(Image by NEIVANMADE)
I just want to follow up on my comment from WG’s de-lurking post earlier. Specifically I want to post it here:
Just want to let everyone know that even when I’m busiest and don’t hang out in the comments of my Ukraine war update posts, I still read all the comments. And as I mentioned, I’m basically not around for doing other posts or commenting in other front pagers’ posts because between the projects I’m working for work and those updates, I’ve got no time to do so.
Unfortunately I only have so much time and energy/bandwidth. In terms of Balloon Juice, this is the priority to spend it on.
Last night in comments, commenter Maxim asked:
It is very frustrating that we have been so slow to reach this point with the jets and training. Was there some myopic thinking that Russia would give up, or that Ukraine would win without this becoming a necessity? (Rhetorical questions.) Risk aversion, sure, don’t rattle the loony-nukes dictator too much, but we should have understood this was inevitable and been better prepared. And not waited until there was the risk of it being too little, too late.
My professional opinion is that the beltway consensus was that the Russian army was what we had assessed it to be: professional, properly resourced and equipped, and powerful. Another part of the beltway consensus was that despite Ukrainian resolve their was no way they would withstand having the bulk of that force thrown at them. These two beliefs, which we now know like much of the beltway’s deeply held convictions are just wrong, were exacerbated and enhanced by the fact that Russia won the information war around Ukraine back in 2014 and almost every policy discussion and almost all of the news reporting was being done within the informational shaping that Russia had successfully undertaken. This includes everything from views of Russia’s military to views of Ukraine and the Revolution of Dignity to taking Russia’s nuclear weapons and usage doctrine exactly as Russia wanted us to. And that’s not an inclusive list.
The first strategic assessment I did on Russian and Ukraine was started in January 2014 for my boss, the Commanding General of US Army Europe. I began it because we had an initially meeting to discuss what was going on on, if I’m recalling correctly, the evening of 14 January 2014. And that meeting’s discussion was held within Russia’s framing of what it was doing, what the EuroMaidan Movement/Revolution of Dignity was, etc. I knew something was off based on what I knew about Putin, his ties to Soviet and post-Soviet Russian organized crime, his rise through politics as a result, his activities in Chechnya and Georgia and Syria, his remarks at the Munich Security Conference in 2007, and his rhetoric regarding the Russian elections in 2011. So I went to work to make sure that the Old Man, the Deputy Commanding General who is now the Commanding General at USAREUR, the rest of the command group, and the senior staff had the proper context to understand what was going on. I also assessed what Putin would likely try to do once he got past the Sochi Olympics and the spring gave way to summer and mud season ended. My boss pushed this up to his boss – the Commanding General of US European Command/Supreme Allied Commander Europe – and I was notified by one of the colonels on the latter’s staff that it was made the read of the week for the command. Despite having far more knowledgable subject matter experts than I on these issues, such as Dr. Hill, working in even more senior appointments than my non-political one back in 2014 (her National Security Staff political appointment was at least at the SES 3 level, my Office of Secretary of Defense and Department of the Army non-political appointments were supervisory GS15), my impression is far too few people are able to recognize that the vast, vast majority of news reporting from legitimate news outlets and far too much of the discussion of what is going on in, to, by, and with Ukraine is being done from within Russia’s informational framing.
I don’t think that problem has been resolved. And when you combine it with the risk aversion of President Biden’s folks you get the problem we’ve been discussing. Frankly, it is one of the major reasons I do these updates so that there is one (more) place that is working to push back on Russia’s framing and shaping of the information domain.
Here is President Zelenskyy’s address from earlier today. Video below, English transcript after the jump.
In Hiroshima, Ukraine was indeed an honored participant in the G7’s work, and the topic of Ukraine was principal – President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s address.
21 May 2023 – 21:02
Fellow Ukrainians!
We are finishing this very difficult yet very important week. On Friday, we had the Arab League. On Saturday and Sunday – G7 plus Ukraine and an expanded format – seven plus partners, including the Global South, plus Ukraine. It was intense.
The world hears our position. Protection and security guarantees, the return of all our territories, all our people, justice, the implementation of our Peace Formula… We have an understanding with the world majority on every important point for Ukraine. And together we will increase Ukraine’s potential.
This Saturday was Science Day in Ukraine, and the more opportunities we give to Ukraine, the more we give to everyone who works in this noble field. I congratulate all our scientists!
Today, on Sunday, here in Hiroshima, Ukraine was a truly honored participant in the work of the G7. The topic of Ukraine is principal, the respect for all Ukrainians is special. I am thankful to the G7!
Meeting with President Biden – and, as always, we become stronger after such talks. Meeting with the leader of Indonesia – meaningful. Meeting with the President of the Republic of Korea – there is potential for strong relations. Meeting with Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau – thank you, Justin. I also spoke with the leaders of Vietnam and Australia. We spoke separately and in detail with the Prime Minister of Japan – we will enhance cooperation.
There was also a very important ceremony and address at the Peace Memorial Museum in Hiroshima…
Our unity with the world, our protection for Ukrainians, and our strength – the strength of the Ukrainian state – will also be the most worthy tribute to the memory of our people of different generations, whose lives have been broken and trampled by Russian evil, by this long-standing tyranny that changes its form but kills equally brutally.
Today is the Day of Remembrance of the Victims of Political Repression… the Day of Remembrance of all those who were killed in times of the Soviet regime. Let us not forget what happened, let us not forget whom we lost, and let us not forget that we must be strong.
And we will always be.
Glory to Ukraine!
Mr. President, what the people of Ukraine are defending and what you've achieved is a matter for the entire world to observe.
I speak for America when I say that we're in awe of what you've done so far. pic.twitter.com/uPKsTXAJW0
— President Biden (@POTUS) May 21, 2023
This is the correct framing:
Here's the video: https://t.co/GM5Grxob7r
— Michael Weiss (@michaeldweiss) May 21, 2023
As is this and, frankly given the source, I am very surprised:
Russian propaganda is going crazy over the fact that Sullivan calls the strikes on Crimea legitimate as this is Ukrainian territory. These guys keep getting funnier. pic.twitter.com/cBRUYH17n7
— Maria Avdeeva (@maria_avdv) May 21, 2023
This gets to what I was referring to in my answer above the jump. These are exactly the answers that should be given every time Putin, Lavrov, whomever makes a threat or declares a red line. However, until recently this has not been the case. While hope is not a strategy, it would be nice if they’ve finally recognized that the US, NATO, our non-NATO allies and partners have to work within and promote our own framing of Russia and its actions and not work within Russia’s.
