(Image by NEIVANMADE)
Here is President Zelenskyy’s address from earlier today. Video below, English transcript after the jump:
It is inspiring and encouraging to see our Ukrainian resolve and know that there will be victory – address by the President of Ukraine
18 April 2023 – 22:15
Good health to you, fellow Ukrainians!
We are wrapping up this day in Poltava. Quite a long and emotional day.
In the morning I was in the Donetsk region, in our Avdiivka. It is hard to see what Russian terrorists have done to this city…
And honor to each of our warriors, to all Ukrainian men and women, who have been restraining and gradually destroying this Russian evil for 419 days and 9 years already.
I had the honor to congratulate Ukrainian soldiers and officers on Easter, to present awards. I often thank them in my evening addresses for their accuracy and bravery, for destroying the occupiers.
The 55th separate artillery brigade, marines of the 35th and 36th separate brigades, paratroopers of the 79th separate brigade, warriors of the 110th separate mechanized brigade… The 501st separate marine battalion… Bohdan Khmelnytsky separate presidential brigade… Thank you all for your service! And thank you all for the chevrons you gave me today, it’s truly an honor. Thanks guys!
I especially want to thank our medical forces, all the doctors and nurses who bring our defenders back to life after wounds. I visited hospitals both in the Donetsk region and here in Poltava. I am proud of our people, strong even when they are still recovering. Honor and respect to all who heal our soldiers!
I held a long, meaningful meeting in Poltava regarding the situation in the region. The military leadership, local authorities… The first priority is security and social issues, security for educational institutions, reconstruction, support for displaced persons.
There are solutions for the restoration of the energy sector – generation and networks. There are various assignments of the working level – what we should support the Poltava region with. And we will definitely do it.
It is important that we do not lose a single day in communication with our partners. And it was from here, from Poltava, that I had a conversation with Speaker of the House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress Kevin McCarthy. I thanked for the unflagging bipartisan support. Right after a trip to the frontline, I briefed Mr. McCarthy on what is happening now at the front, on our defense needs and capabilities. I raised the issue of F-16, long-range weapons, additional artillery and the tribunal – the tribunal regarding Russia’s aggression against our country.
Together, we make the free world stronger, and every dollar invested in that strength is fully transparent and accountable to our partners. I invited Mr. Speaker to visit Ukraine.
It is truly inspiring and encouraging to see our Ukrainian resolve and know that there will be victory.
I am thankful to the Donetsk and Poltava regions for today!
Thank you to everyone who works for our victory! Glory to everyone who is currently in combat, at combat posts, on combat missions!
And today I would like to mention separately those of our fighters who identify and destroy enemy positions, those positions from which the occupier fires at our cities and villages. Russian strikes at Kherson, at the Beryslav district, at the cities of the Donetsk region – all the enemy strikes will face our response. A tangible response.
Glory to Ukraine!
I want to highlight this portion:
It is important that we do not lose a single day in communication with our partners. And it was from here, from Poltava, that I had a conversation with Speaker of the House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress Kevin McCarthy. I thanked for the unflagging bipartisan support. Right after a trip to the frontline, I briefed Mr. McCarthy on what is happening now at the front, on our defense needs and capabilities. I raised the issue of F-16, long-range weapons, additional artillery and the tribunal – the tribunal regarding Russia’s aggression against our country.
Together, we make the free world stronger, and every dollar invested in that strength is fully transparent and accountable to our partners. I invited Mr. Speaker to visit Ukraine.
It is truly inspiring and encouraging to see our Ukrainian resolve and know that there will be victory.
Because we’re starting to see this be bandied about by the sage grey eminences in DC:
After just over a year, the war in Ukraine has turned out far better for Ukraine than most predicted. Russia’s effort to subjugate its neighbor has failed. Ukraine remains an independent, sovereign, functioning democracy, holding on to roughly 85 percent of the territory it controlled before Russia’s 2014 invasion. At the same time, it is difficult to feel sanguine about where the war is headed. The human and economic costs, already enormous, are poised to climb as both Moscow and Kyiv ready their next moves on the battlefield. The Russian military’s numerical superiority likely gives it the ability to counter Ukraine’s greater operational skill and morale, as well as its access to Western support. Accordingly, the most likely outcome of the conflict is not a complete Ukrainian victory but a bloody stalemate.
Against this backdrop, calls for a diplomatic end to the conflict are understandably growing. But with Moscow and Kyiv both vowing to keep up the fight, conditions are not yet ripe for a negotiated settlement. Russia seems determined to occupy a larger chunk of the Donbas. Ukraine appears to be preparing an assault to break the land bridge between the Donbas and Crimea, clearing the way, as Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky often asserts, for Ukraine to fully expel Russian forces and restore its territorial integrity.
The West needs an approach that recognizes these realities without sacrificing its principles. The best path forward is a sequenced two-pronged strategy aimed at first bolstering Ukraine’s military capability and then, when the fighting season winds down late this year, ushering Moscow and Kyiv from the battlefield to the negotiating table. The West should start by immediately expediting the flow of weapons to Ukraine and increasing their quantity and quality. The goal should be to bolster Ukraine’s defenses while making its coming offensive as successful as possible, imposing heavy losses on Russia, foreclosing Moscow’s military options, and increasing its willingness to contemplate a diplomatic settlement. By the time Ukraine’s anticipated offensive is over, Kyiv may also warm up to the idea of a negotiated settlement, having given its best shot on the battlefield and facing growing constraints on both its own manpower and help from abroad.
The second prong of the West’s strategy should be to roll out later this year a plan for brokering a cease-fire and a follow-on peace process aimed at permanently ending the conflict. This diplomatic gambit may well fail. Even if Russia and Ukraine continue to take significant losses, one or both of them may prefer to keep fighting. But as the war’s costs mount and the prospect of a military stalemate looms, it is worth pressing for a durable truce, one that could prevent renewed conflict and, even better, set the stage for a lasting peace.
Although Washington is right to keep a watchful eye on the risk of escalation, its concerns are overblown. Western policy is caught between the goals of preventing catastrophic failure (in which an under-armed Ukraine is swallowed by Russia) and catastrophic success (in which an over-armed Ukraine leads a cornered Putin to escalate). But it is difficult to see what Russia would gain from escalation. Expanding the war by attacking a NATO member would not be in Russia’s interests, since the country is having a hard enough time fighting Ukraine alone, and its forces are severely depleted after a year of war. Nor would using nuclear weapons serve it well. A nuclear attack would likely prompt NATO to enter the war directly and decimate Russian positions throughout Ukraine. It could also alienate China and India, both of which have warned Russia against the use of nuclear weapons.
