I am not sure if this is feasible, but it sounds like an appealing idea:
Simply put, the C.I.A. is not suited to the mission of homeland security. Its tradecraft is imbedded in everything from its training manuals to its computers. For example, because the agency deals in sensitive secrets, you need C.I.A. clearance, including a polygraph exam, to log on to its computer network. Even officials from other agencies with the highest government security clearances are banned. Thus if the Terrorist Threat Information Center answered to the C.I.A., it would be very hard for someone from a state or local government to get information unless a C.I.A. official decided the person had a “need to know.”
This sort of impediment to information-sharing is exactly what the recent Congressional report says contributed to the Sept. 11 intelligence failure. It is why Congress correctly wants the secretary of homeland security, not the director of central intelligence, to have authority over collecting and releasing intelligence for our domestic defense.
Moreover, making sure the new agency gathers and assesses information efficiently may not be our greatest challenge