Bakhmut:
We have a statement from Colonel General Syrskyi posted at the Ukrainian MOD’s Telegram channel:
Is there anyone who is old enough to remember that was the original goal of this 10-day special military operation featuring a year-long battle for (what’s left of) an average regional town?
— Illia Ponomarenko 🇺🇦 (@IAPonomarenko) May 21, 2023
The 93rd Separate Motorized Brigade, the Kholodny Yar Brigade, brings us this update from Bakhmut:
Наші "очі" в Бахмуті – оператор дрона із позивним "Єнот" – не лише розвідує місце знаходження противника і коригує нашу арти. Він ще фіксує, як гине місто від дій російських окупаційних військ. pic.twitter.com/gGNdzxJOeX
— 93ОМБр (@93OMBr1) May 21, 2023
Here is the machine translation of their tweet:
Our “eyes” in Bakhmut – a drone operator with the call sign “Raccoon” – not only scouts the location of the enemy and adjusts our artillery. He also records how the city is dying from the actions of the Russian occupying forces.
Unbelievably, there are still civilians, even children trapped in Bakhmut. Some are desperate to escape. Others are what Ukrainians refer to as "zhduny," meaning "the waiting ones," those waiting for Russia. I also know a few people are left in Ivanivske, where I used to teach. https://t.co/8tMSSpPEYG
— Christopher Miller (@ChristopherJM) May 21, 2023
Here is a machine translation of the Ministry of Internal Affairs tweet that Christopher Miller is retweeting:
❗️ Bahmut. Operational information.
Police and military personnel continue to evacuate people under the target fire of the enemy. This time — ten people, including a 14-year-old child.
The rescue operation was successful, but it was difficult because of the mined road and shelling by the occupiers.
Video of Ukrainian SSO during the battle of Bakhmut. https://t.co/4dSRY6aAKMhttps://t.co/xFCfxVhlgs pic.twitter.com/SLkFc1DyzY
— Rob Lee (@RALee85) May 21, 2023
Since the author of this account uses a pseudonym, I can’t validate his statement about covering a lot of wars or what his expertise for doing so would be, but based on my own professional education and experience I think this is a good take.
In all honesty, I have covered many wars in several decades and I can say that I haven't seen in a long time a more hysteric way to declare "victory" as we see now around Bakhmut. And I'm not even into the semantics whether Russians hold 95%, 98% or 100%. The very fact that they… pic.twitter.com/zYrHZ2Cwox
— (((Tendar))) (@Tendar) May 21, 2023
Full text of Tendar’s tweet:
In all honesty, I have covered many wars in several decades and I can say that I haven’t seen in a long time a more hysteric way to declare “victory” as we see now around Bakhmut. And I’m not even into the semantics whether Russians hold 95%, 98% or 100%. The very fact that they phrase it that way is hilarious in its own.
As I have mentioned already few days ago, Russians do not intend to move any further, or more precisely, they are not capable to move any further, which simply begs the question what was this all about. What strategic value offers Bakhmut in itself? The answer is simple. None. This fact was even stated by Prigozhin, Strelkov and others. It is a military travesty, aiming only for political games of the involved Russian warlords.
The Ukrainian strategy on the other side has been coherent and quite clear. First, to deny Russians entry to Sloviansk and Kramatorsk, secondly, bind Russian forces and prepare for their counteroffensive and, third, in the process decimating their ranks, which – when reflecting 100,000 Russian casualties – they have achieved with flying colors. The only threat was a potential encirclement of Bakhmut with the subsequent destruction of the Ukrainian armies in it, but that was averted and Russians were forced to run against the heaviest fortification, a stupidity in itself and exactly how Ukrainian strategist can ask for.
Ukrainians have even achieved additional tactical advantages by binding additional Russian forces in Bakhmut. Russians were so obsessed with Bakhmut that they were depleting lines and more importantly ammunition in Kreminna, Svatove, Avdiivka and Vuhledar. Literally every single one of those named areas ended in total disasters. Especially, Vuhledar can be called an epic fail.
However, when you look at the numbers than you can see that Bakhmut was actually the worst sector for Russians, because for the sake of just “staying in this area” it makes literally no difference whether you stay inside Bakhmut or 7km more to the East, because this is their pathetic “progress” in almost 10 months. It is however a complete difference when you have those 100,000 men and millions of artillery shells at your disposal. Even some Russians are starting to realize this.
You do not have to take my word, the developments in battlefield will say this in the clearest language. History is full of examples where political lunatics forced their military leaders into steps which any sane military commander would never have done. The terms “pyrrhic victory, second Stalingrad etc.” have been used more than once. Maybe we will even add “Bakhmut victory” to the books. It certainly deserves a place in military idiocy.
Russia will:
C̶a̶p̶t̶u̶r̶e̶ ̶K̶i̶e̶v̶ ̶&̶ ̶a̶l̶l̶ ̶o̶f̶ ̶U̶k̶r̶a̶i̶n̶e̶
̶J̶u̶s̶t̶ ̶K̶h̶e̶r̶s̶o̶n̶,̶ ̶O̶d̶e̶s̶s̶a̶ ̶&̶ ̶t̶h̶e̶ ̶D̶o̶n̶b̶a̶s̶
̶J̶u̶s̶t̶ ̶K̶h̶e̶r̶s̶o̶n̶ ̶&̶ ̶t̶h̶e̶ ̶D̶o̶n̶b̶a̶s̶
̶J̶u̶s̶t̶ ̶t̶h̶e̶ ̶D̶o̶n̶b̶a̶s̶ ̶
Bakhmut which was the plan all along— Darth Putin (@DarthPutinKGB) May 21, 2023
Bucha:
In Bucha, Vokzalna Street, where a column of russian tanks was destroyed in February 2022, has been rebuilt.