Ramping up the provision of military assistance to Ukraine, while it will help Ukrainian forces make progress on the battlefield, thus holds little promise of enabling Kyiv to restore full territorial integrity. Later this year, a stalemate is likely to emerge along a new line of contact. When that happens, an obvious question will arise: What next?
Come the end of this fighting season, the United States and Europe will also have good reason to abandon their stated policy of supporting Ukraine for “as long as it takes,” as U.S. President Joe Biden has put it. Maintaining Ukraine’s existence as a sovereign and secure democracy is a priority, but achieving that goal does not require the country to recover full control of Crimea and the Donbas in the near term. Nor should the West worry that pushing for a cease-fire before Kyiv reclaims all its territory will cause the rules-based international order to crumble. Ukrainian fortitude and Western resolve have already rebuffed Russia’s effort to subjugate Ukraine, dealt Moscow a decisive strategic defeat, and demonstrated to other would-be revisionists that pursuing territorial conquest can be a costly and vexing enterprise. Yes, it is critical to minimize Russian gains and demonstrate that aggression doesn’t pay, but this goal must be weighed against other priorities.
The reality is that continued large-scale support of Kyiv carries broader strategic risks. The war is eroding the West’s military readiness and depleting its weapons stockpiles; the defense industrial base cannot keep up with Ukraine’s expenditure of equipment and ammunition. NATO countries cannot discount the possibility of direct hostilities with Russia, and the United States must prepare for potential military action in Asia (to deter or respond to any Chinese move against Taiwan) and in the Middle East (against Iran or terrorist networks).
Given the likely trajectory of the war, the United States and its partners need to begin formulating a diplomatic endgame now. Even as NATO members ramp up military assistance in support of Ukraine’s coming offensive, Washington should start consultations with its European allies and with Kyiv on a diplomatic initiative to be launched later in the year.
Under this approach, Ukraine’s Western supporters would propose a cease-fire as Ukraine’s coming offensive reaches its limits. Ideally, both Ukraine and Russia would pull back their troops and heavy weapons from the new line of contact, effectively creating a demilitarized zone. A neutral organization—either the UN or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe—would send in observers to monitor and enforce the cease-fire and pullback. The West should approach other influential countries, including China and India, to support the cease-fire proposal. Doing so would complicate diplomacy, but getting buy-in from Beijing and New Delhi would increase the pressure on the Kremlin. In the event that China refused to support the cease-fire, Xi’s ongoing calls for a diplomatic offensive would be exposed as an empty gesture.
Assuming a cease-fire holds, peace talks should follow. Such talks should occur along two parallel tracks. On one track would be direct talks between Ukraine and Russia, facilitated by international mediators, on the terms of peace. On the second track, NATO allies would start a strategic dialogue with Russia on arms control and the broader European security architecture. Putin’s effort to undo the post–Cold War security order has backfired and ended up strengthening NATO. But that reality only increases the need for NATO and Russia to begin a constructive dialogue to prevent a new arms race, rebuild military-to-military contacts, and address other issues of common concern, including nuclear proliferation. The “2 plus 4” talks that helped end the Cold War provide a good precedent for this approach. East and West Germany negotiated their unification directly, while the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union negotiated the broader post–Cold War security architecture.
Provided that Ukraine makes battlefield gains this summer, it is at least plausible that Putin would view a cease-fire and peace plan as a face-saving off-ramp. To make this approach even more enticing, the West could also offer some limited relief from sanctions in return for Russia’s willingness to abide by a cease-fire, agree to a demilitarized zone, and participate meaningfully in peace talks. It is of course conceivable that Putin would reject a cease-fire—or accept it only for the purpose of rebuilding his military and making a later run at conquering Ukraine. But little would be lost by testing Moscow’s readiness for compromise. Regardless of Russia’s response, the West would continue to provide the arms Ukraine needs to defend itself over the long term and make sure that any pause in the fighting did not work to Russia’s advantage. And if Russia rejected a cease-fire (or accepted one and then violated it), its intransigence would deepen its diplomatic isolation, shore up the sanctions regime, and strengthen support for Ukraine in the United States and Europe.
Another plausible outcome is that Russia would agree to a cease-fire in order to pocket its remaining territorial gains but in fact has no intention of negotiating in good faith to secure a lasting peace settlement. Presumably, Ukraine would enter such negotiations by demanding its top priorities: the restoration of its 1991 borders, substantial reparations, and accountability for war crimes. But because Putin would surely reject these demands out of hand, a prolonged diplomatic stalemate would then emerge, effectively producing a new frozen conflict. Ideally, the cease-fire would hold, leading to a status quo like the one that prevails on the Korean Peninsula, which has remained largely stable without a formal peace pact for 70 years. Cyprus has similarly been divided but stable for decades. This is not an ideal outcome, but it is preferable to a high-intensity war that continues for years.
That’s Richard Haass and Charles Kupchan of the Council on Foreign Relations. There’s a lot of back and forth that I didn’t copy and paste that includes give Ukraine a lot more now so we can negotiate a settlement this Fall, assurances through security agreements can be made, etc in their essay. The one thing that isn’t in their essay: the recognition that Ukraine is defending itself against a genocidal re-invasion by Russia led by a delusional, high on his own alternative historical supply Putin. Also, until or unless the US and our EU, NATO, non-EU, and non-NATO allies actually state that yes, we’re in a war, even if they don’t go so far as to say it’s World War III, and actually put blood on the line, it isn’t their call. If the Ukrainians decide that this existential fight goes on, and it is, without a doubt, an existential fight, even if it is ultimately futile, it is the Ukrainians fight to wage. There aren’t any American military personnel in combat or even in advisory roles in Ukraine, just twenty or so personnel – Marines assigned as guards, the Defense Attache and his deputy, and a dozen or so others working on security cooperation – assigned to US Embassy Kyiv. That’s it. If Haass and Kupchan are getting this stuff published, then they’re also whispering it into policy makers’, legislators’, and their staffs’ and advisors’ ears. It is the height of arrogance for us, no matter how much we’ve spent, to tell the Ukrainians that they should settle for defeating only 85% of 90% of a genocidal re-invasion because Putin and the Russian leadership will certainly have learned their lesson if they can only keep 10 to 15% of Ukraine.
