Come for the politics, stay for the snark.

Bark louder, little dog.

Republicans can’t even be trusted with their own money.

ha ha ha! Nice try weird people.

Marge, god is saying you’re stupid.

… gradually, and then suddenly.

…and a burning sense of injustice to juice the soul.

The US Supreme Court is on the ballot in november.

Let there be snark.

SCOTUS: It’s not “bribery” unless it comes from the Bribery region of France. Otherwise, it’s merely “sparkling malfeasance”.

You don’t get rid of your umbrella while it’s still raining.

fuckem (in honor of the late great efgoldman)

🎶 Those boots were made for mockin’ 🎵

The media handbook says “controversial” is the most negative description that can be used for a Republican.

“Why isn’t this Snickers bar only a nickel?”

Dear media: perhaps we ought to let Donald Trump speak for himself!

Republicans seem to think life begins at the candlelight dinner the night before.

It could be worse. Vance could have said “post-menopausal sows.” Waiting for that audiotape to surface.

Bad people in a position to do bad things will do bad things because they are bad people. End of story.

Historically it was a little unusual for the president to be an incoherent babbling moron.

The rest of the comments were smacking Boebert like she was a piñata.

Polls are now a reliable indicator of what corporate Republicans want us to think.

Compromise? There is no middle ground between a firefighter and an arsonist.

The revolution will be supervised.

They were going to turn on one another at some point. It was inevitable.

You are here: Home / Foreign Affairs / War for Ukraine Day 936: A Brief Monday Night Update

War for Ukraine Day 936: A Brief Monday Night Update

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Two quick housekeeping updates. First, Rosie is doing well after her treatment today. Just two more to go. Thank you for all the good thoughts, well wishes, prayers, and donations.

Second, today was a much longer day than I was expecting. Nothing bad, just long. So just the basics tonight.

Here is President Zelenskyy’s address from earlier today. Video below, English transcript after the jump.

Next Week, We Are Preparing to Present the Victory Plan to Our Allies – President’s Address

16 September 2024 – 19:47

I wish you health, fellow Ukrainians!

Today, almost the entire day was focused primarily on military matters. There was a report from Commander-in-Chief Syrskyi – a lengthy conversation at the start of the day, and just now, we spoke again to review the day’s outcomes. Over a hundred battles have taken place since the start of this day, with the most intense fighting in the Kurakhove and Pokrovsk directions. We are defending our positions. We also reviewed the Kursk operation in detail, and each day we are acting precisely as planned. I want to thank every brigade and every unit for their coordinated actions and true resilience. Today, I signed several decrees awarding state honors to our warriors, particularly participants in the Kursk operation. I am proud of each and every one of them!

I held a meeting of the Staff, with a detailed focus on the protection of energy facilities. This included physical protection, relevant construction projects, air defense, and electronic warfare. The Prime Minister and energy companies provided reports. Additionally, there was an in-depth report from our intelligence services on the situation in the ranks of the occupying army, the situation on Russian territory, and within its population. It is important for us that the perception of the war in Russia is deteriorating, as is the public’s view of the results of Putin’s policies. We are working to ensure that reality ultimately overcomes Russian state propaganda. Of course, we are also preparing for Russia’s future actions in battles on the frontline. We are continuously working to ensure Ukraine has sufficient capacity and resources for the production and supply of drones. Regardless of changing global circumstances, Ukrainian warriors must receive everything necessary for successful defensive and active operations. Provision of drones is not merely a tactical matter – it is a strategic priority. I thank everyone involved in this effort, especially those helping our troops master new drone operation tactics.

Throughout the day, meetings were held in various formats to prepare our Ukrainian Victory Plan. The real substance of all the points – military, political, diplomatic, and economic. Key people from each sector are involved. The necessary steps for Ukraine have already been clearly defined. The steps designed to give us the strongest possible position to bring about peace – a real, just peace. For each step, there is a clear list of what is needed and what will strengthen us. There is nothing impossible in this plan. Over 90% has already been written out. Together, this package can ensure the right development of the situation not only for Ukraine, but for everyone in the world who values international law. Next week, we are preparing to present the Victory Plan to our allies.

