Quick housekeeping note: Chas, I saw the question you posted early this morning in the Israel-Hamas thread. I will try to get to it this week. This weekend at the latest.

I read the news today, oh boy

— Illia Ponomarenko 🇺🇦 (@IAPonomarenko) January 29, 2024

About 1 PM EST, The Economist’s Ollie Carroll reported that President Zelenskyy was replacing GEN Zaluzhnyi.

Zaluzhny is on his way out. A huge change of command at a key moment in the war. See his essay for us a few months ago: https://t.co/H2SjN0Ef6V https://t.co/BplAozUly9

— Shashank Joshi (@shashj) January 29, 2024

This was then quickly knocked down by the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense:

BREAKING: Ukrainian Ministry of Defence Telegram channel is denying reports that Zaluzhny has been sacked pic.twitter.com/zT0BeBX63U

— Oz Katerji (@OzKaterji) January 29, 2024

Two hours later Carroll reported the following:

So, where we are: Zaluzhny and Zelensky met tonight. Sources close to Zaluzhny + other top government sources told me they believed firing would happen tonight. The presidential order has not been signed. There has been huge outrage about rumoured plans. There may be walk back. https://t.co/YtC1kdaDU1

— Oliver Carroll (@olliecarroll) January 29, 2024

The Kyiv Independent has something of an explanation of what is or might be going on:

Ukraine’s Commander-in-Chief Valerii Zaluzhnyi remains in his post, yet may be soon dismissed, according to sources of the Kyiv Independent and several other Ukrainian media.

Zelensky’s spokesman Sergii Nykyforov told the Kyiv Independent on Jan. 29 that Zaluzhnyi wasn’t dismissed and no official decree has been published on the President’s Office website.

The news was first reported in the early evening of Jan. 29 by a group of anonymous Telegram channels, including some that have reported insider information coming from the Ukraine’s President’s Office before. At the same time, Telegram channels have been known to report misleading stories and spread misinformation.

Ukrainian media, including the Kyiv Independent, have been trying to confirm the news about Ukraine’s top commander’s firing. The sources, all speaking on condition of anonymity, have been providing contradicting responses.

A Kyiv Independent source in the General Staff of Ukraine’s Armed Forces confirmed that Zaluzhnyi was fired. The source wasn’t authorized to speak to the press.

Neither Zaluzhnyi nor Zelensky have made any public comments on the issue.

Zaluzhnyi serves as Commander-in-Chief since July 2021. Reports first surfaced in November 2023 about disagreements between Zelensky and Zaluzhnyi.

The alleged disagreement between the two received increased attention following Zaluzhnyi’s interview on the state of the war for The Economist on Nov. 1, in which he said there was a danger that Ukraine was walking into the trap of a prolonged war.

Zelensky said he disagreed with this sentiment during a briefing on Nov. 4.

Ukrainian media outlet Ukrainska Pravda then reported on Dec. 4 that Zelensky was allegedly “bypassing” Zaluzhnyi in communication with some military commanders, citing anonymous sources.

President Zelensky said during a press conference on Dec. 19 that he has a “working relationship” with Zaluzhnyi, responding to a question about their alleged dispute.

“He and the General Staff (of Ukraine’s Armed Forces) are responsible for the situation on the battlefield. There are many issues to address there,” Zelensky said during that press conference.

Like so many things these days, we will have to wait for further reporting.

More on this after the jump.

Here is President Zelenskyy’s address from earlier today. Video below, English transcript after the jump.

Keeping ahead of the enemy in the quality of drone operations is one of the main tasks of the year – address by the President of Ukraine

29 January 2024 – 20:23

I wish you health, fellow Ukrainians!

Results of this day.

First. Morning conference call. As usual, there were reports on all areas of government work. The military reported on the situation at the front, on each area of intense battles. Intelligence focused on current issues, with special attention, of course, to what the enemy is doing and how it is exerting pressure on its satellites. I am grateful to all our specialists who obtain relevant special information for Ukraine. A separate conversation was held on drones: the issues of production, supply, and provision for the units. It is clear that this is one of the main tasks of the year – to keep ahead of the enemy in the quality of drone operations. The more successful Ukrainian drones are, from FPV to strategic drones, the more lives of our warriors we will save.

Second. I held a substantial meeting with Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal, a strategic meeting on the entire first half of the year in working with our neighbors in the European Union. We discussed the details of planned intergovernmental cooperation with Poland, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Romania, and Bulgaria. The agreements that are already in place. The agreements we need to reach. It was a very informative meeting. Leadership in the neighborhood policy is what gives leadership to the entire state policy. And I am grateful to each of our neighbors – every country, every leader – who is inclined to have completely pragmatic and mutually beneficial relations, and endorses the implementation of our agreements. Productivity with every neighbor in the European Union is necessary. Today, by the way, negotiations with the Hungarian Foreign Minister took place at the level of Head of the Office Andriy Yermak and Foreign Minister of Ukraine Dmytro Kuleba. I think these were worthwhile negotiations. Mutual understanding and productivity in relations is our priority. Together with the head of the Ukrainian government, we discussed the upcoming work with donors – a meeting of the relevant donor coordination platform here in Kyiv. We also talked about the planned conferences on Ukraine’s recovery, scheduled for February in Japan and June in Germany. Ukraine’s position will be well represented throughout the first half of the year.