Colonel-General Syrskyi has an operational update from his area of responsibility:
The Ukrainian MOD has still not posted a new operational update.
Bakhmut:
This is a truly heartbreaking video.
Volunteers and soldiers from the 93rd Mechanized Brigade are assisting in the evacuation of Bakhmut civilians.🎥 @ivlevyorke pic.twitter.com/xk6wYqCI98
— Defense of Ukraine (@DefenceU) April 18, 2023
Update from Bakhmut by the commander of the 127th Territorial Defence Brigade, Roman Grischenko. pic.twitter.com/elQrGXRIrV
— Dmitri (@wartranslated) April 18, 2023
Avdiivka:
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky visited Avdiivka, the frontline town in the Donbas, to award its defenders. pic.twitter.com/zrkf7SZPQB
— Dmitri (@wartranslated) April 18, 2023
Zaporizhzhia:
Enemy UAVs are in the air above Zaporizhzia. An air alarm sounds in the region. Be careful and proceed to shelters. pic.twitter.com/5qoGKzfUha
— NOËL 🇪🇺 🇺🇦 (@NOELreports) April 18, 2023
The Ukrainian officer who tweets as Tatarigami has an update on the “new” PMC, the Wolves:
Previous threads that covered this topic: https://t.co/MWPkNLDeb7https://t.co/fL09AmcrW7
— Tatarigami_UA (@Tatarigami_UA) April 17, 2023
Berlin:
Now this is serious. Germany delivered first PATRIOT air defence system to Ukraine. pic.twitter.com/0e6iOhbBWa
— Maria Avdeeva (@maria_avdv) April 18, 2023
From the German Federal Government’s Germany4Ukraine page:
Military support for Ukraine
Germany provides support for Ukraine by supplying equipment and weapons, these come from supplies of the Federal Arms Forces and from deliveries from industry financed from the Federal Government’s funds for security capacity building. An overview.The Federal Government supports the Ukrainian military in close coordination with its partners and allies. This list provides an overview of lethal and non-lethal German military support for Ukraine. It includes deliveries from the Federal Armed Forces, as well as supplies from German industry financed from the Federal Government’s funds for so-called security capacity building.
Funding for the security capacity building initiative amounts to a total of 2.2 billion Euros for the year 2023 (after 2 billion Euros for 2022). The funds are to be used primarily to support Ukraine. At the same time, they will be used to finance Germany’s increased mandatory contributions to the European Peace Facility (EPF), which in turn goes towards reimbursing EU member states for costs incurred to them in providing support for Ukraine.
Delivered military support to Ukraine:
(Changes compared to the previous week in bold)
air defence system PATRIOT with missiles
76 trucks Zetros* (before: 60)
124 border protection vehicles* (before: 122)
4 armoured engineer vehicles DACHS* (before: 3)
42 mobile antenna mast systems* (before: 34)
34 reconnaissance drones* (before: 26)
83,520 rounds ammunition 40mm* (before: 60.000)
18 LEOPARD 2 A 6 main battle tanks with ammunition (joint project with further LEOPARD 2 operators)
40 infantry fighting vehicles MARDER with ammunition (from Bundeswehr and industry stocks*)
2 armoured recovery vehicles Bergepanzer 3
2 mine clearing tanks WISENT 1*
160,000 first aid kits*
103.000 tourniquets
100 MG3 for LEOPARD 2, MARDER and DACHS
Spare parts for LEOPARD 2 and MARDER
90 drone detection systems*
500 pistols SFP9*
2 hangar tents*
23,500 projectiles 155mm
155mm precision guided ammunition*
ammunition for multiple rocket launchers MARS II
8 lift trucks*
295 generators
34 self-propelled anti-aircraft guns GEPARD including circa 6.000 rounds of ammunition*
6 bridge-laying tanks BEAVER*
10 winter camouflage nets
26 load-handling trucks 15t*
32 frequency range extensions for anti-drone devices*
10 roll off containers
Iris-T SLM missiles*
3 mobile, remote controlled and protected mine clearing systems*
40 laser target designators* (before: 20)
12 truck tractor trains and 4 semi-trailers*
145 Pick-ups*
8 mobile and protected mine clearing systems*
168 mobile heating systems*
20 rocket launchers 70mm on pick-up trucks with rockets*
15 armoured recovery vehicles Bergepanzer 2*
12 tank transporter tractor M1070 Oshkosh*
7 tracked and remote controlled infantry vehicles for support tasks*
35 load-handling trucks 8×8
36 ambulances*
36.400 wool blankets
12 heavy duty trailer trucks*
55 anti-drone sensors and jammers*
50 MRAP vehicles DINGO
10 unmanned surface vessels*
14,000 sleeping bags
Mi-24 spare parts*
spare parts for heavy machine gun M2
17 heavy and medium bridge systems*
5 multiple rocket launchers MARS II with ammunition
14 self-propelled howitzers Panzerhaubitze 2000 (joint project with the Netherlands)
air defence system Iris-T SLM*
200 tents
116.000 winter jackets
80.000 winter trousers
240.000 winter hats
405,000 pre-packaged military Meals Ready
67 fridges for medical material*
counter battery radar system COBRA*
4,000 rounds practice ammunitions for self-propelled anti-aircraft guns
54 M113 armoured personnel carriers (systems of Denmark, upgrades financed by Germany)*
53,000 rounds ammunitions for self-propelled anti-aircraft guns
3,000 anti-tank weapons Panzerfaust 3 with 900 firing devices
14,900 anti-tank mines (9,300* from industry stocks)
500 Man Portable Air Defense Systems STINGER
2,700 Man Portable Air Defense Systems STRELA
22 million rounds of ammunition for fire arms
50 bunker buster missiles
100 machine gun MG3 with 500 spare barrels and breechblocks
100,000 hand grenades
5,300 explosive charges
100,000 m detonating cord and 100.000 detonators
350,000 detonators
10 anti-drone guns*
100 auto-injector devices
28,000 combat helmets
15 palettes military clothing
280 vehicles (trucks, minibuses, all-terrain vehicles)
6 palettes material for explosive ordnance disposal
125 binoculars
1,200 hospital beds
18 palettes medical material, 60 surgical lights
protective clothing, surgical masks
600 safety glasses
1 radio frequency system
3,000 field telephones with 5.000 cable reels and carrying straps
1 field hospital (joint project with Estonia)*
353 night vision goggles*
12 electronic anti-drone devices*
165 field glasses*
medical material (inter alia back packs, compression bandages)
38 laser range finders*
Diesel and gasoline (ongoing deliveries)*
10 tons AdBlue*
500 medical gauzes*
MiG-29 spare parts*
30 protected vehicles*
7,944 man-portable anti-tank weapons RGW 90 Matador*
6 mobile decontamination vehicles HEP 70 including decontamination material
10 HMMWV (8x ground radar capability, 2x jamming/anti drone capability)*
7 radio jammers*
8 mobile ground surveillance radars and thermal imaging cameras*
1 high frequency unit with equipment*Military support to Ukraine in planning/in execution
(due to security concerns, the Federal Government abstains from providing details on transportation modalities and dates until after handover)
6,350 projectiles 155mm*
Iris-T SLM missiles*
20 bridge-laying tanks BEAVER*
300.000 rounds of GEPARD ammunition
2 air surveillance radars*
