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You are here: Home / Foreign Affairs / War for Ukraine Day 321: Ukraine Is Holding in Soledar & Gerasimov To the Front!

War for Ukraine Day 321: Ukraine Is Holding in Soledar & Gerasimov To the Front!

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A month of Mondays crammed into a Wednesday, so let’s get started!

Here is President Zelenskyy’s address from earlier today. Video below, English transcript after the jump:

 I wish you health, dear Ukrainians!

Today, here in Lviv, important news for Ukraine was announced during the Summit of the Lublin Triangle, our special format with Poland and Lithuania. Poland has decided to provide tanks for Ukraine – I am grateful for this. I thank President Duda, the Government of Poland, all our Polish friends.

Lithuania provides anti-aircraft systems to our country – the weapons we need to protect ourselves from Iranian drones – to protect our energy sector.

I thank Gitanas for another demonstration of unwavering and principled support for Ukraine, which began even before February 24 and will continue until our victory.

Today, I heard this confidence once again from both Andrzej and Gitanas – we will go all the way together to restore security of Ukraine and the whole of Europe, to restore our territorial integrity, to restore peace. Russian aggression must fail – and it will.

Today, we have discussed the issue of our integration into the EU and NATO in a very meaningful way. This year, we must achieve tangible progress in European integration. This concerns, first of all, the start of negotiations on membership. Poland and Lithuania are equally and comprehensively ready to support us, see us fully integrated into the European and Euro-Atlantic structures. Together with our other partners on the continent and in the Alliance, we have to transform this readiness, this energy into real institutional movement, into real decisions.

Of course, today we also talked about the situation on the battlefield. In particular, that Russian aggression will be depleted only when Russian ambitions have no other alternative except for the defeat. All Russian ambitions – on the front, in politics, in economy, in the legal sphere.

Now the terrorist state and its propagandists are trying to pretend that some part of our city of Soledar – a city that was almost completely destroyed by the occupiers – is allegedly some kind of Russia’s achievement. They will present – and are already presenting – this to their society in such a way as to support mobilization and to give hope to those who support aggression.

But the fighting continues. The Donetsk direction is holding out. And we do everything, without stopping for a single day, to strengthen Ukrainian defense. Our potential is growing. And I thank all our partners who help in this.

Western-type tanks are the work of our entire anti-war coalition and this is a new level of our potential.

Today, in Lviv, I also held a meeting on the security situation in our western regions and on our state border. We take into account all threats, strengthen all elements of the security of our regions.

Glory to all who fight for Ukraine!

I thank everyone who works for our victory!

I thank everyone who helps us restore security!

Glory to Ukraine!

Touch not the cat, but a glove!

Here’s the machine translation:

President @AndrzejDudaw #Lwów : A company of Leopard tanks for Ukraine will be transferred as part of building an international coalition. Such a decision is already in Poland.

Right now Chancellor Sholtz is in full pucker mode…

Here is former NAVDEVGRU Squadron Leader Chuck Pfarrer’s most recent assessments of this situations in Kremenna, Bakhmut, and Soledar:

The Ukrainians are holding in Soledar!

Here’s Dmitri’s English translation so you don’t have to click through and then click again:

I’m not going to post Dmitri’s English subtitled video update from Magyar this morning as the term he uses to refer to the Russians is a slur for LGBTQ in the US. Here, however, is a different one of Dmitri’s English subtitled video’s from a different Ukrainian Soldier in Bakhmut this AM:

 

Don’t go on patrol like this. Just don’t.

And here’s Dmitri with the explanation of what we’re seeing above:

General Surovikin has been relieved of command of Russian forces in Ukraine. The new theater commander is now General Gerasimov. Surovikin will now report to him, though it is unclear if he is going to take over the air component or some other senior assignment.

