(Image by NEIVANMADE)
Here is President Zelenskyy’s address from earlier today. Video below, English transcript after the jump:
We will do everything possible and impossible to strengthen our warriors – address by the President of Ukraine
13 March 2023 – 21:42
Good health to you, fellow Ukrainians!
A brief report of the day.
I held important coordination meetings. The Prime Minister, the Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada, our international experts, and the Office’s domestic political bloc. We agreed on a course of action for the coming weeks.
In particular, the government has approved and proposes to the Verkhovna Rada to adopt amendments to the state budget, with more than half a trillion hryvnias allocated for defense additionally. All funds will be used to provide financial support to the military, to support our defense sector, and to buy defense equipment, including drones. We will do everything possible and impossible to strengthen our warriors.
Today we also discussed humanitarian demining, something that is vital, literally.
As of now, more than 170,000 square kilometers of our territory remain dangerous because of enemy mines and unexploded ordnance. A significant part of this territory is the land of our farmers, the land that has been cultivated. So today we discussed how to intensify this work: to speed up humanitarian demining and increase cooperation with partners.
We discussed how to support our farmers. The second sowing season has already started during the full-scale war. Last year, the heroic efforts of our farmers and all workers in the agricultural sector made it possible to preserve Ukrainian agricultural production and Ukraine’s global role as a guarantor of food security. And I thank everyone who contributed to this. The government is working on appropriate steps to support the industry.
We also discussed the situation in the energy sector, which has been normalized. In fact, we are meeting the energy needs of Ukrainians throughout the entire free territory of the state, in accordance with the generation capabilities. We continue to prepare for the next heating season, both in terms of accumulating resources and protecting our energy facilities.
The coming weeks are planned to be quite active in terms of international communication. Both in order to strengthen our defense and to strengthen Ukraine’s position in the fight for justice, that is, in the fight to punish Russian murderers. We are preparing news.
We are also working to add new sanctions against Russia. Recently, Canada took a significant step by expanding sanctions on imports of Russian aluminum and steel. I thank Canada for this decision – for this signal to the international community.
We must not only limit the capability of the terrorist state to circumvent existing sanctions, but also impose new ones to prevent Russia from adapting to global pressure. The less Russia’s ability to adapt to sanctions, the sooner we can restore the territorial integrity of our country and return peace to Ukraine.
And, of course, our defense forces. Our soldiers and global pressure on Russia are the only effective guarantee of protecting the freedom of Ukraine, Europe, and the free world.
As always, today I was in touch with our commanders and intelligence.
It is very tough in the east, very painful. We need to destroy the enemy’s military might, and we will. Bilohorivka and Maryinka, Avdiivka and Bakhmut, Vuhledar and Kamyanka – and all other places where our future is being decided. Where our future, the future of all Ukrainians, is being fought for.
I am grateful to each and every one who is now in combat! Thank you to everyone who defends their positions and fights for Ukraine and brothers-in-arms! Thank you to everyone who never lets down those who are next to them on the frontline!
Today, I would like to commend the warriors of the 92nd separate mechanized brigade for their successful actions in the area of Bakhmut. Thank you, guys!
Glory to all Ukrainian warriors!
Glory to our unbreakable and beautiful people!
Glory to Ukraine!
Here is a machine translation of this afternoon’s operational update from the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense as posted on their Telegram channel:
Here is former NAVDEVGRU Squadron Leader Chuck Pfarrer’s most recent assessment of the situations in Kreminna and Bakhmut (newest of the two Bakhmut ones first):
https://twitter.com/ChuckPfarrer/status/1635299115344203778?cxt=HHwWhMDQ-bL437EtAAAA
https://twitter.com/ChuckPfarrer/status/1635407957218451457?cxt=HHwWgoDTjeq3kbItAAAA
https://twitter.com/ChuckPfarrer/status/1635243882538766337?cxt=HHwWgsDUvbbpxrEtAAAA
Bakhmut:
The Kyiv Independent has more details on Bakhmut:
Fierce fighting rages over central Bakhmut as Russia’s Wagner mercenaries try to break through Ukrainian defenses in the ruined city, Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi said on March 13.
Syrskyi, who commands Ukraine’s Ground Forces and made two known visits to Bakhmut in recent weeks, acknowledged that the situation in the embattled city remained difficult as Russia continued to press forward.