78 truck tractor trains and 86 semi-trailers*
8 mobile antenna mast systems*
40,000 first aid kits*
108 reconnaissance drones*
1 tank transporter tractor M1070 Oshkosh*
17 mobile heating systems*
18 wheeled self-propelled howitzers RCH 155*
7 load-handling trucks 8×6 with 18 roll of containers*
3 self-propelled anti-aircraft guns GEPARD*
7 tracked and remote controlled infantry vehicles for support tasks*
6 mobile and protected mine clearing systems*
40 mine clearing tanks WISENT 1*
5 mobile reconnaissance systems (on vehicles) *
376 border protection vehicles*
132,480 rounds ammunition 40mm*
1 armoured engineer vehicles DACHS*
3 heavy and medium bridge systems*
16 self-propelled howitzer Zuzana 2* (joint project with Denmark and Norway)
78 heavy duty trailer trucks*
3 air defence system IRIS-T SLM*
12 communications electronic scanner/jammer systems*
field hospital (role 2)*
8 frequency range extensions for anti-drone devices*
2 tractors and 4 trailers*
10 protected vehicles*
vehicle decontamination system
5,032 man-portable anti-tank weapons*
124 trucks*
The total value of individual licenses issued by the Federal Government for the export of military goods in the period from January 1, 2022 to April 17, 2023 amounts to 2.748.163.254 Euro. The total license value includes the goods listed above insofar as their export is subject to licensing requirements under German foreign trade laws. This is not the case for all of the goods listed above. In order to speed up the processing of certain deliveries, the Federal Government has also eased certain licensing processes, e.g. with regard to military protective goods. These deliveries are also not included in the total license value. The values stated for used material from the German Armed Forces are also based on current values which can be significantly lower than the corresponding values for new or replacement goods. The total license value includes the goods regardless of how their procurement and delivery were financed. For security reasons, the Federal Government does not provide further details until the goods have been delivered.* Deliveries from industry stocks financed by German funds for security capacity building. Some of the deliveries require upgrades or productions is ongoing; also training measures take place.
Tuesday, 18 April 2023
Ukraine and US prosecutors to freeze Wagner Group overseas assets to deprive it of the resources to finance its criminal activities in Ukraine and worldwide. pic.twitter.com/hCcOHMlOIZ
— Maria Avdeeva (@maria_avdv) April 17, 2023
I just want to finish up tonight with some excerpts from this interesting War on the Rocks commentary on informal security assistance to Ukraine. Normally we (in the US) define security assistance as:
Security Assistance is a group of programs, authorized under Title 22 of the U.S. Code, by which the U.S. government provides defense articles, military education and training, and other defense-related services to eligible foreign governments by grant, loan, credit, cash sales, or lease.
Now here’s what informal security assistance is:
“We are where NATO should be,” says Rima Žiūraitienė, Managing Director of Blue/Yellow Ukraine. Her non-governmental organization communicates directly with combat units at the brigade level and uses trusted drivers to deliver much-needed equipment directly to units on the frontline, bypassing Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense.
Debates about appropriate military equipment for Ukraine continue a year after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. These arguments focus predominantly on state-to-state assistance. But they miss an important element of Kyiv’s battlefield performance: informal security assistance. Aid from domestic civil society, informal military networks, and foreign volunteers are bolstering the Armed Forces of Ukraine in real and meaningful ways.
While some may argue that the aid provided by non-state actors — relative to over $113 billion in global aid provided to Ukraine — is too small to make an impact, we believe the aid has had a tangible effect. Highly motivated groups are providing equipment with a comparative advantage in areas where formalized state aid cannot. Several Ukrainian soldiers told us that “It’s more common for the average Ukrainian unit to have 100 percent of its drones sourced from these non-governmental organizations [Prytula Foundation, Come Back Alive, and Monsters Corporation], not our Ministry of Defense…and these drones already come ‘modified’ so they’re ready for combat use when they arrive.”
These soldiers also told us that “Most Ukrainian units have half their vehicles coming from non-governmental organizations,” and that Come Back Alive arms all “Territorial defense units with ready fire support” by providing them “120-mm mortars with vehicles.” Volunteer organizations are providing night vision goggles and medical supplies, collecting and analyzing battlefield intelligence. Many international volunteers also serve a vital role with training simulators, delivering lethal aid, and buying and modifying simple drones to drop grenades.
Informal security aid reinforces a global narrative that Ukraine’s battle against Russian invaders is a just cause worthy of support. Third parties act with speed and initiative that risk-averse government bureaucracies lack and provide a low-profile and low-risk lever that Western governments can use to amplify the impacts of conventional assistance and strategic-level communications. Such hobbyists often work through important networks of people and trusted information sources beyond the reach of government agencies. Thus, private aid fits within the scope of irregular warfare.
As the political winds shift in Western capitals, informal security assistance offers a way to bridge the gap in the “boom-bust” cycle that has typified Western military aid in past conflicts.
There are four ways the West can help Ukraine. First, the United States can continue to emphasize transparency. Volunteer groups that publish where and how they spend their resources engender public trust and broader, follow-on support. Second, U.S. officials can engage critical private companies, like SpaceX, and encourage more robust assistance to Ukraine’s defense. With privately sourced capabilities like Starlink playing decisive roles on the battlefield, such pressure will ensure Ukrainians receive energetic support from both the private and public sectors. Third, policymakers can revisit export laws to ensure that the U.S. government transfers key manuals and supporting information for Western equipment without violating export controls. Finally, the United States government can incorporate volunteer groups into a long-term, low-cost strategy for irregular warfare in Ukraine. Flexibility and responsiveness are important elements to strategically compete with the Kremlin without risking significant escalation or expending additional state-based resources.
