supposed to disclose that.
Martin
Oh, a correction to Chris Hayes on his segment about Ted Cruz trying to troll California. Hayes said that blackouts in CA had been a regular occurrence in the assumed context of lack of power generation or distribution. The state has had one power outage due to lack of generation since 2000 when Enron was cutting off supplies to the state. That outage was one day in 2020.
We’ve had a number of rolling outages in order to depower transmission lines during high wind/fire events, but they weren’t because we didn’t have the power. That’s a problem most states are going to be facing in time. And we’ve had outages due to fire taking lines down, wind taking lines down, earthquakes taking lines down, but that too is a problem all states face at one time or another.
HumboldtBlue
@Another Scott:
Boooooo!
@Anoniminous:
Maintenance? Who has got time for maintenance?
Gin & Tonic
@Anoniminous: That video is not current.
Fair Economist
@moops: Kupyansk is the supply center for a huge section of the Russian line, Izyum to past Lyman. None of it is tenable with UKR even near Kupyansk. The Russian soldiers know this too and seem to mostly just be trying to escape.
Even after they fall the Russians will have to fall much further back to get to lines they can supply without Kupyansk. Looks ugly for them.
Ishiyama
“Surprise when achieved yields rich results.”
Anoniminous
@YY_Sima Qian:
No reason for President Xi to be anything but polite. China has money and needs natural resources. Russian has natural resources and needs money. The Belt-and-Road Project doesn’t need the headaches of internal upheavals in the various ‘Stans and Russia can help with that, as we saw earlier this year.
Sometimes International Relations gets real simple. :-)
zhena gogolia
Good news.
bbleh
@Fair Economist: yes. Let’s just not celebrate victory quite yet though.
Anoniminous
@Gin & Tonic:
Yup, it was taken … 4 years ago? …. when there was absolutely no excuse for the failure.
Frankensteinbeck
@Anoniminous:
One thing I’ve noticed is that international relations are never simple with China. Xi would try to play chess with an avalanche.
kalakal
@Anoniminous: Yep. Their other speciality was outrunning their supply lines. There are numerous reports of Russian tank units breaking through and then running out of petrol miles behind enemy lines.
I mentioned earlier this reminds me a lot of Beda Fomm ( Operation Compass 1940/41) where the Italian army in a set of defensive positions completely routed against a highly mobile assault and surrended in the 10s of 1,000s when their escape was blocked. They should have been able to stand up to O’Connors offensive but they were badly led and had very low morale and a defense turned into a retreat turned into a rout within hours.
Ruckus
@Omnes Omnibus:
The majority of the Russian solders likely get poorly trained, are poorly equipped and lied to on a daily basis. It’s a shitty way to run a country. The people that own the Russian companies that make and sell stuff mostly are billionaires with huge yachts in a country where the average wage is $20k/yr. I can’t imagine why anyone wouldn’t be just thrilled to die for all that.
HumboldtBlue
moops
@Ruckus: I doubt most Russians are aware that things are any different in any other part of the world. regular folk getting by and oligarchs owning everything is just how they think the world is. They think they have a good standard of living compared to many of their neighbors, and they would be right.
moops
@HumboldtBlue: HA. It will be fun when we hear about WarGonzo being captured on the road out of Ilyum.
Ruckus
@Martin:
Making a cel phone is a relatively small precision item to make that can be made in large numbers rather easily.
Moving a lot of metal in high precision is an entirely different story. And modern weapons have to be made to a rather high standard to work well. A 155 is rather big, just a bit complicated and has a lot of high precision parts to it to work well and stay together under some rather difficult usage. I know I used to build stuff out of metal to high precision standards, have done that for decades. (Did other stuff in the middle but my working career started in high precision work and ended the same way. The very last job I worked on had me making 5 in long hardened steel pins just under 5/8″ dia to a tolerance of +/- 2 1/2 millionths of an inch. Take my word for it that building a 155 gun is a lot harder than it looks.
Omnes Omnibus
@Martin: How exactly are we “fucked?”
Calouste
@Martin: The Ukraine didn’t kill the Queen, but having met Truss when she was Foreign Secretary, they knew that prolonged exposure to those levels of stupidity would be fatal to a 96-year-old. So they just had to wait until Truss became PM.