The commander said that the Wagner members were storming into central Bakhmut from multiple fronts, but Ukraine still held on to the “fortress” while inflicting “significant losses” on the invading forces.
“All enemy attempts to capture the city are repelled by artillery, tanks, and other firepower,” Syrskyi said, as quoted by the Ukrainian Defense Ministry’s media center.
Syrskyi’s statement comes amid an eight-month-long battle over Bakhmut, a largely destroyed city nearly emptied of its 70,000 residents. Russia has intensified its offensive on Bakhmut in recent weeks as it captured neighboring settlements, inching its way into encircling the city.
Late on March 12, Wagner head Yevgeny Prigozhin said in a Telegram post that his mercenaries began storming into the underground compound of the Artemivskyi non-ferrous metal processing plant, also known as AZOM, in northern Bakhmut.
Neither Ukraine nor Russia officially commented on the situation at the plant on March 13.
Serhiy Cherevatyi, a spokesperson for Ukraine’s Eastern Military Command, said on March 11 that Ukraine seeks to degrade Wagner forces during its defense of Bakhmut.
He added that Ukraine has already “thinned out” the second formation of Wagner’s recruited prisoners over the winter, and Ukraine has “a real chance” of degrading Wagner if it keeps up the pace.
As fierce battles raged in the east and south of Ukraine, civilian casualties continued to be reported.
The President’s Office said on March 13 that Russian troops launched two missiles at a school in Avdiivka, Donetsk Oblast, killing a woman.
To the northeast, the Russians launched a missile strike on the village of Znob-Novhorodske in Sumy Oblast, killing at least one and wounding four, according to the President’s Office.
On the southern front, the Russians fired upon energy workers in a liberated area of Kherson Oblast, wounding one person, the regional military administration said.
More at the link.
Here’s Colonel-General Syrskyi’s full remarks machine translated from Ukraine’s Military Media Center’s Telegram channel:
And here is more machine translation of Colonel-General Syrskyi’s thoughts on the situation in Bakhmut from his own Telegram channel:
Bakhmut Front.
Defense is an organization of action that builds on the strategy, discipline, and trust of personnel.
Its success depends on the intelligence and cunning of each commander.
We must be able to anticipate the actions of an enemy who has a quantitative advantage.
Bakhmut’s defense has been going on for 7 months. The Defense Forces have taken a number of tactical actions that have not yet allowed the enemy to take the city into an operational environment. But the situation remains very difficult.
Russian forces act by the usual methods, do not count people. But the number of soldiers is not a decisive advantage or a factor in victory.
We understand the tactical importance of Bakhmut for the enemy and know his plans for action in other parts of the front.
Defense forces now continue to defend the city. The situation is dynamic. Here, every move and decision can radically change it. Every day has the highest value.
I am proud of the staff. I appreciate the speed of thinking of the brigade commanders next to whom I am.
Honor!
Kharkiv:
https://twitter.com/maria_avdv/status/1635364446762848256?cxt=HHwWgMDS-ZfT_bEtAAAA
The Ukrainian officer who tweets as Tatarigami and has been posting regular(ish) updates from Vuhledar has something important for us to keep in mind:
https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1635344489106513922?cxt=HHwWhICx6b_J9LEtAAAA
Here’s the text of the whole tweet:
OPINION: Although my views may differ from those of some government officials, I’d like to express some cautionary thoughts regarding the upcoming offensive. While I remain hopeful and committed to achieving victory, I believe it’s important to temper our expectations and avoid the assumption that the war will end quickly as a result of one counter-offensive. A realistic approach that takes into account the challenges that we might face. Even though Ukraine has received substantial support from the West, it’s still only enough to sustain few large offensives. Even if Ukraine successfully clears the entire southern region, it won’t necessarily resolve the ongoing issues with Donbas or Crimea. The fall of one area doesn’t guarantee the fall of the other. It’s important to recognize that the Russian forces are actively preparing for the upcoming counter-offensive, and we shouldn’t underestimate their capabilities. Rather than making optimistic statements about how the war will end soon, it’s more realistic to be prepared for a potentially prolonged conflict. We should also communicate this to our allies, so they can adjust their expectations and support accordingly. While I remain hopeful and committed to achieving victory, I believe it’s important to temper our expectations and avoid the assumption that the war will end quickly as a result of this counter-offensive. Everyone in Ukraine is grateful for the support we receive from the West, including from both governments and society, but I believe that we need much more to finish this war. This goes beyond just the provision of ammunition and military equipment, as important as those are. In addition to expanding training programs, we must prioritize efforts to improve our command and control structure. This includes sending our reserve officers to the best military schools to enhance their skills. We need to focus not just on improving the command abilities of NCOs and junior officers, but also those at the brigade level and above. I plan to release a breakdown of the analysis made by Lieutenant Colonel Glen Grant in his article on the necessary changes for our army to remain modern and successful. Finally, I would rather hear that the war has ended sooner than expected, even if it means admitting that my previous predictions were incorrect, than to hear that my advice could have made a difference if only it had been heeded earlier.
