Come for the politics, stay for the snark.

Let me eat cake. The rest of you could stand to lose some weight, frankly.

A tremendous foreign policy asset… to all of our adversaries.

Those who are easily outraged are easily manipulated.

Never entrust democracy to any process that requires Republicans to act in good faith.

Sadly, there is no cure for stupid.

The snowflake in chief appeared visibly frustrated when questioned by a reporter about egg prices.

Too often we confuse noise with substance. too often we confuse setbacks with defeat.

There are no moderate republicans – only extremists and cowards.

If you thought you’d already seen people saying the stupidest things possible on the internet, prepare yourselves.

American history and black history cannot be separated.

Democracy is not a spectator sport.

Seems like a complicated subject, have you tried yelling at it?

Roe is not about choice. It is about freedom.

Reality always lies in wait for … Democrats.

At some point, the ability to learn is a factor of character, not IQ.

People are weird.

Thanks to your bullshit, we are now under siege.

rich, arrogant assholes who equate luck with genius

All hail the time of the bunny!

Innocent people do not delay justice.

Stamping your little feets and demanding that they see how important you are? Not working anymore.

Rupert, come get your orange boy, you petrified old dinosaur turd.

I might just take the rest of the day off and do even more nothing than usual.

The arc of history bends toward the same old fuckery.

You are here: Home / Foreign Affairs / War for Ukraine Day 796: (Some of) You Have Questions, I (May) Have Answers

War for Ukraine Day 796: (Some of) You Have Questions, I (May) Have Answers

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Air raid alerts for Kharkiv have just gone up over the past 1/2 hour (as I type this it is currently 6:35 PM EDT).

Last night in comments, way2blue asked:

Adam, I am out of cycle for your evening posts, but still wanted to ask a question I hope see…

A few days back you embedded a news bit about F16 pilot training.  Indicating that the handful of Ukrainian pilots being trained wouldn’t be ‘battle ready’ till much later this year.  As they are young (21-23?) and inexperienced.  Did I remember that correctly?   I’d thought that experienced pilots with a foundation of English were being trained…

Thanks always for gathering updates that keep us grounded—even when it’s hard to read.

First, you are most welcome. To answer your question, yes, that was me. The bottom line is that it was specifically referring to the group of least experienced/youngest Ukrainian pilots. Instead of being ready by June, that cohort is more likely to be ready by August. Here’s the details from Euromaidan Press:

Ten Ukrainian pilots are currently at an airbase in southwest France, learning the basics of aerial combat as part of the training for 45 F-16s arriving in Ukraine this summer, BFMTV reports.

After the United States approved last fall, countries including the Netherlands, Denmark, and Romania are helping train Ukrainian F-16 pilots to counter Russia’s air superiority. Currently, twelve Ukrainian pilots are being trained in Denmark, Britain, and the US, and are expected to be combat-ready this summer. However, upon their return, only about six of the promised 45 F-16s from European allies may have been delivered, as per media reports.

The beginning of training in France was announced on 12 April by French Defense Minister Sébastien Lecornu, who stated that future Ukrainian fighter pilots likely to operate American F-16 aircraft are starting their training in southern France with the French Air Force. France doesn’t operate F-16s.

The young pilots are the ones receiving training abroad because the experienced aviators have remained in Ukraine to fly the fleet’s aircraft amid the ongoing all-out Russo-Ukrainian war.

BFMTV reports that this summer, 45 F-16s are expected to be delivered to the Ukrainian army. According to the think tank Ifri, Denmark will provide 19 jets – 14 in 2024 and five in 2025. Norway is reportedly contributing 22, with the remaining aircraft sourced from the Netherlands and Belgium.

While some pilots are trained in Europe, with France training a portion of them, the technical teams, including mechanics, are likely to be trained in the USA, according to BFMTV. Each aircraft requires a crew of about a dozen people, including the pilots.

Earlier, the Ukrainian Air Force spokesman reported that two Ukrainian pilot groups were refining their F-16 skills in Denmark and the USA, with another group transitioning from the UK to France for light aircraft training. He also mentioned that Ukrainian F-16 technical personnel are being trained to eventually instruct their peers in Ukraine.

The Kyiv Independent has more on the three cohorts of pilots in training.

There are three separate programs for pilots at different levels. Earlier this month, Air Force spokesman Yurii Ihnat said that six advanced pilots are already flying F-16s in Denmark and should be ready to fight in the spring. The least experienced group is training in the U.K. — they might not be ready until 2025.

An intermediate group training in Arizona is expected to graduate later this year, according to a Jan. 4 briefing by the U.S. State Department.

Ukrainian ground crews are also learning to service the aircraft.

The first batch of planes may be coming from the Netherlands. Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte on Dec. 22 said that his government started preparing the initial 18 fighter jets, while a spokesperson from the Dutch Defense Ministry told NOS that more jets may be delivered at a later date. There have been no updates since then.

Denmark had pledged to supply six planes by the end of 2023, but the delivery date has been reportedly pushed back six months. Copenhagen said it would give 19 planes in total.

Danish and Dutch officials have said the delivery schedule depends on the readiness of Ukraine’s infrastructure and pilots, among other factors.

Belgium’s defense minister has promised several jets, which would likely arrive in 2025. According to Norwegian broadcaster NRK, Norway plans to send between five and 10 planes, but neither the total number or the delivery schedule has been fixed.

Experts told the Kyiv Independent that Ukraine will likely have at least some F-16s operational in late spring or early summer.

If everything goes right, then the Ukrainians should have six F-16s sometime by late May or early June and a group of pilots to fly them and ground crews to service them. The remainder of planes, pilots, and ground crews will then become available in bits and bobs over time into 2025. Six F-16s with pilots and ground crews is better than no F-16s, pilots, or ground crews, but it’s not what the popular perception has been about what is happening. This is part of the reason I have been so hard on the Biden nat-sec team. These planes, pilots, and ground crews were needed no later than spring of 2023. Had the training started in the late summer/early fall of 2022, then when the Biden administration finally overcame its fears in the fall of 2023 and decided to allow allies and partners to provide F-16s to Ukraine, they would have been ready as soon as the announcement was made. Instead, several months were lost figuring out who was going to do what in terms of training, determining which planes would go, figuring out what they needed in terms of upgrades and service, then doing the upgrades and service, then doing the training, etc. By the time all of the promised F-16s get to Ukraine it’ll be sometime in the spring or early summer of 2025. Two years after they would have had the greatest theater strategic impact. That’s if everything goes right. It never does. I’ll leave it there before I write something that hurts someone’s feelings.