Omnes Omnibus
@Ruckus: I think Martin is taking about the rounds, but your point is still valid. The things are full of explosives, rammed into a steel tube, a bunch bags of explosives are shoved in behind it, then it gets sealed in, and the bags of explosives go bang. Then it zooms out of the steel tube at high speed and is expected took follow a set ballistic path which means its shape has to be virtually perfect. But, yeah, you don’t just throw something like that together.
moops
You big dummies. The Queen isn’t dead. This is all a big put-on by the royals.
Ruckus
@Martin:
If one of those rounds goes off in the factory that is going to make a very, very big mess. 155mm is just over 6 inches and that’s a big round. We had 5 in guns on the ship I was stationed on for 2 yrs and each round weighed 75 lbs and that’s just the shell that leaves the gun. Another 20% makes it about 90 lbs. And it’s not just a hunk of steel, it’s likely a high explosive filled shell. If one went off in a factory that would likely demolish several city blocks and anyone within a good distance. Making them is not the same as making a cell phone at all.
Jinchi
Belarus was smart enough to keep out when Russia seemed unstoppable. I don’t think they’ll join in now unless Putin threatens to throw Lukashenko out a 6th floor window.
Carlo Graziani
It’s awesome news. But that salient looks dangerous as hell. Winter is coming, and its time to look for a line that (a) is comfortably defensible, and (b) is maximally awkward for the Russians. That’s not the line. that the Ukrainians are holding now. That line is just an invitation to get shelled continuously at will for six months.
I expect thst the Ukrainians wll exact the maximum cost in prisoners and equipment from the current battles, then withdraw to straighten out that line to something that cuts through north-south roads and rail lines, just to fuck with Russian lines of communication. I do not expect that they will expand that salient into a re-conquest of the Donbas. I don’t believe that they have tge forces for that, irrespective of current Rrussian negligence.
Ruckus
@Omnes Omnibus:
They use a cartridge load. The shell is loaded then the cartridge is loaded and the gun fired. That’s the same way a 5 in round was done in the navy. From what I’ve seen the cartridge is not as long so the range is likely less but it’s still impressive.
And yes I realized after I posted he was talking about the rounds not the gun but the reality is that it is still rather dangerous work and not easy to build.
Omnes Omnibus
@Ruckus:
It’s basically modular. The traditional set up uses bags of various sizes that provide enough bang that the round goes as far as you want it to. There are newer more simplified systems, but the premise is the same. You watched guns being fired. Firing them was my job.
Carlo Graziani
Sorry, Ponomarenko thinks the Ukrainians are going to move on Melitopol?
Is he on crack? Or did something really insane just happen?
Melitopol seals off Crimea from Russia (except for the Kerch bridge).
It’s a joke, right? Or just enthusiasm of the moment?
Sebastian
Jinchi
I do’t know. We’d been hearing rumors for a while now that Russia was press-ganging men from the occupied territories and sending them in, poorly equipped, to hold ground after their regular troops had taken it. Then they rushed forces south to defend Kherson against the long epected UA assault.
The RU forces in the north look paper thin now, and are collapsing. There might not be much of a force around to challenge the Ukrainians. If they can take Kupiansk and Izium they control a lot of territory. They’ll try to keep it unless the Russians bring enough force to push them out.
kalakal
@Carlo Graziani: No it’s not a crazy idea, the UKR is obviously capable of keeping the Russians tied down and bleeding out around Kherson. They can use the current rout on the northern flank of the eastern salient around Sloviansk to inexpensively inflict large personnel and material losses on the Russians, trash communications etc and then close down the operation in a set of defensive positions pulled back from the furthest advances as resistance hardens as the Russians desperately commit reserves. Then launch another limited strike on the Southern flank of the salient, towards say Melitopol. 50 miles away for the UKR , 400 miles for the Orcs. As a plus that area may by this point be seriously understrength as many of it’s defenders have been rushed to the northern area
You wouldn’t dare try this against a competent army with high morale but it may well be doable against the shambles that is the dangerously overstretched and undermanned Russian army . The Russians only real hope would be air power and the US and others have been sending in an awful lot of AA lately.