The column was passing through Bucha to Irpin, and from there the russians planned to go to Kyiv to “take it in 3 days.”📷Ruslan Kravchenko pic.twitter.com/sYC19kBHX2
— Defense of Ukraine (@DefenceU) May 21, 2023
Marinka:
Video of UAVs operated by Ukraine’s SSO dropping grenades on Russian soldiers in Marinka. https://t.co/nhWU7fGSqK pic.twitter.com/EpMEN7SlIo
— Rob Lee (@RALee85) May 21, 2023
Bilohorivka, Donetsk:
The 8th battalion of the 10th brigade of Ukraine repels Russian attack near Bilohorivka, Donetsk region. As said, 3 Russian BMPs destroyed, 1 damaged. https://t.co/srnImPEaR7 pic.twitter.com/HA3pZLFeZY
— Special Kherson Cat 🐈🇺🇦 (@bayraktar_1love) May 21, 2023
Pevomaiskoye:
The 9th battalion, the 59th brigade of Ukraine repels the attack of Russians in Pervomaiskoye, near Donetsk. https://t.co/zleLStsv57 pic.twitter.com/G86YRZY3p8
— Special Kherson Cat 🐈🇺🇦 (@bayraktar_1love) May 21, 2023
Ouch!
The Black Sea:
THIS IS RUMINT, BUT I’VE NOW SEEN IT POSTED BY SEVERAL RELIABLE SOURCES, THAT SAID CONTINUE TO TREAT IT AS RUMINT!
Unofficial reports appear that Ukraine downed Russian Su-35 over Black Sea. Prior to this, plane bombed Kherson Region. pic.twitter.com/kLVFGXm9D1
— Maria Avdeeva (@maria_avdv) May 21, 2023
Former Naval Aviator and now think tanker Brynn Tannehill has some more detailed thoughts on the F-16 news. First tweet is from her thread, the rest of the thread is copied and pasted from the Thread Reader App:
Lot of virtual ink being spilled on F-16s to Ukraine over the past few days. It's looking like it will become a reality. So, let's discuss some of the capabilities, challenges, limitations, and best potential uses of the aircraft. 1/n
— Brynn Tannehill (@BrynnTannehill) May 21, 2023
The thread below provides a fair bit of technical information on the aircraft. But the short version is that ~60 former NATO F-16A/B Mid-Life Update aircraft are in storage, and are the most readily available airframes. 2/nThe big things to take away that are important to further discussion at that they’re AIM-120 AMRAAM, JASSM, and LINK-16 capable. They also use the AN/APG66V2A radar, which is close to obsolescent (Pulse Doppler, not phased array, PESA, or AESA like modern radars). 3/nSo, some things that represent challenges for Ukraine to employ F-16s were written up by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) in a report from March 2023. Well worth a full read, but I’ll summarize here. (Thanks to you-know-who for sending) 4/n* Adapting Defense Structure: Ukraine was still in the process of changing from Soviet military doctrine to something closer to NATO when the war started. This includes their air force. This could impact effective employment of a NATO aircraft. 5/n* Pilot training: This was highlighted, but is one of the most surmountable problems. Putting Ukrainian pilots through just the training they need appears to take about 4 months, and lots of countries are volunteering. 6/nLeaked U.S. Report Says Basic F-16 Training For Ukrainian Pilots Could Take Just Four MonthsAn official U.S. Air Force assessment on training Ukrainian pilots has leaked as pressure builds to send Western fighter jets to Ukraine.https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/basic-f-16-training-for-ukrainian-pilots-could-take-just-four-monthsMaintaining and Sustaining Aircraft: I did a thread about this. It takes time and a mountain of parts to fully sustain an aircraft. Maintainers take time to train as well. This could be partially mitigated by contract maintainers, and leaning on Poland and Romania for support 7/nHowever, I would caution that electronic parts for elderly aircraft like these F-16 MLUs are hard to come by, as they’ve been out of production for a decade+. If they break, and you run out of spares, you’re going to have to micro-manufacture it in a workshop. 8/nMunitions: Who is going to provide what? AIM-120s are $1.2M a copy. The 2023 NDAA didn’t allocate any $$ for HARM. Is the US willing to provide early model JASSM? Thankfully, the F-16 Block 20 doesn’t need mods to employ them, but it is a challenge. 9/nFinancing: Where will the money for operation and sustainment come from? Operating these aircraft is likely to be more expensive than older MiG-29s, Su-24s, and Su-27s in Ukrainian inventory. This has to be budgeted for, w/legal authority. Surmountable, but a consideration. 10/nThe other piece that gets lost in this is more technical considerations. Simply put, neither Ukraine or Russia wants to go in each others air space because the air defenses are so lethal. Ukraine has scored kills with Patriot and S-300s. Russia has lots of even nastier stuff 11/nRussian ground based air defenses are lethal enough that the idea of flying old F-16s within their envelope is suicidal. Drawing them down with legacy aircraft not optimized for the SEAD mission with HARM would be long, brutal, and have a significant chance of failure. 12/nThis is why we see Ukrainian aircraft nap-of-the-earth flying, lobbing munitions, and getting out of dodge without ever crossing the front lines. They’re using terrain to mask them from defenses. 13/nThe other massive threat is Russian MiG-31s and Su-35s flying with long range R-37 missiles. These have been particularly lethal against Ukrainian MiG-29s and Su-27s. These Russian aircraft can see further and shoot at longer range than the F-16 MLUs 14/nMost people imagine modern air combat to look like Top Gun. In reality, it’s mostly fought Beyond Visual Range (BVR). The guy with the more powerful radar and longer range missiles usually wins. Dogfighting is something of an afterthought, even in training. 15/nWhile we paid a price for this thinking in Vietnam, radars and missiles (and the situation) have evolved such that in Ukraine air-to-air combat has played out as BVR only, and the Russians are consistently winning fights with bigger better radars and longer range missiles. 16/nThe F-16 MLU doesn’t change this equation. It’s small, antique APG-66 radar can’t see as far as bigger, more modern Russian radars on the MiGs and Sukhois. The R-37 has a significantly longer range than the AIM-120C. And it (potentially) gets worse. 17/nRussia has A-50 AEW&C aircraft for long range detection, targeting and cuing. Ukraine doesn’t have an equivalent. If they did, it might allow Ukraine to fire AIM-120s at data-linked targets without turning on their APG-66 radars, mitigating radar counter-detection. 18/nThe video below explores how this might play out in a simulated environment, even assuming that something (like a Patriot Battery) can provide data link cuing for an F-16 equipped with AIM-120s vs a MiG-31 with R-37s. 19/nMind you, I think the F-16 driver in this did just about all they could. Another sim with “Growling Sidewinder” (who is very good) has him getting splattered over and over again like Tom Cruise in Edge of Tomorrow. 