Russia bombarded Ukraine again today:
https://twitter.com/Euan_MacDonald/status/1635242839541161984
https://twitter.com/Euan_MacDonald/status/1635246457824608257
https://twitter.com/Euan_MacDonald/status/1635247856692101122
https://twitter.com/Euan_MacDonald/status/1635249269107216385
General Zaluzhnyi has the butcher’s bill:
https://twitter.com/CinC_AFU/status/1633734951026716672?cxt=HHwWgMCz0YbSmKwtAAAA
https://twitter.com/DefenceU/status/1635325801108238336?cxt=HHwWgMCzsduJ7LEtAAAA
https://twitter.com/DefenceU/status/1635333400100741121?cxt=HHwWgoCxpYTE77EtAAAA
https://twitter.com/DefenceU/status/1635342459793186817?cxt=HHwWgoCxobDT87EtAAAA
That’s enough for tonight.
Your daily Patron!
A new video from Patron’s official TikTok! Though I think they’ve recycled the voice over.
@patron__dsns Відео про сон вам дуже сподобалось, тому ловіть ще такий варіант😂
The caption machine translates as:
You really liked the video about sleep, so catch another version like this 😂
Open thread!
japa21
I know a lot of people are looking forward to a Spring counter-attack, but I’m not sure that many think it is going to end the war. I have read of some high up in Ukraine implying that, but I sometimes wonder if that might be a mistake.
As to Bakhmut, I have come to the belief that Ukraine will stay there to the last man/woman. I have seen it written that these are more of the national guard type troops and newly mobilized. I think Ukraine feels the sacrifice of these troops will be worth it if it depletes the Russian forces enough so that the counter offensive has an easier time. Bakhmut is, IMO, a delaying tactic.
Of course, there is also the possibility that Russia, including Wagner, are at just about the end of what they can do there and Bakhmut can serve as a jumping off point for the offensive.
As I have said before, my only military knowledge comes from my son, and he usually told me, if I asked questions, that he could tell me the answers but then he would have to kill me.
Alison Rose
(Quick comment before reading: Adam, it looks like your numbering got off-track again. Per Zelenskyy’s YouTube channel, today should be Day 383. Now to read the post.)
Alison Rose
While I certainly didn’t think that one strong counter-offensive or victory in Bakhmut would equal the end of the whole war, I very much appreciate Tatarigami for, as they said, tempering expectations. When Ukraine retook Kherson last fall, I had a few friends ask me if that meant the war was over. I tried to be polite in my refutations since I know most people don’t pay as much attention to the news as we jackals do.
I fucking love the cat graffiti. I want the bridge one on a shirt.
Thank you as always, Adam.
Bill Arnold
Noting that Ukrainians have been asking for cluster munitions, including bombs that can be disassembled and the submunitions dropped from drones.
Ukraine seeks U.S. cluster bombs to adapt for drone use, lawmakers say (JONATHAN LANDAY, PUBLISHED MARCH 7)
One can imagine usages in various scenarios, including offense. Russian and Ukraine (and the US) have not signed onto a ban on cluster munitions. Ukraine apparently (and reasonably) believes that it can manage the risks to civilians post-active-conflict in an area, vs the risks of Russian occupation.
Roger Moore
@japa21:
My general feeling is that Ukraine has decided Bakhmut is a place where they can achieve two goals: tie the Russians down and attrit them at a favorable casualty ratio. The Russians have decided for whatever reason to keep throwing troops into battle there despite the high casualties. Ukraine is unlikely to get a major victory out of it, but they might succeed in wearing the Russians down to the point they don’t have the forces they need somewhere else.
West of the Rockies
I don’t know how Russian military/Wagner “leadership” lives with itself, funneling thousands of their own to certain death. Vile, heinous creatures. Too bad there’s not a Hell.