Flexible and Responsive Informal security assistance: Caution required
Informal security assistance can be more flexible and responsive than official aid. This informal assistance should be considered as part of a robust irregular strategy for the United States military. However, governments looking to utilize this irregular warfare approach with non-governmental organizations need to properly vet individuals running these groups to ensure appropriate alignment with U.S. interests and concepts of irregular warfare doctrine. The other danger is that countries such as Russia view these organizations and human rights activists as an “ecosystem of propaganda…in the interests of the West” that is waging hybrid warfare against Russia.
Balancing official and unofficial linkages between governments and non-governmental organizations is a nuanced juggling act of achieving similar interests in Ukraine while managing escalation with Russia. As part of our research, we spoke with individuals that since 2014 have organized and maintained a grassroots movement known as the “Red Dawn Project.” This Ukrainian diaspora-led organization leads guerilla operations against Russian forces, spray painting “Wolverines” graffiti on destroyed Russian armor. The Red Dawn Project consists of Ukrainians, the Ukrainian diaspora, and dozens of veterans from foreign militaries. Their aim is to convey the effectiveness of partisan units in a manner that creates uncertainty and frustrates the Russian adversary in the classic manner of irregular warfare.
Not all groups trying to help Ukrainian forces are reputable. According to Rima Žiūraitienė, “the number of unqualified people in Ukraine is a bit of a mess…people teaching and training under false credentials.” The New York Times identified this growing problem with some volunteer fighters and organizations doing paramilitary training with Ukrainians. For instance, the decision by the Mozart Group shutter its operations in Ukraine came amid growing scrutiny of its murky legal status, in-fighting, perceived fraud, and some troubling comments made by one of its founders Andy Milburn. In other cases, groups like Ripley’s Heroes blurred the line between helping and trying to profit from donors. The organization also allegedly broke export laws and is under federal investigation, underscoring the importance of appropriate vetting.
Building on a Foundation of Success
Informal security assistance scored successes in the first year of Russia’s renewed invasion in part due to three key factors. First, crowdfunding efforts and leading organizations emphasize transparency. They track and publish where and how they spend their resources. Transparency engenders donor trust and spurs follow-on support.
Second, when it comes to private citizens assisting Ukraine, smaller is often better. A smaller organization means less overhead when financing assistance. Organizations that are smaller on the ground tend to be more efficient and responsive — translating into higher quality assistance — according to our discussions with Blue/Yellow and Christian Borys and Evgen Vorobiov, the founders of St. Javelin. Instead of dealing with layers of bureaucracy and contractors, smaller groups are flexible and can quickly solve problems through personal networks.
Third, successful informal security assistance is built on years of close and continuous relationships. Many organizations conveyed the value and credibility built by being present in Ukraine before 2022, which enabled faster donor responses and mobilization of networks and resources. U.S. National Guardsmen who trained Ukrainian soldiers in the aftermath of Russia’s 2014 intervention were instrumental in advising the Ukrainians in the first weeks of Putin’s full-scale invasion. Moreover, the California Air National Guard has advised the Ukrainian Air Force since 1993 through the State Partnership Program and is credited as an important relationship in keeping the Ukrainian Air Force highly adaptive and flying.
Improving Informal Security Assistance Efforts
Four policies are needed for the U.S. and Western governments to make informal security assistance more effective and cost-efficient.
First, policymakers can streamline International Traffic in Arms Regulations to prioritize groups sending assistance to Ukraine. Volunteers mentioned the State Department export process is mired in red tape and can cost them up to $2,500 per license, impeding the delivery of supplies to frontline Ukrainian forces. The State Department must place a “pause” and moratorium on certain export licenses and costs involving the movement of goods to Ukraine.
Second, the United States must leverage technology companies. Per our interview with Jonas Oehman, PayPal blocked electronic payments to Blue/Yellow in June 2022, because they “felt that we, at first were allowing friends/family payment types and then later we were told we were deemed a ‘risk’ because it looks like we supply weapons, but we don’t.” In January of 2023, the Russian government, according to Oehman, filed a complaint with Paychex and Amazon Web Services for “objectionable content” on the Blue/Yellow website to prevent donations. Such actions force them to seek alternative funding methods. The February 2023 announcement that Starlink was limiting the use of its systems for Ukrainian troops was not new. Several activists said SpaceX has been unresponsive to multiple repeated attempts to troubleshoot Starlink terminals for internet access near Russian frontlines since the summer of 2022, impeding Ukrainian communications. Concern about Elon Musk cultivating closer relations with Russia and advocating pro-Russian narratives gives many activists worries about Musk inhibiting pro-Ukrainian use of Twitter and Starlink. Congress should pressure companies to allow pro-Ukrainian groups to utilize vital services, and in the case of Space X, the White House should consider invoking the Defense Production Act to compel the provision of Starlink coverage.
Third, Congress and the Department of Defense — and many NATO allies — need to reform export laws concerning manuals and firing tables for certain weapon systems. In most cases, such information is not classified or top secret but is marked “Not for Export” or “Controlled Unclassified Information.” This creates a difficult dilemma for some NATO military members hamstrung by the laws of their own governments that limit their abilities to provide instructions to units using Western weapons and ammo. Weapon manuals come in many different languages, leaving Ukrainian units to translate them into Ukrainian or English. NATO could expedite translations or provide English manuals. Our team has identified the Ukrainian military using at least 18 western mortar and artillery systems (105mm, 120mm, and 155mm), over 28 unique projectiles, and 9 different propellants. Due to the unusual mix of Western weapons and mismatched rounds, more resources should be dedicated to model artillery and mortar distances at the U.S. Army Combat Capabilities Development Command Armaments Center. This would save Ukrainian units resources by not having to develop their own trial-and-error firing tables and reduce the number of tubes damaged each week due to incompatibility.
Finally, the U.S. can support concerted interagency efforts to integrate some non-governmental organizations and activists into long-term irregular statecraft strategies for Ukraine. Military planners could establish non-governmental organization coordination cells, providing them access to excess military airlift to help transport bulk goods and supplies. It would save volunteers thousands of dollars on international flights and excess baggage fees. Civil society and highly motivated volunteers bring substantial speed, power, and value in a crisis and should be accounted for in future irregular strategies.
