25Comments

1. 1.

   oldster

   October 15, 2023 at 8:53 pm

   The graphic showing that Russia’s artillery activity per day is trending down, and Ukr’s holding even, or even trending up, corresponds with something that I have noticed in watching videos.

   I watch the Reddit thread “UkraineWarVideoReport,” which shows almost exclusively Ukrainian strikes on Russian materiel and personnel. Often, they will show an artillery strike on a tank or SPG, or less often a strike on a group of soldiers.

   What has often struck me is that they never seem to show anything like a solid barrage. Not even a half-dozen shells at once, much less a steady drumbeat over minutes, WWI style. Sometimes it is frustrating — you see a concentration of forces, and you wish that they would rain down shells on their heads. One shell comes in, that’s about it.

   And yet, the fields surrounding the action are frequently pin-cushioned with shell-holes.

   I wonder if this shows the difference between how the two sides are using their artillery. Ukraine is being extremely stingy, hoping to make every shell count. Russia started out blasting away with abandon, wasting shells left and right. The pin-cushioned fields may be due to their shelling, not to Ukrainian shelling.

   I don’t know if this is the right explanation. Surely part of why I never see barrages has to do with which videos the Ukrainian forces decide to upload and circulate. So I’m not seeing a representative picture, that’s for sure. But I still wonder whether the Ukrainian artillery is simply not trying to act as a traditional saturation barrage, but instead trying to act as long-range snipers.

2. 2.

   japa21

   October 15, 2023 at 8:56 pm

   As usual, thanks Adam, particularly with all the things going on in your life.  Glad to hear it’s good stuff.

   As far as Avdiivka is concerned, Russian seemed to think this was an area to really make a major offensive.  It has really backfired on them, despite, apparently, surprising the Ukrainians there.  How much this will matter down the road is difficult to predict, obviously, but if Ukraine has damaged the Russians there enough, Donetsk could be reachable.

3. 3.

   Alison Rose

   October 15, 2023 at 8:59 pm

   “So much russian losses” is a nice phrase to read. I hope to see it daily!

   It’s gutting to see photos of places the orcs have destroyed, and even more so knowing the time and money and effort it will take to rebuild. And that’s another thing that scares me about the US potentially ceasing to send aid. They don’t just need it now during the war; they’ll need it after the victory, too. I want us to be there for them now and in the future, and it depresses and frightens me that we may not be.

   If anyone comes across an official Patron wall calendar, let me know. I’ll have to explain it to my cat, but I think she’ll understand.

   Thank you as always, Adam.

4. 4.

   Carlo Graziani

   October 15, 2023 at 9:14 pm

   @oldster: It’s a qualitative difference. The Russians simply don’t have the 1m or so accuracy of NATO-supplied artillery systems. They waste huge numbers of rounds just turning over dirt.

   Which, incidentally, means that the Ukrainian advantage in what counts, to wit, “artillery rounds that hit a target,” is much greater than what one would infer from that plot. Add to that the differential effectiveness of cluster munitions over unitary warheads, and, well, the tables certainly have turned.

5. 5.

   Cacti

   October 15, 2023 at 9:14 pm

   Hi Adam.  Still silencing criticism of Israel?

6. 6.

   dmsilev

   October 15, 2023 at 9:24 pm

   @Carlo Graziani: Add to that, Russian losses/expenditures in artillery are so severe that they’re turning to North Korea for munitions. The accuracy problems …will not improve.

7. 7.

   eversor

   October 15, 2023 at 9:41 pm

   @dmsilev:

   If you can’t hit a shot take a lot!  Que the stupid.

8. 8.

   Wombat Probability Cloud

   October 15, 2023 at 9:48 pm

   It’s ghoulishly mesmerizing to watch the drones’ payloads glide to their targets, especially with thermal imagery. But, more power to the UA, which is the only way forward. Thank you, Adam, particularly in these times of double duty (in addition to your day job).

9. 9.

   Anoniminous

   October 15, 2023 at 9:51 pm

   Russian losses over the last 24 hours estimated at over 800 KIA.

   Assuming that’s accurate the 3:1 WIA/KIA ratio means 2,400 WIA for an estimated total of 3,200 which is just about the total head count for four pre-war Russian BTGs. With the armor losses the Ukrainians have destroyed a reinforced Mechanized Brigade.

