(Image by NEIVANMADE)
The cost:
Last year russian rocket hit apartment block killing Valeriia and her 3 months old daughter. Shortly after the tragedy, her husband Yuri joined the army. This week russians killed him as well. pic.twitter.com/bRF3I7OdEx
— Kateryna_Kruk (@Kateryna_Kruk) November 5, 2023
Yuriy Glodan killed on the front lines. His wife Valeria, three-month-old daughter Kira, and mother-in-law were killed in Russian missile strike on residential complex in Odesa last year. Confectioner before the war, he decided to join AFU after the devastating tragedy pic.twitter.com/maXaxKx0u5
— Maria Avdeeva (@maria_avdv) November 5, 2023
Ukrainska Pravda has the details: (machine translation)
Yuri Glodan died in the war, whose family was killed in April 2022 Russian missilesand, which destroyed the residential complex “Tiras” in Odessa.
After the loss of the family, Yuri decided to join the ranks of the Armed Forces.
On November 5, his colleague Alexander Yakovenko announced that Yuri died at the front.
Alexander is a co-owner of a confectionery in Odessa, where Glodan previously worked.
Recalling the tragic day when Yuri lost his family, Alexander says that Easter in 2022 was the first weekend of the confectionery. The man spent time with his family, went to the store, and when he returned – “his world was destroyed”.
Then the Russian rocket was injected into the house where the Yuri family lived. The tragedy took a life 3-month-old daughter Kira, her mother Valeria and grandmother Ludmila.
“He committed as a worthy man of the Ukrainian nation – went to the Armed Forces. First “Azov”, then the 3rd assault. Today (November 5 – ed.) We learned that he died defending his nation. Light memory, a man with a big heart”, – written by Alexander Yakovenko.
In April 2022, the man admitted that the service is not easy, because professionalism requires time and training.
“Time to draw, the enemy is not waiting. The fact is that here is a war, we do not paint grass under the line. Wrong — you’re already 300 or 200. It hurts a lot to lose your fellows, and it’s a shame to understand that in his place could be you, or you, in fact, can be next”, – told then the man of “Public”.
Yuri Glodan died in battle. His body was recognized by the cross.
Here is President Zelenskyy’s address from earlier today. Video below, English transcript after the jump.
Regarding Russian strike on soldiers of 128th Separate Mountain Infantry Brigade: The main thing is to establish the truth about what happened and prevent such incidents from happening again – address by the President of Ukraine
5 November 2023 – 18:18
Dear Ukrainians,
First and foremost, regarding the Russian strike on the soldiers of the 128th Separate Mountain Infantry Brigade occurred in Zaporizhzhia region.
My condolences to all the families and loved ones of the fallen soldiers! It is a tragedy that could have been avoided. Defense Minister Umerov has reported to me on the measures taken to clarify all the circumstances of what happened, who was specifically involved, and what orders were given.
Criminal proceedings have been initiated in response to this tragedy. The relevant investigation is ongoing.
The main thing is to establish the complete truth about what happened and prevent such incidents from happening again. Every soldier in the combat zone – in the enemy’s line of fire and aerial reconnaissance – knows how to behave in the open, how to ensure safety.
Now, the investigation must provide honest answers to the families of the fallen soldiers and the society about how this tragedy occurred and whether any improper orders were issued.
Secondly, what I would like to say today. When we go through weeks like this, filled with pain and difficult discussions, it is important for people to understand that what weighs on their hearts is seen, and the necessary changes will be made.
This applies to many things, from negligence that can occur to the Soviet legacy and the terrible bureaucracy that prevents Ukraine and many in our defense forces from realizing their potential correctly and effectively.
We must protect Ukraine. And we will protect it – I have no doubt about that. Believing in Ukraine is knowing that Ukraine and Ukrainians can preserve their independence, will preserve it and reclaim their own.
But, just like after February 24th, this can be done together – and only together, in unity, caring for the state, for those next to you, for Ukrainians, no matter where they are. Preserving the unity of the people is the most important. And I am grateful to all those who make efforts for this.