20/nI used to work for the Air Force on their sims to train F-16 pilots in air-to-air combat, from 2012-2015. These videos (particularly the first) are (in my opinion) a fair representation of the challenges faced by F-16s in Ukraine. 21/nI do not believe that giving Ukraine F-16s is sufficient to allow them to achieve even temporary, local air superiority with pulsed ops. However, I do see several potential tactical advantages over the current situation. They aren’t useless. 22/n1. First is that the combination of Patriot’s modern radar, plus data link of targets, will increase survivability of the F-16s, and improve lethality against targets such as cruise missiles, improving Ukrainian defenses against attack. 23/n2. Somewhat improved long term sustainability. As hard as it is to obtain F-16s parts and technical expertise from the manufacturer, it’s still easier than obtaining it for Russian made MiG-29s and Su-27s. 24/n3. It continues the work of integrating Ukrainian equipment, tactics, doctrine, and data sharing with NATO standard systems. If there is to be long term security for Ukraine, I believe NATO membership is a must. One of the requirements for joining is compatibility. 25/n4. Most important, to my mind, is it facilitates Ukraine obtaining and using the AGM-158 Joint Air to Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM). Broadly similar to the StormShadow, JASSM would provide additional long range strike capability against difficult targets. 26/nIt would also facilitate use of the LRASM missile, which is basically JASSM but for anti-shipping work. Even a relatively small number of either of these could dramatically shift the balance of power in the Black Sea (particularly LRASM). 27/nThus, I’m not opposed to moving F-16s to Ukraine. I think its a good thing overall. But, I think people need to be clear eyed in their assessment of the capabilities and limitations of the system. This is not a wunderwaffe. 28/nIt’s a 35-40 year old lightweight multi-role fighter with a mid-90s upgrade to some mission systems. It is capable of linking to other NATO standard systems, and can carry some more modern weapons. It is not going to grant air superiority. 29/nUkraine isn’t going to be loitering over the battlefield dropping JDAMs the way the US did in Afghanistan and Iraq. It may potentially help with the SEAD (suppression of enemy air defenses) mission, but it won’t draw down most of Russia’s air defenses. 30/nBut, in combination with JASSM, LRASM and AIM-120, it could significantly improve Ukraine’s position overall in areas that are critical (defense against cruise missiles, long range strike, and sea control). – fin 31/n
On the third Sunday of May, Ukraine marks the Day of Remembrance of the Victims of Political Repression.
The great terror, which claimed the lives of hundreds of thousands of people in Ukraine alone, was the major tactic used by the communist state to hold power over conquered…— Defense of Ukraine (@DefenceU) May 21, 2023
Full text of the above tweet:
On the third Sunday of May, Ukraine marks the Day of Remembrance of the Victims of Political Repression.
The great terror, which claimed the lives of hundreds of thousands of people in Ukraine alone, was the major tactic used by the communist state to hold power over conquered peoples for 70 years. Today, the putin dictatorship has adopted it.
May 21 marks the anniversary of the Circassian genocide and exile. As a result of the russian empire's conquest of the Caucasus, up to 1.5 million Circassians were slaughtered or forced to flee. Since the 19th century, nothing has changed. The only choice given by the russians to… pic.twitter.com/VvHftUKuo0
— Defense of Ukraine (@DefenceU) May 21, 2023
Here’s the full text of the MOD’s tweet:
May 21 marks the anniversary of the Circassian genocide and exile. As a result of the russian empire’s conquest of the Caucasus, up to 1.5 million Circassians were slaughtered or forced to flee. Since the 19th century, nothing has changed. The only choice given by the russians to the conquered peoples is forced assimilation or genocide.
That’s enough for tonight.
Your daily Patron!
For whatever reason, the link of the new video at Patron’s official TikTok still won’t embed properly here, so just click through to watch it.
Open thread!
Obvious Russian Troll
I really appreciate these, Adam.
John Revolta
it was made the read of the week for the command.
Dude! You went viral!
lowtechcyclist
I was going to ask you what you thought of Tannehill’s thread about the F16s, now I guess I don’t have to. Not a game-changer, then, but can make a difference in conjunction with the proper accessories.
Nukular Biskits
As always, Adam, great read.
I particularly appreciate the inclusion of the discussion about providing F-16s. I had seen Brynn Tannehill’s tweet’s elsewhere but it’s nicely laid out here, making it more readable.
Adam L Silverman
@Obvious Russian Troll: You’re most welcome. Thank you for the kind words.
Adam L Silverman
@John Revolta: Before there was such a thing!
Adam L Silverman
@lowtechcyclist: I’m planning on asking my former boss, who is also a naval aviator – F/A-18s and he was a Commander Air Group (CAG) – and see what he says and if I can post it here.
Adam L Silverman
@Nukular Biskits: You’re most welcome too!
Alison Rose
Nice to see Dark Brandon back in action. Here’s hoping his prediction proves very very true.
That Darth putin tweet is funny, but also kind of gut-wrenching. All of this destruction and terror and pain they’ve rained down on Ukraine, and for what? What will russia end up with? Sometimes I wish time travel existed so I could find out when and where putin’s parents met and kidnap one of them beforehand and drop them off halfway around the globe.
Thank you as always, Adam.
lowtechcyclist
@Adam L Silverman:
Thanks, additional perspectives are always appreciated!
One other thing Tannehill mentioned in answer to comments from others was that A-10s would not be able to survive in this environment, which made sense to me, given everything else she was saying about the aerial combat environment.
Chetan Murthy
I am unqualified to judge this (long, but very informative) thread by this former very-experienced F-16/F-15 maintainer. It’s kinda dour, sigh.
https://nitter.net/TJOSInt/status/1659757656997871619#m
Adam L Silverman
@Chetan Murthy: I think the key piece is his third to last tweet explaining these are not getting to Ukraine until after the war is over.
karen marie
You are my personal hero.
Thank you.
