(Image by NEIVANMADE)
Last night in the comments there was a lively discussion about whether the US will provide any more aid to Ukraine, I want to come back to a point I’ve made repeatedly. Specifically, that the Biden administration should have locked in long term aid via legislation while the Democrats had majorities in both chambers prior to the 2022 midterm elections. In 2016, the Obama administration entered into a 10 year $38 billion Memorandum of Understanding to provide Israel $3.8 billion per year in military aid, requiring it be spent on US made weapons and munitions, and preventing Israel from going around the agreement to seek additional aid from Congress. Congress then appropriated the funding, which is why notwithstanding Leahy Amendment violations, the bulk of US military aid to Israel is locked in for at least two more years regardless of who controls Congress. Pursuing a legislative strategy that provided Ukraine with a steady stream of funding and material in order to ensure that Ukraine can win – win means to inflict sufficient pain on Russia that it seeks to negotiate a settlement that will favor Ukraine and on Ukraine’s terms – would have been a better approach than what has happened.
Especially because it is going to take longer to deliver a lot of the aid to Ukraine.
"One American official said most of the larger weapons that were financed by the new U.S. aid, and even some of the ammunition, would be shipped from the United States and most likely not be delivered until well into the summer" https://t.co/rlcakqJ39l
— Shashank Joshi (@shashj) May 3, 2024
The New York Times has the details via the Wayback Machine due to the paywall:
Last Sunday, as Russia put pressure on Ukrainian forces across a 600-mile front line, Ukraine received a shipment of anti-armor rockets, missiles and badly needed 155-millimeter artillery shells. It was the first installment from the $61 billion in military aid that President Biden approved just four days earlier.
A second batch of those weapons and ammunition arrived on Monday. And a fresh supply of Patriot interceptor missiles from Spain arrived in Poland on Tuesday. They would be at the Ukrainian front soon, a senior Spanish official said.
The push is on to move weapons to a depleted Ukrainian army that is back on its heels and desperate for aid. Over the last week, a flurry of planes, trains and trucks have arrived at NATO depots in Europe carrying ammunition and smaller weapon systems to be shipped across Ukraine’s borders.
“Now we need to move fast, and we are,” Mr. Biden said on April 24 when he signed the bill approving the aid. He added, “I’m making sure the shipments start right away.”
But it may prove difficult for Mr. Biden and other NATO allies to maintain the urgency. Weapons pledged by the United States, Britain and Germany — all of which have announced major new military support over the last three weeks — could take months to arrive in numbers substantial enough to bolster Ukraine’s defenses on the battlefield, officials said.
That has raised questions about Ukraine’s ability to hold off the Russian attacks that have had Kyiv at a disadvantage for several months.
Yet there is little time for Ukraine to lose against a steady Russian advance.
Avril D. Haines, the director of U.S. national intelligence, told Congress on Thursday that Russia could potentially break through some Ukrainian front lines in parts of the country’s east. A widely anticipated Russian offensive this month or next only adds to the sense of gravity.
“The Russian army is now trying to take advantage of the situation while we are waiting for deliveries from our partners, primarily the United States,” President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine said on Monday at a news conference in Kyiv with the NATO secretary general, Jens Stoltenberg.
He noted that “some deliveries have already been done” but added, “I will only say that we haven’t gotten all we need to equip our brigades.”
More at the link.
Here is President Zelenskyy’s address from earlier today. Video below, English transcript after the jump.
The Day is Devoted to the Situation in the Khmelnytskyi Region: Security, Protection of the Region, Contribution to the Defense of the Whole of Ukraine – Address by the President
3 May 2024 – 13:37
I wish you health, fellow Ukrainians!
Today I am in Khmelnytskyi. The day is devoted to the situation in the region – security issues, protection of the region, everything related to the contribution of Khmelnytskyi region to the defense of our entire country. There were detailed reports on air defense and electronic warfare in the region at key facilities. We discussed the safety of the Khmelnytskyi Nuclear Power Plant, the overall potential of the energy sector in the region, and the restoration of those facilities that were damaged by Russian strikes.
Today I appointed Serhiy Tiurin as the head of the regional administration.
We presented our economic platform “Made in Ukraine” in the region, and I had the opportunity to talk and thank the entrepreneurs of the region, all those who preserve jobs and provide the economic foundation for our country.