10. 10.

    Jay

    October 15, 2023 at 10:01 pm

    Logo
    (((Tendar)))
    @Tendar
    14h
    I would like to make an assessment of the momentarily situation around Avdiivka.

    Russians made a range of huge mistakes, but I would like to start with things which they did right. The first was to apparently conceal their built up in this sector. It is only fair to say that the intensity of the Russian attack in the sector surprised the Ukrainian defense. The Russian army successfully deployed a strike force which comprises a forces the size of several brigades. To conceal such a large offensive force is a feat in itself and I will give them that. The second feat is to muster logistically such an attack, though there is something which already nullifies this feat, but I will dive into this later.

    And here it ends what they did right.

    Despite early success of the Russian attackers primarily around Krasnohorivka (Screenshot 1) and thanks to their clandestine built up in this sector, Russian forces showed almost instantly their weaknesses, especially when it comes to mobile warfare. You cannot describe it differently than they utterly suck here. This has been a constant in Russian warfare since February 24, 2022, and it is mind boggling how little they learned ever since. There were several videos showing large convoys of Russian vehicles trying to squeeze themselves through roads which in the end were basically chokepoints. Especially their strike force from Krasnohorivka, which made few hundred meters progress, showed this development (Screenshot 1). You could observe that Russian tanks were trying to bypass the leading vehicles which likely were stopped by mines or Ukrainian ATGM and drone teams, which btw. fought valiantly.

    In fact, those Ukrainian ATGMs and drone teams made the difference and stopped the Russian onslaught in the tracks. This was also likely the moment when the Russian and way too optimistic plans went sideways. We saw countless of Russian vehicles, most of the time the leading vehicles of the convoy, being knocked out, only to observe Russian vehicles trying to bypass them and mindlessly rushing through the fields. The result can been seen in the post I sent yesterday showing the Russian tank which hit TM-62 mines in open field. I’m fully aware that the visibility of T-Series tanks is weak, but running over such a defense line, which certainly was known before the attack was launched and which should be relayed to all offensive units before, only emphasizes the little combat quality the average Russian soldiers brings. It is true that the Russian High Command consciously sacrifices troops for land, which was especially witnessed in Bakhmut and where the win-loss ratio of up to 1:10 was acceptable, but this is not a tenable strategy. This can be also witnessed in Bakhmut where ever since the Russian army found herself in a defending position and losing ground, gradually.

    What is the highest blunder of the Russian offensive is the fact that it is strategically seen totally useless. Even when we project that they would take Avdiivka, which is a very big If and after this week more than questionable, it is – even when projected the most optimistic outcome – a huge waste of resource. In my opinion it is even far worse than Vuhledar and Bakhmut because it completely ignores the situation in Zaporizhzhia. We have seen along the southern frontline a huge uptick of Russian losses, especially in terms of artillery. Aside from a range of other objectives, it is obvious that Ukrainian forces methodically degrade Russian artillery capabilities. This comes along with a visible drop of Russian artillery fire, though I assess this is increasingly related to the huge wear of the artillery barrels and less due to ammunition shortages, which however are also an issue since Ukraine methodically destroys logistics hubs.

    In an atmosphere like this one might assume that Russia would rather chose to further invest in an effective and “elastic” defense and allocate resource to deny Ukrainians to further advance or just degrade the Russian defense in Zaporizhzhia, something which Russian General Ivan Popov was demanding shortly before he got discharged by the Russian Defense Ministry. Instead, this stunt around Avdiivka gets approved and ends as other Russian offensives ended, in utter disaster. It shows that Putin does not reward competence. He only rewards loyalty.

    You cannot even say that this Russian offensive around Avdiivka would further bind Ukrainian reserves because Avdiivka has always been a fortress which Ukrainians can defend with a relative minimum of soldiers. In fact, thanks to the Russian offensive in this sector, Avdiivka has become an integral part of the Ukrainian counteroffensive because it binds huge Russian reserves, and the longer the Russian army tries to take the city the better for the Ukrainian war effort in the long run.