Jay
@japa21:
The Territorial Defence Groups are some of the most experienced “defenders” in the UA Military and UA “newly mobilized” are a far cry from Rashist “newly mobilized” in training, arms and units.
Saw a post the other day, showing the Wagner graveyard, for all the ones that they did pick up out of the fields, or who died inside Rashist lines, but wern’t sent home for burial, paired with an estimate from the UA, that with mobilization, Wagner reached a peak of 80k, but because of “actions” and the RU stopping the flow of convicts, is down to about 7.5k.
While Bakhmut is a UA salient into the Rashists lines, the Rachists in their drive to take Bakhmut, have created salient’s of their own, north and south of the town. The US striking from the town would be hard going, but striking those salient’s from the flanks would probably ruin The Orchestra and the Kamakazi’s whole year.
Amir Khalid
@japa21:
If there ever comes a point when the Ukrainians feel they’ve worn down the enemy forces by enough, or when the Russians wise up and quit squandering their troops, I suppose the battle around Bakhmut will peter out. I just don’t think it’s very likely given the mindset on both sides.
Will the Ukrainians kick off their spring offensive from Bakhmut? I’m far less well-resourced than you on military knowledge, but I don’t see a good military reason for it. If they want to punch through a weak point in the Russian front line, they’ll need a route through which they can send lots of doodz and tanks quickly, and I don’t think such a route would go through Bakhmut.
Jay
@Bill Arnold:
saw an interesting vid yesterday about tactics. RU sappers clear lanes through the UA minefields at night, by hand then launch mobile armour attacks through the lanes. UA sappers close the lanes at the far end, at night. wait for the attack, then close off the lanes in the rear, with 155mm arty shells that each deploy 9 mines.
After the first few blow up in the “cleared” lane, the attackers 180 and retreat, only to be blown up in that area they have already driven through “safely”.
patrick II
@Roger Moore:
That is true, but as I watch the Russians slowly advance and the Ukrainian’s escape route narrow I grow more concerned daily about the Ukrainians in Bakhmut. I don’t think, as japa21 does, that they meant to leave them there, but Ukraine, encouraged by the losses they were incurring, I worry they may have waited too long
Anonymous At Work
What happens if the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Plant has more issues related to lack of skilled workers or Russian damage? Is there a point where the IAEA comes in and clears everyone/everything out?
Cameron
@Bill Arnold: I don’t recall where I read it, but I did see a claim that Turkiye has provided Ukraine with some cluster munitions.
YY_Sima Qian
Posted this in yesterday’s thread after it was already dead. Re-posting here:
This is getting a bit more interesting.
I still think most of this is performative, part of the Chinese effort to sooth the EU & ensure that there isn’t lockstep alignment between the US & the EU against China, or a similar consensus w/in NATO. There is no pathway to a negotiated settlement at this time. Evan Feigenbaum at Carnegie Endowment also raised the good point that Xi is making an official visit (not sure if it is a state visit) to Moscow, he absolutely needs a meeting w/ Zelenskyy to even things out a bit, if only to sustain its claims at neutrality. China has also remained Ukraine’s top trading partner through the course of the invasion, & the largest purchaser of the latter’s grains. Furthermore, Modi has also had a virtual meeting w/ Zelenskyy in Dec. This brings China back in line w/ the other straddlers.
However, even a virtual meeting between Xi & Zelenskyy would be symbolically significantly, & at least a slight tilt away from the rhetorically pro-Russian neutrality that has characterized the “Beijing Straddle” to date. It can’t be something that Putin is pleased w/. I am now rather skeptical if there is any serious consideration in Beijing for selling weapons & munitions to Russia, or if there was any such serious considerations to begin w/.
It is not a surprise that the the sudden surge of Chinese diplomatic activity comes at this time. While Xi secured his 3rd term & put in place his preferred Party leadership team during the 20th Party Congress in Oct. 2022, China just completed the “Two Sessions” (the National People’s Congress & the National People’s Political Consultative Congress) where the new upper echelons of the State bureaucracy has been filled out, & the top level Party leaders (members of the Central Committee, the Politburo & the Standing Committee) are also assigned corresponding positions in the State bureaucracy. There has been a large turnover in both the upper echelons of both the Party & the State. W/ both new teams in place, Xi & the CCP leadership can now start to shift both domestic & foreign policy in directions that they intend. Historically, the months between a Party Congress & the following “Two Sessions” can be a time for policy stasis & paralysis, but Xi & the new CCP leadership has been active laying the groundwork.