And one more thing. Avdiyivka. Mariyinka. Lyman. Bakhmut. Kupiansk. Melitopol direction. Kherson region. The artillerymen of the 55th Zaporizhzhia Sich brigade. The 95th Separate Airborne Assault Brigade. The 68th Separate Hunting Brigade. The 79th Separate Airborne Assault Brigade. The 33rd and 31st separate mechanized brigades. Our powerful 54th Separate Mechanized Brigade. The 57th Separate Motorized Infantry Brigade. The 82nd Separate Airborne Assault Brigade. I thank all of you, soldiers, who fight for Ukraine, who believe in Ukraine! Thank you to all the commanders who truly care for the people! And thank you to all who work for Ukraine and help Ukraine in the world!
Every week should make Ukraine stronger. It is essential. And it is a shared task for everyone in the state. All of us.
Glory to Ukraine!
And it’s not just Putin pic.twitter.com/PtRFpJQJMF
— Maria Avdeeva (@maria_avdv) November 5, 2023
Well that pretty much says it all.
Avdiivka:
Авдіївка, Донеччина 05.11.2023 pic.twitter.com/K5YzpBZhCN
— Мисливець за зорями (@small10space) November 5, 2023
Russian occupied Sedove, Zaporizhzhia Oblast:
Meanwhile in Russian-occupied Sedove pic.twitter.com/npIScySRp5
— Illia Ponomarenko 🇺🇦 (@IAPonomarenko) November 5, 2023
A Russian ammunition dump allegedly in Russian-occupied Sjedove between Mariupol and the Russian border is very much on fire.
Source: https://t.co/x5wuRF2OVD#Ukraine #Donetsk #Mariupol pic.twitter.com/1xxGtkVCXE
— (((Tendar))) (@Tendar) November 5, 2023
Here’s some more analysis and discussion regarding the assertions that Ukraine’s counteroffensive has stalled:
The following assertions can all be true:
– Ukrainian counteroffensive failed to achieve its original goals
– The war is not a stalemate (Russia is gearing up for another offensive as we speak)
– Negotiations cannot resolve this conflict right now just as they haven’t since 2014— Dmitri Alperovitch (@DAlperovitch) November 5, 2023
From Mykola Bielieskov of Ukraine’s National Institute for Strategic Studies. From the Skyview app (think the Thread Reader App, but for Bluesky):
Unfortunately both people inside&outside of UA mostly concentrate on specific personalities analysing war dynamics instead of giving a thought to objective conditions. By this people miss really important things and how they shape limits of possible. Thread 🧵
The major problem for UA mil strategy that in 2023 campaign (unlike in 2022 campaign) political goals, military capabilities and combat performance have not been in balance. Moreover there was a tension between political&military dimension. Let’s see this contrast in detail.
In 2022 UA campaign there was kind of perfect match between political goals, mil capabilities&combat performance. Politically strat defense with counterattacks was just fine. And for this UA had proper capabilities&combat performance. Front dynamics in 2022 reflected this match.
In 2023 campaign politically UA had to do classic offensive operation to liberate its people&territories. Staying just defensive was no more enough. Cause if it’s only defensive mode it means pressure on UA to freeze frontline with first hints on freezing out of US in Nov 2022.
But militarily offensive in this war is a challenge with “offensive-defensive balance” favouring defense. It’s much easier to detect&strike opponent concentration of forces than creating such concentration and applying it which is required for successful offensive action.
This tension between political&military dimension is one of themes in gen Zaluzhniy piece for The Economist. UA Commander in Chief admitted that politically UA needs to advance. But militarily it’s a challenge with number&sophistication of technology UA Forces currently possess.
There is another problem – trap of West expectations UA got into. As partners finally decided in Jan 2023 to establish offensive specific grouping of forces&provided weaponry RU created defense in depth+obstacles which only reinforced defense-offensive balance in defence favour.
So West basically expected things UA Defense Forces would find it hard to deliver with all the negative consequences for sustaining long term military aid for UA.
That’s why in June 2023 UA faced a kind of strat zugzwang. As it happened doing a classic offensive people expected out of UA proved to be a challenge. At the same time it’s hard to imagine that UA would dare to say “We are not going to do offensive as we deem it too risky”.
That’s things we need to accept and in 2024 campaign plan bring into balance political&military considerations while looking technological&tactical solutions which finally change offensive-defensive balance back in offensive favour as gen Zaluzhniy suggested.