Today I also met with our border guards, our men and women, the cadets of the Academy of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine, who are studying to be strong so that our state can become stronger, studying here in Khmelnytskyi. There were also lyceum students. I would like to thank all the lecturers of the Academy for their professionalism, the command staff of the Border Guard Service, its commander, Lieutenant General Serhiy Deineko, and the Minister of Internal Affairs, Ihor Klymenko, for their support, and each of our border guards for making all Ukrainians confident in your loyalty to Ukraine.
And I started this day by visiting a military hospital and expressing my gratitude to our doctors, nurses, and everyone who helps save our warriors after they have been wounded and provides rehabilitation. The key is to do everything at your own level so that our entire Ukraine can achieve the necessary results. I am grateful and proud of everyone who is fighting for our country, everyone who is working to make sure we endure, everyone who is helping. I am proud of Ukraine!
Thank you, Khmelnytskyi, for this day!
Glory to Ukraine!
President Volodymyr Zelenskyy visited the Bohdan Khmelnytskyi National Academy of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine.
The Head of State got acquainted with the changes introduced to the work of the institution after the beginning of the full-scale Russian invasion. The Rector, Major General Oleksandr Lutskyi, pointed out that the Academy had enhanced its military training.
During a conversation with lyceum students, cadets and teachers, Volodymyr Zelenskyy noted that the functions of the SBGSU had significantly expanded due to the war. Besides defending Ukraine’s borders, the border guards are also mastering various types of equipment and performing combat missions on the front line. In particular, drone operators have shown effective results at the front.
“Our border guards have proven themselves at the highest level. They performed all combat missions with utmost courage and professionalism. The Border Guard Service is expanding its skills because of the war. Of course, when the war is over, all these skills will not vanish. And this number of electronic warfare and drone operators, all these specialists should stay and ensure the protection of Ukraine’s modern border in time of peace,” the President said.
Volodymyr Zelenskyy also inspected the machinery used by Ukrainian border guards today. These include armored vehicles, MLRS, artillery, drones, and electronic warfare equipment.
Since the beginning of the war, 9 combined detachments have been created on the basis of the Academy, and they have performed combat missions near Kyiv, Hostomel, Bucha, Moshchun, and on the eastern border of our country.
For their courage and heroism, 234 servicemen of the Academy were presented with state awards, and 10 graduates received the titles of Hero of Ukraine and the Orders of the Golden Star, 7 of them posthumously.
Here’s the video:
A very sobering @olliecarroll interview with Ukraine’s deputy mil intel chief. He says Chasiv Yar will fall eventually, that Ukraine is far from stabilising the front and that Russia is “generating a division of reserves” & wants to strike at Sumy/Kharkiv. https://t.co/9RKSFsBWUe
— Shashank Joshi (@shashj) May 2, 2024
From The Economist:
The scruffy headquarters of hur, Ukraine’s military intelligence agency, stands on a jagged piece of land in central Kyiv known as Fisherman’s Island. Strictly speaking, it is not an island but a peninsula. And there isn’t much fishing going on these wartime days. But sporting a piratical beard, the agency’s deputy head, Major-General Vadym Skibitsky, plays a nautical theme. Blunt, enigmatic and sharp as a captain’s hook, he exudes many of the qualities that have made hur one of the most talked about secret services in the world. But he sounds troubled as he assesses Ukraine’s battlefield prospects. Things, he says, are as difficult as they have ever been since the early days of Russia’s full-scale invasion. And they are about to get worse.
He predicts that Russia will first press on with its plan to “liberate” all of Ukraine’s eastern Donetsk and Luhansk regions, a task unchanged since 2022. He says a Russian order has gone out to “take something” in time for the pomp of Victory Day in Moscow on May 9th, or, failing that, before Vladimir Putin’s visit to Beijing a week later. The speed and success of the advance will determine when and where the Russians strike next. “Our problem is very simple: we have no weapons. They always knew April and May would be a difficult time for us.”
Ukraine’s immediate concern is its high-ground stronghold in the town of Chasiv Yar, which holds the keys to an onward Russian advance to the last large cities in the Donetsk region (see map). It is probably a matter of time before that city falls in a similar way to Avdiivka, bombed to oblivion by the Russians in February, says the general. “Not today or tomorrow, of course, but all depending on our reserves and supplies.”