The policymaking (foreign & domestic) are carried out by the Party organs, while the policy execution is the province of the State organs. For example, Chinese Ministers of Foreign Affairs is actually a relatively low level position in both the State & Party apparatus, a mere executioner of policies decided by higher ups, & not at all an equal counterpart to the US SOS. The top foreign policy person is the State Councilor for foreign policy who is also typically a member of the full Politburo. (& it is striking the that the top foreign policy point person has never held a seat in the Standing Committee, that tells you where the CCP regime’s priorities lie, & who is the ultimate foreign policy decision maker).
Wang Yi, the former State Councilor for foreign affairs & head of the MFA, is now in the Politburo. Qin Gang, the former Ambassador to the US & current head of the MFA, has now been elevated to State Councilor. It is no coincidence that photos of the trilateral meeting among China, Iran & Saudi Arabia show Wang Yi at the center of the Chinese table & Qin Gang to his side. Qin Gang’s position has also been elevated compared to previous heads of MFA, becoming State Councilor & member of the Central Committee in his 1st term in office (normally does not happen until the 2nd term, if there is one). Of course, organization changes announced during the “Two Sessions” has concentrated virtually all of the policymaking power in the Party organs, w/ the State organs losing what policymaking input they used to have. Qin Gang’s influence in Chinese foreign policy will come from his position in the Central Committee, rather than position as head of the MFA. However, he will have likely greater freedom in policy execution, by virtue of his position as State Councilor.
Bill Arnold
The Russia That Might Have Been – How Moscow Squandered Its Power and Influence (Foreign Affairs, Alexander Gabuev, March 13, 2023. I was not seeing a paywall)[1]
Bold mine. Does anyone know of any scholarly literature on this effect, of authoritarian leaders captured in epistemic bubbles (or even echo chambers) of their own creation?
[1] “ALEXANDER GABUEV is the director of the Carnegie Russia-Eurasia Center in Berlin.”
Jay
@Amir Khalid:
Nope, there is another place they are “holding”, more favorable terrain, and the ability to cut RU supply lines from Crimea to the north, south and east.
Bill Arnold
@Jay:
Interesting, thanks.
Ukrainian tactical inventiveness has been impressive, agreed, and should be expected to continue.
Tony G
@West of the Rockies: I’m sure that the Wagner “leaders” sleep like babies. It’s easy when you don’t care.
Bill Arnold
@YY_Sima Qian:
Since you re-upped that, asking a question that came up:
How does the MSS fit into the Chinese power structures?
Geminid
@Anonymous At Work: I don’t think the IAEA has the power to clear anyone out of the Zaporizhzhya nuclear plant. In this situation they have to rely on voluntary compliance by the Russians.
HumboldtBlue
IWM –Why have Ukrainian ATGMs destroyed so many Russian tanks?
Jay
@Tony G:
pretty sure they are having nightmares about open windows, underwear and doorknobs,……
Ruckus
@West of the Rockies:
I’d guess it’s typical Russian concept of the “people.” Anyone not in power is there to protect and serve those in power. This is how all countries used to be, but that mold has been broken in many parts of the world, but not in Russia. There is the monied class and everyone else. And the monied class is like every other monied class, greedy as all hell. Too much is never enough. Add in the concept that the “state” is in charge and you do as they say or else and you have a wonderful place to live. Or die if the head of the place says you get to. As vlad has basically said to his country. I seriously doubt there is even close to a reasonable sized group in Russia that thinks “We have to win this!” It’s likely vlad and maybe his top 10-12 ass kissers. They are throwing bodies into this at a pace that will negatively effect them for decades. And that is the likely reason that Ukraine is staying in this there, in the battle of attrition they are winning. And battle of attrition is pretty much all Russia has left.
Jay
zhena gogolia
@Jay: That is cool.
Gin & Tonic
YY_Sima Qian
@Bill Arnold: The Ministry of State Security, just like all of the government ministries, are executors of policy, not policy makers. It is responsible for both internal regime security (whereas Ministry of Public Security are primarily responsible for maintaining public order & suppressing regular criminal activities) as well as external espionage & influencing operations. The Minister for State security is only a member of the Party Central Committee, and not a State Councilor. OTOH, the current minister of Public Security is a State Councilor, & member of the the party Central Secretariat.