Greg
Saw this thread on maintenance of the F-16. The challenges are large.
https://twitter.com/TJOSInt/status/1659757656997871619?t=63LnMok1ziadBg2ooEzTsQ&s=19
Chetan Murthy
@Adam L Silverman: Yes: Link
Everything else in the thread is the argument, the evidence that leads to this conclusion. I was especially troubled by his description of a line of runway maintainers walking arms length apart looking for every single pebble or other kind of trash on the runway, doing that several times a day.removing every weed, patching every crack etc.
Anonymous At Work
Who are these “waiting ones,” the civilians in Bakhmut are waiting for Russians? If they are loyal to Russians, why would the Ukrainians allow them to stay, given their potential for betrayal?
Chetan Murthy
@Chetan Murthy: his description of the MIG 29 and how it is specifically designed to avoid foreign objects entering the engine during takeoff/landing was also very interesting, and of course troubling.
Chetan Murthy
@Anonymous At Work: I think the answer is that Ukrainians are not like Russians: they’re not going to deport people for their beliefs. And since those “waiting ones” haven’t actually done anything to collaborate with Russians, it really does just come down to beliefs.
Chetan Murthy
@Anonymous At Work: several months ago there were a few videos of relief workers bringing food to civilians in Bahamut. I remember that there was discussion in the videos about these waiting ones, and the relief workers could tell, they could see that these people were waiting for the Russians.This didn’t change anything, the relief worker still brought them food.
Anonymous At Work
@Chetan Murthy: Well, their choice, as long as no active collaboration. I just can’t imagine waiting through all of THAT, patiently, without doing anything one way or another.
El Cruzado
The Russians seem to be losing at least a modern plane or two a week, and I’m sure they are not so oversupplied with those as they are with artillery rounds.
Since I doubt they can make many (any?) more of those with the sanctions and their general dysfunction going on, at which point does the Russian air force start running out of good planes itself?
Goku (aka Amerikan Baka)
@Chetan Murthy:
Would the air intakes of the F/A-18 Hornets I’ve seen mentioned be as vulnerable as the F-16’s apparently are? If not, why weren’t those chosen instead?
ETA: I confess I didn’t read that Twitter thread. Didn’t have the heart
Chetan Murthy
@Goku (aka Amerikan Baka): this is interesting about aircraft carriers and foreign objects: https://www.businessinsider.com/jet-mishaps-show-difficulty-of-aircraft-carrier-flight-operations-2022-8
One of the things that maintainer writes about is that the Mig 29 has two separate engines and if one is destroyed the other can continue to function. The F-16 of course only has one engine, and if it is destroyed, the plane becomes a lawn dart.
Chetan Murthy
@Goku (aka Amerikan Baka): read the thread: It’s very informative. Seriously.
Another Scott
@Chetan Murthy: IIRC, the JR folks walk the Shinkhansen tracks every day, to make sure there are no issues that would affect the bullet trains. It’s labor intensive, but obviously can be done.
Seeing the threads tonight on the F-16 issues, I’m reminded that a Navy F/A-18 was blown off the deck of the Harry S Truman last year:
It was blown off the carrier on Friday July 8, 2022. In less than a month, they recovered it in 9500 feet of water.
The US military can and does move very quickly when it’s possible to do so. If important things aren’t moving quickly, there are typically reasons for it and those reasons may not be mentioned in reporting about it.
Thanks Adam, and everyone.
Cheers,
Scott.
Freemark
@lowtechcyclist: Not completely true. A-10s would be shot down, but Ukrainians are flying those missions right now with less capable aircraft . The A-10 would be a significant improvement for them in pilot survivability and improved attack capabilities. Part of the problem is since Vietnam we’ve become accustomed to essentially never losing any aircraft that even one loss is considered too much. But there is also the fact that the A-10 is really only useful in a ground attack role. The F-16 has more capabilities and Ukraine needed to focus their effort on getting one aircraft.
zhena gogolia
The replies on the Anton Gerashchenko tweet are fabulous. I like the one where Biden and Zelenskyy are kicking TFG’s and Putler’s asses.
dmsilev
For the F-16s, would the picture be significantly different with newer versions of the type? Better radars, that sort of thing. We might well see a similar pattern as with tanks, “OK, we’ll give you some older models. OK, now that you are getting the older models and the world hasn’t come to the end, why don’t we also give you something a bit more up to date.”.
Goku (aka Amerikan Baka)
@Chetan Murthy:
I see the F/A-18 Hornet has twin engines and is capable of taking off from the ground, not just a carrier. Wouldn’t this have been a better alternative than the F-16?
@Chetan Murthy:
I’ll try
Ruckus
I believe that the concept for F-16s for Ukraine was that they are good planes that are no longer up to the standards that the US considers their planes need to be up to. We are several lines ahead of the F-16 now, they are becoming surplus items. And the thing is we have to compare them to what Ukraine is using now and has enough spare parts for to continue to fly. And is the F-16 a better plane than what they have and can the numbers be big enough to be better than the current planes, which has a slight issue with spare parts because it was made by the country attacking them. Ukraine has to be in this for the long haul, not that it is going to end next week. If vlad is insane (and it seems like it..) is he going to give up before he runs out of bodies and ammo? I don’t get that impression. He is ill and is reported to have a not insignificant cancer so maybe he’ll die soon. Will that end the war? And if not what then?
But the big question is, can the F-16 make a difference and can enough be provided to make the situation better. It was built in large numbers, spare parts are likely available and the US is past this as a mainline fighter.
Tehanu
I don’t always read these posts in their entirety, because it’s often very painful to read about the continuing horribleness, but I do at least check the first couple of paragraphs every day. Thank you, Adam, I just want you to know your work is appreciated.
YY_Sima Qian
Great thread by Brynn Tannehill.
I had not realized that the F-16A/B MLU spares for electronics are so sparse now a days.
However, the ROCAF (Taiwanese Air Force) has been one of the world’s largest operators of F-16A/B MLUs, & it is in the process of having them further upgraded to AESA radars, as well as other modernizations of electronics. That should create a ready source of spares for any that go to Ukraine. Surely the US can arrange to obtain the older electronics stripped off Taiwanese F-16A/Bs, & quietly send them to Ukraine w/ the fighters. It will have to be done quietly, the US can serve as the middle man. Involving Taiwan & Ukraine directly would be far more trouble that it is worth.