Thank you to everyone in the world who stands with Ukraine! Thank you to everyone who helps us protect lives!

Glory to Ukraine!

This is all necessitated because the Biden administration has told the Ukrainians that until or unless they can articulate a plan to achieve victory against Russia’s genocidal re-invasion that satisfies the Biden administration, then the Biden administration is not going to lift the restrictions on the use of long range US weaponry. Frankly, it won’t matter much at this point even if they do because Russia has now moved everything even farther east and out of the range of the weaponry that Ukraine wants to use.

The cost:

WARNING!! WARNING!! GRAPHIC CONTENT!! WARNING!! WARNING!!

Here’s the machine translation:

I was mentally ready, but when I saw my dad, it took 20 minutes for my eyes to get used to it. this is what he looks like now. was in captivity for 2 years and 4 months. the second photo is from January 2022, which I took before he left for Mariupol.
first photo @Liberov

The US:

Also, the US:

Here’s the rest of the quoted thread:

Long thread of the Trump shooter Ryan Routh’s craziest posts on X 🧵

1. Writes Ukrainian presidential advisor Podolyak that he, Ryan Routh, will personally buy Poland’s MiG-29 fighter jets and then “fly them at night just above ground and hit every place Putin sleeps”Image

2. Writes Polish Defense Minister Błaszczak that he’s an American business man who wants to meet with the Minister to buy Poland’s MiG-29 fighter jets and transfer them to Ukraine.Image
3. Writes U.S. Senator Mazie Hirono to ask whether she can help him “borrow some Patriot Missile Defense Systems”Image

4. Writes Sean Penn with a request that Sean and Ryan but Poland’s MiG-29 fighters jets together and then go together to borrow some Patriot Missile Defense Systems at the border.

“How can they say no to you?”Image

5. Writes U.S. Senator Brian Schatz that he is flying out to Ukraine in a few days but needs the Senator’s help to borrow some Patriot Missile Defense Systems which he, as a civilian, will then “learn how to operate”Image
6. Goes to Taiwan to offer them “50 000 Afghan soldiers”Image
7. Writes Seth Rogan to inform him that Seth, James Franco and Ryan himself should go together to North Korea to talk with Kim Jong Un to show him that America and North Korea can be friends.Image

8. Tries to write to the head of Hong Kong’s local government Carrie Lam hoping that she will make him “her private American advisor at no cost”

He believes that he and Carrie Lam can sit down with the protesting students and “find solutions”Image

9. Writes the Belarusian opposition during the street protests in the wake of the falsified presidential election in 2020.

Advises them to “buy sniper rifles from Amazon”Image

10. Writes Elton John with the hope that they can release a songs together to rally more support for Ukraine.

Ryan has already prepared the lyrics and music to the song “We Are One.”

He believes it would be a good idea to have young kids sing the chorusImage

11. Writes the Ukrainian National Security and Defense Council that he has 20 000 Afghan and Syrian soldiers that could come to Ukraine to fight against Russia.Image
12. Writes Tulsi Gabbard during her primary campaign in 2020 that he has requested she go with him to help out an a homeless shelter in Hawaii in a PR-move to help her campaignImage

13. After never receiving an answer from Tulsi, he gets angry and accuses her of being a “Republican and a Trump nut”

Says the grey streak in her hair is “stupid”Image

14. Writes Nikki Haley to tell her he is disappointed in her. Wanted to hear more in her speech about Taiwan, China, Ukraine and “the Gaza Murders”Image
15. Admits days before leaving for Ukraine that he has “no military experience” but hopes to receive help from journalist Jack HewsonImage

And the final 16th tweets:

Claims he is a “Hawaii leader” and invites Kim Jong Un to Hawaii for vacation. Says he can arrange the whole trip.Image

Oy vey.