Russia has already won a tactical success in the south-west in the village of Ocheretyne, where a recent Ukrainian troop rotation was bungled. Russian forces succeeded in breaking through a first line of defence and have created a salient 25 square kilometres in size. Ukraine is some way from stabilising the situation, while Russia is throwing “everything” it has to achieve a bigger gain. The Russian army is not the hubristic organisation it was in 2022, says the general, and is now operating as a “single body, with a clear plan, and under a single command”.
Looking at a wider horizon, the intelligence chief suggests Russia is gearing up for an assault around the Kharkiv and Sumy regions in the north-east. The timing of this depends on the sturdiness of Ukrainian defences in the Donbas, he says. But he assumes Russia’s main push will begin at the “end of May or beginning of June”. Russia has a total of 514,000 land troops committed to the Ukrainian operation, he says, higher than the 470,000 estimate given last month by General Christopher Cavoli, nato’s top commander. The Ukrainian spymaster says Russia’s northern grouping, based across the border from Kharkiv, is currently 35,000-strong but is set to expand to between 50,000 and 70,000 troops. Russia is also “generating a division of reserves” (ie, between 15,000 and 20,000 men) in central Russia, which they can add to the main effort.
This is “not enough” for an operation to take a major city, he says—a judgment shared by Western military officials, but could be enough for a smaller task. “A quick operation to come in and come out: maybe. But an operation to take Kharkiv, or even Sumy city, is of a different order. The Russians know this. And we know this.” In any event, dark days lie ahead for Kharkiv, a city of 1.2m people that rebuffed Russia’s initial assaults in 2022.
May will be the key month, says the general, with Russia employing a “three-layered” plan to destabilise the country. The main factor is military. Even though America’s Congress belatedly gave the go-ahead for more military aid, it will take weeks before it filters through to the front line. It is unlikely to match Russia’s stock of shells or provide an effective defence against Russia’s low-tech, destructive guided aerial bombs.
The second factor is Russia’s disinformation campaign in Ukraine aimed at undermining Ukrainian mobilisation and the political legitimacy of Volodymyr Zelensky, whose presidential term notionally runs out on May 20th. While the constitution clearly allows its indefinite extension in wartime, his opponents are already emphasising the president’s vulnerability.
A third factor, says the general, is Russia’s relentless campaign to isolate Ukraine internationally. “They will be shaking things up whichever way they can.”
On top of this, an already delicate process of mobilising the population to fight has been hamstrung by political infighting and indecision in Kyiv. Conscription largely stalled in winter after Mr Zelensky fired the heads of the military draft offices. It took months for parliament to agree to a new law to extend the draft to 25-to-27-year-olds and oblige military-age males to register on a new database.
The situation has improved a bit since December, but General Skibitsky is reluctant to declare the emergency over. Ukrainian officials worry that the next wave of mobilised recruits will make for unmotivated soldiers with poor morale. One saving grace, says the general, is that Russia faces similar problems. Its army is unrecognisable from the professional corps that started the war. But Russia still has more of them to throw into battle, stretching Ukraine’s already stressed defences.
General Skibitsky says he does not see a way for Ukraine to win the war on the battlefield alone. Even if it were able to push Russian forces back to the borders—an increasingly distant prospect—it wouldn’t end the war. Such wars can only end with treaties, he says. Right now, both sides are jockeying for the “the most favourable position” ahead of potential talks. But meaningful negotiations can begin only in the second half of 2025 at the earliest, he guesses. By then, Russia will be facing serious “headwinds”. Russian military production capacity has expanded but will reach a plateau by early 2026, he reckons, due to shortages in material and engineers. Both sides could eventually run out of weapons. But if nothing changes in other respects, Ukraine will run out first.
The general says the largest unknown factor of the war is Europe. If Ukraine’s neighbours do not find a way of further increasing defence production to help Ukraine, they too will eventually find themselves in Russia’s crosshairs, he argues. He plays down Article 5 of nato’s collective-defence charter and even nato’s troop presence in states bordering Ukraine, which he says may mean little when put to the test. “The Russians will take the Baltics in seven days,” he argues, somewhat implausibly. “nato’s reaction time is ten days.”
Ukraine’s bravery and sacrifice have given Europe a multi-year head start, removing the immediate threat from Russia’s once feared airborne forces and marine corps for at least a decade, he says. The question is whether Europe will repay the favour by keeping Ukraine in the game. “We will keep fighting. We have no choice. We want to live. But the outcome of the war […] isn’t just down to us.”