If there is a irrecoverable collapse of the Orcs great, use it, if not by the time the weather intervenes, the UKR should have hopefully enlarged that dangerous bulge to the East and effectively destroyed Russian offensive capability.
Ambitious and risky but not crazy. espescially given the state of the Russians and the fact that the UKR seem to be handling the current large scale operation in the north so well
Alison Rose 💙🌻💛
@Calouste: I don’t know if maybe you meant to type “The Ukrainians” but if not, please remember it’s not called “The Ukraine” – just Ukraine.
Martin
@Carlo Graziani: Well, if Russians have moved so much out to Kherson that they could sweep Kharkiv that easily, what are the odds that Melitopol wasn’t largely hollowed out to try and reinforce either flank.
If I’m reading the map correctly, Ukraine has been making some moves to push south in that direction.
El Cruzado
Looks like the glorious victories of the Motherland keep happening closer and closer to the Ukr/Rus border.
Grey Michael
Thank you for putting this together, Adam.
I’m equal parts pleased and surprised at the swift progress Ukraine is making versus the Russian occupiers! I had always hoped Ukraine would eventually retake enough land to get to their original 1991 borders. Now, I more than hope Ukraine will do it, I believe they will.
Ruckus
@Omnes Omnibus:
I know that was your job. All I got to do with the 5 in guns was carry ammo and once during firing to sit outside with an OBA and a charged fire hose in case of a misfire, I was the guy that got to cool the barrel so it didn’t blow up in case it did misfire. Which wouldn’t have been good for me because if it blew up I’d likely have been dead meat. If they could find the pieces.
Just saying that the 155 uses a projectile and a cartridge like the 5 in guns on the DDG I was stationed on. Which sort of surprised me about the 5 in guns. But then that ship was less than 10 yrs old when I signed on board. And I’ve seen videos of the 155 being fired. That 5 in gun could fire quite a few rounds per minute, auto loading. My normal job was working on electronics, navigation and internal communications stuff. I was department head for a year before I was discharged.
piratedan
seeing unconfirmed reports that the Russian collapse continues and that the Russian forces around Izyum have surrendered… just some twitter traffic, nothing substantiated by a news agency that I am aware of…
lowtechcyclist
Ukrainian forces in the center of Kupyansk
Traveller
Russian Army Version 1917
…if there wasn’t video and Telegram confirmation I would not go to the trouble of posting this…I am not sure I still believe it…Kupyansk and Izyum have fallen? Or, at a minimum have Ukrainian troops in the center of each city…
lowtechcyclist has posted a good link of Kupyansk…here is one on the developing situation in Izyum:
https://twitter.com/ChuckPfarrer/status/1568373140480221184
I am almost breathless…this is beyond my wildest dreams…this all still seems inconceivable to me.
But I will take it….lol
Traveller
The hits just keep coming…Russian Colonists Flee Kharkiv….this is also just an unbelievable video…parenthetically, I might add, Russia is a huge country…why are Russians moving to Ukraine at all? Is this kind of like the Oklahoma land rush…free land for you Dacha, go take it…odd…but it is striking to see this line of cars attempt to escape…same as leaving Crimea a few weeks ago.
https://www.reddit.com/r/UkraineWarVideoReport/comments/xakfze/russian_colonists_flee_kharkiv_ukraine_back_to/
HeartlandLiberal
On behalf of all BJ readers, I want to again thank Adam Silverman for the time he devotes to these in depth stories on what is happening in Ukraine. The Washington Post would be so lucky as to have such thorough and unbiased coverage of the war. And may I say I hope Putin and the Russian army rot in hell and in the Hague for their war crimes against the civilian population in Ukraine.
Geminid
@Traveller: It looks like a lot of Russian troops are throwing in the towel. They know that winter is coming and they want out of the fight. Their officers may feel the same way.
Geminid
@Geminid: I wonder if the next tranche of war materials the U.S. supplies Ukraine will include a few hundred snowmobiles and several thousand sets of cross country skis.
PaulWartenberg
I saw what you did there, Adam. :-)
Woke up this morning to reports that the Ukrainian counteroffensive has punched a huge gap into the northern half of the battlefront and driving Russian forces faster than expected, probably capturing hundreds if not thousands of troops in the process. Even caught a Russian general trying to dress up as a lowly lieutenant (isn’t that illegal, even for Russia?).
