We’ll get to the cyber defense stuff after the jump.
Here’s President Zelenskyy’s address from earlier this evening. Video below, English transcript after the jump:
Good health to you, fellow Ukrainians!
A brief report on today. The morning began with the Staff meeting. Frontline. Provision of the army. Energy sector. Communication. Points of Invincibility. Strengthening our air defense. Working with partners. The situation in the frontline areas and suppression of Russian firing positions. We keep all key issues in the focus of the Staff’s attention.
That day, as every other day, the occupiers again shelled Kherson and the communities of the region. In just one week, the enemy fired 258 times on 30 settlements of our Kherson region.
The Russian army also damaged the pumping station that supplied water to Mykolaiv.
Well, what can be said about them? This is the real essence of those random “comrades” who took over Russia. After 20 years of rule, a large part of their own state is in such devastation, as if a war had taken place there. And this is not a war – it’s just because they have come.
They are capable of nothing but devastation. This is all they leave behind. And what they are doing now against Ukraine is their attempt to take revenge. To take revenge for the fact that Ukrainians have repeatedly defended themselves from them.
Ukraine will never be a place for devastation. Ukraine will never accept orders from these “comrades” from Moscow. We will do everything to restore every object, every house, every enterprise destroyed by the occupiers.
Today I spoke about Ukraine’s needs for protection and reconstruction with the foreign ministers of seven Northern European countries. Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Sweden, Norway, Iceland. I thanked them for this joint visit to Ukraine – a gesture of support and solidarity that is very important right now.
We have agreements on further cooperation in the defense and energy spheres, in the reconstruction projects of our state and in the sanctions sphere.
The Ukrainian Peace Formula was discussed with each of the delegations, in great detail – the possible participation of each state in the implementation of the points of the Formula.
We are actively working to create a Special Tribunal for the crime of Russian aggression against Ukraine. We are working at different levels.
In particular, I discussed this today with the foreign ministers of the partner countries. Head of the Office Andriy Yermak took part in the conference held in France. Members of the working group on the issue of creating a Tribunal work there. Prosecutor General Andriy Kostin and the First Lady of Ukraine represented our country in Britain today – a conference on combating sexual violence in wartime was held there. Mr. Kostin is preparing to meet with the G7 ministers of justice in Berlin tomorrow.
The main topic of all these events is Russia’s responsibility for war and terror. There will be more news tomorrow.
I spoke with Prime Minister of the Netherlands Mark Rutte. By the way, the Netherlands provides substantial assistance to Ukraine in the preparation of the Tribunal for aggression and in establishing the truth about all Russian murderers and torturers. Ukraine is grateful for this.
I heard a very important signal from Mr. Prime Minister Rutte – a signal about next year. Support for our state will only increase.
I met with the ambassadors of our United24 fundraising platform. Andriy Shevchenko, Oleksandr Usyk, Scott Kelly – they were in Kyiv, and Elina Svitolina, Liev Schreiber and Timothy Snyder joined the meeting via video call. The main issue is getting through this winter, helping Ukraine with generators and other energy equipment. Detailed news will be tomorrow, but I will note: we will do everything so that Ukraine receives the maximum possible help from the world.
And one more thing.
The volume of accumulated funds for our Grain from Ukraine initiative is growing and already exceeds 180 million U.S. dollars. This is already one of the historically largest Ukrainian humanitarian initiatives. And it will be even bigger.
Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Great Britain, Greece, Estonia, Ireland, Spain, Italy, Canada, Qatar, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Germany, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, USA, Türkiye, Hungary, Finland, France, Croatia, Czech Republic, Switzerland, Sweden, European Union have already announced their financial, technical or logistical contribution to the Grain From Ukraine initiative – this is a significant participation. Plus the Republic of Korea. Japan – from the first days. And also NATO and, of course, the UN.
I am thankful to everyone who participates!
Thank you to everyone who helps Ukraine implement our Peace Formula! I am sure that it can be fully implemented – all points just as the point on food security.
Glory to each of our warriors! Glory to all who work for the victory of our state!
And please pay attention to the air sirens, don’t forget that.
Glory to Ukraine!