Here is President Zelenskyy’s address from earlier today. Video below, English transcript after the jump.

In June the Path to a Just Peace Can Begin – Address by the President

28 April 2024 – 18:25

I wish you health, fellow Ukrainians!

We are not losing a single day for Ukraine – I have just spoken with Hakeem Jeffries, the leader of the Democrats in the U.S. House of Representatives. I thanked him and all the congressmen for their support of our country and personal leadership in advancing a new package of assistance to Ukraine. We are interacting with our partners at all levels to achieve the level of efficiency in assistance that is needed not only to hold our positions, but also to disrupt Russia’s war plans. We are still waiting for the supplies promised to Ukraine – we expect exactly the volume and content of supplies that can change the situation on the battlefield in the interests of Ukraine. And it is important that every agreement we have reached is implemented – everything that will yield practical results on the battlefield and boost the morale of everyone on the frontline. In a conversation with Mr. Jeffries, I emphasized the need for Patriot systems, they are needed as soon as possible.

Also, our teams, Ukraine and the United States, are currently working on a bilateral security agreement, and we are already working on a specific text. Our goal is to make this agreement the strongest of all. We are discussing the specific foundations of our security and cooperation. We are also working on fixing specific levels of support for this year and for the next ten years, including armed support, financial, political, and joint arms production. The agreement should be truly exemplary and reflect the strength of American leadership. I am grateful to both our team and the team of the American side for the progress in drafting the agreement.

Next week there will be quite a lot of international communication, both public and non-public. We remember what this year should bring us in the political sense, in particular the result with the European Union. Ukraine has fulfilled all the necessary conditions for the actual start of accession negotiations, and now it is up to the EU side to fulfill its obligations.

We continue preparations for the first inaugural Peace Summit in June, and our team, along with the teams of our key partners, is working to make the Summit truly global. We can say for sure that all continents will be represented – different parts of the world, different views on global development. But all of them share the same recognition that the UN Charter and basic international conventions are binding documents for every country in the world, including a country like Russia, where madness prevails. The world majority must force Russia into peace – and it can do this. It is in June that the path to a just peace can begin.

We are also preparing for the NATO Summit to be held this summer. A strong political signal is needed – the Alliance should not be afraid of its own strength or shy away from its own foundations – every country that shares common values and is willing to actually defend them deserves an invitation to join the Alliance.

And our unwavering gratitude to the warriors – to all the Defense and Security Forces of Ukraine, to each and every one of them at the front, at combat posts, on combat missions. Kharkiv region, Donetsk direction, all the southern directions. I am grateful to every soldier and commander who is doing everything to destroy the occupiers – this is needed the most.

According to the results of the week, the warriors of the 57th and 58th separate motorized infantry brigades, as well as the warriors of the 35th separate marine brigade deserve special gratitude. I would also like to mention our border guards, both those who are fighting on the frontline alongside everyone else, and those who are protecting our border communities and destroying Russian subversive groups. Special gratitude goes to all the servicemen of the Dozor special forces unit of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine. Also, to the warriors of the Revenge brigade – and I would like to thank Staff Sergeant Oleksandr Meteyko, Senior Sergeants Serhiy Nesterenko and Sviatoslav Ihnatiuk for their special results. The Steel Frontier brigade – Staff Sergeant Ivan Koval, Sergeant Vitaliy Mykytenko, and Senior Soldier Yevhen Kolesnik. Well done! Chernihiv and Volyn border guard detachments – Senior Soldiers Mykhailo Danyliuk and Mykhailo Myndiuk, Sergeants Yuriy Romashyn and Mykhailo Sereda, and Senior Sergeant Roman Novyk. Sumy border guard detachment – Soldier Andriy Krut and Staff Sergeant Yuriy Popkov particularly distinguished themselves… I also thank all the soldiers of our Kharkiv detachment, especially Senior Soldiers Denys Shevchenko and Volodymyr Shevtsov, and Major Andriy Kuchynskyi. I am proud of you all, warriors!

I am grateful to everyone who is with Ukraine, who is in Ukraine and for whom Ukraine is the only home on Earth.

Glory to Ukraine!

Here’s a machine translation of Colonel General Syrsky’s full statement from his Telegram channel:

The situation at the front worsened. Trying to seize the strategic initiative and break through the front line, the enemy concentrated the main efforts in several directions, creating a significant advantage in forces and means. Actively attacks along the entire front line, in some directions – has tactical successes. There is a dynamic change in the situation, individual positions change “from hand to hand” several times during the day, which gives rise to an ambiguous understanding of the situation.

What is actually happening at the front?

Heavy fighting continued across the front line this week. The situation was changing dynamically – in some areas the enemy had tactical success, and in some areas it was possible to improve the tactical position of our troops.

In Luhansk region, the enemy is trying to take advantage of its advantage in air, missiles and the number of artillery ammunition. The main task for himself is to reach the administrative border of the Luhansk region.

The main areas where the enemy’s efforts are concentrated in the Kupyan direction are the villages of Stelmakhivka and Berestov. There, the enemy had partial success, but was stopped by the actions of our units. Also, continues the offensive on the village of Terny in the Lymansky direction, tries to push the Defense Forces of Ukraine beyond the Black Stallion River, without success.

In the Siversk direction, the enemy is advancing in the area of ​​Bilogorivka and Rozdolivka, trying to break through and block Siversk in order to create conditions for the continuation of the offensive on Slovyansk. There are no successes, his progress in this direction is stopped.

In the Kramatorsk direction, Ivanovske and Chasiv Yar remain the hottest spots. Also, the enemy is trying to bring Klishchiivka under its control and go to the border along the “Siverskyi Donets-Donbas” channel.

The most difficult situation is in the Pokrovsky and Kurakhiv directions, where fierce battles continue. The enemy deployed up to four brigades in these directions, is trying to develop an offensive west of Avdiyivka and Maryinka, making its way to Pokrovsk and Kurakhovo. Units of the Defense Forces of Ukraine, preserving the lives and health of our defenders, moved to new frontiers west of Berdychi, Semenivka and Novomykhailivka. In general, the enemy achieved certain tactical successes in these directions, but could not gain operational advantages. Ukrainian troops inflict maximum losses on the enemy, both in terms of personnel and military equipment. In order to strengthen the defense in these directions, to replace the units that have suffered losses, the brigades that have regained combat capability are being moved.

