Conversely, if it is possible to conduct Cultural Operations and Engagement prior to a disaster occurring – either through data mining or because we have personnel working with host country partners or both, then the socio-cultural information can be used to create much more proactive responses. Socio-cultural information may make it possible for decision makers and planners to recognize at risk communities, by fusing geographic information pertaining to areas that are at risk for flooding, hurricanes, tornadoes, forest fires, avalanche with information about those who reside there. Having socio-cultural information during disaster response and emergency management planning would allow for a better understanding of the actual populations at risk by knowing if they are likely to or predisposed to evacuating, if they have the economic wherewithal to do so, if they have places they can go to to seek shelter, as well as who in the communities would need to be engaged in order to facilitate a safe and effective evacuation. Finally, it allows the planner to propose better locations to stage relief and assistance supplies as there is really no good reason to place them to quickly reach those that will either not be effected or will easily (or more easily) evacuate.

Hurricane Katrina

The four near miss hurricanes that threatened New Orleans in 2004 provided disaster management and emergency response personnel with a wealth of data (not only about what might happen to the physical terrain of New Orleans), but also who would and would not evacuate the city.(11) As a result it was possible well in advance of the devastating effects of Hurricane Katrina in 2005 to do a socio-cultural analysis of New Orleans relative to a potential catastrophic hurricane strike. The information was available about who would and would not evacuate. As a result it should have been possible to cross correlate that data based on ethnicity and socio-economic status, which would delineate why individuals would not evacuate (lack of available funds, lack of transportation, lack of relatives to stay with, disbelief of the threat). Such analysis would have also helped to identify the key community leaders and agents of influence who needed to be engaged in order to promote a timely and orderly evacuation. Sadly, there was no coordinated and coherent system for putting this information together, bringing it to the attention of the policy makers, and enabling more effective, more proactive, and more humane management of the preparations for the disaster and its aftermath.

If the planners and decision makers at FEMA, the State of Louisiana, and New Orleans Parish/adjacent parishes had robust socio-cultural information, derived from the cultural operations and Engagement process, available to them many problems could have been averted through the creation of a more effective preparation and evacuation plan. Additionally, high probability areas for natural disasters could be made into hardened targets in much the same manner as high value terrorist targets were hardened post 9-11. There is only so much that can be done geographically in the case of natural disasters, but the ability to improve on the effectiveness of disaster mitigation, response, resupply, and evacuation procedures is fruit that can be harvested. This can only be accomplished through a clear understanding gained by careful study of the socio-cultural and socio-economic terrain.

Access to proper socio-cultural information of greater New Orleans prior to Hurricane Katrina would have allowed the local authorities at New Orleans Parish and the adjacent parishes, Louisiana state officials, and FEMA to focus their relief efforts on those areas where New Orleans residents would not and could not evacuate and where they were most in jeopardy. Moreover, efforts could have been implemented well in advance of the hurricane to work with local elites and notables on creating an effective information operations (IO) campaign, rooted in the local socio-cultural milieus of New Orleans’ most vulnerable communities to push preparation for an evacuation. In this manner the first phase of disaster management, the emergency response, would have been in place and in play much sooner and much more proactively. The same goes in regard to the staging of relief supplies, equipment, and personnel. All of these could have been placed to be surged into safe areas adjacent to those deemed most at risk in order to facilitate both a more robust and orderly evacuation of the most difficult to evacuate communities in New Orleans, as well as much more effective movement of relief personnel and supplies into the worst hit areas. Finally, a better understanding of social behavior, and behavioral drivers, among people afflicted by disaster would have gone a long way towards disaggregating out those simply taking basic supplies or taking up arms for protection (regardless of community) for survival and those very few truly bad actors who took advantage of the disaster for their own enrichment. This would have enabled authorities to more carefully and successfully engage with those in need of assistance, while effectively moving against the small fraction that actually posed a threat. The implications of this are very important for two reasons: 1) it prevents the wrong reactions by the emergency responders towards the afflicted communities and 2) it prevents the commission of Information Operations fratricide by stepping on the appeals and request for emergency aid and donations.

Additionally, the proactive use of socio-cultural information would have made the actual reaction much better. Not only would the emergency response have been in place much sooner and likely been more effective, it would have had an important shaping function on the operational environment. By identifying, engaging, and working with the local communities that are at risk in advance, lines of communication are established, which has a positive Information Operations and shaping effect on the disaster response. Given that all communication is strategic communication, having established and positive communications with the right people sets positive conditions for conducting all three phases of the reactive response.

Given that none of this was done prior to Hurricane Katrina, socio-cultural information derived from the Cultural Operations and Engagement process could still have been of use in the aftermath and response to the disaster. In a reactive response situation, as opposed to a proactive prevention one, Cultural Operations and Engagement may be as or even more important. Robust socio- cultural information tethered to the Hurricane Katrina response would have allowed the disaster response managers to surge out teams of personnel with law enforcement and emergency responders in the initial emergency response phase to determine where the location of the affected New Orleans’ communities were in time and space, which elites, notables, and power brokers were either still in those communities and could be leveraged or who could be quickly brought back. This would have allowed for the facilitation of interactions between the emergency responders and the survivors, as well as determine the context – including the basics of shelter, nutrition, and hydration – of the wants, needs, and expectations of the various New Orleans’ populations going forward from the initial response. By having this information the disaster management response to Hurricane Katrina could have more efficiently and effectively moved through all three divisions of the response: emergency, rehabilitation, and restoration.