Here is former NAVDEVGRU Squadron Leader Chuck Pfarrer’s most recent assessments of the situations in Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, and Bakhmut:
NUCLEAR ROULETTE; Local sources report that RU troops are preparing to leave the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power facility. This was denied by RU officials, UKR reports on 28 NOV ‘that an object of the RU invaders was damaged in the area of Enerhodar settlement’. Facts remain unclear. pic.twitter.com/6MVPoK5IEw
— Chuck Pfarrer | Indications & Warnings | (@ChuckPfarrer) November 28, 2022
KHERSON AXIS /0130 UTC 30 NOV/ UKR Partisans and SOF continue to identify high value RU targets in occupied Kherson and Zaporizhzhia Oblast. UKR precision strike artillery targets a Russian HQ element at Babyne. pic.twitter.com/dFG66QPBz8
— Chuck Pfarrer | Indications & Warnings | (@ChuckPfarrer) November 29, 2022
BAKHMUT AXIS/ 0015 UTC 30 NOV/ RU consolidated advances across Bakhmutka River S of the urban area. The Forward Edge of the Battle Area (FEBA) now conforms to the rail line in the vicinity of the village of Andrivka. UKR artillery continues to exact a heavy toll on RU infantry. pic.twitter.com/ko9yCDqNkN
— Chuck Pfarrer | Indications & Warnings | (@ChuckPfarrer) November 28, 2022
Also, if this is correct, and the imagery certainly suggests that it is, then it is going to be another long night Ukraine:
AIR RAID WARNING: @MT_Anderson reports that Tu-95 and Tu-160 strategic bombers are being prepared for strike missions at Engles Air Force Base in Saratov, Russia. Kh-101 and Kh-555 air launched cruise missiles will target UKR civilian targets in the coming hours. https://t.co/OIgpY8iUmU pic.twitter.com/aDpBHzdNf0
— Chuck Pfarrer | Indications & Warnings | (@ChuckPfarrer) November 29, 2022
As does Ukrainian military intelligence:
1/ #Ukraine's military intelligence reports that today Russian Air Force at Engels-2 airbase near Saratov city is arming strategic bombers incl. TU-160 for tomorrow's missile strike on Ukraine's energy infrastructure. It's 1,000 km to the capital Kyiv. pic.twitter.com/ZOZZ79S2Tq
— Viktor Kovalenko (@MrKovalenko) November 28, 2022
3/ On the evening of Nov 28 (local #Ukraine time), several Russian missiles hit an industrial plant in #Dnipro city. The type of missiles, damage, and a number of casualties are yet unknown.
— Viktor Kovalenko (@MrKovalenko) November 28, 2022
Now the Ukrainians, and those of us watching and keeping good thoughts for them, wait…
Here’s a great thread on the Russian attacks on civilian infrastructure:
Some confront me that attacks on critical infrastructure is not genocide. Somehow they don’t want to remember that Russians have also raped, tortured, killed and deported Ukrainians based on our identity wherever they could reach.
— Iryna Matviyishyn (@IMatviyishyn) November 28, 2022
The rhetoric around destroying the infrastructure is genocidal to the core. They’re openly calling to freeze and starve Ukrainians to death or make them push the government to surrender (which would mean more persecution and death, just go talk to people in the liberated Kherson)
— Iryna Matviyishyn (@IMatviyishyn) November 28, 2022
Despite the Ukrainians’ resolve is unwavering, Russia continues to attack all critical facilities. That said, by destroying the infrastructure, Russians know that Ukrainians who have no money, who are immobile, or have no other place to go, might be freezing and starving indeed.
— Iryna Matviyishyn (@IMatviyishyn) November 28, 2022
In Kherson, there’s been no water, electricity or heating for weeks, I stayed a night in such apartment on the 7th floor. It could be 13 degrees during the day, but when the sun goes down at 4pm you know it’s winter. We were sleeping in jackets under two blankets. Now imagine -10
— Iryna Matviyishyn (@IMatviyishyn) November 28, 2022
Just a reminder. As history shows, keeping the term «genocide » for a day when all acts get a tick, and when it’s internationally recognized as such, might bring you to millions of dead. And millions more die with no justice. We’ve already gone through that, other people, too.