And the third for today. I spoke with the Prime Minister of Greece to thank for standing with us, for upholding justice and international law. The voice of every nation that values peace and security as much as we do is fundamental in defending against Russian aggression. Together with Mr. Prime Minister, we discussed further cooperation between Ukraine and Greece at the bilateral level and the level of the entire Europe: in the EU institutions, as well as in the Balkan region – we are preparing a new Ukraine-Balkans summit. I also invited Greece to join the organization of the Global Peace Summit.

I thank everyone in the world who helps! I thank everyone who works for the sake of Ukraine, for the sake of our warriors, so that our Defense and Security Forces of Ukraine have greater capabilities.

Glory to Ukraine!

If you ask me, the dismissal of General Zaluzhny would be, of course, a massive shot not only in the leg but also in the head, right there.

Zaluzhny has his reputation as an iron general and the national Salvator, the embodiment of the Ukrainian armed forces that saved this…

— Illia Ponomarenko 🇺🇦 (@IAPonomarenko) January 29, 2024

If you ask me, the dismissal of General Zaluzhny would be, of course, a massive shot not only in the leg but also in the head, right there.

Zaluzhny has his reputation as an iron general and the national Salvator, the embodiment of the Ukrainian armed forces that saved this country against an enemy as fearsome as Russia.

Zaluzhny personally has the support of 88% of Ukrainians. 97% of Ukrainians trust the armed forces under his command.

The state of the 1-million-strong armed forces are far from ideal under Zaluzhny’s command, he has had his setbacks in this war.

Yet, General Zaluzhny is a true national hero today. It’s a fact.

And, of course, Zelensky and the presidential office know this very well.

So yeah, Zelensky may be jealous of his top general’s glory (I personally don’t buy this media-driven ‘rivalry’ for ‘future elections’ though).

Of course, there is still a ramble between politicians and generals over who’s to blame for Ukraine’s unsuccessful 2023 campaign and the present state of things.

The presidential office maybe even thinking about having someone who does not shine way too bright next to Zelensky, for quite a long time.

I’m pretty sure they’d love to – but they can’t afford that. Zaluzhny is now too big to get kicked out.

It’s a shot in the head. The apocalyptic rampage that is taking place now amid rumors on Telegram is just a walk in the park compared to what would be happening if Zelensky really signs a dismissal order.

That’s the system somewhat balancing itself in a country where public opinion is vivid and fierce enough.

Not today, IMHO.

Ukraine's Ministry of Defense says: "No, this is not true". Of course, that's about the alleged dismissal of General Zaluzhny.

— Illia Ponomarenko 🇺🇦 (@IAPonomarenko) January 29, 2024

The presidential office also dismisses the claim regarding General Zaluzhny's dismissal.

I hope they've seen the overall reaction tho.

— Illia Ponomarenko 🇺🇦 (@IAPonomarenko) January 29, 2024

And the plot thins:

What's apparent is allies of ex-president Poroshenko, who is Zelensky's top political rival, are the ones who first caught wind of what's maybe an imminent shakeup and leaked it. They first posted the rumors online. Now Poro, in Brussels, is spinning this: https://t.co/oMqZ0Y6zFb

— Christopher Miller (@ChristopherJM) January 29, 2024

This is a very good question:

Still wondering what are all these sources that journalists cited today re. dismissal of Zaluzhniy. Are all these sources different from each other? Was it one source that spread the disinfo and everyone picked it up? Very odd.

— WarTranslated (Dmitri) (@wartranslated) January 29, 2024

Yep, I somehow missed it that there are no hoods))
Sweatshirts those are!

— Illia Ponomarenko 🇺🇦 (@IAPonomarenko) January 29, 2024

The cost:

Dramatic artist Volodymyr Fedinchuk of the Rivne academic theater.
Killed in action on January 22, 2024.
Russia keeps killing our finest men and women. pic.twitter.com/c9ehXE8T3u

— Illia Ponomarenko 🇺🇦 (@IAPonomarenko) January 29, 2024

The Financial Times has the details of Orban’s response to the EU’s threat of coercion:

Hungary has vowed to defy EU pressure to approve a four-year, €50bn aid package to Ukraine, condemning as “blackmail” a proposal to undermine its economy if it fails to back down.

Brussels has laid out ways to sabotage Hungary’s economy unless it agrees to drop its veto against the Ukraine funding plan at a special summit this week, in a confidential document seen by the Financial Times.

Hungary’s currency fell 1 per cent to Ft390 per euro and the benchmark 10-year bond yield rose 0.09 percentage points to 6.35 per cent, the highest level since December, on Monday.

“Hungary does not give in to blackmail,” Hungary’s EU minister János Bóka wrote on X on Sunday night. “The document, drafted by Brussels bureaucrats, only confirms what the Hungarian Government has been saying for a long time: access to EU funds is used for political blackmailing.”