But wait, there’s more…

Warning about Ryan Routh: he is not, and never has been, associated with the International Legion or the Ukrainian Armed Forces at all. He is not, & never has been, a legion recruiter. He is misrepresenting himself and lying to many people.
Image
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Routh is currently posting on Facebook about getting Afghanistan citizens into the International Legion. He told the New York Times in 2023 that he wanted to get soldiers into Ukraine illegally.

nytimes.com/2023/03/25/wor…

Image
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Ryan Routh has many many public Facebook posts about getting soldiers into Ukraine in 2023 and 2024. He has no authority to act on behalf of Ukraine, and ignores laws about visas.
Image
Image
Routh is either human trafficking, scamming people, or attempting to break as many country’s laws as he can by trying to smuggle people into Ukraine to fight. This is unethical, unprofessional, and unacceptable. Worse, he is doing this by insisting he is helping Ukraine. 

Other issues: Routh has posted soldiers phone numbers on websites without permission; given out recruiters phone numbers to people without permission; manipulates people to breaking laws. Avoid any contact with Routh, as he misrepresents what he can legally do.

Image
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I served in the International Legion for two years, and I’ve told Routh many times since 2022 that he’s not helping and what he’s going is illegaly. He doesn’t listen. 

That boy ain’t right!

Danish military expert Anders Nielsen @anderspuck shares his opinion on why the West does not respond with force to Russian provocations:

▪️ Recently, there has been an increase in hybrid attacks on Europe, which Russia or its agents may be behind. These include fires, sabotage, cyber attacks, attempted murders.

In addition, there have recently been several cases when Russian drones violated the airspace of NATO countries – Romania, Latvia, and Poland.

▪️ Contrary to expectations, the Western reaction to these incidents was very calm. There was no media uproar, and no direct action against Russia was taken. According to Anders Nielsen, there is a good reason for this.

“The first thing to understand is that this is a very deliberate strategy on the part of the Western countries not to make a big deal out of these things,” the analyst believes.

Nielsen believes that NATO countries have the courage and guts to confront Russia. However, Western governments believe that such a confrontation is not in their interests.

Because the point of Russian provocations is not the action itself but the creation of the effect in the information space. In fact, these are information operations.

▪️ What the Kremlin is trying to accomplish:
– set the agenda in the Western news media;
– move the war to Europe so that Europeans feel the consequences;
– to force NATO countries to withdraw support from Ukraine and redirect resources to their own defense.

Accordingly, the lack of response to Russian provocations and hybrid warfare is a refusal to play by the rules set by Russia.

▪️ The Western strategy of ignoring Russian hybrid attacks has been successful so far. Russia has failed to drive a wedge between Western countries and Ukraine, and the aid and support have not stopped.

However, in the long term, if Russia continues to send more and more drones across the border into NATO countries, it will become difficult to pretend that this is all an accident or a mistake.

Latvia:

Latvia announced a new military aid package for Ukraine valued at EUR 40 million.

The package will include 9 CVR(T) armored fighting vehicles, drones, individual equipment for soldiers and sappers.

We are grateful to our Latvian friends for their staunch support. Together, we are stronger!
🇺🇦🤝🇱🇻
@AizsardzibasMin

@AndrisSpruds

Denmark:

Syria:

Kharkiv:

The Kursk cross border offensive:

Moscow:

From the Carnegie Endowment:

SUMMARY
Russia is poised to begin a long-term military reconstitution program designed to restore losses from its full-scale invasion of Ukraine and to potentially expand the force beyond 2022 levels. While the Kremlin has not yet decided on the future force design of its military, this paper highlights the near-term policy choices, opportunities, and constraints that will likely shape Russia’s military reconstitution process through 2030. As the Kremlin’s antagonism toward Ukraine and the West sharpens, it will be critically important for policymakers and warfighters to anticipate, monitor, and respond to Russia’s military reconstitution progress in the years ahead.