The situation is still tense in the South, in the Zaporizhia and Kherson regions. On the Novopavlivskyi direction, the enemy is trying to advance in the Staromayorsky area, on the Orihivskyi – in the Robotyny and Verbovoiy areas, on the Khersonskyi – they still hope to knock out our troops from Krynyk. There is no success in any of the directions. Moreover, in the direction of Kherson, our units managed to advance in the area of ​​Veletenskyi and establish control over the island of Nestryga.

Also, the Defense Forces of Ukraine managed to improve their tactical position in the area of ​​Synkivka (Kupian direction) and Serebryan Forestry (Lyman direction).

In the North of Ukraine, the enemy continues shelling border settlements in the Sumy and Chernihiv regions, conducts sabotage and reconnaissance activities. There are no signs of direct enemy preparation for offensive actions in the North of Ukraine. At the same time, we are monitoring the increase in the number and regrouping of enemy troops in the Kharkiv direction. In the most threatening directions, our troops have been reinforced by artillery and tank units.

We continue the rotation of military units in order to organize personnel rest and restore the combat capability of our military units.

Training of personnel in training centers continues, the main emphasis is placed on quality and skill in handling weapons.

Work on the fortification equipment of defensive lines and positions continues.

We are also working with partners to obtain weapons, weapons and military equipment as soon as possible.

Together to victory!
Glory to Ukraine!
t.me/osirskiy/670

Estonia:

https://twitter.com/DavidPriess/status/1784001481118540007

Russia has been at war with the US, the EU, NATO, and our other non-EU and non-NATO allies since at least 2011 if not 2009. A war Putin declared at the Munich Security Conference in 2007 with the claim that the US and NATO had and was attacking Russia. We have been living within World War III for well over a decade. It might be prudent for our leaders to wake up to that reality and act accordingly.

Kharkiv & Kupyansk:

Cape Tarkhantut, Russian occupied Crimea:

Russian Telegram channels report the Ukrainian military attacked a Russian air defense unit at Cape Tarkhankut overnight allegedly with ATACMS missiles.

In addition, a powerful explosion is reported in Dzhankoi and Dzhankoi district of occupied Crimea.

According to Suspilne, more than ten explosions sounded around 1 am in Razdolne district bordering Dzhankoi in northern Crimea.

There is no official information on the strike yet.

Despite the explosions, Russians want to rest in Crimea: the tourist flow has been off the scale since the morning of April 28. Local Telegram channels report about queues for inspections in Taman and Chonhar checkpoint (on video).

Crimea has become one of the few alternatives for restricted Russians.

Russians are used to celebrating Easter holidays (next week) in Crimea.

Well, Russians love fireworks and salutes.

On the border of Zaprizhzhia and Donetsk Oblasts:

An update on the octogenarian who fled Russian occupied Donetsk on foot:

Ivan Vivsianyk, 88, who fled the Russian-occupied village of Ocheretyne on foot under shelling because he did not want to live with a Russian passport, settled in Dnipro region and plans to garden.

Mr. Ivan said that Russian occupiers threatened to shoot him, they took away his Ukrainian documents. He walked for more than six hours with one bag, and then hitched a ride to Pokrovsk. There the man asked for help.

Now, at the center for evacuees in Dnipro, Mr. Ivan is recovering. The head of the center says that despite his age, Ivan is independent and eager to lead an active life.

“He wants to garden. I think, he will find a a partner here. He enjoys success among our grandmothers and not only grandmothers, so I think we don’t need to worry. He is an independent person – he showed himself right away,” Olha Volkova, head of the temporary accommodation center said.

Ivan Vivsianyk is sure that he will also harvest tomatoes and grapes, at least in Dnipropetrovsk region.

📹: TSN

Odesa:

Odesa. A family stands on the ruins of their house, which was destroyed by a Russian drone on April 23.

Khrystyna and Ruslan have three children. Little Andriana, who is only 1 year old, nine-year-old Vadym, and twelve-year-old Vanya, who is in the hospital. The family was at home at the time of the explosion. It’s a miracle that they survived, but the eldest son was injured.

📷: Libkos

Kushchyovskaya airfield, Russia:

For those wondering, here’s an update on what has happened to the Wagner Group since Prigozhin was killed.

From Politico:

Seven months after the fiery death of Yevgeny Prigozhin, the audacious oligarch whose private army known as the Wagner Group led an insurrection against Russian President Vladimir Putin, the Russian state is establishing control of the private mercenaries and putting them to work pursuing the Kremlin’s agenda.

The thousands of the former Wagner forces have splintered into at least four groups, according to two U.S. officials granted anonymity to discuss sensitive intelligence matters.

By mixing the fighters with other mercenaries loyal to Putin, the Russian government hopes to prevent a repeat of the events of last year, when a unified Wagner turned on Putin and his defense ministry.

“Part of the objective of the restructuring is to make sure there is more control over the operations overall,” one of the U.S. officials said.

The new private armies are already being deployed across the world on special missions, including to Ukraine and Africa, where they are expected to play a similarly destabilizing role on the global stage as when under the command of Prigozhin, the officials said. The reconstituted paramilitary groups have already forced the Biden administration to withdraw troops from Niger and Chad — in major setbacks for counterterrorism — while challenging U.S. policies in the Central African Republic, Mali, Burkina Faso, Libya and other African nations.

One of the four groups is aligned with Russia’s National Guard. It has already transferred to Ukraine and lost a significant number of fighters. Two other groups are operating under the control of the defense ministry and Moscow’s intelligence services. The fourth group — known as the Africa Corps and aligned with an existing group known as Redut — is still working to assume control of former Wagner forces in some African capitals, the officials said.

Little else is known about the breakdown of the new factions, including how many members come from Prigozhin’s Wagner versus other existing paramilitary organizations. It’s also unclear to what extent Prigozhin’s son, who initially took control of thousands of Wagner mercenaries after his father’s death, is still involved in leading a smaller group of fighters still loyal to his father’s memory. The younger Prigozhin is likely in charge of some forces in the Central African Republic and Mali, the officials said.

Prigozhin died last August when his plane exploded in midair. The crash was widely viewed as a state-sponsored assassination, ordered by Putin.

Prigozhin’s death left the fate of his empire in limbo. At that time, the Wagner Group was in the process of establishing close ties to the leaders of rogue African states, providing security to dictators while engaging in lucrative mining operations.