Despite the entrepreneurial value of non-governmental organizations and volunteers — supplying frontlines units, collecting sensitive intelligence, and developing trusted sources and networks — several groups told us no U.S. government agency has reached out to them for information. As rising costs and fears of escalation continue to shape debates over military assistance to Ukraine, informal security assistance to Kyiv represents a long-term, low-cost irregular option to outcompete Russia and, more importantly, defend Ukraine’s territorial integrity. The fact that many view informal security assistance as little more than a hobby suggests the United States is missing a major opportunity.
Much, much, much more at the link!
That’s enough for tonight.
Your daily Patron!
There are no new Patron tweets or TikTok videos posted, so here’s some adjacent material from Ukrainian Army Cats and Dogs:
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— UkrARMY cats & dogs (@UAarmy_animals) April 17, 2023
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Open thread!
Anonymous At Work
If the officially-worst prognosticators of the cocktail circuit have their way and try to get Ukraine to “settle or else”, any appetite for serious security guarantees like, or including, Article 5?
Old School
Did McCarthy explain about the debt ceiling?
Anonymous At Work
@Old School: Start with “can” and work from there.
Andrya
Damn, Zelenskyy is one slick strategist. (If he played poker, nothing on earth would induce me to play poker with him.) Does everyone remember that Zelenskyy invited McCarthy to Ukraine in March and McCarthy (rudely) refused, saying he does not need to visit to determine if we are giving Ukraine a blank check? (link)
McCarthy has been trying to play both sides of the street- presenting himself as a Ukraine supporter to sane Republicans and crossover voters and presenting himself as anti-Ukraine to the MAGA/MTG types. By speaking as though McCarthy was Ukraine’s best friend, Zelenskyy has forced McCarthy to choose. If he goes MAGA/russian sympathizer it hurts the Republicans in 2024. If he accepts the pro-Ukraine role that Zelenskyy forced on him, well, he’ll have to support more aid packages, won’t he? And if he weasels (most likely he will, because he is a weasel “par excellence”) he alienates everybody.
Gin & Tonic
Uhm, yes.
PaulB
The thing that puzzles me about the “peace at any cost” people is that Russia’s leaders, along with various Russian pundits, influencers, etc., have made it clear that the Ukrainian effort is just phase one of rebuilding the old USSR, restoring Russia to its former greatness and influence. At various times, they’ve talked about moving on to Moldova, the Baltic states, even Poland.
None of this is hidden, or even much of a surprise, given Russian leadership, so why on earth would you want a peace deal that leaves Russia free to save face, continue to hold Ukrainian territory, and rebuild for another try in a year or two? If you stop them decisively at Phase 1, you’re not just restoring Ukrainian territory and sovereignty, you’re significantly reducing the chance that there will ever be a Phase 2.
If you’re serious about peace in Europe, then Russia’s dreams of imperial expansion have to be stopped now. What am I missing that these people don’t seem to get that? Or am I misinterpreting current events?
japa21
I am old enough to remember when everybody was going after Germany for not doing anything. How times have changed.
I had read that article referenced above in Foreign Affairs and the one 5 days prior. The earlier one was more “give Ukraine what it needs to win” but ultimately had a downer approach as well.
Yes, these people have the ears of policy makers, but so do proponents of “whatever they need, whatever they ask for, give it to them”.
A big argument right now is that we don’t want to get to a point of thrashing Russia so badly that Putin is deposed and Russia falls apart, because that would be bad. “Bad” is seldom defined. But that thinking was the same as, “If we do this, Putin will use nukes and WWIII will break out.” To which I say, so what? If we are afraid to do something for a country which is probably, as of now, more faithful to the core values that we supposedly espouse, then we should just fold up as a going concern.
Way back, when all this started and there was a lot of worry-warting going on, I wrote “Justwhat is the red-line that, if Putin crosses it, all bets are off?” Adam, you replied “That is the most important question.” Personally, I think the line has been crossed many times. And yes, to me stopping Putin now is worth risking WWIII, because if we don’t do it here, we will eventually, and probably sooner than later, be in WWIII anyway.
Gin & Tonic
@PaulB: You are not missing or misinterpreting anything.
Jay
The speed, flexibility and efficiency of most of these “informal” aid groups is based on several factors. First, they are on the ground, second they ask the fighters/civilians what they need, third they crowdfund both money to buy what is needed, and accept donations of what is needed, from a global talent pool, accumulated them, then make a delivery in civillian vehicles to the combat areas, often with no more protection than a basic bulletproof vest and a helmet. Sometimes from as far as Britain.
I think it was Myra, who delivered food, clothes and food to an elderly Grandmother in a razed but newly liberated town. She broke down in tears, a few of the remaining neighbors came out, she cooked them a meal, and then, once she trusted them, with the help of her neighbors, she showed them where her buried stash of crated mortar shells and ammo, that she had stolen from the Russians when they occupied her village was. So the aid group made an unplanned journey towards the front to deliver the ammo to the Georgian Legion.
My general response to anybody suggesting a truce/negotiated settlement is:
– so you want to give Russia time to rearm, rebuild their army and take another shot at genocide in a couple of years, right?
What part of Russia lies, Russia’s word is meaningless, Russia’s signature is worthless, don’t you understand by now?
oldster
Echoing Japa21, I am delighted to see that Germany is beginning to live up to some of its responsibilities. Of course I would like to see 180 Leopards instead of 18, and 200,000 shells of 155mm caliber instead of 20,000. Of course I wish they had sent it a year ago.
But the size of this tranche gives me hope that things are finally starting to change in Berlin. I may yet be forced to give them some credit for doing the right thing.
And thanks as always, Adam!
Jay
@oldster:
over 100 Leopard 1A5’s from Germany, Dutch and Danish stocks will be in Ukraine before the ground dries. They have the upgraded welded turret, fire control systems and other mods.
Being an older, less sophisticated tank, and having driven one, once they really are something that any tanker can pretty much jump in and run, with minimal training.
Andrya
@PaulB: You are exactly right, though I would add one other thing: the russian leadership doesn’t just talk about restoring the USSR, but restoring the russian empire. Both Finland and Poland were never considered part of russia, or the USSR, but they were for a time kingdoms ruled by the russian tsar. The Finns are armed to the teeth and ferociously supportive of Ukraine: they know that if (G-d forbid) putin pulls this off, he’s coming for Finland too.