F-16A/B MLUs’ pulse doppler radar (slotted planar arrays) are still much better than the MiG-29s & Su-27s that Ukraine has been flying, w/ totally obsolete pulse doppler radars (Twist Cassegrain).
I also think Tannehill is overhyping the threat of the R-37 AAMs present to maneuverable fighters. Those big missiles have very long range, but are not very maneuverable at the terminal phase, & are primarily intended to target opponent’s lumbering AWACS & tanker aircraft. If Ukrainian fighters were getting shot down by the R-37s at long ranges, they were likely being caught completely unawares. I wonder how obsolete the radar warning receivers on the Ukrainian MiGs & Sukhois are. The F-16A/Bs should have much more modern RWRs, & should be able to integrate more modern jamming pods.
Just another boomer
Adam, as you point out, the MSM accepts Russian framing and terms in concepts both large and small. Today’s WaPo has a big story on Ukrainians raiding across the “Dnieper River” instead of the Ukrainian “Dnipro.” Quite a few commenters make the correction.
A comedian once pointed out “War is God’s way of teaching Americans geography” but we’re incorrigible. And don’t get me started on “Afghani.”
Alison Rose
@zhena gogolia: I still maintain that I’d love to see this shit ended by a one-on-one between Zelenskyy and putin.
Chetan Murthy
@Goku (aka Amerikan Baka): i don’t have any topical knowledge, i’m just repeating what I’ve read elsewhere. So, just like you. Here are a couple more links I found about American planes versus Soviet planes.
https://www.quora.com/How-can-Russian-fighter-planes-not-be-subject-to-foreign-object-damage-as-planes-of-American-design-seem-to-be-It-would-appear-that-Russian-planes-have-a-substantive-design-benefit
https://hushkit.net/2017/03/28/the-barrel-and-the-griffon-saab-j-29-tunnan-and-jas-39-gripen-compared-part-1/
Some conclusions one might draw from the maintainers thread above, and these two links are:
low slung air intakes are much worse than side mounted air intakes.
Americans substitute expensive and meticulous runway maintenance, Soviets make their planes able to handle rougher environments. The American choice presupposes air superiority. After allIf you don’t have air superiority your runways are constantly getting bombed.
But really both the maintainer above and Tannehill, as well as others like Justin Bronk seem to all conclude ukraine’s not going to have F-16s in the air in four months. Which is depressing.
YY_Sima Qian
@Goku (aka Amerikan Baka):
@Chetan Murthy:
The F/A-18 is only marginally less vulnerable to FODs than the F-16. The F-16’s air intake is under the fuselage (meaning closer to the ground), while the F/A-18’s are a bit higher.
The MiG-29 was a short legged fighter designed by the USSR for service in the Frontal Aviation, stationed at rough airfields relatively close to the front, that are likely to be under constant NATO air attack (& thus debris on the runways are to be expected). Its engine nacelles are placed under the wings, thus also very close to ground. Then Soviet made engines were also less reliable, & more vulnerable to FOD. The MiG’s solution to minimize FOD was to add the pop up screen doors to the intakes, used during taxing. The Su-27 has similar features. The penalty is that these mechanisms are essentially dead weight that detract from the flight performance of the aircraft.
YY_Sima Qian
@Chetan Murthy:
If the process starts soon, they will be useful for air & missile defense this winter, & next year’s summer offensive.
Chetan Murthy
@YY_Sima Qian: as many have pointed out, we knew a year ago at this time that Ukraine would prevail. If we had started then with training for both maintenance and pilots, by now ukraine would be almost ready to deploy western Jets. Instead, it will be at least another year.I can’t be happy about that Ah well.
Another Scott
@Chetan Murthy: My interpretation of Biden’s comments today is that the US and NATO thinks that Ukraine is going to win with the scheduled weapons in the pipeline. The F-16s are intended to be able to keep VVP on his back foot so he doesn’t think about causing more mischief in Ukraine even if he doesn’t sign a binding peace agreement.
Whitehouse.gov:
Is he right? Dunno. We’ll find out.
Slava Ukraini!!
Cheers,
Scott.
Carlo Graziani
@Adam L Silverman: That would be really great. I hope he consents.
Carlo Graziani
@Another Scott: This speaks to a point that I tried to make two nights ago, but which I then buried in one of my usual loghorroic tracts.
At any given time in the war, the weapons supply pipeline has had (and still has) finite bandwidth. The reason that PDA and budgeted supplies show up in tranches of $500M to $2B every few months is that that’s the carrying capacity, with restrictions at both the inlet and outlet. Those restrictions have to do with mobilizing scarce human and material resources at the inlet, and even scarcer resources at the outlet—the Ukrainians could never have assimilated HIMARS, M-777s, NASAMS, Patriot, F-16, etc. simultaneously. Just the effort of finding and allocating the technical and managerial personnel to handle all that would have paralyzed them.
At every stage of the war, there has been necessary prioritization. The key question is, as ever: In the next quarter’s $2B tranche, what mix will have the most positive effect on the battle as it will stand when those weapons are delivered? From this perspective, it would have been absurd (and dangerous) to prioritize F-16s over, say, M-777. As we see in this evening’s great explanatory thread, the benefits of F-16s are modest and may not even be realized until after the war, while their costs are considerable. It isn’t even clear to me whether fully-operational F-16 squadrons in UKR AF service now would have any impact worth mentioning on the upcoming offensive.
I don’t blame the Ukrainians for asking for everything, as they know that their asks set political conditions favorable to supply even when they don’t get everything they ask for. But I do wish that the supply constraints on the pipeline, and the urgent requirement triage that necessarily follows from those constraints, were more widely acknowledged as explanations for how the supply operation has proceeded.
Chetan Murthy
@Carlo Graziani: Carlo, your arguments make sense for the pipeline of weapons. But there’s the other pipeline — of training and skilled people, both pilots/soldiers and maintainers. From everything I’ve heard, we haven’t even *begun* to start training either for F-16s. That’s where I worry: that the long leg will be training, not provision of weapons, parts, or even standing up logistics into UA.