Here’s hoping Ukraine retakes everything including Crimea before the winter season kicks in.
Geminid
@Carlo Graziani: If could be that in a couple of days the “salient” will no longer be a salient but the center of a wider area of liberated territory. That doesn’t mean the Russians won’t counterattack (if they can) but the UAF position would not be as vulnerable as it appears now.
Traveller
@Geminid: The question might be asked…with all this recent talk from the West, Germany, everybody, that the war would surly not be settled at all before 2023, maybe even 2024…was also just another disinformation campaign to lure the Russians that they had only to survive the Winter and then, maybe then, they could have their issues finally sorted out and regain the initiative.
So like freezing Russia at Kheson, that also may have been a ruse of sorts…that front was always meant to be a boa constrictor kind of battle…
The final history will certainly be interesting on this war, (which I hasten to add is not won yet…good news is better than bad, but still….) Best Wishes, Traveller
kalakal
Wow. A great morning for Ukraine.
The UKR forces are tearing a large chunk of the RU army to bits. The Russians seem to be completely collapsing if the reports of mass surrenders at Izyum and Kupyansk are true, even the RUs worst case scenarios would have assumed they’d hold out for several days, tying down the Ukranians offensive and giving them time to stabilize the situation and mount relief operations. At this point they can’t even be certain wether uncommitted units will fight or just bug out.
A repeat of Lenin’s “The Russian Army voted with its feet” is a distinct possibility.
Next stop Lyman!
PaulWartenberg
This is looking less like how Russia fought in World War II and more like how they were clobbered in World War I.
MomSense
@Enhanced Voting Techniques:
What’s that saying about history may not repeat but it rhymes.
Geminid
@PaulWartenberg: There are similarities also to the first phase of the Soviets’ “Winter War” against Finland 1939-40. Finnish troops ran (and skied) rings around the Soviet invaders until massive Russian reinforcements made the Finns settle. This time, though, the Russians have few forces to reinforce their position.
Warblewarble
Get your kicks on ROUT 666.
Carlo Graziani
Well, we live in one of two worlds, and while I know which one I prefer, I’m still not certain that my (and clearly everyone else here) preference is dispositive.
In world 1, the Ukrainians managed to bring forth the manpower and weapons to exploit Russian weakness everywhere it manifests itself, in all theaters, heedless of strategic consequence, despite being engaged in the project of reducing the largest part of the Russian army to sandwich spread around Kherson, and despite having ostensibly being starved for resources compared to the Russians throughout the war.
In world 2, the Ukrainians are only opportunistically deranging the Russian lines of defense and communication in preparation for the winter, while not disdaining to pick up any low-hanging fruit, such as bags of prisoners and equipment, but are doing so using small commitments of forces as can be spared from the Kherson project.
The thing about world 1 that would be both attractive and embarrassing to me, if it is true, is that it would actually confirm something that I’d believed all along about Ukraine’s manpower advantage over Russia, but which I had given up on seeing any real-world manifestation of. In this world, the Ukrainians really did hide a huge manpower reserve for months of difficult grinding warfare, during which they used up their territorial units in the Donbas to look weak in manpower, until the time was ripe, and everybody fell for it. It would be embarrassing to me because eventually I fell for it too.
But I’m still not persuaded that we’re not in world 2. If we do see that salient turning into a flat bulge, and large parts of the Donbas changing control, then we’re not in that world. And if the UA picks a fight at Melitopol, then we are definitely in world 1, because that would instantly become the center of the conflict, to the extent that the Russians preserve any combat power at all.
So I guess we’re performing Schroedinger’s cat experiment in a sense, and our observation over the next day or so should collapse the wavefunction to one world or the other.
Okay, that’s both nerdy and solipsistic, but I couldn’t help myself…
Jinchi
@Traveller:
From the Guardian:
Carlo Graziani
@Jinchi: Do we know that there are “thousands of Russian troops in Izyum”?
I mean, if there are, what have they been doing for the past week? Gardening?
Jinchi
Apparently, the Russians never wanted Izium anyway:
Everything is going according to Putin’s plan.
Jinchi
According to witnesses living in Izyum, the Russians started packing up and leaving when the UA started moving a few days ago. I think the draftees Putin sent in were perfectly happy to occupy the region, but not to fight to keep it.