Estonia:
The IT Coalition, led by Estonia 🇪🇪 & 🇱🇺Luxembourg, delivered the first order of IT Equipment to the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
Thank you for your steadfast support.
Unity will bring Victory!@MoD_Estonia@Defense_lu pic.twitter.com/Jh5s8oFdWw— Defense of Ukraine (@DefenceU) May 3, 2024
The US & Germany:
Ben Hodges: 'US and Germany must finally say: we want Ukraine to win' https://t.co/94KoKcXRwm
— Ben Hodges (@general_ben) May 3, 2024
RBC-Ukraine has the details:
In an interview with RBC-Ukraine, American general Ben Hodges discussed the possible development of events on the Ukrainian front, assistance to Ukraine from the West, and how the war might end.
The main strategic event of the recent Russian-Ukrainian war is the United States finally approving a multi-billion dollar aid package to Ukraine after a six-month delay. And the consequences of this decision are already beginning to be felt on the battlefield. In addition, other allies of Ukraine have noticeably become more active.
However, it cannot be precisely stated that the assistance from Washington is a turning point in the war. The conceptual approaches of Ukraine’s key partners to the war have not changed: concerns about possible escalation and red lines still exist (the most vivid example being Germany’s stubborn reluctance to transfer Taurus missiles to Ukraine).
As emphasized in a conversation with RBC-Ukraine by the former Commanding General of US Army Europe, Ben Hodges, instead of the usual approach of “helping Ukraine as long as it takes,” the West, primarily the United States and Germany, should choose another approach – “helping Ukraine to win, whatever it takes.” And this will pave the way for a successful repulsion of Russian aggression – when Putin realizes he cannot win.
Next are the main theses of Hodges’ interview with RBC-Ukraine.
Assistance from the USA, ATACMS, and F-16s
According to Hodges, the recent aid allocation from the USA, albeit with a six-month delay, sends a message to Russia: the USA will not turn its back on Ukraine, which remains a strategic priority for it. The corresponding hopes of the Russians have been dashed.
At the same time, the general emphasizes that the new package primarily allows Ukraine to gain some time to stabilize the front and strengthen the army. “This is very important, but this one package is not enough to win the war,” Hodges stresses.
In his opinion, ATACMS missiles, which apparently have already been used on the battlefield, will help Ukraine make Crimea unsuitable for the activities of occupation forces, Russian air force, and fleet. However, Hodges doubts the possibility of attacking the Crimean Bridge with ATACMS missiles. “I don’t know that using ATACMS against Kerch Bridge is necessarily the best use. It would take so many. And I think the Ukrainian General Staff and General Budanov, they have other plans for the Kerch Bridge,” says Hodges.
As for the F-16 aircraft, the delivery of which is expected soon, they can be used against the Russian army in various ways, he says. In particular, F-16s are mentioned as part of the overall air defense system. They can also be used for strikes against Russian logistics or artillery, as well as to support ground operations.
Attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure and Russian oil refineries
“I was embarrassed when I saw that Mr. Sullivan and others from the US government had said or implied that Ukraine should not attack that infrastructure. I would encourage the government to disregard that and it seems like in the last few weeks that that has really kind of disappeared,” commented Hodges on reports that Washington urged Kyiv to cease attacks on Russian oil refineries, fearing escalation and rising fuel prices.
As for Russian attacks on Ukraine’s energy system, which intensified in the spring, the general believes they may have several objectives: to inflict critical damage to the energy infrastructure already in the context of the upcoming winter period, to disrupt the strengthening of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, and to cause as much harm as possible before Western allies of Ukraine transfer new batches of Javelin anti-tank missiles.
Preventing escalation and nuclear weapons
As Hodges says, the closer someone lives to Russia, the better they understand what Russia represents and that it respects only strength. And somehow managing it, controlling escalation, is impossible. The general assures that in Europe, this is increasingly being understood.
He does not believe in the possibility of Russia using nuclear weapons. According to Hodges, those in power understand that Russians understand: nuclear weapons are more effective as a threat, and as a means of influence, especially on the USA and Germany. “The key will be when the United States and Germany both finally say: we want Ukraine to win, it’s in our interest that Ukraine defeats Russia. And then when you have a clearly defined strategic outcome, then you can have much better, more effective policy decisions,” emphasizes the general.