EU leaders will gather on Thursday to discuss a plan to use the bloc’s budget to provide Ukraine with crucial financial assistance necessary to continue its war effort against Russia’s full-scale invasion.

The emergency summit was called because Hungarian leader Viktor Orbán vetoed the package at a December summit. With US aid also held up in Congress, Ukraine’s finances are in a perilous state and it urgently needs the EU infusion.

The Brussels proposal sets out ways to exploit Hungary’s economic weaknesses, noting its high inflation and high cost of debt. The plan would rely on other EU leaders pledging to freeze all EU funding to Budapest in the event of Orbán’s veto, sparking a possible fall in investor confidence in the country.

Two EU diplomats told the FT that they were not convinced all other EU leaders would agree to do so. However, they said the proposal underscored the depth of anger at Orbán’s refusal to assist Ukraine, an EU candidate country, and the nadir of the Brussels-Budapest relationship.

“The length of the blockage with Hungary has led some to evoke more radical options,” said a French official, adding that Paris nevertheless wanted to remain in the “framework” of EU rules. “We are looking for a decision with 27 countries and we hope that the prime minister of Hungary does the same.”

An EU official on Monday sought downplay the significance of the proposal document, saying it was a “factual paper which does not reflect the status of the ongoing negotiations”, adding that it “does not outline a plan but makes a suggestion”.

“The document referred to in the Financial Times article is a background note written by the Secretariat of the council under its own responsibility which describes the current status of the Hungarian economy,” said the official, who requested anonymity.

Talks “are going and have always been based on funding a compromise acceptable to all 27 EU [member states]”, the official added.

The European Commission said it was not aware of the proposal.

Alongside the Ukraine funding stand-off, Hungary is also under intense pressure from its western allies in Nato to approve Sweden’s accession to the alliance. Budapest is the last member still blocking that process, despite promises to the contrary.

Last week the US accused Orbán of pursuing a “fantasy foreign policy” on the issues, saying Hungary was acting in the interests of Russian leader Vladimir Putin.

Orbán has repeatedly said he will not agree to amending the bloc’s common budget to allow for more aid to Ukraine, nor will he permit any more joint borrowing to raise the necessary funds.

Instead, he demanded member states finance a separate fund without new borrowing. The other 26 member states have resisted that idea.

Yet in an emergency proposal on Saturday, Budapest appeared to have softened its position, telling the FT it would accept modifying the EU budget and even joint new debt as long as it retained a right to review the package each year and block it if necessary.

However, that idea has already been declared unacceptable by other member states.

“Brussels is using blackmail against Hungary like there’s no tomorrow, despite the fact that we have proposed a compromise,” Balázs Orbán, the premier’s political director, wrote on X.

He added that the EU’s complaints about democratic backsliding in Hungary, and a resulting freeze on tens of billions of euros’ worth of funds, were being used to apply political pressure to force Budapest to comply with the bloc’s Ukraine policies.

“Now it’s crystal clear: this . . . has nothing to do with the rule of law. And now they’re not even trying to hide it,” Balázs Orbán said. “Whatever happens, change is needed in Brussels!”

More at the link!

There appears to be a disconnect between the German Minister of Defense and the German defense industry over what is actually going on within that industry. Bild has the (machine translated) details: (emphasis in the original)

Federal Defense Minister Boris Pistorius (63, SPD) has resisted allegations from Ukraine that Germany is too slow to deliver arms. In an interview with BILD Vice Paul Ronzheimer the minister announced that he would deliver more than 200,000 rounds of artillery ammunition.

Pistorius also said that the federal government would ultimately depend on the arms industry. „ The industry is doing insanely, but it is still in a mode from before the war began. It doesn’t work that quickly, obviously. “

The arms industry works almost two years after Russian attack on Ukraine still like before the war? The BILD interview quickly became the topic in the top floors of the German armaments industry. Obviously, hardly any manager wanted to speak to BILD. The minister’s indirect „ Trödel accusation “ was hotly debated behind the scenes. Tendency: It is not faster – due to political hurdles.

Direct criticism only came from the arms group Hensoldt, which among other things. manufactures radar systems for the IRIS-T air defense system, which is used in Ukraine. Head of Communication Joachim Schranzhofer said on X (formerly Twitter): „ As an employee in the armaments industry, I would disagree with the minister: Our mindset has changed quickly and fundamentally since February 24, 2022. We are able to deliver quickly and in large quantities. All you have to do is place orders! “

Hans Christoph Atzpodien (68), head of the Federal Association of the German Security and Defense Industry (BDSV), also contradicts the minister: „ Immediately after the Russian attack on Ukraine, the Ministry of Defense asked us to do everything possible to make the Bundeswehr ready to fight. As a result, many of our companies made efforts –, sometimes at their own risk –, to improve the equipment of the Bundeswehr as quickly as possible. “

He also blames the government: „ Unfortunately, almost nothing could be ordered at the beginning for budgetary reasons … “

This has improved fundamentally since Pistorius took office. BUT, the association boss wedges against the traffic light government: „ It is all the more regrettable that the federal government has not followed its call for an increase in the regular defense budget. “ The 100 billion special fund is expected to be used as early as 2026.