That would explain all the pictures of happy Ukrainian soldiers standing in the open on city streets waving the Ukrainian flag. It doesn’t seem like they’re getting involved in too many firefights up north.
kalakal
@Carlo Graziani: I see where you’re coming from with this and it makes a lot of sense. A few weeks ago I wondered if that the sheer amount of telegraphing Ukraine was doing about the forthcoming Kherson offensive meant that they were hoping to use it as a way to draw RU forces to there and then strike elsewhere. A grand feint as it were. That isn’t what happened either. I now get the feeling that the Kherson operation is more like the original German conception of Verdun in WW1, force the RU to commit large forces at a military disadvantageous point that they have to hold for political reasons and hammer them flat with artillery while commiting enough assault forces to keep those RU troops there. It’s one of the few places the UKR forces can get an artillery advantage as the RU supply lines are so .vulnerable to interdiction.
The scale of the UKR forces now attacking in the North East surprises me. I guess clues might have been that there have been large training programs in NATO countries for months now . Zelenskyy mentioned the UK one several days ago and it may be they were husbanding those newly trained and equipped forces for just such an assault as this rather than committing them as they became available. It may also explain where those 250 ex Polish T72s went.
Their intelligence is obviously excellent they must have known just how weak the RU forces were before risking this but I expect the extent of what seems to be a major RU collapse has been a welcome surprise.
I suspect they planned for world 2 but are now seeing the possibility of world 1
Chetan Murthy
@Traveller:
I’m no historian, but IIUC, Russia has form here. They deport entire peoples to some far-away part of their empire, and import other peoples to replace them. Soviet Russia did this in spades: it’s why there are so many large ethnic Russian communities in ex-Soviet countries. IIUC it’s a means of control: uproot the restive
UkrainiansEstoniansLithuaniansTatarsChechens and send them to Siberia where they’ll be alone and unprotected (and hence docile) and replace them with loyal Russians.Carlo Graziani
@kalakal: I’m very comfortable now with a picture of the Kherson offensive as a brilliant 3-part trap. Part 1 was the July-August signalling, which enticed the larger part of the Russian army to move West of the Dnipro so as to make spoiling attacks in the Kherson-Mikolaiv-Zaporizhzhia region and to get ready to “greet” the offensive, exploiting the political importance of Kherson to Putin. Part 2 was the HIMARS-based bridge-dropping campaign and rear-area logistical degradation. Part 3 is now in progress, which is just a pure attritional battle, with no real intermediate territorial objectives, intended to exploit the fact that the Russians must suck desperately needed logistical supplies through then thin straw of their pontoon bridges (which are also now being attacked and destroyed), whereas the UA can resupply at will. It’s a perfect inversion of the correlation of forces of the earlier Donbas battles. Whoever thought this up is going to get memorialized in future monographs on military strategy.
This is the bag where the UA has the most Russians trapped, and this is the reason I’m still in doubt about which world we’re in. It makes no sense to me to risk letting up any pressure until they’ve completed the task that they prepared so carefully for months ago. They need to completely wreck that army, accept its unconditional surrender, and take as many prisoners — enlisted men and officers — as possible. This is their principal task.
Big diversions in other theaters, under the circumstances, can only mean that the’ve been hiding a manpower reserve numbering in the many thousands of men, minimum, somehow, and resisted the temptation to use them at the Severodonetsk meat grinder, when the territorials were pleading for help, as well as in all the succeeding Donbas engagements as they very gradually fell back, because they knew that the time would come when they could use them to maximum effect. In other words, world 1.
Maybe. The events of next few days should be clarifying.
