Republicans in Disarray!

There's palpable sense of disappointment at CNN that the Democrat's debate will just be actual policy stuff and not the GOP reality show.

— Bob Schooley (@Rschooley) October 13, 2015

"For Democrats, it’s field [organizers]. For Republicans, it’s gross ratings points on TV." http://t.co/TPx0HICehl

— Daniel Drezner (@dandrezner) October 13, 2015

From the Politico article:

… In 2012, both sides in the general election invested enough on television, but only one side invested enough in registering and turning out the vote. The Obama campaign registered 3 million voters (a good chunk of its national popular vote margin), and had 3,000 full-time organizers on payroll whose mission was to “organize themselves out of a job.” This meant that staffers were explicitly told not to call voters and knock on doors, and instead focus exclusively on recruiting a massive volunteer army who could do the job instead. This process of “capacity building,” as it was referred to internally (and documented extensively in Elizabeth McKenna and Hahrie Han’s academic book, Groundbreakers), allowed the Obama campaign to scale its operations an order of magnitude beyond the Romney campaign. On Election Day, the president over-performed the final polling averages by 3 points, a possible indicator that his turnout operation had done the trick.

This legacy influences the party’s 2016 hopefuls today. According to Democracy in Action, a website that uses Federal Election Committee data and press reports to track campaign structure and organization, Clinton has a staff of at least 90 in Iowa, with an additional 100 unpaid organizing fellows, and at least 17 field offices. Bernie Sanders’ Iowa staff has grown to more than 50, with 14 offices. In Democratic circles, an operation of that size is not considered a luxury available only to front-runners like Clinton, but a prerequisite for being taken seriously. Though gaps in reporting are likely, Democracy in Action reports that no Republican candidate has more than 10 full-time staff in any early voting state (not counting consultants and volunteer leaders).

These numbers speak to a stark divide in what Republicans and Democrats find valuable in campaigns. For Democrats, it’s field. For Republicans, it’s gross ratings points on TV. The Republican position might be understandable at the moment; no one wants to sink money on a big staff in a fragmented field and risk not having enough to capitalize on late momentum. (Scott Walker would probably tell you this.) But failing to invest in staff will make adjusting to the very different terrain of the general election a major challenge for Republicans once the Trump freak show ends. And, make no mistake, it is likely to end…

The Republican approach may be completely rational in a Hobbesian primary, where TV advertising can assist in defining candidates who still relatively unknown. The challenge the GOP will face is in adapting to the general election—not just message-wise, but in scaling an operation in an era of mass engagement. Many would argue that widespread mistrust of Clinton and an aversion to “Obama’s third term” should be enough to ensure a Republican victory. Such talk is political malpractice. The duty of a political campaign is to press every small advantage possible on every front, because the fundamentals of the election (the economy, or identity of the opponent) are often out of its control. Lessons forged in the parochialism of a primary may not be enough to ensure victory in the general election. Despite the obvious headwinds they may face in 2016, the two leading Democrats are at least trying to win their primary in a way that might pay dividends a year from now. Because of the primary campaigns each are running, Clinton or Sanders would be able to more easily roll over an experienced field team into a general election contest…

Field organizing is old-school and digital fundraising is new-school, but what both have in common is a philosophical commitment to building a campaign one voter and one donor at a time. Once critical mass is reached, both are perpetual motion machines for voter outreach and fundraising. This is in contrast to the emphasis on mass communications we are likely to see in the Republican primary.

For a Republican campaign engaged in the 15-way trench warfare of primary, it is easy to put off thinking about the general election until the primary is won. But by then, it might be too late. Field and digital infrastructure don’t come together overnight; unlike media buys, they must be planned and built months in advance. The deficit in campaign mechanics Republicans have faced in the past two election cycles have largely come about because of a lack of time between winning the primary and the general election…

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