„ Naturally, this also depresses the willingness of companies to take their own risk without a fixed order perspective with further capacity building “, said Atzpodien: „ The following applies: the sooner you order, the faster can be delivered. “

Nils Beyer, spokesman for „ Thyssenkrupp Marine Systems “, made a similar statement keel (build etc. Submarines, frigates). He at BILD: „ We aim to develop Wismar into a naval shipbuilding location for the construction of new submarines and frigates. For a full activation of the location, however, the corresponding orders by the federal government and the resulting investments are decisive. So we are ready when the covenant needs us. “

Rheinmetall-Chef Armin Papperger (60) emphasized the good cooperation between the federal government and the arms industry. The CEO of BILD said Düsseldorf Armory: „ A lot has changed for the better in military procurement. Rheinmetall alone received orders from the federal government last year. Get framework contracts in the amount of over 10 billion euros – for the Bundeswehr and for Ukraine. In the current year, this amount will increase to at least 15 billion. “

However, he did not accept allegations of slow deliveries. Papperger: „ The pace is high: what would have taken ten years earlier will be boxed through in a few months today. We will now build a new ammunition factory in Germany in record time to create strategic security of supply. “

Latvia:

Exclusive: Tatjana Zdanoka, a Latvian member of the European Parliament, has been an agent of Russian intelligence for at least twenty years, @the_ins_ru can reveal, based on emails we obtained between Zdanoka and two of her FSB handlers. https://t.co/Jf2cIKZS2N pic.twitter.com/nAUeuZvAVw

— Michael Weiss (@michaeldweiss) January 29, 2024

From The Insider:

Tatjana Zdanoka MEP has spent decades openly advocating for Moscow from both Riga and Strasbourg. The Insider can today reveal that Zdanoka was working on behalf of the FSB’s Fifth Service, reporting to two different handlers from at least 2004 to 2017.

Tatjana Zdanoka, a Latvian member of the European Parliament, has been a trusted asset of Russian intelligence since at least 2005, The Insider, in collaboration with the news site Delfi Estonia, Latvia’s Re:Baltica investigative journalism center, and Sweden’s Expressen newspaper, can disclose. Leaked emails between Zdanoka and her two known Russian case officers include explicit, detailed reports from Zdanoka to her handlers describing her work as a European legislator, particularly as those official duties relate to fostering pro-Kremlin sentiment in her native Baltic region. Other correspondence involves arranging physical meetings in Moscow or Brussels between Zdanoka and her Russian handler, along with requests for funding from Russian sources to underwrite her political activities in Latvia and the European Parliament. At least once she requested money for organizing a rally to commemorate the Red Army’s victory in World War II.

In an emailed response to The Insider, Zdanoka stated: “I cannot consider this text to be questions put to me because it is based on information that you supposedly have, which by definition, you should not have.”

The Insider has confirmed that Zdanoka’s two documented handlers have been officers of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), the successor agency to the Soviet-era KGB. According to the emails, her first case officer was a veteran FSB cadre from the St. Petersburg central directorate, Dmitry Gladey, 74, who ran Zdanoka from approximately 2004 to 2013. After 2013, Zdanoka was in regular contact with Sergei Beltyukov, an FSB operative since 1993.

Zdanoka told The Insider she has met “thousands of people” and cannot remember anyone named Beltyukov, which may be because he communicated with her using the cover name “Sergey Krasin.” The Insider followed up by asking if Zdanoka could confirm knowing anyone by that name or meeting him in person. She did not respond in time for publication of this story.

Zdanoka did, however, confirm knowing Gladey for decades, having met “in the early 1970s at a tourist base in the North Caucasus, where they were learning to ski.” However, she denied having any knowledge that Gladley is a Russian spy. “I can testify that the only people with whom I have sat at the same table, and with the certain knowledge that they are/were Russian FSB officers, are Vladimir Putin and Sergei Naryshkin,” Zdanoka said. (Naryshkin is the current director of Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), the successor of the KGB’s First Chief Directorate.)

Alice Bah Kuhnke, an MEP from Sweden’s Green Party and the former Minister of Culture and Democracy in Stockholm, is vice president of the Greens/European Free Alliance to which Zdanoka belonged until April 2022. Kuhnke said news of Zdanoka’s espionage struck her as “terrible [but] unsurprising. After all, we [both] receive ongoing reports in the European Parliament, as parliamentarians. And I know, since I was a minister in the government of Sweden, about how Russia and Putin’s agents work, and they have networks everywhere.”

Much, much more at the link!

The EU:

"Ukraine has made its European choice. Now Europe must make its Ukrainian choice. We need to decide and act fast, or face disastrous consequences for decades to come." Sobering analysis by @fromTGA https://t.co/SgKo14ZnXF

— alan rusbridger (@arusbridger) January 29, 2024

From The Prospect:

The Air Alert app flashes on my phone: “Immediately proceed to the nearest shelter.” I click on the map and see red spreading across the country from the east, like a bloodstain on a shirt. In the first days of 2024, as Russia launched a massive barrage of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and drones at civilian targets in Ukrainian cities, the entire map showed red. You need to activate this app when you’re in Ukraine, but I keep it live all the time to remind me that the biggest war in Europe since 1945 has been raging for almost two years, since 24th February 2022.