John Revolta
@Chetan Murthy: Same as the Chinese are doing in Tibet. Ethnic cleansing.
kalakal
@Carlo Graziani:
This is I think where we disagree and why I reference Verdun. Von Falkenhayn’s intention was inflict as much damage as possible on the French army as possible while minimizing his own losses. He picked an exposed salient that the French politically had to defend, launched a limited assault that overran weak French positions, stopped, and waited with an insane of amount of artillery for the French to counterattack. He forced the French to commit huge forces to hold a disadvantageous military position and to bleed themselves dry doing so. Unfortunately for von Falkenhayn ( and over a 1,000,000 others) he couldn’t resist the pressure to turn his plan into a serious assault. 11 months and a million casualties later von Falkenhayn’s ‘mincing machine’ ground to a halt, the longest and bloodiest battle ( casualties per area fought over) in history. The Ukranians have very large Russian forces tied down defending Kherson for political reasons when the RU would be much better off in military terms on the east bank of the river. They can’t pull troops out or they’ll lose the place and troops that stay are constantly being ground down, like a bleeding ulcer. The UKR doesn’t need to capture those troops straight away, it needs to keep them contained and suffering serious one-sided attrition while a large section of the Ukranian army proceeds to play merry hell with the depleted RU forces elsewhere.
In chess terms the Russians are in a fork
lowtechcyclist
Ukrainian troops in Izium (Izyum?)
kalakal
@lowtechcyclist: Splendid!
Carlo Graziani
@kalakal: Possible. Still seems risky. A quick liquidation of that force reduces the Russian options for escalation, in my opinion. And at this point I would not be surprised if they were looking at NBC again to get out if the trap. Those tools are in their field manuals, after all.
lowtechcyclist
@Chetan Murthy:
Another example would be Kaliningrad Oblast, which used to be part of East Prussia. And Kaliningrad used to be named Königsberg, where Euler proved why you couldn’t cross all seven bridges without repeating one. AIUI, it’s now mostly ethnic Russian on account of the USSR moving lots of Russians in.
kalakal
@Carlo Graziani: It’s certainly is a risk, we have to hope that Ukranian intelligence has correctly evaluated that level of risk. Due to their horrible supply problems I expect that the offensive capability of the RU troops around Kherson is very limited. POL constraints alone must be crippling their ability to move. I don’t think they’ll go the NBC route, I certainly hope not, that’s a short route to WW3.
I do take your point though, I think the Ukrainians have decided to risk is worth taking in light of the damage they can cause elsewhere. Another factor is a direct accelerated assault on Kherson would probably result in very high Ukrainian casualties
Carlo Graziani
@kalakal: I can’t imagine that in July the Ukrainians imagined in their most optimistic scenaria that the Russians would respond so idiotically to the ruse as to pack nearly everything into the Kherson pen/killing gound. So if this is what’s happening, I would assume it is a late addition to the plan, tacked on when they realized that the bait had really gone down all the way to the Russian army’s gut.
So OK, I’ll add
World 3 (kalakal variant): The Kherson battlefield is really a moderately-surrounded and attacked holding pen for now, because the Ukrainians have decided to risk reducing it at their leisure, in order to free up the forces required to take advantage of the unlooked-for, impossible-to-hope-for STAVKA imbecility that stuffed the bag full of resources that can no longer be utilized to defend the Donbas.
Jinchi
@Carlo Graziani: I doubt the Russians will use NBC. That’s a major trigger point for the west and would end up with much more explicit aid to the Ukrainian army and sanctions against Russia.
The exception being an “accidental” attack on the Zaporizhzha nuclear plant. They’ve been telegraphing that excuse for a while now.
That would have very little military advantage though. It would be entirely for spite and only if the Russians were retreating.
kalakal
@Carlo Graziani: Well if you put it that way :-).
I’d amend it slightly, Kherson is not being moderately contained and attacked. It’s being hammered flat. Ukraine is letting artillery do most of the talking rather than ground troops just like the Russians did earlier in the east. Difference is the Ukranians in the east could fall back when they needed to, the Russians in Kherson have a mile wide river at their backs.
I think they did hope/expect for Russian stupidity combined with political neccessity ( would you want want to be the commander who told Putin you’d preemptively withdrawn from Kherson to the east bank of the river as it was the smart thing in military terms?) they telegraphed an assault on Kherson for weeks before starting one. I think (to their delight) they seriously underestimated the level of stupidity they got
Chetan Murthy
Bill Arnold
Was amused to read Zelenkskyy’s reminder to bloggers that they are part of OPSEC/information warfare landscape:
Mostly I assume this is directed at mil-bloggers. We’re not bad here. (I always assume observers (including future analysts/employers, with future tooling), excepting maybe encrypted chats, and have occasionally redacted parts of draft comments.)