    Even though we cannot entirely assess the Russian losses in the Avdiivka sector, then it still safe to say that they are extraordinarily high and that Russia clearly squandered a huge amount of resources around Avdiivka. It is a strategic blunder because it wouldn’t have changed the strategic situation even if Avdiivka would have been taken by Russia. Instead, vital resources needed for the upcoming winter and next year are gone forever. The whole Russian operation reminds me of the German WW2 offensive in the Ardennes in 1944 which is commonly known as the “Battle of the Bulge”. Just like in the Ardennes, German forces surprised the Allies and made tangible gains, but were bogged down against fortified Allied positions, such as in Bastogne, and were mired in long traffic jams. In the end, Germany squandered her last elite forces and wasted resources which were much more needed for the defense.

    The question – why Russia launched this offensive in the first place – is justified and I speculate that those are primarily of propagandistic and to a certain extent narcissistic nature. Ever since Wagner’s announcement of taking Bakhmut the Russian Ministry of Defense and in particular Shoigu and Gerassimov have been yearning to present something similar to the Russian people. Avdiivka is at the gates of Donetsk and has always been a painful thorn for Russia in this sector. Taking the city even when it would mean to lose countless of resource – similar to Bakhmut – is sometimes more preferable than a (perceived) stalemate. I believe Avdiivka has been selected for this very reason by them.

    Russians never get tired to claim that the Ukrainian counteroffensive in Zaporizhzhia is a “failure”. This derives from the fact that on the map you do not see many changes, even though the dynamics are huge, just as the Russian losses. But nothing could be more wrong and can get proven statistically as mentioned in the artillery ratio and the fact that Russian artillery systems are getting destroyed in huge numbers. But those strategically important points cannot easily been converted into propagandistic talking points. The public and even the press loves maps and arrows on them and if they lack they draw their own and in most cases wrong conclusions. The Russian leadership thought that if some Russian arrows on the map appear after weeks of perceived stalemate, it would yield in some propaganda points which would be picked up by the press and further increasing political pressure on the Ukrainian leadership. Taking the heating up crisis in Israel and Gaza into account, this might get even more traction.

    In the end, I assess that the Russian Avdiivka offensive reflects everything what is wrong in Russia’s way to wage war in Ukraine. It is strategically seen a blunder and in the long run will certainly have a negative impact in Russia’s war effort, whether they take or take not Avdiivka. It also shows the absolute difference in how Ukraine wages war. In the first weeks Ukraine’s counteroffensive, AFU tried to storm the Zaporizhzhia front similar to how Russia storms Avdiivka, though at to no time to the same extent and volume as Russia. Ukrainian forces have drawn the right conclusions, stopped it, changed tactics and started to degrade Russia in a way how to degrade an entrenched enemy. This is not a spectacular way, but an effective one. It will bring the desired results when it continues this way and, more importantly, it will be persistent.

    Ukraine has something what Russia does not have and this is a coherent war strategy. In the end, this will be the most important reason why Ukraine will win this war.

    #Ukraine #Donetsk #Avdiivka

    https://nitter.net/Tendar/status/1713520368151941558#m

11. 11.

    Jay

    October 15, 2023 at 10:02 pm

    Thank you again Adam, for both posts today, and your moderation and appeal to self moderation.

12. 12.

    Mike in DC

    October 15, 2023 at 10:18 pm

    I remain fixed in the belief that Ukraine needs a tangible and obvious gain or “victory” before the 2024 election, to hedge against a possible loss of outside support.   This is likely to be the capture of a major city,such as Melitopol, though it could simply be the effective severing of land routes between Crimea and the Donna’s.

    I think that while Russian equipment is stretched, it won’t entirely disappear from the battle, and the possibility that Russia could effectively reconstitute its forces a few years down the line means that Ukraine must make hay while the sun shines, and bring the war to an end on their own timetable and terms.

13. 13.

    CCL

    October 15, 2023 at 10:26 pm

    Adam, I haven’t posted my thanks in a long time, but I read every night, to witness.   So again, thank you.

14. 14.

    Jay

    October 15, 2023 at 10:39 pm

    UA
    @Tatarigami_UA
    Oct 14
    After days of intense combat in Avdiivka, I’ve decided to make a preliminary analysis of the ongoing events. I’m looking at the bigger picture, aiming to spot key patterns and notable signs that can help us understand the situation better. This analysis will cover both the upsides and downsides based on the limited data on hand.