Freezing the war
“Anybody that says should freeze the war has never looked at a map. I mean that they don’t understand the significance of Crimea, and the Black Sea, and also they’ve never read a history book because Russia will never live up to any agreement that’s made. So the idea that you can sort of freeze this conflict and that that leads to a good peaceful outcome that’s sustainable is ridiculous. Anybody that appreciates geography and history knows that’s not going to happen. So I hope that we will stop the nonsense talking about freezing and conflict,” says Hodges. The general adds that such a move would only postpone Russia’s next aggressive actions.
Conditions for ending the war
“I think the war ends when Vladimir Putin realizes he cannot win. So we have to make sure he realizes that Ukraine is not going to quit, that the West is not going to quit,” says Hodges. The general criticizes the popular Western formula of supporting Ukraine “as long as it takes” and instead proposes another: helping Ukraine to win, whatever it takes.
In particular, the general highlights that Western sanctions are still being effectively circumvented by Russia and its allies and this needs to be addressed. “When all these things are done and then Vladimir Putin realizes he has lost. That’s when it ends,” concludes Hodges.
More at the link.
Here’s the video:
Why Peace Without Reliable Guarantees is Unattainable
What comes next is critically important as it highlights a crucial strategic perspective that may be controversial and elicit strong emotions. Nevertheless, it is a long, yet essential message that must be addressed.… pic.twitter.com/od2e3yy3uz
— Tatarigami_UA (@Tatarigami_UA) May 3, 2024
Why Peace Without Reliable Guarantees is Unattainable
What comes next is critically important as it highlights a crucial strategic perspective that may be controversial and elicit strong emotions. Nevertheless, it is a long, yet essential message that must be addressed.
Discussions around peace negotiations are becoming more frequent. Some of these discussions are inspired by the Kremlin’s agenda, aiming to undermine foreign aid to Ukraine. Others stem from genuine concerns among Western elites who seek an exit strategy from the ongoing war and a return to peace. One approach, which I support, suggests providing Ukraine with the means to liberate the entire Ukraine. Still, we must also review and analyze alternative perspectives and options suggested by others. So, what are the options? To answer this, we need a better understanding, which involves modeling scenarios and assessing potential outcomes.
Let’s consider a scenario where Ukraine agrees to a ceasefire with Russia, halting major hostilities and freezing the war at the current frontlines. In this situation, likely, that Western aid to Ukraine would gradually decrease. Even during wartime, Ukraine faces challenges in securing sufficient foreign aid, let alone during peacetime. Politicians in democratic countries may find it increasingly difficult to justify prioritizing aid to “peaceful” Ukraine over domestic issues. Ukraine will slowly disappear from the informational field.
Ukraine has lost access to fertile agricultural lands, a nuclear power plant, strategic and industrial facilities (like Azov Stal in Mariupol), seaports, and critical infrastructure. Hundreds of thousands, if not millions are internally displaced, with tens of thousands disabled or injured, and many more moved abroad forever. Ukraine will inevitably grapple with significant social and internal problems, leading to political instability exploited by Russia through hybrid measures. Rebuilding Ukraine’s military independently amid these challenges is optimistically unrealistic. Current foreign aid mitigates these issues, but surpassing current aid levels to fully rebuild the military for defense against potential Russian aggression would be extremely challenging, if not impossible.
Meanwhile, Russia is likely to stabilize its economy, rebuild its military, and draw lessons from the past experience. Russia can manage these challenges more effectively due to its financial resources and could also use the populations of newly occupied territories to draft into its military, akin to what occurred in Crimea and Donbas. With its military-industrial complex largely intact, Russia holds an advantage in domestic production compared to Ukraine, where factories and employees have been decimated.
Now, why are the US and other Western countries hesitant to commit to agreements providing NATO membership or similar mutual defense agreement for Ukraine? The honest answer is simple: they fear the high likelihood of another Russian invasion of Ukraine. The US and allies like Germany are unwilling to engage in direct military conflict with Russia. This reluctance underscores their belief that Russia’s future aggression is a near certainty. Consequently, proponents of peace advocate reducing aid to Ukraine under the guise of peace, fearing that continued support may harm their political standing at home, branding them as warmongers.