In the Central African Republic, for instance, Wagner had taken control of a gold mine. In the wake of Prigozhin’s death, his former subordinates have significantly expanded the mine, U.S. officials said, but have not yet found a way to efficiently market and ship the minerals. They would reap hundreds of millions of dollars in profit on the global market.

Prigozhin also oversaw a sweeping disinformation operation that organized protests in Africa, helped place falsified news stories in media outlets around the world and ran massive troll farms to destabilize elections in Western Europe, the United States and other democracies.

The disinformation arms are now likely under the control of Russia’s foreign intelligence service, the U.S. officials said. And Prigozhin’s economic employees may have been placed under other intelligence offices, including the military’s intelligence directorate.

Moscow’s newly asserted command of these private mercenaries has vast implications for geopolitics. In Africa, especially, it could undermine the Biden administration’s efforts to fight terrorism, promote democracy and forge diplomatic ties to newly formed regimes.

“The timing element is key here. Russia can give these countries what the U.S. cannot and immediately,” one of the U.S. officials said, referring to Moscow’s ability to use private fighters to provide under-the-table weapons and ammunition to newly formed military governments in Africa. “And a lot of the leaders of those countries are sick of the U.S. lecturing them about democracy.”

Moscow’s direct control of paramilitary groups could also convince some African countries that had previously shied away from the Wagner Group — which was under global sanctions as a criminal organization — to reconsider their resistance, said the officials.

Moscow’s use of the paramilitary fighters to spread its influence in Africa is already visible in Niger, one of the most important outposts in the war against terrorism.

Nigerien military leaders took control from the country’s elected president, Mohamed Bazoum, last July. The coup prompted Washington to suspend its economic and military aid to the country while the Biden administration pushed the military leaders to transition back to a civilian-led democracy.

Earlier this month, however, hundreds of Russian mercenaries arrived in the capital city of Niamey, claiming they were there to help train Niger’s military and to enter into a formal partnership with the ruling junta.

Their arrival came just days before the Biden administration announced that the U.S. would withdraw its 1,000 troops from the country after nearly 10 years, creating the appearance of Russian forces supplanting those of the U.S. in a country where terrorist groups have organized and plotted global attacks.

Meanwhile, in Chad, another country with a significant presence of former Wagner fighters, the Biden administration announced this week that it was withdrawing about 75 special operations forces who had been performing counterterrorism roles, at the request of the local government.

The move was widely seen as another instance of Russia supplanting U.S. influence.

Former Wagner fighters also remain active in Mali, Libya and Sudan, where they have contracts to provide security to unstable regimes. The U.S. has tried to counter Wagner’s presence in those nations and the Central African Republic, urging officials to distance themselves from Russia.

In another country, Burkina Faso, as in Niger and Chad, former Wagner forces are now under firm control of the Africa Corps.

But the two U.S. officials caution that there are risks to Russia’s strategy — especially pertaining to ongoing questions about the loyalty of former Wagner fighters and their willingness to take orders from the country’s oft-maligned defense ministry.

Even before his insurrection, Prigozhin would often publicly condemn the ministry of defense, blaming its leaders for setbacks on the battlefield in Ukraine. And his final break with Putin occurred when he attempted to force the ouster of Sergei Shoigu, minister of defense, and Valery Gerasimov, the military’s chief of staff.

Prigozhin blamed the duo for the poor performance of Russian troops. He also claimed that they had exaggerated the largely illusory threat posed by Ukraine to push Putin into an unwise war.

Many of Wagner’s fighters have remained loyal to Prigozhin’s memory and similarly disliked the defense minister. Now, some of them are being led by that very official — Shoigu — in a highly selective group known as Patriot. It is supervised and financed by the ministry of defense, officials say.

“It’s unclear if Moscow will be able to pull off what Wagner has done for years,” a third U.S. official said. “These fighters are being put into an existing, bureaucratic system that might slow things down and make them less dangerous.”

More at the link.

That’s enough for tonight.

Your daily Patron!

I would like you to get to know about Ukrainian poetess Lina Kostenko. Here’s the translation of my favorite poem:

Words terrify when they remain not spoken,
When suddenly, they tuck themselves away,
When you don’t know how silence can be broken,
For someone else has said all you might say.

These words were once pronounced in tears or pain,
They were the dawn yet also the cessation,
Billions of men and words, like drops of rain,
For the first time now, they are your creation.

Both beauty and ill will have had their fame,
There have been weeds and roads beneath our sole,
But poetry will never be the same,
It will forever touch the human soul.

(Translation Ivan Doan)

Open thread!

Reader Interactions

54Comments

  6. 6.

    Nukular Biskits

    Adam, with reference to this:

    his is part of the reason I have been so hard on the Biden nat-sec team. These planes, pilots, and ground crews were needed no later than spring of 2023. Had the training started in the late summer/early fall of 2022, then when the Biden administration finally overcame its fears in the fall of 2023 and decided to allow allies and partners to provide F-16s to Ukraine, they would have been ready as soon as the announcement was made. Instead, several months were lost figuring out who was going to do what in terms of training, determining which planes would go, figuring out what they needed in terms of upgrades and service, then doing the upgrades and service, then doing the training, etc.

    what are your thoughts on why the Biden Admin was (and continues to be) so timid on sending weapon systems to Ukraine?

    My personal opinion is that domestic politics (the obstruction of the apparent pro-Putin GOP, for example) didn’t really play into that.  And I find it hard to believe that the administration was seriously concerned about Putin escalating to the use of nukes.

    EDIT:  Sorry. I didn’t read all the comments before I posted.  Have a good evening!

  7. 7.

    Adam L Silverman

    @Nukular Biskits: I think Biden is old, weak, and risk averse. I think his senior appointees are all the wrong make models and types and are a bunch of craven, feckless, cowards. If I had any other choice in November that wouldn’t cede the republic to the fascists, I’d vote for it. But no one does. So I’m voting for Biden because I have no choice.

  8. 8.

    Lyrebird

    @Nukular Biskits: Hello NB, I also remember at the beginning of the full-scale invasion that China’s response was being closely watched.  I think YY posted some comments that he saw public commentary there that favored the RU story about Ukraine being a Western puppet or something , chiming in with concern that overzealous US response would lead to a much greater flow of materiel into RU from China.

  9. 9.

    Harrison Wesley

    @Nukular Biskits: Early on in the Russian invasion, I saw a couple reports (don’t know how accurate) that US leaders were surprised by Ukrainian resistance.  They apparently had assumed Russia would march right into Kyiv, and then the West would use sanctions (a pretty worthless weapon) to destroy Russia.  If that’s true, they may not have planned to send anything to Ukraine.