We were all shocked and horrified at the outset. We said we must not “normalise” it. But we have. As the television news crews have decamped from Ukraine to Israel, to cover the war in Gaza, this has become just another war in a faraway country. Why does it matter that it’s a war “in Europe”? Not because a Palestinian, Israeli, Yemeni or Sudanese life is one jot less valuable than a Ukrainian or British one, but because we are in Europe and our own security is more directly affected. When Europeans said “Never again!” after 1945, they meant in the first place never again in Europe. It happened again in former Yugoslavia, and again we said “Never again!”. Now Bucha has joined Srebrenica in Europe’s long gazetteer of barbarism. Somehow that “Never” never comes.

The scale of the Russia–Ukraine war sets it apart as much as its brutality. Four out of every five Ukrainians say that they have a family member or close friend who has been killed or wounded. The Ukrainian government doesn’t release figures, but last summer US officials estimated there were already some 70,000 Ukrainian war dead—more in 18 months than the US had in two decades of war in Vietnam—and upwards of 100,000 wounded. By now, the numbers will be larger. When I first visited Lviv’s military cemetery in December 2022, there were two long rows of fresh graves. When I visited it again last October, to lay flowers on the grave of a very brave volunteer I had met the previous year, there were four long rows, the last resting places of more than 500 soldiers from just one city. The display of photographs of the fallen along the outside walls of St Michael’s monastery in Kyiv seems endless.

And that’s just the dead. Late last year, I found the corridors of Unbroken, a national rehabilitation clinic in Lviv, full of soldiers missing arms, legs, hands or feet—mainly victims of the terrible Russian minefields on the southern and eastern fronts. Then there are the millions of internal refugees from cities such as Mariupol, weeping tears for the homes that they may never see again. No one is untouched. I have been to Ukraine four times since the outbreak of the full-scale war, and each time I’ve been struck by how much more visibly exhausted, traumatised and frustrated my friends and acquaintances have been.

The Ukraine that we see today is the product of a century’s struggle for recognition as a distinct European country and an independent state. Already, in 1918, Ukraine’s nation-building historian Mykhailo Hrushevsky wrote an essay on the country’s “European orientation”. In the revolutionary, state-creating period immediately after the First World War, competing versions of Ukrainian statehood briefly emerged. The entity that prevailed, the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic, initially had limited autonomy inside the Soviet Union, before that was crushed by Joseph Stalin with the aid of a forced famine, the Holodomor.

This struggle has been both internal and external. When Ukraine held a referendum in December 1991, all parts of the country—including Crimea—voted for independence. But there was not a strong sense of shared national identity and “European orientation” uniting it, especially not in the predominantly Russian-speaking east and southeast. It’s a great mistake to confuse being Russian-speaking with being Russian, as Putin does. If that were the case, President Volodymyr Zelensky, a native Russian-speaker, would be a Russian. But in a 1997 public opinion poll, 56 per cent of the population identified as “Ukrainian only”, 11 per cent as “Russian only”, and 27 per cent as “both Ukrainian and Russian”. There was no nationwide majority for joining the EU, let alone Nato.

It took three great national moments to unite Ukraine around what is now a passionate shared commitment to being an independent, sovereign European country, firmly anchored in Europe and the west. The first was the Orange Revolution of 2004. I will never forget standing on the Maidan, Kyiv’s now famous central square, on a freezing evening in December of that year—I’ve never been so cold in my life—and looking out over a forest of both Ukrainian and European flags. And yet as late as 2013, a poll by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) showed majorities against joining the EU in both the eastern and southern parts of the country.

The second catalytic moment was the “Revolution of Dignity” or Euromaidan (the clue is in the name) in 2014, sparked by a decision by then president Viktor Yanukovych to renege on a promise to sign an association agreement with the EU. It ended with a new government signing that agreement—but also with Putin’s annexation of Crimea and the beginning, in eastern Ukraine, of the Russia-Ukraine war which, as Ukrainians always remind us, has been going on for almost 10 years. After 2014, the country made significant efforts to reform and prepare for possible EU membership, also securing visa-free travel for its citizens in 2017.

Zelensky’s 2019 presidential election campaign was focused on Europe. In his inaugural speech, he said “Our European country begins with each one of us. We have chosen a path to Europe, but Europe is not somewhere out there. Europe is here”—and he pointed to his head. But it’s one thing to want to be a European country, another to be accepted as such by the rest of Europe. For decades, this acceptance was lacking. Asked in 2005 about Ukraine’s prospects of becoming a candidate for EU membership, a spokeswoman for the European Commission said: “There will first have to be a discussion of whether a country is European.” (Irony of ironies: she was British.)

Even after Putin’s annexation of Crimea and the beginning of the war in 2014, former German chancellor Helmut Schmidt pontificated that “as late as 1990, the west did not doubt that Crimea and Ukraine—both—were part of Russia… Historians disagree as to whether a Ukrainian nation exists at all.” The resistance to EU membership lasted even longer.  Just four days before Putin’s full-scale invasion, a key adviser to Olaf Scholz told me the current German chancellor’s position was clear: the EU should enlarge to include the western Balkans, but no further.