Since Xi reduced the size of the Politburo Standing Committee for 9 to 7 in 2012, there is no one on the SC w/ specific internal security portfolio. This is likely a reaction to Zhou Yongkang (a member of the SC before 2012) & significant parts of the MSS bureaucracy (as well as elements of the PLA leadership) supporting Bo Xilai’s bid to overturn the planned leadership transition from Hu to Xi. Xi has since purged Zhou & many members of the upper echelon at the MSS & the PLA. The MSS is kept strictly as a tool of the regime, & not an independent power center w/in the regime.
Anonymous At Work
@HumboldtBlue: Don’t need to watch to know that the Russian military theme is the same as the Benny Hill Show. That’s why Russia is losing so many tanks.
Anonymous At Work
@Geminid: Then isn’t in Russia’s best interest to keep the plant from exploding or leaking or venting? I know they’ve scrammed all the reactors but day-to-day still requires skilled workers.
Jay
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maks_Levin
patrick II
@Geminid:
Just an opinion, but I think the Russian’s careless guardianship of Zaporizhzhya has been purposeful and their intent is to have a nuclear “accident” while claiming they are not responsible.
Chetan Murthy
@japa21:
There are “I’m anti-Russia, but ….” types who argue that if Ukraine can’t finish the war NOW, then they MUST sue for peace, give up land, etc, etc [imagine screeching harpies circling, dropping shit and piss]. I think Tatrigami’s argument is directed at demolishing those folks.
sanjeevs
DeSantis making explicit his support for Putin.
Jonathan Swan on Twitter: “News: One of the most important developments so far in the nascent 2024 presidential race – Ron DeSantis Says Protecting Ukraine Is Not a Key U.S. Interest. In a questionnaire to Tucker Carlson .. w @maggieNYT t.co/lFFyiG76Nl” / Twitter
Chetan Murthy
@sanjeevs: Hostis Americani (assuming Google Translate got it right *grin*)
Bill Arnold
@YY_Sima Qian:
Thanks. So it would surprise the regime if the MSS made any independent moves, and such independence is discouraged.
YY_Sima Qian
@Bill Arnold: Depending on the level of operational detail. As w/ any huge bureaucracy, it is impossible for the Xi or the CCP leadership to micromanage the execution of policy., but the MSS is not going to go off formulating or pursuing its own policy that is contradictory to the strategic guidance given by the leadership (certainly not under Xi’s more centralized regime). To use a specific example, if the spy balloon program was/is an MSS show (PLA more likely), the central leadership must have signed off on the program & its general scope, but it is highly unlikely that Xi or anyone else in the Politburo is reviewing or approving each mission or it’s profile.
Steeplejack
@Alison Rose:
Yes, today is 383. There was a glitch in early March: 372 on March 2, 371 on March 3, 372 again on March 4.
YY_Sima Qian
Sobering read from the WaPo. The only truly significant information in the article is the estimate that Ukraine has suffered ~ 120K casualties to Russia’s ~ 200K through the course of the invasion to date. Ukraine cannot sustain that kind of exchange rate indefinitely, especially as the Ukrainian Armed Forces go on the offensive later in the spring. The losses among junior officers are also worrisome, & one would assume NCOs, as well. The possibly rising hesitation to volunteer or being drafted is also worrisome, but it is impossible to tell from the article how widespread it is.
The rest of the article contains anecdotes from Ukrainian side on the front (an officer & someone who appears to be an NCO), views from a couple of unnamed Ukrainian officials, & views from a few unnamed NATO officials. The standard qualifications apply for anecdotes, they may not be representative, & that applies to anecdotes from both the Ukrainian & Russian sides. I would also question some of the characterization of the article, whether the reporters are being sensationalist. One can only hope that Ukraine is husbanding enough NATO trained & equipped reserves to cut the land bridge to Crimea via the spring offensive. However, the Ukrainians are quite right to complain that the NATO aid has been far too inadequate to support the attritional warfare or to equip Ukrainian reserves.
SteverinoCT
I have a translation question. When President Zelenskyy says, “guys,” is that an accurate translation, a somewhat casual, lightly affectionate reference to the troops, or is it a convenient term that covers a number of similar words?
Gin & Tonic
@SteverinoCT: The word he uses is, to me, essentially equivalent to the American “guys.”