    Instead, Ukraine knocked the stuffing out of the Russians, which put the US on the spot to show its support.

    This has been your paranoid delusion for the night, brought to you commercial-free from southwest Florida.

  12. 12.

    Chris

    @Adam L Silverman:

    This might be mean to say, but the impression I’ve been getting is that both Democrats domestically and Europeans internationally have been able to coast for the last half century or so on the fact that the “hawk” job was outsourced to U.S. Republicans. All they had to do was either keep up with it or push back against it, depending on the circumstance. Except now it’s turned out Republicans don’t want the job, at least in this exact case, so they’re having to flex that muscle for the first time since they-can’t-remember-when, and not surprisingly, they don’t really remember how. Assuming they even realize they have to.

  13. 13.

    Seeker

    @Comrade Bukharin:

    Yes. It’s not up for debate. The reason most Americans think Bidens administration has been a failure is because it has been.

    Unlike Adam, I will not be voting for Biden.

  14. 14.

    Another Scott

    AirAndSpaceForces.com (from August 2023):

    Ukraine won’t get a basic F-16 capability until at least 2024, and developing proficiency with that aircraft “could be four or five years down the road,” Gen. James B. Hecker, commander of U.S. Air Forces Europe and Air Forces-Africa, said Aug. 18.

    “It’s going to [take] at least until next year until you see F-16s in Ukraine,” Hecker said at a virtual meeting of the Defense Writers Group.

    According to multiple media reports, within the past few days President Joe Biden’s administration gave the necessary official approvals needed for a consortium of countries led by Denmark and the Netherlands to start training Ukrainian pilots on the F-16. The U.S. has also provided formal assurances that it will fast-track any requests from those countries to transfer their older F-16s to Ukraine that they are trading out for newer aircraft like F-35s.

    Yet Hecker downplayed the significance the F-16s may have in helping Ukraine combat Russia’s invasion, saying the capability won’t be a “silver bullet” but will simply ease Ukraine’s use of air-to-ground weapons already being provided. His comments echo previous remarks from Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Army Gen. Mark A. Milley, who have said F-16s won’t be a “game-changer” or “magic weapon,” respectively.

    […]

    FWIW.

    Cheers,
    Scott.

  15. 15.

    JCJ

    @Adam L Silverman:  That is interesting, but I am curious how you might rate others?  GW Bush was young and reckless, Reagan was old, a fool, and ridiculous (fuck you Grenada!), GHW Bush looked so strong roughing up Panama…

  16. 16.

    Adam L Silverman

    @Seeker: Then you’re voting for the ruin of us all. The choice is Biden or a Trump dictatorship. There are no other options or choices.

  18. 18.

    Jay

    @Harrison Wesley:

    Both NATO and the US amped set up training for the Ukrainian Military after 2014. Both NATO and the US armed Ukraine with light infantry weapons, both NATO and ex-Soviet. They provided Ukraine with intelligence.

    That is in part why the “Thunder Run” on Kyiv failed.

    They did not provide much in the way of heavy weapons, because the Ukraine Military was not set up to use or maintain them.

  19. 19.

    Another Scott

    Defense.gov (from April 26):

    Q: Mr. Secretary, some critics say the U.S. strategy in Ukraine has been to give Ukraine enough assistance not to lose, but not enough to win for fear of provoking Russia because Russia is a nuclear power. Will there be any restrictions on the new weapons that are being sent, the ATACMS and others, where they can be used, where they cannot be used? And what would you say to Republicans who voted against aid to Ukraine who say that you don’t have a strategy? What is your strategy?

    SEC. AUSTIN: Thanks, Jen. We’ve said from the very beginning and you heard the president say that our goal is to see a democratic, independent and sovereign Ukraine that has the capability to defend itself and deter aggression going forward. And so you see us working towards that end with not only the capability that we’re providing Ukraine in the current battle, but the kinds of things that will build — we’re building — helping Ukraine build for the future, going back to the capability coalitions.

    So in terms of what Ukraine needs on a day-to-day basis, as you know, I talk to Minister Umerov every week, and we talk about what his requirements are, what’s most needed, what’s most critical. And when, you know in days gone by, when others were saying — were talking about their — different types of systems, we were focused on providing Ukraine adequate air defense capabilities, and we’ve seen how important that was over time, and it will continue to be important going forward. And without that focus, without that kind of capability, Ukraine would be in much worse shape because of the capability that the — that — that’s resident in the Russian air forces.

    So I would caution anyone in saying that, you know — in believing that one type of system is going to be a silver bullet. It’s going to be a combination of a number of systems. It’s going to de- — be dependent upon whether or not Ukraine can effectively employ these systems and sustain those systems, and whether or not Ukraine can mobilize the — an adequate number of troops to replenish its ranks.

    And so we continue to work on all those things simultaneously, and we really want Ukraine to be successful. We’ve invested a lot. This is really important not just for Ukraine, but for the world, and for all the reasons that you heard me talk about my opener, so —

    Q: And General Brown, can Ukraine win?

    GEN. BROWN: Well, you know, the key part here is to make sure Ukraine can defend itself, and as the secretary highlighted and I’ve talked about here recently is that, you know, unchecked aggression leads to more aggression, and so this is why it is so important for us to put Ukraine in a place they can defend itself, and that we don’t have this broadened to a much wider conflict. And when I think about how World War II started, or previous world wars, this is why this is so important for — that we have Ukraine Defense Contact Group and all the nations around the world that are focused on ensuring Ukraine’s successful.

    SEC. AUSTIN: And Ukraine can be successful if it has the right amount of security assistance, so we are all very grateful for Congress passing the supplemental, and again, if you think about what Russia intended to do early on, what its strategic objectives were and the fact that it failed to achieve any strategic objectives, and two years later, 793 days later, Ukraine is still fighting and still holding its ground. That’s quite remarkable, and it’s holding that ground even in the face of, you know, a question as to whether or not we were going to continue to support them. That — that question is off the table now, and that has reassured the Ukrainians, but also its reassured our allies and partners around the globe, as well.

    FWIW.

    Cheers,
    Scott.

  20. 20.