I worry that what we’ve given Ukraine will be enough to eject Russia out of the mainland oblasts, but that Crimea will remain occupied, and …. well, then somehow it’ll remain that way. Because we really haven’t given Ukraine enough heavy armor to kick Russia out of Crimea, too. I’ve read many analysts saying that, sure, Ukraine has some good kit, but not enough to end the war.
Gin & Tonic
Adam, I appreciate your discussion of the “framing” issue and deeply respect your efforts in places both high and low to correct it. This has been a very sore point for Ukrainians for decades, as that framing has dominated both the foreign policy establishment and the halls of academia which train them. How many “Departments of Russian and East European Studies” are there? Too many people have made a comfortable living in that framing, and are loath to let it go.
YY_Sima Qian
@Another Scott:
That has not been the prevailing sentiment coming out of DC/London/Brussels in the past few months. If anything, the anonymous sources leaking to western MSM have been playing down expectations for the Ukrainian offensive.
Of course, it depends on the definition of “winning”. Will Ukraine gain the initiative in the coming offensive & recover chunks of occupied territory? Almost certainly. However, even the most optimistic assessments do not foresee Ukraine recovering all occupied territories (even excluding Crimea) this year. So, if Ukrainian victory is defined as recovering all occupied territories (even excluding Crimea), then just the equipment & training scheduled in the pipeline is unlikely to suffice.
Carlo Graziani
Apropos of Bakhmut, here’s an amateur operations/strategy question that I’ve been wondering about, and which I’d appreciate takes on:
The Russians have apparently erected defensive fortifications comprising nearly the entire front line, in anticipation of the coming UA counteroffensive. However competently those defenses have been built (and I appreciate Jay’s perspective as he’s expressed it on this question) they are certain to impose high cost on the force echelons tasked with breaching them.
Except, perhaps, in Bakhmut itself?
After all, that sector has been held largely by Wagner, with some backup from VDV and other scratch teams yanked from MOD units. It’s been an offensive sector for the Russians, so constructing the kind of obstacles intended to stop and trap an offensive infantry push opening the way for a combined-arms mobile echelon has probably not been the highest priority. And to the extent that it would have been a priority at all, action on that priority would likely have fallen victim to the bureaucratic/PR guerilla war between Prigozhin and MOD. Also, can you see Prigozhin ordering Wagner troops to start building defensive works STAT? Me neither. But who else would do so in that sector of the line?
The thing is, there is evidence that this may in fact be the weakest sector in the entire Russian line, because of divided command, logistical starvation, and force exhaustion. And there’s already a fight brewing over whether Wagner will be allowed to leave by May 25 to rest and refit (my take: rub a lamp), a schedule that Prigozhin himself has announced. So divided command here seems certain to create tactical confusion among the Russians around Bakhmut.
And, while Bakhmut was a strategic dead end for the Russians, for the Ukrainians it is the gateway to Luhansk Oblast. Good roads run to both Severodonetsk and to Luhansk, and if the Russians aren’t set to stop a breakout, the only natural geographic obstacle is the Siversky-Donetsk River.
I can’t help wondering whether this is the real reason that the UA hung on in Bakhmut long after observers believed that choice made rational sense.
YY_Sima Qian
@Chetan Murthy: I agree. It made sense to prioritize MiG-29s to Ukraine because they can put the fighters to use immediately, & even then the transfers of the Fulcrums took far too long. The process of training Ukrainian pilots on whatever western fighter(s) likely to be provided should have started since Nov. 2022 at the latest, after Ukraine proved that it was quite capable of defeating & ejecting the Russian forces via offensive operations.
Kyle Rayner
I think it’s specifically the framing you provide that makes these updates a compelling read every time. It’s NOT Ukrainian framing, it’s Ukrainian Ally framing, and it’s very much become its own distinctive perspective and language in the comments section. Presumably, also beyond, as readers go out and apply this thinking.
I don’t look for news much, but the closest source I can think of in terms of being able to speak broadly on current developments in the war in non-Russian terms is Arestovich, but he speaks in specifically Ukrainian perspective. I’m sure his faithful listeners also have a similar alternative framing that they’ve developed over time and can perpetuate. Much like spellings of cities, the Russian versions of things haven’t been merely ubiquitous abroad, they’ve been creating the illusion that there IS nothing else to find even if one were to look.
Thanks for a meaty update :)
YY_Sima Qian
@Carlo Graziani: If that was the case I don’t think the Ukrainian Army would be evacuating from the ruins of Bakhmut, & would instead try to maintain a foothold. Ruins make for excellent defensive positions, too, if the defenders are determined.
Chetan Murthy
@Carlo Graziani: Have the Russian not built defensive works to the east of Bakhmut? I don’t know where I’d find the relevant map, I can’t check.
Carlo Graziani
@Chetan Murthy: I don’t know the answer either. But it would be interesting to try and find out. That’s partly why I issued this provocation—there are people here who are much better at that sort of thing than I am.
MobiusKlein
If we’re not supposed to take the Russian Frame on things (without at least some thought), are we absorbing the Soviet boasting about their planes’ ruggedness and such uncritically?
Carlo Graziani
@YY_Sima Qian: True that. On the other hand, a hypothetical counter-strike would not necessarily require a drive through Bakhmut itself.
Chetan Murthy
@Carlo Graziani: this map seems to indicate that they have substantial fortifications east of Bakhmut.
https://read.bradyafrick.com/p/russian-field-fortifications-in-ukrain
ETA: And Africk seems well-regarded by other Ukraine bloggers I follow.
Ruckus
@Carlo Graziani:
I believe there are a number of reasons for hanging on in Bakhmut as much as Ukraine has. First, it may have limited the civilian damage in other parts of the country. Second, it may have used up a lot of the russian military, which they can’t seem to replace as well as they would need to do to win, because they have spent so much in Bakhmut. Third, it’s made vlad look more and more like the jackass that he is and lost him a lot of equipment, munitions and men and that is a good thing for Ukraine going forward. And vlad hates losing more than seemingly pretty much anything else. And while the cost has not been insignificant Ukraine has to play careful with the human power it has. Costing vlad a lot for a lot less from Ukraine is how wars like this one are won. It always comes down to superior tactics and supplies. Ukraine seems to be winning on this point. There are a lot of back room things to discuss as possible things that would help Ukraine, I’m not putting any of them on line and I’d bet that all the people that know what they are have been in discussion with Ukraine and working towards them.