— Iryna Matviyishyn (@IMatviyishyn) November 28, 2022
What Ukrainian Cyber Defense doing? The Carnegie Endowment tells us in their fairly recently published report:
Western leaders have been unequivocal that they will not commit military forces to fight in Ukraine. Yet in the digital sphere, Western governmental, military, and commercial actors are directly engaging Russian attackers and taking on a swath of responsibilities for defending Ukrainian networks and data. This ad-hoc coalition confronted an intense campaign of Russian cyber attacks in the first six months of the war.1
Notwithstanding the heightened rate of cyber attacks, Russia’s much-feared cyberwar has failed to materialize the way that many experts anticipated it would. The international effort to bolster Ukraine’s cyber defenses has featured prominently among the wide range of theories put forward to explain the relatively limited impact of cyber operations in the war. But experts are divided on the significance of almost every aspect of the cyber campaign, including the claim that international assistance has been instrumental in enabling a relatively small country to fend off one of the world’s leading cyber powers. This article investigates what has been done to assist the defense of Ukrainian cyberspace in order to evaluate what, if any, strategic effect has followed and to identify the broader implications for the value and feasibility of collective international defense in cyberspace.
It would be premature to draw definitive conclusions based on eight months of war, but nonetheless the activity in cyberspace has developed to the point where important lessons are emerging. It is hard for any outside observer to form a comprehensive picture of activity, and so this article draws on interviews with representatives of some of the organizations that have participated in the defense of Ukrainian cyberspace. I wish to thank the people listed below, who gave their time to assist my research. The views expressed are entirely mine and may not reflect the policies of any of the organizations listed.
The article focuses on the defense of Ukrainian digital networks against Russian attacks since the ground invasion began. It is important to note that this represents only a part of the international effort to support Ukraine in cyberspace, activity that has additionally included combating disinformation, generating open source intelligence, and harnessing digital platforms for humanitarian assistance and civil defense. Inevitably, the analysis is skewed to those activities that participants are willing to discuss; readers should assume that the measures described are complemented by a substantial amount of covert operational activity.
The common view that emerged from my interviews was that the defense of Ukrainian cyberspace is an exceptional response to a unique set of circumstances. Therefore it would be premature to identify a template for enduring or more widespread collective defense partnerships. Nevertheless, the war prompted one CEO of a large cybersecurity company to call for a “Tech NATO,” and Microsoft President and Vice Chairman Brad Smith has stated that the war has demonstrated the requirement for a “coordinated and comprehensive strategy to strengthen [cyber] defenses.” The war in Ukraine may not have revealed a ready-made blueprint for collective international defense in cyberspace, but it has tested the concept of multistakeholder collaboration and, in the process, demonstrated five key lessons.
- Cyber defense at scale relies on the involvement of the largest commercial technology and cybersecurity companies. This is because of both the deep dependence on the services of a small number of providers and the fact that national scale cyber defense relies heavily on automated protection of millions of targets.
- Politics and geopolitics count in cyberspace just as everywhere else. The response to the Ukraine war has not involved a strategic and operational construct akin to a “Tech NATO,” relying on an accumulation of efforts conducted within national government strategies. There is a long way to go to evolve from the Ukrainian response to an enduring foundation for international alliances in cyber defense. Devising such mechanisms will require national governments to confront the fact that the most indispensable commercial partners for cyber defense are American. Even European governments, let alone those who view Washington less favorably, might be uncomfortable relying on the decisions taken in a handful of boardrooms in America. For their part, those American companies generally do not want to take positions on global political issues, preferring to focus on protecting users and networks.
- Shared values are as important as shared interests. Commercial entities’ reasons for engaging in the defense of Ukrainian cyberspace are commercial (demonstrating capabilities and benefits), reputational (outwardly, to governments, customers, investors and so on, and inwardly, to employees), and normative (protecting values and preventing harm). The normative component might easily be dismissed as insignificant when compared to the commercial interests of huge corporations, but the practitioners I interviewed displayed a genuine sense of commitment to shared values of conduct in cyberspace, especially in defending civilian targets against state cyber attacks. Sustaining a high tempo of cybersecurity operations has tested all the entities involved, and the motivation to protect Ukrainian democracy and thwart Russia’s aggression has been a key factor in maintaining effectiveness over a prolonged period.