Here’s RUSI associate fellow Samuel Ramani’s take. First tweet from the thread, the rest from the Thread Reader App:
Ukraine's counter-offensive has been panned as a failure
The truth is more complex
Some thoughts on the successes and failures of Ukraine's counter-offensive /1
— Samuel Ramani (@SamRamani2) November 5, 2023
SUCCESS: Preventing Russian GainsUkraine has carried out offensive operations in the south and east, while preventing notable Russian gains
Fortifications and mines caused Russia to lose 200 armoured vehicles and 1000s of personnel in Avdiivka alone over 3 weeks
SUCCESS: Degrading Russia’s Black Sea FleetUkrainian strikes on the Black Sea Fleet HQ, creation of an alternative grain corridor and creation of insecurity around Russian ships in Sevastopol and Crimea is a big success
It reduces sea-borne Kalibr strikes on Ukrainian cities
SUCCESS: Upgraded Air DefencesUkraine has secured NATO-class systems like IRIS-Ts and Patriots to blunt Russia’s Shahed drone barrages in Kyiv
There is more work to be done on Black Sea port cities but mass electrical line barrages like last winter haven’t yet happened
SUCCESS: Upgrading Air Power and Long-Range missilesATACMS, Storm Shadows and SCALPS arrived, while F-16s are on their way
Ukraine is also stepping up domestic production, which can strike deeper into Russian territory proper
FAILURE: Territorial GainsThe obvious one: Ukraine wanted Melitopol, so it could disrupt Russian supply chains, and make real progress in Zaporizhzhia, Kherson and outside Bakhmut
It downsized its goal to Tokmak, which has been partially successful, but battle lines are frozen
FAILURE: The Drone WarIn terms of production, Ukraine is suffering in the drone war. Bayraktars are not the game-changers they once were, Russia is mass producing Geran-2s as Iranian Shaheds
There is still hope for the Ukraine-made Shark drone and for a winter drone barrage
FAILURE: Stopping Russia’s Production LinesSanctions have not stopped semiconductors from entering Russia and precision missiles are built
North Korea’s supply of 1 million artillery shells plus accelerated domestic production shows Russia is in this war for the long haul
FAILURE: Securing Long-Term Shell and Ammunition SuppliesUkraine has depleted the influx of shells and ammunition it received and it is unclear how fast it will be replaced
Sluggish EU production is to blame but recent Dutch and German deals provide hope
MIXED: GPS JammingRussia’s GPS jamming restricted the efficacy of HIMARS by May 2023 and fuelled fears that longer-range missiles could be restricted
But Ukraine used a guided bomb to destroy a GPS jammer recently, which shows a technological gain
MIXED: Capitalizing on Russia’s DivisionsWhile Prigozhin and Shoigu clashes might have thwarted Russian gains in Donetsk, the Wagner mutiny did not destroy cohesion
With Tantsyura/Reznikov ousted, Syrski under attack and election controversies, Ukraine has divisions of its own
MIXED: Rallying Non-Western SupportUkraine’s Global Peace summit idea and Jeddah talks have gained some traction, as have African criticisms of Russia’s grain deal suspension
But China’s no show in Malta and stagnant UNGA voting patterns reveal that Ukraine has a lot to do
So Ukraine’s counter-offensive did not reach lofty expectations, as Russia’s fortifications were stronger and sophisticated technology was delayedBut it was not a complete failure by any means and Ukraine still has many cards to play heading into 2024 /END
And a response, and contrary take, to Ramani by a member of the Black Bird Group (that’s a Finnish OSINT outfit):
The opinions of some of the Western commentators regarding the counteroffensive bear a striking similarity to the Russian narratives that we've seen after every major failure.
Getting on that cope train is not a great look when we've been laughing at Vatniks for 1,5 years. https://t.co/bPAduq03nT
— John Helin (@J_JHelin) November 5, 2023
Ramani also says that the goal of capturing Tokmak, has been partially successful.
I wouldn't say that being stuck 20km from Tokmak is a partial success, especially when Tarnavskyi said that Tokmak is only the minimum objective.
— John Helin (@J_JHelin) November 5, 2023
I might also say that while getting Storm Shadows and ATACMS is good for Ukraine, it's weird to count it as a success as it was somewhat out of Ukrainian hands.