Carlo Graziani
@Chetan Murthy: Interesting. The map is too low-resolution to be conclusive, but if red-dot-density is indicative of fortification strength, then the Russians appear to be strong at Donetsk and at Kramatorsk. But Bakhmut is pretty much half-way between those two points…
Kelly
@Chetan Murthy: Ben Hodges, retired commanding General US Army Europe believes Ukraine can push far enough south to put enough of Crimea within range of long distance fires sufficient to disrupt Russian logistics enough to renders the occupation untenable. A Kherson kind of fight rather than a Kharkiv kind of fight. He also believes Ukraine must take Crimea to have a defensible frontier.
Chetan Murthy
@Carlo Graziani: If you click on the image, you’ll get a Google Map. You can zoom in on Bakhmut, and you’ll see that there’s a lot of fortifications a bit north, at Druzhba. Then a line of sparse points, down to Luhanske. But behind that line is Popasna, which is a Russian strongpoint town. It was from Popasna that they originally started attacking Bakhmut.
YY_Sima Qian
@Carlo Graziani: Bakhmut is still a local transportation node, Russian forces in the city’s ruins could still harass the flanks & rears of any Ukrainian advances, & Russian artillery in the ruins could threaten Ukrainian logistics, at least until encirclement is imminent. If Bakhmut was so easily bypassed, the Russians would have surrounded the city & reduced it slowly like at Mariupol.
For your proposed strategy to work, the Ukrainian Army needs to keep the Russians myopically focused on taking the remaining ruined neighborhoods, before assaulting weakly held flanks. Withdrawing does not do that.
So far in this war, neither side has had much success surrounding significant enemy formations, w/ the exception of Mariupol. (& Lyman to a lesser extent?)
Another Scott
@Kelly: This makes sense to me.
Inshallah.
Thanks.
Cheers,
Scott.
Carlo Graziani
@Chetan Murthy: OK, at risk of making more of this than I think it’s worth: when I got that map to load, and looked to the East of Bakhmut, what I found was that the T-0504 highway running E-W from Bakhmut to Popasna is the least fortified part of that sector—maybe a roadblock on the highway, and no other blocking positions within a mile. As in, holy shit. The Russians really don’t seem to believe that anything bad could happen here.
That map is a real find. Thanks.
Anoniminous
@Carlo Graziani:
Urban combat is the vilest form of an essentially vile undertaking. Armies led by competent commanders avoid it whenever possible.
Chetan Murthy
@Carlo Graziani: you may find the map in this article to be useful also.
https://www.csis.org/analysis/russias-ill-fated-invasion-ukraine-lessons-modern-warfare
Chetan Murthy
@Carlo Graziani: also this article:
https://www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/in-ukraine-defenses-carved-into-the-earth/
original, w/map that I can’t see: https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022/12/14/world/europe/russian-trench-fortifications-in-ukraine.html
Chetan Murthy
@Anoniminous: if I understand correctly, urban Warfare is much better for the defender than the attacker. And furthermore ruins aren’t exactly terrible for urban warfare. But I’m just a joker on the internet.
Geminid
@Chetan Murthy: Bakhmut would probably not be a good spot for the Ukrainian Army to attack through. The built up areas would constrict traffic, and there is a river running right down the middle of the city.
The extensive network of trenches and firing positions Russia has constructed will have to be breached somewhere, and likely in more than one place. A week ago, German military analyst Tendar reviewd the latest UK MOD analysis and said:
Tendar said he believes that the Russian army’s situation “is basically a catastrophe waiting to happen.”
EmbraceYourInnerCrone
@Chetan Murthy: FOD walk downs. Yup
Uncle Cosmo
From a purely aerodynamic POV, the
Friggin’ Falcon** (um, scusami, Fighting Falcon) is not much airworthier than the SpaceShmatteShuttle, which (IIRC) was once described as having “the glide characteristics of a thrown brick.” Fly by the wire, die by the wire, I guess…FTR still wondering why the Ozzies haven’t offered UAF their soon-to-be-retired F/A-18s, which would work better from highways anyway…
** NB IMHO “Ghostwriters In Disguise” ;^D is the wrong music for this – it works better to “Sink the Deutschmark” :^p which tho a much lamer tune at least cuts out the distraction of yippie-ky-ays. But who am I to say…
Another Scott
@Carlo Graziani: I’m reminded of the recent video of a drone leading a russian soldier down a “trench” for an area to surrender to Ukraine.
The “trench” seemed to be barely 12-24 inches deep in places.
I wonder how many of these “fortifications” which are visible from the air are little more than that. I’m not there, and I’m sure even “easy” break-thoughs are likely to cause injuries and death for Ukrainians, but I think we have to remember that VVP’s army has not been a modern, well-run, competent force thus far.
Cheers,
Scott.
Paul in KY
@Chetan Murthy: We had F-16s at my base. FOD was emphasized every day.
Bill Arnold
Unknown known
The War on the Rocks podcast interviewed a senior American logistics guy about a month or two ago. His explanation with the planes is that only a few of them would make no difference, and a large number would have taken up a huge chunk of the budget available for help, which would be at the cost of large volumes of artillery, air defence, armoured vehicles, etc – the stuff Ukraine needed much more.
Add in that effective SEAD isn’t something that multi role fighters can do on their own, and it just wasn’t an effective use of the resources available.
Put it together with what is said here, and I do see a longer term case that they can eventually take the place of the existing MIGs as they run out of maintenance for them. So has a role in protecting Ukraine’s internal air space, and maybe adding one more expensive option for lobbing big missiles the other way… But still, only a mild upgrade on the MIGs. More of an evolution than a revolution.
That all felt pretty compelling to me, but what the hell do I know
Janus Daniels
Thanks; you’ve built a place to learn, and an excellent place to point people who want to understand.
Constantly correcting framing, Russian to Ukraine, grows tedious, and going back a decade or more to correct all of it looks useless.
We need a compare\contrast resource for Ukraine versus Russian framing. That way, we can just write, “Please correct <quote> and please use <link> from now on.”
Does anybody have <link>? If not, who can write it?
Example: for economics, I use https://modernmoneybasics.com/facts/
Janus Daniels