What is reconstitution, and how should it be thought of in practice? Broadly speaking, reconstitution is a process by which a military unit is restored to a sufficient level of combat capability after sustaining losses in combat. Reconstitution is accomplished through replenishing a unit with personnel, equipment, and other critical enabling components. Reconstitution begins during wartime and continues in the postwar period, as military and civilian leaders make procurement and recruiting investments to restore wartime losses.

Reconstitution should not be framed as a military force being in a binary state of “reconstituted” or “unreconstituted,” and nor should reconstitution be measured only through the restoration of prewar numbers of personnel and equipment. Conceptualizing reconstitution in such a manner is too imprecise to be beneficial for strategists and planners. Reconstitution is a process of regaining combat functions, proficiency, and capabilities that will allow a force to execute various types of combat missions.

A more precise method of evaluating Russian reconstitution requirements and the Kremlin’s progress toward those goals involves identifying requisite force structures and proficiency levels for Russian forces to accomplish different types of missions. Reconstitution requirements vary based on the specific conflict scenario, whether it is a limited power projection into another neighboring country that is not a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), a second attempt at achieving 2022 maximalist invasion goals for Ukraine, or a war against NATO.

In the two years since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Kremlin has chosen to reconstitute its forces without setting the economy on a full war footing. It has done so through partial mobilization, repairing on-hand equipment, purchasing ammunition and weapons from abroad, offering lucrative financial incentives for volunteer soldiers, and maximizing production at existing defense factories. Yet, apart from drone production, equipment production capacities have plateaued as of early 2024. Russia could generate more efficiency in the system by reducing corruption on the margins and reemphasizing innovation for certain technologies, but this would not result in a dramatic increase in available resources.

For Russia to reach a fundamentally higher level of weapons production or manpower availability compared to early 2024 levels, the government would need to activate additional mobilization authorities that would likely affect its economy, labor market, and population’s engagement with the war, putting the country on even more of a wartime footing than it is as of 2024. Thus far, the Kremlin’s calculus and political will have constrained Russia from taking such a step.

While a precise vision of the future regenerated Russian military has not yet come into focus, it is clear from recent debates and actions that Russian leadership intends to enlarge the force. It is also likely that the acquisition of combat experience has raised the military’s proficiency. Still, Russia faces multiple financial and demographic factors that will constrain how far it can grow qualitatively and quantitatively by 2030.