Furthermore, it is almost certain that investment, insurance, and credit organizations will classify Ukraine as a high-risk state in the absence of security guarantees. Regardless of their proclamations, these entities are not philanthropic organizations. In the absence of proper security guarantees, the country may find it challenging to attract long-term investments, and many investors may choose to abstain from investing in Ukraine.
Those advocating for meaningful peace negotiations must present a concrete framework with solid security guarantees, outlining specific actions rather than relying on ambiguous statements and general declarations. Whether through NATO membership or bilateral/trilateral security agreements supported by mutual defense clauses, these guarantees should be implemented immediately after signing them, and not in the form of distant promises of potential alliance membership. Additionally, a detailed plan to rebuild Ukraine and integrate it into the Western/Transatlantic economic and security framework is essential, rather than simply sacrificing Ukraine under the guise of achieving peace.
Until such guarantees and plans are in place, Ukraine remains very vulnerable, and these problems will pave the way for another, certainly more successful Russian invasion, which will erase Ukraine from the map.
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Kharkiv:
Second attack on Kharkiv today. Russia's employing a new tactic, dropping gliding bombs like the UMPB D-30SN in residential areas in broad daylight to instill fear and terrify residents. At least one woman killed pic.twitter.com/YZes21So7M
— Maria Avdeeva (@maria_avdv) May 3, 2024
Another group of russian Shahed drones is reported in the direction of Kharkiv!
— Iryna Voichuk (@IrynaVoichuk) May 3, 2024
Explosion reported in Kharkiv! The city is under russian Shahed drone attack!
— Iryna Voichuk (@IrynaVoichuk) May 3, 2024
Bilohorivka:
2/ The Russian forces persistently attempted to reach Ukrainian positions and disembark infantry into trenches. We previously reported on the assault involving tanks and MTLBs. While they successfully reached the Ukrainian trenches, they failed to achieve anything. pic.twitter.com/RoYe6JPvrz
— Tatarigami_UA (@Tatarigami_UA) May 3, 2024
Novomykhailivka front:
79th Brigade repelling Russian attacks on the Novomykhailivka front.
Previously undocumented Russian losses: 2хТ-62М; 1xT-72B3; 1xT-90M; 2xBTR-80; 2xBMP-3; 1xBMP-2https://t.co/8MkgeP7qyohttps://t.co/d5cUK0uGv5https://t.co/cNCHYzPZq2 pic.twitter.com/buS37q3Wap— Special Kherson Cat 🐈🇺🇦 (@bayraktar_1love) May 3, 2024
That’s enough for tonight.
Your daily Patron!
There are no new Patron tweets tonight. Here is some adjacent material from the Ukrainian MOD:
Cats definitely know where the safest place is.
📷: 122nd @TDF_UA Brigade pic.twitter.com/l2ln2niuvM
— Defense of Ukraine (@DefenceU) May 3, 2024
Open thread!
Westyny
Thank you, Adam.
Carlo Graziani
Here is a gift link to the paywalled NYT article.
Jay
Thank you, Adam.
Jay
https://nitter.poast.org/Gerashchenko_en/status/1786360648286257198#m
Another Scott
I’m going to again respectfully disagree. I think you’re mixing apples and oranges comparing the 10 year Israel military aid package (from 2016) and the Ukraine Supplemental process.
The US has been providing billions of dollars of military assistance annually to Israel since the Carter administration. There was no prospect of that changing significantly, so locking in a long-term understanding (subject to annual appropriations) with Israel was in the US’s interests given Israel’s history of demanding (and receiving) substantially more than the president requested.
FMF is an annual appropriation. Congress goes along with agreed funding level because they recognize the benefits of the agreement with Israel.
The Pentagon (nearly?) always funds wars and support for active military assistance via Supplementals (e.g. Afghanistan, famously in Iraq, etc.). It’s the same with Ukraine. And that makes sense – a 10 year assistance plan cannot sensibly cover the military aid needs in an active war. Ukraine was getting $115M in FMF and $276M in USAI assistance in FY21. (3 page .pdf). The amounts need to be adjusted annually because the requirement change annually.
Ukraine doesn’t have a history of getting billions of dollars a year in assistance for decades on end from the US. Ukraine’s annual assistance line in the federal budget doesn’t have a history of being double that requested by the president. Israel’s military funding assistance from the US was and is an annual appropriation as part of the normal budget process, not a wartime supplemental. There was no way to somehow lock-in Ukraine’s war funding needs in the annual budget process.