What a difference a war makes. Russia’s attack has been the third and final catalytic moment, both internally and externally. Internally, there’s now an overwhelming consensus that the country should join the EU and Nato as soon as possible. Already in May 2022, those same KIIS pollsters found an 81 per cent majority in favour of EU membership, with a whopping 94 per cent in western Ukraine and 76 per cent even in the east. This has accompanied a profound revulsion against Russia and all things Russian. In 2010, KIIS found that 92 per cent of Ukrainians had a generally positive attitude to Russia; by May 2022, this was 2 per cent. An academic told me his students now write the word “russia” with a small r—“I don’t correct them.”

More remarkable still is the external recognition. I have compared Ukraine’s 2022 to Britain’s 1940: the moment of wartime defiance that defines the nation for decades to come, both in its own eyes and in those of the world, with Zelensky as “Churchill with an iPhone”. But no one doubted before 1940 that Britain was a major independent country, so Ukraine’s breakthrough is doubly exceptional. Shortly before he died in November, Henry Kissinger grandly opined that “Ukraine has become a major state in Central Europe for the first time in modern history.” More colloquially, Tetiana, a young activist and part-time tattooist I met in Lviv, told me that when she had travelled abroad previously, foreigners “thought Ukraine is, like, part of Russia”, but now “finally the world finds out what Ukraine is.”

That same Scholz who in mid-February 2022 was resolved that the EU should enlarge no further than the western Balkans was standing in central Kyiv less than four months later, shoulder to shoulder with three other EU leaders and Zelensky, declaring that Ukraine should be accepted as a candidate for EU membership. This year, membership negotiations will begin. But whether, when and in what shape—territorial, demographic, military, economic and political—Ukraine might actually join the EU depends on the outcome of this war.

The third and most decisive actor this year will be the west. Thus far, the west has done just enough to stop Ukraine being defeated but not enough to enable it to win. Even before the probable disaster of Trump being re-elected US president, it’s clear that declining support in American public opinion, hyperpolarised politics in an election year and the competing priority of the Israel–Hamas war mean the Biden administration will be hard-pressed to maintain its current level of military and economic support for Ukraine, let alone to increase it. But without a significant uplift in western support, Ukraine is highly unlikely to recover significant amounts of territory. So what happens next depends on Europe, the only set of countries with both the vital interests in this conflict and the resources to make a difference. Germany alone has an economy twice the size of Russia’s; the EU, seven times. In this context, Britain, one of Ukraine’s foremost supporters, is also very much part of the relevant Europe.

At the moment, Europe is confusedly not facing up to its real choice. If support for Ukraine continues only at the current level of scale and boldness, Russia will have successfully seized nearly one-fifth of Ukraine’s territory. Privately, some policymakers in major west European capitals hope for either a frozen conflict or a negotiated settlement on that basis. Some kid themselves this would be an outcome in which “Ukraine does not lose but Russia does not win.” Surely Ukraine should be content with the prospect of EU membership and some sort of security guarantees, perhaps eventually leading to Nato membership, for four-fifths of its territory? How unreasonable can these pesky east Europeans be?

In reality, neither Russia nor Ukraine is ready either to negotiate or to freeze the conflict. If, however, the current line of division, or something close to it, were to become frozen, Putin could claim a famous victory. This would be a huge defeat for Ukraine. Millions of Ukrainian men and women would face a choice between never returning to their homes or living under a hated dictatorship, speaking a language they no longer wish to speak, and having their children indoctrinated at school with a grotesque falsification of their own history. The rest of Ukraine would be demoralised, demotivated and depopulated, with millions more Ukrainians permanently making their lives abroad and, back home, an angry populism of internal discord and bitter recrimination against the west.

In the eyes of the world, it would not only be Ukraine that had been defeated. Polling done by ECFR, in partnership with my Oxford University research project on Europe in a Changing World, shows that 57 per cent of Chinese respondents, a majority in Saudi Arabia and Turkey, as well as pluralities in South Africa, Indonesia and South Korea, believe that the US is at war with Russia. Many of them also think Russia will win in Ukraine and that the EU will fall apart in the next 20 years. The outcome muddleheadedly envisaged by some European policymakers would confirm these major non-European powers in this view of the weakness of Europe, and of western democracies altogether. And if Putin can get away with seizing a territory larger than Portugal right next door to Nato and the EU, Xi Jinping might start thinking that he can get away with seizing Taiwan, an island in China’s backyard.

The alternative is for Europe to do what is needed to enable Ukraine to break the land bridge and recover at least the Kherson and Zaporizhia provinces in 2025. What would this require? Rapidly and massively enhancing Ukraine’s air defences. Supplying long-range missiles such as Germany’s Taurus so that Kyiv can continue to push back Russia’s Black Sea fleet—its one big military success in 2023—and pressurise Crimea, which has both strategic and symbolic importance for Putin. Working with Nato and the US to provide Ukrainian forces with the large-scale, multi-week training needed for combined arms operations. Actually moving towards what French president Emmanuel Macron merely talks about: a “war economy”. In free-market democracies, this means national and European authorities guaranteeing long-term, coordinated orders for weapons and munitions, to which Europe’s private sector defence industry would respond. This would also position Europe to tell an incoming US president that it’s doing more for its own defence, which is the closest it can realistically come to “strategic autonomy” in just one year.