    YY_Sima Qian

    @Adam L Silverman: Umm, I have been very critical of the Biden team’s foreign policy (including the economic nationalism) across the board, not just on the PRC, but I do not agree that these adjectives applies to them. Not even the risk averse part. The Biden team is risk averse in terms of the short term, which produces mixed results in crisis management. However, their actions show an obliviousness to long term (downstream, 2nd & 3rd order) risks from their policies, wrt Russia & Europe at large, the PRC, NK & the “Indo-Pacific” at large, Iran, Israel/Palestine & the ME at large, the Global South, etc.

    The adjective I would use is conventional (in the extreme), completely beholden to the old ideas & mental frameworks dating from the Cold War & the US’ unipolar moment immediately after, that dominate the foreign policy technocracy, & not updating them to account for the new realities that prevail today. The only change is replacing neoliberalism w/ economic nationalism internally (for me), & yet still preaching neoliberal policies externally (for thee). This conventionalism used to be strongly bi-partisan, & still is to an extent, but large parts of the GOP leaning side has devolved into full blown bomb thrower/arsonists, in foreign & domestic policy.

  21. 21.

    Adam L Silverman

    @Another Scott: This doesn’t contradict or refute my point it makes it. If you begin the training in 2022, then if you decide to send the F-16s in 2023, everything is ready. If you don’t all you’ve done is trained up so pilots and ground crews and our allies and partners have refurbed and upgraded their older F-16s. By waiting to make the decision till Fall 2023, you ensure that the Ukrainians get what they’ve been begging for and have needed one to two years to late.

  24. 24.

    dimmsdale

    Just nodding in to say, again, thanks, Adam. Your nightly chat plus a very few other commentators are the stations of the cross for me. One I’ve been following for a while is another natsec insider, on the civilian rather than military side; I’m presuming he’s plugged into what I’d call the “establishment” insider info chain, which gives him (or her, I honestly don’t know which) some valuable global awarenesses as to WHAT is going on. But his/her stance on Ukraine until very recently has been that we’re giving them what they need, as opposed to what they may want. Lately, though, there’ve been some cross words in his/her dispatches about risk aversion and Jake Sullivan’s name has come up a couple times (at long last, I might add)  in a newly unfavorable light. Coupling what I’ve read & digested of Adam’s comments so far, plus Chris’s speculation above (which strikes me as spot-on), has only stoked my anger at Biden’s natsec team, and Jake Sullivan and HIS team in particular, and makes me  wonder what in Gods’ name keeps them from seeing Ukraine as freedom fighters in the Valley Forge/Bunker Hill tradition, and helping them with everything we have and/or can build. Well, thanks for coming to my TED talk, as the cliche goes. My thanks to Adam and all the esteemed commenters here who contribute so much night in and night out

    Editing to add: I hit “post” on this comment before reading the Jay/YY Sima Qian colloquy. Reading Austin’s comments, sounds like a lot of blah-blah-blah. Disgusting.

  25. 25.

    wjca

    @Seeker: Unlike Adam, I will not be voting for Biden.

    Is it that you think we need Trump back because his administration was so much more successful?  Or perhaps you see a realistic 3rd alternative that all our tiny minds are unable to grasp.  If so, would you care to share?**

    ** It does (belatedly) occur to me that you won’t be voting for Biden due to not being a US citizen.  Apologies for omitting that.

  26. 26.

    Gin & Tonic

    @YY_Sima Qian: I think your second paragraph is spot-on. There’s too much thinking still shaped by (now ancient) Cold War frameworks. A large part of that, IMO, is the fault of academia, where it takes forever for new thinking to permeate, and where the influence of russia is still profoundly out of proportion to russia’s actual influence in the real world.

  27. 27.

    wjca

    @Adam L Silverman: Notice that Austin did not say that the US policy was for Ukraine to win. And Gen Brown dodged the question.

    I also notice that neither they nor the questioner defined what it was that they took “win” to mean.  I can think of a couple of different ways that it might be interpreted.  Some of them entirely reasonable and desirable, others extremely implausible or downright undesirable.  Hard to have a meaningful discussion of the point until that detail is made clear.

  28. 28.

    Andrya

    @Adam L Silverman:

    I think Biden is old, weak, and risk averse. I think his senior appointees are all the wrong make models and types and are a bunch of craven, feckless, cowards. If I had any other choice in November that wouldn’t cede the republic to the fascists, I’d vote for it. But no one does. So I’m voting for Biden because I have no choice.

    Agree 100% but I think there was another factor- Biden’s advisors were terrible at game theory.  If they understood game theory, they would have understood that the most dangerous situation, in terms of nuclear war, is being unpredictable.  Especially with a guy like putin, who would rather incinerate the world than be perceived as backing down.  If they intended to honor NATO Article 5 if putin attacked Poland or the Baltic states, they needed to send a clear message in advance:  “Don’t do this.”  If putin encountered a squishy response to the Ukraine invasion, his thinking would be “Hey, NATO is decadent and I’m on a roll!   Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Poland, here I come!”  That’s when the risk of nuclear war becomes extremely high.

  29. 29.

    YY_Sima Qian

    @Gin & Tonic: I think part of it is deeply ingrained, almost unconscious Russo-centrism. Part of it is that the foreign policy technocracy in DC is far more exercised by the PRC than Russia. To them, Ukraine is not the central theater that warrants top priority, the “Indo-Pacific” is. That is part of the reason the Biden team & so many in the bureaucracy are so risk averse in Ukraine, they do not want take even low probability but high consequence risks for a secondary theater (remember what Omar Bradley said about the Korean War?), & they do not want aid to Ukraine to undermine the US’ military position against the PRC in the “Indo-Pacific”. Preparing for a possible war w/ the PRC (which many in DC seemed to have convinced themselves to be both inevitable & imminent) takes precedence over helping Ukraine fight an ongoing war.

    That is why Biden has continued Trump’s trade war w/ the PRC (despite all Dems correctly characterizing it as being self-defeating during the 2020 elections), escalated & escalating the tech war, & promoted dangerous block formation around the world. Of course, this has been an interactive process w/ equally active contribution from Xi & the CPC leadership.

    US politicians & think tankers tend to conflate US primacy w/ “rules based international order”, but they are not the same. Which is the greater threat to US primacy, Russia or the PRC? The PRC. Which is the greater threat to “international order” (such as it is) or any order at all, Russia or the PRC? Putinist Russia. What they prioritize tells you what their motivation really is.

  30. 30.

    YY_Sima Qian

    For all of the well deserved criticism of the US & many European countries for dragging their feet in material aid to Ukraine, I think the Ukrainian government (executive & legislature) also deserve criticism for dragging its feet on expanding mobilization. I’d say the twin deficiencies have equal weight.