Incidentally, I would recommend a great novel, “Deep River” by Karl Marlantes. Although fiction, it incorporates the family history of several Finnish families who emigrated to America to escape tsarist rule. The likeness to russian behavior in Ukraine is striking. (It also made me realize the wisdom of the founding fathers in forbidding the quartering of troops in private homes. The tsar did quarter russian troops in Finnish homes and the result was, for families with teenage daughters, non-stop, really dangerous in-home sexual harassment.)
Ksmiami
@japa21: totally agreed. We can’t live in fear of Putin, or he’s already won. We need to keep him afraid of us.
Another Scott
@japa21: I think you summarize the situation well.
The folks who are trying to carefully balance everything so that russia doesn’t implode remind me of baseball fans who watch a game on TV in their lucky clothes and sit in one place when things are going well, and another when things are going badly, to try to change their team’s luck.
If the last 70 years or so have taught us anything it’s that we over-estimate our ability to influence the actions of other nations at our peril. We in the USA or NATO aren’t going to determine how long VVP stays in power or who follows him. Russians are going to do that.
Russia’s future isn’t about us. Who they pick as their next leader, and all the rest, is about 99% irrelevant to what’s going on in Ukraine now.
If the grand words about “no changing borders by force” and all the rest mean anything, especially in Europe, then this is unprovoked (re)invasion by VVP is about the clearest test one could imagine.
VVP’s forces must leave Ukraine. That is the guidestar. The quicker that happens, the better.
Thanks.
Cheers,
Scott.
Anoniminous
Finland: When they had bugger all to fight with.
Betty
The term “catastrophic success” really threw me. How else would Putin be forced to accept defeat?
NutmegAgain
@Andrya: And I think it’s fair to say this underlies the Finn’s recent entry into NATO.
I have to admit, I’ve become so cynical about the veracity of anything that gets put out in public by Foreign Policy think tank types, State Dept officials, or anybody else that I don’t get alarmed when I read a smear of BS like, “Ukraine should happily bargain back 15% of its territory in exchange for getting the Russians to back down.” Yeah, as if. For one thing, that’s like giving your dog a bunch of hamburger each time it does a bad thing, then telling the dog (with words) not to do it again. Actions not words. My memories of lies told to the American public and everyone else go back to the Vietnam era, so it’s hard for me to grant any credibility to the successors of Kissinger, McNamara, & al. (And why is the old crank still alive, anyway? Um, justice please, universe.) Anyway, I fervently agree with all observations that it’s Ukraine’s decision to make.
topclimber
@Gin & Tonic: Ukraine is not going to go for any settlement that does not include NATO membership. That means changing the rule about stable borders as a prerequisite for joining NATO, unless in fact Ukraine wins outright. If they do, NATO will want to join them.
Mike in NC
I think Zelenskyy understands that the only people that McCarthy really cares about are M T Greene and Matt Gaetz.
Roger Moore
@PaulB:
What part of “at any price” are you failing to understand? They want peace at any price, which includes allowing dictators to get whatever they want by threatening war. IMO it gets back to the same wrongheaded definition of peace MLK was criticizing in “Letter from a Birmingham Jail”. These people confuse the negative peace that is an absence of violence with the positive peace that is the presence of justice. They don’t get that negative peace will never be long lived, because predators like Putin will always come back for more.
Anoniminous
Rumors are flying around the Twit-o-Sphere the Wagner Group has lost so many soldiers at Bakhmut it is now hors de combat and is being replaced by Russian Army units.
Dan B
@Anoniminous: Stunning numbers. Happiest, and most fierce country on earth.
Mike in NC
@Anoniminous: A monoplane called the Brewster Buffalo was developed shortly before WW2. It was intended for the US Navy and Marines, but was considered by them to be unflyable. The British took delivery of a bunch and had moderate success in the Med and Far East. The Finns, on the other hand, fell in love with that little crate and pretty much decimated the Soviet Air Force in the Winter War.
Anoniminous
@Dan B: And it caused the Soviet Union another 70 million or so casualties because it convinced Hitler they would be a push-over.
Roger Moore
@Roger Moore:
Replying to myself: the key thing with the “peace at any price” people is that the price is always paid by someone else. It’s very easy to propose preserving the peace when it’s another country being dismembered.
Anoniminous
@Mike in NC:
Here’s a good write-up of how the Buffalo did in Finnish hands.
Something gear-heads never get is a good-enough piece of equipment combined with crew motivation and superior tactics will generally prevail over “The Best” piece of equipment in mediocre hands.
Anoniminous
I didn’t think they could train-up on it that quickly.
Jay
@Anoniminous:
Wagner is still fighting in Bakhmut. They have long been supplimented by RU forces. What seems to be different now is that the previous RU Forces, (Spetnaz, Para’s, 155th Marines) have been replaced with new units, and these new units are being “embedded” with the Wagner groups, probably because the existing “premium” Wagner Groups have combat experience and better tactics.
Larch
Utterly pathetic that people like Haass and Kupchan can present themselves as foreign policy “experts” when they can’t recognize that Putin is never going to abide by any agreement, especially one brokered by the West. Even with superficial attention to international news, I could tell back when Putin took Crimea that he wasn’t going to stop.
PaulB
That’s my take on it, as well. And we certainly have ample evidence of this, given Putin’s history. You stop him here, and you stop him now, or you’ll face him again next year, and the year after that, and the year after that….
I wonder what the overlap is between (1) those advocating for Ukraine to give up territory for “peace”, (2) those who insisted that Ukraine wasn’t capable of holding off the Russian army so it should just pre-surrender, and (3) those who insisted before the war that there was no way that Russia was going to invade Ukraine, so why even think about it? I wouldn’t be surprised to find that the overlap between those three circles is substantial.
Geminid
Laura Rozen’s Twitter feed (@lrozen) had a couple interesting items today. One was a Reuters reports that Airman Texeira’s unit, the 102nd Intelligence Wing, had its intelligence mission suspended pending the outcome of an investigation by the Air Force’s Inspector General. The Air Force also announced that within 30 days all units will stand down for a day to go over security matters.
The second item concerned reporting on the projected sale by Egypt of rockets to Russia. It sounds like it was a real plan approved at a high level, but evidently it was shelved and instead Egypt ended up selling 152mm and 155mm artillery shells to the U.S. for use by Ukraine.