Key Findings

  • Thus far, Russian leaders speak in euphemisms about their combat losses in Ukraine and cloak their considerable regeneration requirements by tying them to a need to counterbalance NATO expansion. This allows authorities to justify expenses and force expansion without admitting that these high requirements mostly stem from losses in Ukraine.
  • Russia is reconstituting its force in the short term by refurbishing older equipment at sufficient rates, mobilizing personnel, and recruiting volunteers. The majority of Russia’s equipment delivered to the front lines is refurbished equipment. It is suitable for soldiers’ needs but is qualitatively worse than newer equipment. If early 2024 loss rates continue, Russia risks depleting available Soviet-era stockpiles for certain types of equipment possibly in 2026.
  • Russian leaders have a few options for reconstituting the force in the medium term (through 2030), and the path they choose will be determined by the Kremlin’s priorities. If reconstituting and expanding the force as quickly as possible is of paramount importance, Russia’s current reconstitution efforts, which have plateaued, will be insufficient. In this case, Russian leaders will likely be forced to take steps that they have so far resisted—for example, activating additional mobilization authorities to move society and the economy to expand domestic production capacity.
  • If managing domestic stability and economic concerns are more important than rapid reconstruction and force expansion, Russian leaders will likely continue to accept risk and produce equipment at the current 2024 capacity levels, or gradually expand production over time through the early 2030s. This pathway is probably only feasible for the Kremlin if the conflict in Ukraine freezes or ends and Russia is willing to temporarily rely on older Soviet equipment from reserves as it produces new equipment over time.
  • Presently, several structural factors limit the rate at which new Russian military equipment can be produced. Space at Russian defense factories is in high demand for multiple purposes (new builds, repairs, and exports) and cannot easily be converted to increase new domestic production without resulting in tradeoffs. Further, Russia’s production capacity cannot be expanded much beyond 2024 levels unless new factories are built or Russian leaders accept the risk in temporarily halting exports (which is unlikely) or halting production while factories can be retooled and updated (which is incompatible with production rates needed to sustain wartime demands).
  • Other methods to expand defense industrial output include expanding powers to convert civilian factories into wartime production factories, which would be a signpost that mobilization is expanding in Russia. Russia could opt to import armored equipment from other countries, although doing so would be a major departure from historical norms. Such a departure would suggest that Russia is unwilling to accept risk in the short term and plans to continue offensive action against Ukraine.
  • Reconstituting personnel and proficiency in the postwar years will also be a complex challenge for the Kremlin. Impacts of the war on military retention are currently masked due to wartime policies that prohibit servicemen from resigning. Russia is resorting to providing higher wages and social benefits to attract wartime recruits, but maintaining this high per capita spending in the postwar period would add more internal pressure on an already high defense budget.
  • Some officials are requesting a larger force—up to 1.5 million personnel, but so far the force remains capped at an elevated 1.3 million. Expanding the force would require significant investment in the production of new equipment, the recruitment of additional professional soldiers in a society that has recently grown accustomed to high wages and expensive social entitlements and benefits, as well as the construction of new military base infrastructure. These expenses would coincide with procurement pressures on an already bloated defense budget and an already strained male labor force.
  • Notably, Russia has large untapped human resources that so far have not been utilized to staff the war effort. Russia has not reached far into its large reserve officer cadre, and nor have they lifted restrictions on the types of positions Russian women can hold in the military or the defense industrial base. Instead, authorities have chosen other stopgap measures, such as condensing military training for new cadets or recruiting from prisons or abroad to fill its military billets and some defense industry jobs. Changes to these policies would be a signpost that Russia intends to expand the military or defense industry workforce.
  • Excessive secrecy about casualties and equipment losses, along with expanded censorship laws that limit free speech on many topics related to the Russian military, are likely to hinder or distort reconstruction debates. Criticisms of the war effort, particularly of the high equipment and manpower costs, are increasingly taboo, criminalized, or classified. Such a closed environment limits the discourse on reconstruction and the future design of the Russian military. This secrecy, self-censorship, and censorship are also at odds with the Kremlin’s directives to increase innovation in the private sector.
  • Groups of junior officers and experienced noncommissioned officers (NCOs) have sustained the heaviest casualties in the war, but the survivors will have extended combat experience and compressed formal military education. This combination may lead to rapid transformational change in the Russian military in the future, if the survivors’ experiences can be harnessed and introduced widely in the postwar years.
  • Russia’s preferences for a larger force may not be entirely compatible with its demographic and financial realities, and the Kremlin may find that it is unable or unwilling to finance a larger professional standing army. Balancing these preferences and constraints may lead once again to a mixed readiness system for the military, where a smaller and financially manageable active-duty force of 1 million is maintained along with an expansive (and now combat experienced) strategic reserve of personnel and equipment that could be mobilized if necessary. This path would allow Russia to maintain a larger force potential without incurring the significant financial costs and infrastructure requirements of maintaining a larger permanently ready force. Such a force would resemble the return of the mixed readiness system of the late-Soviet and immediate post-Soviet era and would be a significant departure from the last twenty years of force posture and military thought.
  • The Russian military has historical experience with capturing lessons learned from wars and implementing them throughout the force. Specifically, the military may draw from experiences of the post–World War II learning period that rapidly ingested and disseminated lessons throughout the Soviet military. Formal learning organizations will likely be set up in the immediate postwar years to conduct analysis and disseminate the findings to influence concepts, operational art, and force design. This process will be impeded if the process is compromised due to political sensitivities or false reporting.

Much more at the link.

That’s enough for tonight.

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    8Comments

    4. 4.

      Rocks

      “The Russian military has historical experience with capturing lessons learned from wars and implementing them throughout the force. ”  Given the continued dependence on meat assaults and utilizing irreplaceable technical specialists in them, this statement is debatable at best.