Also, there has been a clear problem of coordination in the use of these assets and Ukraine has limited stocks them.
— John Helin (@J_JHelin) November 5, 2023
We really need to have more discussion and analysis on how and why the counteroffensive failed, instead of trying to paint a failure into a partial success or an ongoing operation.
That's the only way forward in to learning and understanding what Ukraine needs in the future.
— John Helin (@J_JHelin) November 5, 2023
Zalushnyi pretty much confirmed culmination and failure in the interview with The Economist.
Almost all the forces earmarked for the offensive have been used to try and gain a breakthrough and now reserves and troops have been moved to reinforce Avdiivka.
— John Helin (@J_JHelin) November 5, 2023
But they did not concentrate force.
One of the great mistakes for Ukraine here was the lack of concentration of force. Instead, they opted to spread out their troops, and especially artillery resources, to Bakhmut, Velyka Novosilka, and Robotyne, at the very least.
— John Helin (@J_JHelin) November 5, 2023
I certainly would've criticised it, but it might've been politically expedient in terms of selling the whole "Bakhmut trap" narrative and justifying the losses.
Now Ukraine has the Bakhmut situation to unwrap in terms of critical analysis as well as the southern offensive.
— John Helin (@J_JHelin) November 5, 2023
Meanwhile, Ukraine sees an aurora tonight.
It’s a very rare thing in our parts.
Let this be a sign of good hope for us all. pic.twitter.com/eixLJeRLs7— Illia Ponomarenko 🇺🇦 (@IAPonomarenko) November 5, 2023
Serhij Rubinkovych, a Ukrainian poet and service member, and his cat Reprimand. pic.twitter.com/pfUwAKN69s
— Defense of Ukraine (@DefenceU) November 5, 2023
That’s enough for tonight.
Your daily Patron!
A new video from Patron’s official TikTok:
@patron__dsns 👉🏻👈🏻🐥💛
Open thread!
Alison Rose
I mean…as I’ve noted before, I don’t know shit about shit, but it seems to me that a thoughtful examination of things that have worked, things that haven’t, and things that are in between is not “cope” or whatever, but realism. I don’t think “realist” has to mean “actually it’s all trash and if you don’t think so ur dumb”. And while criticism is good, hipster contrarianism is just obnoxious.
And as has been noted on this here blog many times, if the US and EU and others had stepped up the way they should have from the beginning, the counteroffensive would be going a lot fucking differently right now. It may not even have needed to happen at all.
Anyway.
Here’s a longer version of that news clip from Zelenskyy’s YT page where he calls putin a fucking terrorist, and the bleep is smaller so it’s more satisfying.
Thank you as always, Adam.
patrick II
There is no such thing as a staIemate with an opponent that will not stop and cannot be trusted not to restart the was at the first opportunity.
Martin
@Alison Rose: I think the assertion of ‘cope’ is how they are balanced. Striking a single GPS jammer does not make up for the lack of ground taken in the counteroffensive, etc. I think the assertion is that the successes are of much smaller importance than the failures.
(said without any agreement or disagreement of the analysis)
Adam L Silverman
@Alison Rose: @Martin: I don’t agress with that contrary analysis, but thought it was important to include it.
Adam L Silverman
@patrick II: Correct.
Chetan Murthy
@Adam L Silverman: Adam, I’m relieved you don’t agree with the contrary analysis. I’ve been pretty worried about the slow pace of Ukraine’s counter-offensive, and feeling that we (the West) are giving Russia far too much time to adapt. That will make the cost of this war (human and also $$) much greater than it could have been, heavy sigh. But that you don’t agree makes me feel a little better.
ETA: by which I only mean that it’s good you don’t think the summer’s been a failure, that UA is worse-off than they were in the spring.
Another Scott
@Chetan Murthy: I’m reminded of Milley’s speech to the National Press Club on June 30. RFERL.org:
We shouldn’t have unrealistic expectations.
Slava Ukraini!!
Cheers,
Scott.
YY_Sima Qian
@Adam L Silverman: I don’t think Samuel Ramani’s & John Helin’s takes are necessarily mutually exclusive.