- Government can be a catalyst and sponsor of large-scale cyber defense involving commercial entities. Technology and cybersecurity companies might be motivated to engage in international cyber defense, but large-scale action can only come from governments exercising their abilities to convene and confer legitimacy. This process is much easier where mutual trust and understanding are already in place between governmental and commercial organizations. Nevertheless, the culture and values of the technology sector mean that these companies might eschew the type of symbiotic relationship with government that has evolved for defense contractors. They are likely to seek less formal relationships that emphasize shared values as opposed to hard power objectives.12 Additionally, although commercial entities might be willing to absorb some costs and foregone revenue, they will require some form of financial compensation for their commitment of resources. The use of public finances to sponsor this activity could be eased by the fact that defensive cyber operations create a wealth of evidence that demonstrates their impact.
- Capacity building is valuable, but it is no substitute for capability reinforcement. Through its years of being targeted by Russian cyber attacks, Ukraine has closely followed best practice advice for cybersecurity and resilience from international partners and has greatly benefited from participation in joint training exercises.13 Inevitably, though, the speed of implementation and development varied across sections of the public and private sectors, such that by the time of the ground invasion there were major uncertainties and known weaknesses in the national cyber resilience. The most prominent example was the government’s concentrated dependency on potentially vulnerable, on-premises servers, a dependence that had to be quickly remedied by migration to data centers beyond the combat zone, generally operated by foreign cloud service providers. The experience of this war suggests that international cyber resilience is built on a foundation of capacity building but also relies crucially on the ability to rapidly surge capabilities to reinforce allies under attack.
In sum, these lessons indicate that collective defense is not only demonstrating its operational potential in Ukraine but also revealing strategic tensions that would have to be addressed in any more enduring arrangements. At the heart of the challenge for democracies are the integration of commercial actors as agents of foreign and defense policies and the reality that a handful of American companies are indispensable to large-scale cyber defense. Designing mechanisms for collaboration would therefore expose profound issues of national sovereignty, accountability, and burden sharing in cyberspace. This is a daunting agenda, but navigating it could be eased by the fact that the protagonists in Ukrainian cyber defense believe the scale of effort has demonstrated a powerful commitment to shared values in cyberspace.
Much, much more at the link!
I think that’s enough for tonight.
Your daily Patron!
There are no new tweets or videos posted tonight from Patron’s accounts. So here are some more Ukrainian military dogs and cats:
Animals and soldiers help each other in war.#Ukraine️ #RussiaisATerroistState #RussiaUkraineWar #CatsOfTwitter #CatsOnTwitter #Bakhmut #armedForces #Nikopol
#NewYork #Zaporizhzia #Kyiv #ukrainecounteroffensive#KhersonisUkraine #Biden pic.twitter.com/3fkBu6iPdg— UkrARMY cats & dogs (@UAarmy_animals) November 28, 2022
K9 in UA#Ukraine️ #RussiaisATerroistState #RussiaUkraineWar #CatsOfTwitter #CatsOnTwitter #Bakhmut #armedForces #Nikopol
#NewYork #Zaporizhzia #Kyiv #ukrainecounteroffensive#KhersonisUkraine #Biden pic.twitter.com/ReelOrxGjb— UkrARMY cats & dogs (@UAarmy_animals) November 28, 2022
Good night 😘 #Ukraine️ #RussiaisATerroistState #RussiaUkraineWar #CatsOfTwitter #CatsOnTwitter #Bakhmut #armedForces #Nikopol
#NewYork #Zaporizhzia #Kyiv #ukrainecounteroffensive#KhersonisUkraine #Biden pic.twitter.com/jFVf1cOlel— UkrARMY cats & dogs (@UAarmy_animals) November 28, 2022
Open thread!
War for Ukraine Day 278: What Ukrainian Cyber Defense Doing?Post + Comments (45)