My $0.02.
FWIW.
Cheers,
Scott.
Parfigliano
@Jay: witty guy
Adam L Silverman
@Another Scott: Let’s see, which one of us has 1) a PhD in political science? 2) Worked on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process for the DOD? 3) Started working on the Russian-Ukrainian stuff for the DOD in January 2014? 4) Has had to sit through the Defense Management course at the US Army War College and evaluate it for the leadership as part of a formal curriculum review?
I’m pretty sure that person has a better idea of what is going on.
Nukular Biskits
Adam, I’ve commented something akin to this before but I honestly don’t know where and how you find the time to do this, particularly given your day job, personal life, etc.
I know many of us thank you for the efforts but I hope you never doubt the sincerity of those of us who do express our appreciation for these round-ups and analyses.
Gin & Tonic
@Parfigliano: Dima is pond scum. I’d love nothing more than seeing him out a fifth-floor window.
Another Scott
@Adam L Silverman: And yet what you say you think should have happened was not reported anywhere (that I recall) as being something under consideration by the people who have decades of experience writing and passing foreign military assistance legislation.
Corrections welcome.
Cheers,
Scott.
Eolirin
@Another Scott: I mean, congress could have passed a law giving Ukraine multi year aid at very high amounts, there’s nothing that would have stopped them from doing that in terms of constraints on their ability to draft such legislation. That’s not really the right question though.
The real question was were there enough votes to do such a thing, and given that every single Democratic senator had an effective veto, and that it would have needed to be moved via reconciliation so there would have needed to be buy in from Manchin on that as well, my guess is that the answer to that was no.
At the very least, given the number of available reconciliation slots and the need to fill those with other priorities, it could have completely derailed the domestic agenda to push hard for it
It’s the same as not getting voting rights legislation passed. Viewed strategically that may end up being fatal to democracy depending on how the next couple of elections go. Certainly, if that had succeeded we probably wouldn’t have lost the House in 2022, and there would have been no lapse in Ukraine aid. But when you don’t have the votes you don’t have the votes.
SpaceUnit
I’m starting to think that NATO needs to put Vlad on notice – that because of Russian aggression Ukraine is now considered to be of critical strategic interest to the alliance. Issue an ultimatum and a deadline for withdrawal.
Nobody wants an escalation, but the current strategy is not a strategy. Waiting for Putin to croak is not a plan.
Adam L Silverman
@Another Scott: Because the Biden nat-sec people assumed incorrectly, as you did in comments here in 2022, that the Democrats would hold the House despite all the overwhelming evidence that they would not. As such, their legislative strategy was flawed because it assumed something that was highly unlikely and did not happen. They then, despite all the evidence to the contrary, believed they could negotiate with Kevin McCarthy. This was also a strategic miscalculation.
They’re not discussing it because despite the public statements, based on what the Biden administration has done and is doing, it is clear that their policy towards Ukraine is provide enough so Ukraine can’t lose, but not enough to ensure they can win.
Another Scott
@Eolirin: Even assuming Congress passed a giant 10 year military funding plan for Ukraine, that wouldn’t solve the problem of not being able to “lock in” funding. There are numerous examples of Congress N funding multiyear programs, and Congress N+1 or N+2 reducing the funding or canceling the program all together and recission/”clawing-back” the money.
SST, Superconducting Supercollider, COVID-19 response, etc.
There is no way to tie Congress’s hand in controlling the budget. There was no way to “lock in” the funding if the next Congress didn’t agree.
FWIW.
Cheers,
Scott.
Eolirin
@Another Scott: Technically that’s true, but any legislation reducing aid would have required Republicans to have also taken the senate, which was much less likely in 2022, and then been subject to a veto, so as long as Biden was still in office, it would have effectively been locked in.
The numbers would have worked in the other direction under those circumstances.
Carlo Graziani
@Adam L Silverman:
Which should have taught you that “argument from eminent authority” is weak, defensive bullshit avoidance of evidentiary standards, but evidently didn’t.
This is not how academics make cases. If you want to flaunt your doctorate, live up to the intellectual standards that undergird it. This shit is unworthy of the academic authority that you ought to be deploying here.