    The scale of the Russian assault on Avdiivka underscores their determination to achieve their objectives. Russians have deployed what I’ve identified as at least two mechanized battalions or two battalion-tactical groups in the primary attack directions, alongside smaller units in other areas, constituting an operation of approximately regimental size. This represents a significant departure from the smaller company and platoon-sized tactical groups that both sides have employed in recent months.

    Based on information from various sources, it appears that the Russians have deployed a substantial number of units, potentially constituting a force of at least a few brigades. However, the exact total number is difficult to accurately assess at this time.

    One group advanced from the South-West of Avdiivka, while another attempted to advance from the North-Eastern side of Avdiivka. The group originating from Krasnohorivka initially made progress, overrunning defensive positions in the North, with some elements even reaching the railroad. Both groups suffered losses, but the northern group achieved tangible results, primarily due to the element of surprise and the concentrated firepower of a mechanized force.

    Positive Aspects:

    – A conservative estimate from our team, based on visual evidence, indicates that Russian forces lost a minimum of 45 vehicles, predominantly tanks and IFVs, by the morning of October 12th. The actual number is likely higher, as we lacked visuals from some areas, especially the South and South-Western regions of Avdiivka.

    – The initial Russian assault did not seem to achieve the desired results of securing areas beyond the railroad in the north and seizing Sieverne and Tonenke in the south, which would significantly impact the operational environment for Ukraine.

    – This operation appears to be primarily politically motivated rather than militarily necessary. Following the loss of Pisky and most of Mariinka, Avdiivka remains the only sizable settlement under Ukrainian control in close proximity to Donetsk. However, given the realities of warfare, it is unlikely that Ukraine will launch a ground offensive into Donetsk from this location in the near future. Avdiivka is well-fortified, and the Russians have suffered significant losses in multiple attempts to capture it since 2022. The Russian motivation appears to be securing a substantial public victory before winter, in contrast to the limited successes of the Ukrainian army in liberating territories in 2023 and the loss of Bakhmut.

    – Despite the initial challenges and the element of surprise, Ukrainian soldiers on the ground demonstrated remarkable resilience and managed to halt the progress of the mechanized enemy groups. This achievement can be attributed to individual acts of heroism, skill, and determination to hold their positions.

    – From a combination of sources, including photographs, drone videos, and personal accounts, Russian mechanized units have incurred significant losses as a result of Ukrainian drones, which have been supplied by volunteers and regular citizens, properly set mines, timely deployed AT teams, and artillery fire.

    Negative Aspects:

    – Despite prior knowledge of the enemy’s buildup for an offensive operation, the attack still caught Ukrainian forces off guard, and it appears that some areas were ill-prepared for such an assault, revealing some vulnerabilities.

    – The Russians executed a regiment-sized operation by deploying several battalions and smaller auxiliary forces. This demonstrates their capacity to conduct larger-scale operations and access to sufficient resources.

    – They managed to penetrate the rear and flank areas of Avdiivka. While this does not necessarily guarantee an immediate encirclement, it presents a perilous situation and an unwelcome development. The Bakhmut operation also began with substantial and seemingly unsustainable losses for the Russians, but after securing control over the flanks, the situation deteriorated for Ukrainian forces. While the operational context is different, we cannot yet assert that the situation is stable.

    – While the focus is on Russian losses, the fact that they were able to break through and seize some Ukrainian positions in the north and south suggests that Ukrainian forces likely incurred losses. Unlike easily trackable vehicle losses, assessing human casualties is more challenging

    Conclusions:

    The enemy is actively seeking to shift the strategic initiative and mold public perception to their advantage. This determination is evident in their efforts to secure Avdiivka and the Kharkiv region. Their goal is likely to achieve victories that could potentially offset or negate the gains made by the Ukrainian army in the South during the summer and fall of 2023. The intended message is clear: “Regardless of the aid provided to Ukraine, Russia will continue to advance and achieve victories”. The gravity of this intent is highlighted by the scale and commitment displayed in this offensive.

    I advise you to stay cautious when assessing the overall situation. The Russians appear to be concentrating significant forces in the Avdiivka area, potentially involving more vehicles and personnel than they have already lost, indicating their capability for further advances. Independent observers can verify this by noting that the battle has persisted non-stop for the fourth day, marked by ongoing company-sized (at least) assaults.