Finally, it is necessary to secure the information produced by the Cultural Operations and Engagement process in less vulnerable areas so that the hard won knowledge is not lost. Rather it is safeguarded and available to the emergency responders at the tactical and operational levels, as well as to the disaster managers at the high operational to strategic levels.

9 Nancy Mock and J.E. McGovern (undated power point). “Contingency Planning for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief.” SOUTHCOM Lessons Learned From Recent Crises in Latin America. Center for Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance.

10 A Cultural Operations and Engagement team should be made up of a team leader with operational experience in emergency response/ disaster management, a research director to coordinate the cultural operations process, several research managers to facilitate data collection and analysis, and a number of field researchers and analysts – many of whom should speak the local language if deployed abroad. It is possible to combine the team leader and research director positions, as well as the field researcher and analyst ones if necessary.

11 Hurricane Pam. Global Security. http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/ops/hurricane-pam.htm.

 

Mass evacuations and narrow networks

One of the positive things I’ve seen from Hurricane Matthew has been the targeted state governors’ communication has been very clear:

GET THE HELL AWAY FROM THE COAST ASAP

There has been no dithering, no hoping that a delayed evacuation could save a tourist weekend. Millions of people have been on the move.

Hopefully it will be enough to save a lot of lives. And hopefully there is a last moment wiggle and the eye of Matthew stays out to sea and then it recurves to the north and open water.

But if that hope fails and Matthew grinds the Atlantic coast hard with the full force that we fear, hundreds of thousands of people will be temporarily displaced. So what happens to their health insurance if an Indian River County resident ends up in Alabama for a couple of weeks?

This splits into two types of questions, emergency and non-emergency care. The easy answer is for emergency care. All policies will pay to stabilize an individual in a critical care scenario. The cost sharing will look like the hospital is in-network. So if a person has a heart attack after looking at the damage on TV, the first few days in the hospital are covered without concern. Rehab might not be covered in Alabama.

This leads to the non-emergency care scenario which we will talk about below:

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Open Thread: Dangerously Dumb Drudge

I sincerely doubt Matt Drudge is dumb enough to try this (or to believe it), but no doubt there’s the odd Trumplodyte idiot already planning for their cellphone SUCK ON THIS MATTHEW WOO HOO!!! videos to go viral. Which would be fine — some people can only learn experientially, as when they get literally thumped around by natural forces — except that rescuing these sorry putzes will put first responders in harm’s way. TPM, “Conservative Hurricane Truthers Downplay Danger Of Hurricane Matthew”:

Hours ahead of Hurricane Matthews’ landfall on Florida’s Atlantic coast, some climate change skeptics downplayed the danger of what meteorologists say could be the worst such storm since Hurricane Katrina…

“This storm will kill you. Time is running out,” Gov. Rick Scott (R) said in a press conference Thursday. “There are no excuses. You need to leave. Evacuate, evacuate, evacuate. Are you willing to take a change to risk your life? Are you willing to take a gamble? That’s what you’re doing.”

Yet in the face of those pleas conservative aggregator Matt Drudge, who has a house in Florida, tweeted that “The deplorables are starting to wonder if govt has been lying to them about Hurricane Matthew intensity to make exaggerated point on climate,” and “Hurricane Center has monopoly on data. No way of verifying claims. Nassau ground observations DID NOT match statements! 165mph gusts? WHERE?”…

On Wednesday, Rush Limbaugh expressed a similar sentiment on his radio show, saying that government scientists might be “playing games” with storm data in order to “sell” the role climate change has played in making hurricanes stronger…

Nah, but you can bet he’ll shove his way to the front of the line to collect any available storm-damage mitigation funds… whether or not he’s actually eligible.

Hermine Blows

We’re feeling mildish effects of Hurricane Hermine in la Casa de Cracker today. It’s breezy with intermittent rain. The massive Sunshine Skyway Bridge is closed due to wind gusts in excess of 50 MPH.

Alligators are gushing out of storm drains. Well, that’s an exaggeration, though there are rumors of it. One lady uploaded a video of an alligator swimming across the flooded road in front of her car:

I don’t understand everything she’s saying, but she did yield the right-of-way to the gator. It was in the crosswalk, so that was the right thing to do. But what she was doing driving around in that mess, I can’t fathom.

A man in that same area reported a “four-foot gator” swimming down the road near his house. The video above is grainy, but that looks like a bigger gator to me. (My dad is an experienced gator hunter, and he claims you can determine the approximate length of the beast by estimating the inches that separate the eyes from the tip of the snout and converting it to feet.)

Anyhoo, stay dry and safe, folks who are in the path. Thread open to all topics save one: Let’s make this a Trump-free zone, okay? I’m sick of that vile shit-stain.