Jay
@Mike in NC:
the Brewster was overweight, underpowered, poorly used and tended to overheat in the Pacific.
the Finns stripped out a bunch of the armour, didn’t have any overheating issues, had a sky full of targets, better tactics and more experienced pilots.
Like the rest of the Soviet Military, the Soviet Airforce was commanded “top down” with no individual flexibility. They often sent their bomber groups in single squadron flights with no fighter escort.
Ruckus
@PaulB:
We have been at war in this country for most of my 70+ yrs. Some we were more involved in than others and the number of KIA has gone down/war since Vietnam, which had last count I know of, 58,202 dead. I am a veteran of the Vietnam era, didn’t get sent that direction but I could have been. I have friends that went. I know guys at the VA who were in the thick of it. My point is that this world needs to fix the concept that we all go to war for the hell of it, because hell is nicer than war. It can’t be any worse. And it is countries and assholes like vlad that cause a lot of them and it is people that profit highly from war that cheer every damn time because they make money off of war. No one should want to go to war and if they do they should volunteer as a moving target at a shooting range. Of course we also need to get rid of the fucking weapons of warfare that the asswipes that mostly would never ever join the Army or Marines to be in a war like to carry around to show how fucking tough they aren’t.
oldster
@Anoniminous:
That’s a fun read about the Brewster as used by the Finns.
Holding your fire until you are within 50 meters of the enemy plane? That takes nerves of ice.
Ruckus
@japa21:
THIS. Absolutely.
And if you read my above comment you’ll notice that I’m not a fan of war. It is an asinine concept, theft of life for greed. That is the only thing that fuels vlad, complete fucking greed. He can’t run what he’s got reasonably so he runs it at an enormous cost to most of his countries citizens. Lives, futures, families, human beings. vlad cares for none of that, he cares for his position in the world. And there is only one reason he has any position in the world. I’ll leave it up to your imagination to see what that reason is. And I’d bet there is a nefarious reason for his timing, he wants to go out a winner. And he does not give a damn about any of his citizens dying or any other humans in the world dying, as long as he gets his ego and bank account fluffed before his cancer ends him.
Ruckus
@Roger Moore:
Bravo!
That comment is a piece of art.
Thank You!
Ksmiami
@Ruckus: find his accounts using our banking system and freeze them /give the money to Ukraine.
Damien
Correct me if I’m wrong here, but the wars that guys like Haass and Kapchuck (the serious types, with gravitas) talked the US into starting/participating in directly took decades and trillions of dollars to achieve what exactly? And now that there’s a war going on that is actually fighting for something tangible, real, and powerful they get wobbly-knees after a single year of fighting that they aren’t even doing??
What a couple of wieners. They type to see a kid getting beaten by his dad and say “how about he stops hitting you for now but you agree to sleep in the yard for a month?” Just weak, weak weakness.
zhena gogolia
@Damien: You’re not wrong.
Tony G
Putin fan-boys on the “left” started predicting an imminent, massive Russian offensive back in December. Now we’re more than midway through April, more than a month after the beginning of mud season. Is it possible that they didn’t, and still don’t, know what they’re talking about?
Bupalos
In other words the only thing missing is everything. I can barely stand to read this kind of analysis, paragraph after paragraph with no reference to the actual structure of the actual invasion we’re talking about and it’s causes. For all one can tell from this tripe, we’re indeed talking about some arcane territorial dispute. And if we can just find a compromise that satisfies each side’s national self interest…
How can people think like this?
Jay
@Tony G:
Russia did mount a massive Winter Campaign, it just didn’t achieve much because of the weaknesses of the Russian Military after 9 months of war,
and the strength and skill of the Ukrainian defenders.
J R in WV
Thanks again for your work compiling this information for the world to learn from.
Today I learned that the Finns are very similar to the Ukrainians as far as motivation and fearlessly working towards total victory — so glad we appear to be on the same page with them, as long as we can keep the rodents working for VVPutin out of the control of our fragile democracy.
Mallard Filmore
@Jay: I thought Russia’s Winter Campaign failed because they dribbled in the new soldiers. They could not feed, equip, arm, supply a large surge.
Jay
@Mallard Filmore:
That was part of it. They also:
amongst other things,……
way2blue
@PaulB:
Garry Kasparov has been saying this for years—the longer you delay in stopping Putin the harder & more costly it will be to do so. With the West’s weak response to Russia’s land grab in 2014 being a case in point.
LosGatosCA
@Larch:
Richard Haass is a moral vacuum and a menace to our national security.
Carlo Graziani
There’s another key thing missing, which you would expect real-world U.S realists (as opposed to “Realists”) to recognize: Putinist Russia was hard at work in the employment of hybrid warfare against the U.S. and its allies well before February 2022. It is correctly described in the latest U.S. National Security Strategy document as a “revisionist power” that identifies its national interest with destabilizing the Western democracy-dominated international architecture, and has been pursuing that goal—to the extent of providing support to a U.S. President who attempted to ring down the curtain on the American democratic project, and of still supporting information ops that undermine our politics.
Even if one didn’t give a shit about the fate of Ukraine as an independent state, you would think that U.S. “Realist” thinkers would be pondering whether it is a good idea to allow Putinist Russia to get away from it’s catastrophic mistake without exacting the maximum possible long-term damage, if only to ensure that the inevitable Russian return to its program of hybrid warfare against the West should be as crippled as can be managed. After all, it’s not as if there’s no recent historical precedent for such an outlook: the policy of supporting Afghan resistance to bleed the Soviet Union to debility springs to mind.
But evidently, if you thought that well of Realists, you would be wrong. These people were either not watching TV on 6 January 2021, or simply could not comprehend or acknowledge who was the original sender of that fuck-you turd-o-gram.
Real “Realism” would look beyond the Ukraine battlefield, to the necessity of dealing Putinism a mortal blow. Realists can’t bring themselves to that wider perspective. They are very small-bore thinkers, in the end.
paul w, of roscoe village chicago
adam, you are providing a valuable service, both here and in your professional life. i agree with you on all the important stuff save one (give them everything they need goddammit, including f 16s, and that beltway weasels ought to shut the fuck up, especially in public forums). unfortunately, the one point on which this old viet nam vet disagrees, is a big one-i just think putin’s superior numbers will be just too much in the end. i hope that i’m wrong and will be exceedingly happy if i am. but i would never say it as out loud as these dc jerks do.