Helin’s analysis is focused on the summer land offensive, which was expected to be & has been the center piece of Ukrainian military preparations & operations in the year to date, & I think it is hard to argue it had succeeded in its tactical, operational or strategic aims, except for attriting Russian combat power at the expense of attriting Ukrainian combat power.
Ramani is looking at the situation more holistically. Ukrainian success in attacking Crimea is unvarnished & probably unexpected. Ukrainian AD, indigenous & Western supplied, are having great effect in limiting the damage from Russian ballistic/cruise missiles & drones. OTOH, saying the summer offensive demonstrated Ukrainian will to fight to its supporters, & calling it a strategic success is pretty questionable. It is a Pyrrhic victory at best, on those terms. A much bigger success would have been if the Ukrainian Army took Tokmak & threatened Russia’s land bridge to Crimea, giving greater confidence to its Western allies that Ukrainian victory is on the horizon w/ more support. Unfortunately, I wonder if Gen. Zalushnyi’s refreshingly brutal honesty might have the opposite effect in some Western capitals. Russian GPS jammers degrading (though far from negating) the effectiveness of HIMARS is not balanced out by a Ukrainian strike against a single jammer site. I think Helin’s is correct in his criticism against counting actions largely outside of Ukrainian control (such as supply of advanced long range precision munitions) as Ukrainian successes, although their effective use against Russian targets are Ukrainian accomplishments. There are few outcomes in warfare that are absolute. Calling anything between 0% & 100% “Mixed” is not serious analysis.
& the failures are not all on Ukraine. As we have been discussing for the past year+, Ukraine is severely hampered by the slow trickle of Western equipment & munitions (& the restrictions placed on some of their use), at least relative to its need. What needs to be done is to assess what led to the failures & the mixed outcomes, in Ukraine & in the West, & address them w/ urgency going forward.
Also, just because the Russians are gearing up for another major offensive does not mean the land war is not at stalemate, unless anyone seriously believe they can achieve what they have yet to achieve since Feb. 2022 – a breakthrough w/o getting bogged down in battles of attrition.
YY_Sima Qian
@Chetan Murthy: The Ukrainian summer offensive failed to achieve its stated aims, & Ukraine being in better shape than in the Spring, both can be true.
I am now seeing assessment from multiple quarters than there is a significant munitions shortage for Ukraine in the coming months, especially tube artillery rounds, & few means to address it. That is much more concerning.
Adam L Silverman
@Chetan Murthy: As I’ve written several times: This is going to be slow going. It will often look or seem frozen until it isn’t. The Ukrainians are not going to stop. And we have been far too slow to give them what they need and then we second guess them doing as well as they are despite us tying one of their arms behind their back.
Jay
@Adam L Silverman:
Fully agree, thank you.
Yarrow
I appreciate Zelenskyy’s way with words.
Also, Kristen Welker is annoying. I saw about five seconds of the interview and had to turn it off.
Damien
It seems to me, as someone with absolutely no expertise in this whatsoever, that there’s some expectation that Ukraine will come to the negotiating table. But why would they? They’ve seen what Russia has in store for any Ukrainian on seized land, and they’ve seen Russia’s complete lack of good faith in keeping promises.
So seriously, the West thinks Ukraine will stop fighting if support was suddenly yanked? Call me skeptical; I think that would just leave them to fight to the death of Ukraine.
This war ends when Ukraine says it does, whether they have Western support or not.
Carlo Graziani
Apparently, the current solar cycle is peaking a bit early, and late 2023 is inaugurating what is expected to be an extended season of strong Aurorae. Space.com has a good summary here.
oldster
Adam, did you see the NYT piece on severe PTSD among Marines who manned batteries of M777s in Syria?
The piece argues that mere proximity to the firing of artillery shells, in large enough volume, is causing something like traumatic brain injury among the gun crews.
It’s not a proper study, just a bunch of anecdotes, but it raises lots of questions:
Is this really a higher rate of TBI among artillerymen than in previous wars? If so, what’s causing the difference?
Is there any difference in effect between being next to an M777 and being inside a NATO SP 155 like the Cesar or Panzerhaubitz? Worse to be in a confined space? Better to be shielded from muzzle blast? No difference?
Anyway, more evidence that armed conflict is hard on everyone. Not that this changes the equation for Ukraine, because occupation by ruzzians is much worse!