  31. 31.

    YY_Sima Qian

    Here is an article from the Economist on the challenging domestic situation in Ukraine, specifically for mobilization. Perhaps G&T can tell us whether this is selective reporting by MSM, somewhat reflective of reality, or perhaps only the reality in Odesa.

    Dodging the draft in fearful Ukraine
    Ever more conscripts are needed against Russia’s offensive
    Apr 28th 2024|odessa

  32. 32.

    YY_Sima Qian

    @Lyrebird: I think that was true early on. However, the PRC’s support to Russia is capped by not providing lethal aid (otherwise Putin would not have had to beg NK & Iran for munitions & missiles), & that has been because the Beijing does not want to fully rupture relations w/ the US & the EU (i.e., credible threats of much greater Wester sanctions), & that consideration remains operative no matter how much lethal aid the West provided/provides to Ukraine.

  33. 33.

    Jay

    @YY_Sima Qian:

    A key issue Ukraine has, is not mobilization, it is training the mobilized.

    Even with NATO assistance, both in country before the reinvasion, and abroad in NATO countries, and after, the best that Ukraine/NATO managed was 34,000 in a year, with pretty basic training.

    It takes two years of training and regular exercises to take a recruit from a waste of skin, to barely being functional at the battalion level in NATO.

    Ukraine also has a shortage of officers, NCO’s and sadly, some of them still have Soviet habits.

    The International’s were not impressed. The “training” base they were sent to, had no procedures/policy/orientation for a ruZZian attack, and of course, 3 days later, the base was hit with cruise missiles and the Internationals had to run for the woods and dig slit trenches on their own. They had to “liberate” weapons from the armory, most of which were garbage.

    Their first Commander was they stereotypical “drunk”, lasted 3 months. The next, engaged in nepotism, disappeared all their weapons and ammo on their first deployment to a combat zone, set his HQ up in a villa 35km from their lines,  then also disappeared along with his son when the UA started investigating. They liked their 3rd Commander, but he wasn’t great at strategy or tactics, which cost him eventually.

  34. 34.

    YY_Sima Qian

    @Jay: I’d say it’s both. Yes, training & leadership are clearly issues, but right now Ukraine is facing a manpower shortage at the front not because the newly mobilized troops are still being trained or are poorly trained, but because there are few newly mobilized troops to begin w/.

  35. 35.

    Jay

    @YY_Sima Qian:

    few newly mobilized troops to begin w/

    AKA, “meatcubes”.

    For what Ukraine “needs” now in manpower, they would have had to set the process/facilities, etc in place, 10 years ago.

    The 115th is being “blamed for “losing”, (withdrawing) from a key town.

    The unit had 6 months of training, (5 months in Ukraine, 1 month in Britain), they were all raw recruits, 4 months on the line, took 50% casualties, were flattened by the newly used glide bombs, and had no combat experienced Officers or NCO’s.

  36. 36.

    YY_Sima Qian

    A comprehensive review of Sino-Russian relations across the board post-Feb. 2022. The economic part jives w/ what Alexander Gabuev has written. I am actually surprised at the incisive & likely accurate assessment by Chinese scholars of the situation, w/ nuance & realism not found in state media. There are a wealth of links in the article worth clicking through.

    Will China Save Russia’s Military in the Current War? What About Rebuilding It for the Next One?
    Thomas Eder
    April 23, 2024

    Ties to Europe remain too important for China to cross clear red lines in its support for the Russian military during ongoing fighting in Ukraine. However, following a ceasefire, Beijing may argue that nothing prevents peacetime weapons deliveries to a strategic partner.

    …

  37. 37.

    Carlo Graziani

    @Jay: For what it’s worth: there is a huge difference between peacetime force design considerations concerning adequate personnel training standards and the analogous considerations that apply in wartime.

    The former affect readiness, the latter address emergency requirements. Also, the latter are to be evaluated not by ideal peacetime readiness standards, but rather by comparison to what the enemy can accomplish by way of force generation. Which is to say, assessing Ukrainian manpower generation and training by the standards of what it takes to get soldiers ready to fight in the US (or Canada) isn’t really helpful. What matters is whether they can match or exceed Russian generation and training standards.

  38. 38.

    YY_Sima Qian

    @Carlo Graziani: Also, the level of training required to fight from prepared defenses is probably not as high as that needed to execute combined arms tactics to breach prepared defenses & combined arms maneuvers exploiting a breakthrough.

  40. 40.

    Carlo Graziani

    @YY_Sima Qian: That’s a pretty interesting comment, because it points to another aspect of the advantage of defensive warfare over the offensive that is not usually emphasized.

    In 2024, both Russian operational and manpower requisition/training requirements are going to be much greater than those of the UA, to say nothing of the logistical challenges.I very much doubt that this is lost on Syrsky.

  41. 41.

    Jay

    @Carlo Graziani:

    We already know that they exceed ruZZian training at the base level. That’s not a high bar.

    Th common term/nickname for a “new guy” in your squad, or a new squad in your platoon, or a new platoon in your Company,………

    is “meat”,

    The big issue, is Officers and NCO’s. You don’t get those in a year, or two unless you have a lot of attrition at battlefield promotions.

    @YY_Sima Qian:

    You would think that defence is easy, but it’s not. It requires combined arms coordination, specific tasks, points of defence and constant reinforcement. One squad opens a hole in your trench, the trench is lost. With out swift blocking and rapid counter attacks, the whole trench system can be lost.

    Properly built, trenches provide good protection from somebody shooting at you, but you have to know when to shoot back and when to keep your head down, good fields of fire, if properly sited, moderate protection from mortars and light arty, no protection from drones, FAB’s or 155mm, and no protection from an enemy in your trench.

  43. 43.

    YY_Sima Qian

    @Carlo Graziani: Well, the Russian Army is only using rudimentary combined arms tactics to breach Ukrainian defenses, & has not had any opportunity to employ combined arms maneuvers to exploit breakthrough since the very beginning of the current invasion (at which time it failed miserably). It is just using overwhelming firepower & power, which can be somewhat effective against an under resourced opponent, as we have seen in Donetsk in recent weeks, albeit at enormous cost.

    At some point Ukraine needs warm bodies, too, to man the prepared defenses & rotate out the experienced but exhausted troops on the front lines. The delay in expanding mobilization, apparently caused by internal political bickering, when Ukraine is fighting for national survival, also weakens Ukraine’s position in demanding aid from Western countries, might give excuse to those countries already lukewarm in supporting Ukraine to drag their feet further.