What happens if and when Ukraine has pushed Russian occupying forces back close to the lines they occupied on the eve of the 2022 invasion? Does that catalyse a change of policy or even of leadership in Moscow? Is there a possible opening for negotiation, with perhaps a demilitarised special status proposed for Crimea? Or does a half-crazed Putin actually try lobbing a tactical nuclear weapon at Ukraine? We must plan for all these contingencies, but the first imperative is to put Ukraine in a position where it is clearly winning and can genuinely choose to negotiate from strength.

Ukraine has made its European choice. Now Europe must make its Ukrainian choice. The path I have outlined is the only good way forward, not just for Ukraine but for Europe, for a lasting peace and for the global credibility of the west. We Europeans need to decide and act fast. If we continue to dither, Hamlet-like, we will end up making the wrong choice by default, with disastrous consequences for decades to come.

Much more at the link!

Donetsk Oblast:

Ukrainian anthem in the Donetsk region.
It will sound throughout the territory of our sovereign and independent country.

📹: o_viola.music / Instagram pic.twitter.com/3zg2vqbGu7

— Defense of Ukraine (@DefenceU) January 29, 2024

Kyiv:

🧵 I received a moving and striking email today from a longtime friend, Tamar Jacoby, who now lives in Kyiv and directs the New Ukraine Project for the Progressive Policy Institute. (https://t.co/3HhsnmcvOr)
With her permission, I'm going to quote from it in this short thread.

— Bill Kristol (@BillKristol) January 28, 2024

2. "…and what path it’s taking across Ukrainian territory.

There are many possibilities–Moscow has an enormous arsenal. What’s most feared: the hypersonic ballistic missiles that fly in a parabola, rather than just across the sky like a plane or a bird…

— Bill Kristol (@BillKristol) January 28, 2024

4. "And while Washington dithers over sending additional aid, Ukraine is running short of ammunition for its three Patriot batteries.

I take this personally. A hypersonic missile that got past Ukrainian air defenses landed in a neighbor’s yard a few weeks ago, and everyone…

— Bill Kristol (@BillKristol) January 28, 2024

6. "…and ammunition to supply all of them through the months ahead. That’s not cheap: The batteries cost around $400 million each and each missile about $4 million.But make no mistake: Vladimir Putin’s number one goal is still to take Kyiv. Nothing would end the war faster.

— Bill Kristol (@BillKristol) January 28, 2024

8. "…could depend on our making the right decision–and making it sooner rather than later."

FIN

— Bill Kristol (@BillKristol) January 28, 2024

Zaporizhzhia Oblast:

UA SOF discovered and remotely destroyed two strong points within a tree line in Zaporizhzhia frontline using strike UAVs.

The enemy positions presumably contained heavy equipment and personnel.

Then, using a drone, UA remotely installed a Ukrainian flag on the site of the… pic.twitter.com/qf5L5qQGFR

— WarTranslated (Dmitri) (@wartranslated) January 29, 2024

 

UA SOF discovered and remotely destroyed two strong points within a tree line in Zaporizhzhia frontline using strike UAVs.

The enemy positions presumably contained heavy equipment and personnel.

Then, using a drone, UA remotely installed a Ukrainian flag on the site of the destroyed positions.

https://t.me/ukr_sof/926

For you infantry enthusiasts:

From Ukrainian Major General Viktor Nikoliuk, Commander of the Training Department at Ground Forces Command.https://t.co/vFK1H7jjgp https://t.co/HezuMoUlEJ pic.twitter.com/hME4Q79yB9

— Rob Lee (@RALee85) January 28, 2024

From Ukrainska Pravda:

Ukraine has the ability to train any number of personnel determined by the new law on mobilisation, which may be adopted soon.

Source: Major General Viktor Nikoliuk, Commander of the Training Department at Ground Forces Command, in an interview with the Radio Liberty project Donbas.Realii

Quote: “500,000, 100,000, 200,000 – whatever the law on mobilisation will determine, we are ready.

Today, for example, we are constantly conducting relevant activities and holding meetings to clarify the actual capabilities of all training centres and the actual conditions of the instructor staff because many of them are  involved in combat missions.

But as of today, we are able to train any number of personnel.”

Details: Nikoliuk said that as of now, 20% of the military have been trained abroad, while the rest have been trained in Ukraine.

The major general added that Ukraine is “several years ahead of those who train it” in terms of combat experience.

“Of course, we are sharing this experience, but it should be borne in mind that it does not stand still. Any war is changing, and these subtleties must be taken into account,” said Nikoliuk.

Answering the question of which specialists are most in demand in the army now, the major general replied that it’s infantry.