    The scale of enemy losses has been significant, but keep in mind that this doesn’t necessarily preclude them from achieving their objectives. In the eyes of their leadership, the potential gains from this massive assault operation far outweigh the value of the vehicles and human resources expended. This pattern of prioritizing strategic and operational goals over immediate losses has been a consistent historical feature of the Russian and Soviet armies.

    The future success of these efforts is likely dependent on the availability of reserves on both sides and the willingness to commit additional forces to this operation.

    https://nitter.net/Tatarigami_UA/status/1713236442804097160#m

15. 15.

    Anoniminous

    October 15, 2023 at 10:48 pm

    @Jay:

    pattern of prioritizing strategic and operational goals over immediate losses has been a consistent historical feature of the Russian and Soviet armies.

    And it led them to defeat in the Sino-Russian War, World War One, and damn near cost them World War Two.  The only reason the Russians were able to keep fighting after their losses in 1941-1943 was by grabbing men from liberated territory in 1944 and 1945.

16. 16.

    Carlo Graziani

    October 15, 2023 at 10:51 pm

    I think that the bottom line with respect to the Russian Army’s artillery arm is that it was designed, equipped, and supplied for a wholly different mission from what it is currently tasked with.

    Prior to 2022, the Russian armed forces were essentially designed to coerce vastly inferior adversaries on Russia’s territorial borders. Given the Russian Way of War, this meant that artillery was not intended for attacking a near-peer opponent’s forces in the field, but rather for missions of population intimidation. Think “Grozny” and you’ve captured the doctrinal concept that shapes Russian artillery in one word.

    That being the mission, low-accuracy+high volume-of-fire is a perfectly acceptable design guideline. You don’t need 1m circular-error-probable to reduce a city to rubble and terrorize its inhabitants. 100+ m is completely fine.

    It’s not an acceptable standard if one needs to target hardened enemy trenches, or moving infantry, much less mobile armor. What we appear to be seeing today is that the Russians never equipped or trained for such missions. Their area-saturation style of artillery attacks is hugely wasteful by the standards that shape modern battlefields. And nearly 2 years into this war, they seem utterly unable to reform their practices in this critical area. And, may I just say, HAHAHAAAHAHAHA. HA.

17. 17.

    Jay

    October 15, 2023 at 10:59 pm

    @Anoniminous:

    Saint Javelin
    @saintjavelin
    Oct 12
    Hold on to your tinfoil hats. We’ve uncovered reliable info suggesting Putin’s CIA ties dating back to the ’90s.

    https://nitter.net/saintjavelin/status/1712524358294360151#m

    Top Secret, do not spread it around,……

18. 18.

    Carlo Graziani

    October 15, 2023 at 11:07 pm

    @Jay: Sure, sounds good.

    Next Up in Cyrillic-Q-Anon Blockbuster Revelations: Both of Putin’s parents were Jewish, and, hence, Nazis.

19. 19.

    Adam L Silverman

    October 15, 2023 at 11:27 pm

    @Jay: I included this in last night’s update.

20. 20.

    Anoniminous

    October 16, 2023 at 12:07 am

    @Jay:

    PANIC!!!!

21. 21.

    Anoniminous

    October 16, 2023 at 12:17 am

    @Carlo Graziani: ​
     

    It goes back to the Red Army in World War 2. By 1944 they had artillery corps consisting of two or three artillery divisions and up to 9 artillery brigades or regiments. I can dig into my copy of Glantz’s Colossus Reborn if you want further info.

    Maybe earlier? I know nothing about the Imperial Russian Army’s organization in WW 1.

22. 22.

    wjca

    October 16, 2023 at 12:24 am

    @Jay: We’ve uncovered reliable info suggesting Putin’s CIA ties dating back to the ’90s.

    But is he working for them?  Or are they (at least some of them) working for him?  Inquiring minds want to know….

23. 23.

    Hangö Kex

    October 16, 2023 at 1:05 am

    Some good news for a change (?): Polish election: Right-wing ruling party to lose majority – exit poll

24. 24.

    YY_Sima Qian

    October 16, 2023 at 3:41 am

    @Carlo Graziani: Russia does market the 152 mm Krasnodar laser guided artillery round, which is supposed to afford meter level accuracy. Like so man Russian systems, however, it is not produced at scale for the Russian Army.

25. 25.

    YY_Sima Qian

    October 16, 2023 at 3:43 am

    @Hangö Kex: Definitely good news!