ColoradoGuy
Definite parallels with Pollyanna thinking in the first year of the Pandemic: Nobody except medical personnel need masks, so let’s not tell the public to worry about them. A month-long delay by the WHO in declaring the pandemic, guaranteeing its spread to every country in the world. Repeated denial by many in the scientific community that the virus spread by aerosol transmission, ignoring the evidence from many other airborne diseases. A misinformed focus on surface transmission, which turned out to be based on faulty analysis of virus fragments. And many, many other mistakes, mostly based on persistent wishful thinking.
The thinking about the menace of Putin, and the greater Russian system going back many centuries, has been similar. Over and over again, Putin and Russia get the benefit of the doubt, to the cost of the people of Eastern Europe. It still has not sunk in to policy elites, and to the pundits of the New York Times and the Washington Post, that Putin wants to create a fascist world order … as soon as possible.
Jay
https://en.defence-ua.com/analysis/ukraine_wont_be_running_short_of_atacms_production_rates_and_stock_estimates-10384.html
So, all those “statements” that ATACMS couldn’t be sent to Ukraine from US stockpiles because “they were no longer being manufactured” and it’s replacement “won’t be available for several years” were just CYA for geofencing Ukraine.
An excuse to cave to ruZZian threats and red lines.
Another Scott
@Eolirin: The COVID-19 recissions (from May 2023) are a counterpoint.
It’s rare for a president to get everything he wants, and a giant, multi-year foreign aid bill would be a juicy target for any opposition.
FWIW.
Cheers,
Scott.
Eolirin
@Another Scott: Yeah but that was a relatively easy ask since that money wasn’t being used and there wasn’t any kind of strong support for continuing to focus on COVID related issues even from Democrats. I think monies committed to an active war in which Ukraine still would have been on the backfoot even with funding would have been far harder to cut significantly.
hrprogressive
Biden can’t go back and undo the fuckups from 2022, but if they committed to helping Ukraine win should the Democrats control everything in 2025, I am sure that could go some distance towards helping that goal become achievable.
Unfortunately, I think they don’t actually want that. It really does feel like they are hoping for an “appeasement” to work in stopping a wider war.
People were wrong about that 100 years ago. Failing to learn, doomed to repeat, and so forth, apparently.
Another Scott
@Jay: Maybe some things got garbled in the reporting. Douglas Bush at army.mil in September 2023:
FWIW.
Cheers,
Scott.
Another Scott
@Eolirin: I wouldn’t be so sure, myself. Monsters gonna monster.
Beyond that, there’s some history of Congress and the President disagreeing on funding belligerents.
Remember the Boland Amendment?
In a closely divided government every vote can be precious, and horse trading can get intense – even when we’ve been supporting belligerents.
(To be clear, nobody would be happier than me if there was some way to ensure that Ukraine had guaranteed, sustained, substantial military support from the US for years into the future. And there is, but only one way that I know of. That is, working hard to try to ensure that sensible people are our elected representatives.)
Thanks.
Have a good night everyone. You too, Adam.
Cheers,
Scott.
Parfigliano
@ColoradoGuy: Its not just Putin that wants a fascist world. Evidence says many elected GOPers welcome fascism with open arms.
Jay
@Another Scott:
Yeah, that’s not it.
“We” were told that ATACMS were no longer being made and the production lines were shut down.
Not true, ATACMS were still being made for other Nations, the US was just not buying new production ATACMS.
“We” were told that the US was protecting it’s limited and rare stock of ATACMS, and they were, but those were the couple hundred ATACMS 57 Block A1 Unitary, not the several thousand of the early ATACMS in storage.
Now we learn, mostly from LockMart that they have been making new ATACMS at a rate of 40 a month for foreign customers and have been upgrading the US inventory of earlier ATACMS to the ATACMS 57 Block A1 at a rate of 30 a month.
Interesting observation. There have been 0 HIMARS, ATACMS, M-177, or GLSDB strikes by Ukraine into Belgorod Oblast despite the huge number of valuable targets easily in range.
That makes it pretty clear that the US was/has geofenced Ukraine out of fear of ruZZia’s empty threats.
AlaskaReader
Thanks Adam
AJ of the Mustard Search and Rescue Team
Thank you Adam. Much appreciated.
Adam L Silverman
@Carlo Graziani: I’m not an academic.
Another Scott
Yet more evidence that VVP’s quasi-infinite supply of domestic meat doesn’t actually seem so quasi-infinite…
His reply has the link to the story.
Slava Ukraini!!
Cheers,
Scott.