      Reply
    5. 5.

      Jay

      Rachel Jamison
      @RachelPAV
      9h
      I want to talk more about the damage caused and danger presented by people like Ryan Routh.

      I direct Protect a Volunteer, which is NOT part of the Ukrainian military but we have a flight sponshorship program for well-qualified humanitarian and military volunteers going to assist Ukraine. We work with current and former members of the Ukrainian military in order to approve flight applicants. They check credentials, military records, reputation within units, etc. We therefore have a really atypical (and good!) relationship with the teams accepting foreigners and good knowledge for how the process is supposed to go despite being an independent organization. We have encountered people duped by fake recruiters before. This is the impact:

      1. There are thousands of potential volunteers from South America, Africa, and South Asia. They have military experience but often limited formal education; they may not read and write or often don’t speak English. They usually haven’t traveled outside their home countries unless deployed. The red flags on a scam that are obvious to you or me are not obvious to them; they are a vulnerable population to exploit. They think they have a real offer with the Ukrainian military and might spend their life savings to go to Ukraine only to get denied entrance at the border.
      2. Ukraine cannot and does not provide visa assistance for neighboring countries or transit countries for volunteers who need it (by law it cannot). These fake recruiters promise visa help which means the volunteers fly somewhere and cannot enter and get stranded.
      3. Volunteers make life-altering decisions to go to Ukraine. They quit jobs, sell cars, sell all possessions, buy expensive kit, and say good-bye to families. Some of them are doing that when in reality they are not accepted by the AFU and might not be eligible.
      4. This takes good volunteers out of the fight. If they were a good candidate and Ukraine would have taken them, they’re now doing nothing and thinking everything in Ukraine might be a scam.
      5. People get confused and don’t know how to apply, who to contact, or what to do. Good volunteers give up on going.
      6. It gives foreign volunteers a bad name because people who should have been rejected for all kinds of reasons (mental health, physical fitness, criminal history) still get offers from fake recruiters and show up in Ukraine telling people that they are volunteering.
      7. It wastes the time of recruiters (and me) constantly trying to tell people what is real and not real.

      There are real consequences to delusions of grandeur and failure on the part of the media to verify who they are platforming. This person never should have had any kind of platform or attention. If you are a journalist covering foreign military volunteers in Ukraine, PLEASE verify your sources. Not doing so has consequences.
      King Jack Strong 🇺🇦 🏳️‍🌈
      @v8mile
      Jun 21
      Warning about Ryan Routh: he is not, and never has been, associated with the International Legion or the Ukrainian Armed Forces at all. He is not, & never has been, a legion recruiter. He is misrepresenting himself and lying to many people.

      Sep 16, 2024 · 4:37 PM UTC

      https://nitter.poast.org/RachelPAV/status/1835719643819872641#m

      Rachel Jamison
      @RachelPAV
      8h
      If anyone wants to help a real volunteer get a flight, we REALLY need more donors to sign up or we will have to turn volunteers away. You can use miles or money and the sign up form is here: docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1F…

      Flight Donor Application
      docs.google.com
      Sep 16, 2024 · 5:08 PM UTC

      https://nitter.poast.org/RachelPAV/status/1835727379949367511#m

      Reply
    6. 6.

      Bill Arnold

      Russia Says ‘False Alarm’ Behind Massive Power Outage In South (July 17, 2024)
      Emphasis mine. (Note; the surprise G4 (G3 forecast) geomagnetic storm peak was on early July 17 UTC (though activity all day), so later than this incident.)

      Russia’s nuclear energy operator, Rosenergoatom, says a unit of the Rostov nuclear power plant whose disconnection left some 1 million people in southern Russia and parts of occupied Crimea without electricity was switched off due to “a false alarm.”
      Major power grid failures and sweeping power outages occurred in the south of Russia and Crimea on July 16 after the emergency shutdown of the unit, which Rosenergoatom said happened when a “protection mechanism was triggered.”
      The company did not specify what had caused the activation of the protection mechanism.

      Reply

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