    I think Ukraine & the West need to start conceptualizing Ukraine’s theory of victory under the current & foreseeable circumstances. Forget about hypothetical discussions about whether Ukraine should insist upon recovering occupied Crimea & Donbass, that is entirely premature & pointless at this moment. While this war can only end in a negotiated settlement (even if Ukraine pushes the Russians all the way beyond the internationally recognized borders, a negotiated settlement is still required to end constant Russian attempts at harassment & skirmish), the only way to force Russia (under Putin or successor) to negotiate & for non-Western powers to be interested in holding Russia to the negotiated terms, is for Ukraine to achieve decisive victories on the battlefield.

    For Ukraine to attain the overwhelming advantages to make decisive victories possible over Russian prepared defenses in depth in occupied territories + likely sustained global numerical advantage, Ukraine has to be able to mobilize the required manpower & give the mobilized manpower appropriate combined arms training & adequate leadership. Western supporters have to provide the required hardware & munitions to equip the replenished & newly stood up formations.

    How much manpower & equipment/training are required, & can Ukraine + the West realistically achieve them, & if so over what time frame? In terms of materiel, is it sustainable for the bulk of it to come from foreign donations, or is it more realistic to stand up a Ukrainian defense industry to provide at least a substantial portion? How large & effective an air force could NATO help Ukraine to expand to, so that the Ukrainian Armed Forces has more arms to work w/ for combined arms operations?

    How much can the West realistically constrain Russia’s military industrial complex? Western diplomacy & threats of sanctions might divert the bulk of PRC (& others’) exports of dual use goods though existing or new intermediaries, thereby making Russia procurement more cumbersome, less speedy & more expensive, no effort is likely to be able to substantially reduce such flows. There is a reason such materials & components are called “commoditized products”.

    Does the West believe that Russia’s militarized economy will finally prove unsustainable in the medium to long term, & if so is that 2025/25/27? Realistically, is collapse of Russia’s militarized economy a prerequisite for Ukraine to be able to achieve decisive victories on the battlefield, by reducing Russia’s ability to sustain numerical advantage? If so, should Ukraine stay largely on the defensive over this time, continue to attrit Russia manpower & hardware when the opportunities arise, while continue to put pressure on Russia & its occupation via long range strikes & ramped up insurgency?

    How prepared & able are the Western coalition able to provide the financial support to Ukraine through this multi-year project? How can Ukraine be able to stand on its own feet financially & economically over this time?

  44. 44.

    YY_Sima Qian

    @Jay: I defer to your expertise, but I got to believe competence/proficiency in static defense is easier to achieve than combined arms offensive & maneuvers.

  45. 45.

    Jay

    @YY_Sima Qian:

    at the individual level, squad, platoon, company level, it’s all the same. It’s not one guy shooting, it’s a group operating as a coordinated organism. If you can hold a trench, you can clear a trench.

    It’s at the Regiment, Battalion, Brigade level, where assault vs. defence becomes more complex, and all that is up to the Officers and higher Command. Eg. logistics, reinforcements, support.

    The whole “Army” unit needs to move as one, in attack, or retreat.

    The only way really that defence is “easier”, is that you have much greater ranges of contact, (you see them coming), where in assault, you might not “see” the enemy  and enemy positions until very close range, no matter what the drones and recon have mapped out.

    ETA, unlike assault, in defence, the enemy knows where you are, and so, you get harassing fire, every day. For the Ukrainians, it’s 17 large caliber incoming for every one they can fire back. It’s not a nice experience. It’s where the term “shell shock” come from. Sitting there and having to “take it” sucks, compared to an advance.

  46. 46.

    YY_Sima Qian

    @Jay: Thanks for the explanation. From the reporting, it seems that at the battalion to brigade to corps levels are where the Ukrainian is facing problems.

  47. 47.

    Jay

    @YY_Sima Qian:

    It’s actually systemic through the whole system.

    The Ukraine Military is a hybrid between a NATO Professional Military and a Conscript Army,

    In peacetime, conscripts learn just enough in their 2 years service to not be dangerous to each other.

    The idea is that if needed, they can be called up, and based on past training, (like Slava) with of will and a bit more training, (a year or more), they can become “professionals”.

    It takes a long time to move from a Soviet model army to a modern army. 20 years or more. Lower ranks can move faster, Senior Staff can however be stuck in their ways until either retirement or as British Midshipmen used to say “a sickly season”.

  48. 48.

    Traveller

    War is an uncertain occupation, an uncertain time, a time where minds can crack, rank cowardice today, blind heroism tomorrow…dogs in the wild nipping at your ankles, bombs and shocking new technicqaues in means and metatods to kill you, or your men, are evolving in real time…

    What is true? What is false? What is safe?

    What is safe is calling down endless criticism on President Biden for his navigating us to here, so far safely. His hand has been steady, when no one knew if Ukraine would fold like Afghanistan, he chose the correct and Measured Course. Recently, no one seems willing to give President Biden for private conversations with Mike Johnson to finally free up Ukraine Aid.

    politico.com/news/2024/04/18/biden-johnson-ukraine-aid-00153237

    We are here now, a perilous time to be sure…but thanks is due, and due to President Biden and his team. There is at least one person in his corner. Best Wishes, Traveller

  49. 49.

    Traveller

    I apologize for some of the gross typos above…I  am not quite sure why, but I am still having trouble editing, or cleaning up text in BJ’s commenting box, I did it but it didn’t publish, or did not take…I guess I don’t do this enough, I am hitting a wrong button here or there, that is for sure. I care about what I write…and when it is presented poorly, I apologize. I should write in a different platform and then publish. Things happen. Best Wishes, Traveller

  50. 50.

    Another Scott

    @Traveller: +1

    I think that Biden’s skill in keeping NATO together, and even quickly adding 2 new members in spite of foot dragging by some, is under-appreciated and vastly important. NATO consensus slows some things, like F-16s, down, but unity is vital.

    Thanks.

    Cheers,
    Scott.

  51. 51.

    Another Scott

    Good article on the “$600 hammer” and the real challenges in deciding what US military equipment and programs actually cost.

    GovExec.com.

    Cheers,
    Scott.

  54. 54.

    way2blue

    Thank you Adam.  (Why is it so hard for Secretary Austin to simply say:  “We support Ukraine’s goal to expel Russian forces from its land and become whole again”?)

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