“This is the infantry that pushes forward, that attacks, that entrenches itself in a trench, that holds positions, that enters enemy positions, that repels the enemy. The most massive training in the Ground Forces is that of an infantryman. Without belittling their role, drone operators, tankers, artillerymen, mortar men, and everyone else is very important. But today, it is the infantry,” he said.

Background:

• On 25 December, it became known that the Cabinet of Ministers had submitted the draft law No. 10378 “On Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of Ukraine on Improving Certain Issues of Mobilisation, Military Registration and Military Service” for consideration by the Parliament. The document regulates issues related to the postponement of military service, including for people with disabilities.
• On 11 January, the government decided to withdraw the first draft law on mobilisation and immediately prepare a new one, as MPs were not ready to support many of the proposals.
• Several MPs from different political forces told Ukrainska Pravda that the parliament expected to see a new version of the draft law on improving mobilisation around 6 February, and on 16 January, lawyers from the Ministry of Defence submitted their draft to the heads of factions for review.
• On 19 December, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said that the military had proposed mobilising an additional 450-500,000 people but that this issue was being finalised.
• In January, Zelenskyy stated that as yet, he does not see the necessity for the General Staff to mobilise 500,000 Ukrainians.

Here’s Tatarigami’s take on the Ukrainian military’s personnel issues. (machine translated):

Однією з серйозних проблем лишається нерозуміння того, що це наша загальна війна на виживання і жодна з країн не буде за нас воювати або серйозно жертвувати заради нашого виживання.
Будапештський меморандум, як ми бачимо, виявився далеко недостатніми, щоб забезпечити суверенітет…

— Tatarigami_UA (@Tatarigami_UA) January 29, 2024

One of the serious problems remains the misunderstanding that this is our general war for survival and that none of the countries will fight for us or seriously sacrifice for our survival.
As we can see, the Budapest Memorandum was far from sufficient to ensure sovereignty and border integrity. The infantile policy of “outsourcing” national security in combination with the economic reality of those times turned out to be destructive.

No treaty or alliance can ever replace the guarantees of sovereignty provided by one’s own armed forces and nuclear arsenal. The country we have relied on for our protection is currently unable to defend its national interests in the Middle East, and its parliamentary establishment is blocking aid to Israel, which is designated as a major non-NATO ally.

Of course, this does not mean that we do not need to develop and maintain close security relations and sign treaties with these countries, but the idea that they will save us must be thrown out of our heads once and for all.
We cannot continue to seriously hope that we will be given enough weapons and technology to seriously change the balance of power in this war.

To continue to build our security strategy around the idea that our right to exist as a sovereign state will be guaranteed by someone else is a mistake.

Yes, we really cannot now suddenly build a Patriot air defense system somewhere near Zhytomyr, or set up mass production of the F-16 in Gadyach.
But there are things we can control, starting with the approach to the use of personnel, which cannot be seen as an endless resource that can be simply burned for another forest strip without having any operational goals. You can always rush for a new drone or buy evacuation equipment, but not for the life of a soldier. Therefore, the infamous “forward forward” should be eradicated, and the performance of managers should be evaluated based on the ability to achieve the set task with minimal loss of personnel in the first place.

No matter how unfortunate it sounds, Europe, which is experiencing a demographic crisis, which it covers by means of migrants from the countries of Africa and the Middle East, will not send its population to die in order for Ukraine to regain control over Berdyansk, so the sequence of actions must be based on the fact that the mobilization our resource is very limited.

Another alternative, of course, is surrender to the mercy of the enemy – with further deportations, the Gulag-FSIN systems, confiscation of businesses and estates, torture in the KGB-FSB system, and all the other bonuses that Ukraine already experienced in the 1930s century. This option will undoubtedly lead to the disappearance of Ukraine not only as a sovereign state, but also as a nation, which will be dissolved in imperial Russia itself and in migration in Europe and North America.

No matter how depressing it sounds, thousands of years of human history teach that the strong always oppress the weak, the armed rob the unarmed, and pieces of paper not backed by an army become toilet paper. And here we either build a system of values, where the highest value and source of security is the Ukrainian himself, or we perish like dew in the sun.

For those of you who are both drone enthusiasts and malevolent female supernatural being enthusiasts:

When the night falls, Baba Yaga drones go hunting for the occupiers.

📹: 60th Mechanized Brigade pic.twitter.com/wkV3P6OXuP

— Defense of Ukraine (@DefenceU) January 29, 2024

Obligatory:

Yaroslavl, Russia:

An unidentified flying object attacked another oil refinery in Russia, this time the "Slavneft" refinery in Yaroslavl. It is one of the largest refineries in Russia. The extent of the damage is unclear. pic.twitter.com/KF7fhbcQTJ

— WarTranslated (Dmitri) (@wartranslated) January 29, 2024

That’s enough for tonight.

Your daily Patron!

There are no new Patron tweets or videos today. Here’s some adjacent material:

Good night 🌙 pic.twitter.com/PQJy10pQbS

— UkrARMY cats & dogs (@UAarmy_animals) October 2, 2023

Cute 🥰 pic.twitter.com/SL1f5z6fvg

— UkrARMY cats & dogs (@UAarmy_animals) October 1, 2023

Open thread!