Here’s RAND’s Dara Massicot with an excellent analysis:

Surovikin has not made strategy blunders on the battlefield like so many other Russian generals have. I do not believe MOD’s rationale that it is to generate greater resources. They may need more resources, but such a step is unnecessary. On what grounds was he demoted? /3Image

Putin appeared to be getting more realistic assessments from Surovikin, a change from when he was getting some other version of events from Shoygu-Gerasimov early on. /4

Contrast with Gerasimov and Shoygu’s command record for this war: it’s a flunk. They flunked it. They signed off on a secret plan, multiple bad assumptions, didn’t tell the majority of their troops. led to big casualties and a partially broken force /5

Under Shoygu and Gerasimov’s command, a large percentage of the Ground Forces and Airborne forces (equipment and personnel) were destroyed. Thousands of both are gone. This leadership is so negligent that it should have been grounds for dismissal in any normal system.. /6
..But they are loyal to Putin and the system so they were kept on. Gerasimov and Shoygu for months now have been sidelined from the main command of the operation. As criticism of them mounted from some quarters. /7Image
Who can claim their leadership is competent after one year of this war? But, they are experienced players in Moscow. With this change, I view this as a power struggle that has resolved in favor of Shoygu/Gerasimov. So, where does this go from here? /8
With Gerasimov in charge, if this is indeed permanent, I think the possibly of the Russians asking their tired force to do something that it cannot handle rises exponentially. Gerasimov didn’t push back in Feb 2022 and won’t do it now. IDK if that is good or bad for Ukraine. /9

This move also puts pressure on Prigozhin and others who don’t trust the MOD leaders anymore. Or they get in line quickly. Wagner has been hurling major insults at the MOD leadership lately. /10.

I view this news like Shoygu’s speech announcing the return of more divisions. Seniors in Moscow are clingingly fiercely to the status quo and also soviet past. Important to keep in mind that they default to looking inwards and backwards even when it leds them to poor outcomes/11

@mentionshas an interesting look at Russian forces under Surovikin here. Let’s see what Russian forces retain of these strategies, or if they try something else. /12

(And, as it turns out, the MOD Telegram was being shady a few weeks ago.) 12/
TL:DR: Russians demoted their “fixer” commander in favor of Gerasimov, who last year agreed to and oversaw a debacle invasion plan that resulted in the partial destruction of their army. What? /ENDImage

And here’s a good thread from @MarkGaleotti

Unroll available on Thread Reader\

And here’s Galeotti’s thread. Galeotti is a professor at University College London’s School of Slavonic and East European Studies:

What did Surovikin do wrong? Nothing, really (in context – this is not about his morality…). Yes, there were all kinds of reversals, including the recent Makiivka strike, but there is a limit to what one new commander can do in 3 months 3/ 
But Putin doesn’t necessarily understand this (remember: no military experience and a court full of sycophants) nor care. 4/ 
For Gerasimov (who were were being assured was out of favour and about to be sacked… or who was Putin’s right hand man…) it is a kind of demotion, or at least the most poisoned of chalices. It’s now on him, and I suspect Putin has unrealistic expectations again 5/ 
It has been pretty clear that there will be spring offensives – that’s what the 150,000 mobiks not thrown into the fight are being held for. 150k fresh troops, however poor quality, will make a difference, but not, I suspect enough for Putin 6/ 
There may well be some advances, but nothing decisive (and the Ukrainians themselves will be looking to a spring offensive). In many ways, I don’t think Moscow’s strategy hinges anyway on battlefield victory – it’s more about politics 7/
In other words, demonstrating to the West that Russia is in this for the long haul, and hoping that we will lose the will and unity to continue to support Kyiv. (I think Putin will be disappointed, but he *has* to believe this – it’s his only real shot at some kind of victory) 8/ 
So what does this actually mean? (a) Confirmation, if we needed it, that there will be serious offensives coming, and that even Putin recognises that poor coordination has been an issue (though can even Gerasimov truly command Wagner + Kadyrovtsy?) 9/ 
(b) Gerasimov is hanging by a thread. I don’t think this is intended to create a pretext to sack him as the war is too important and Putin can sack who he wants. But he needs some kind of win or a career ends in ignominy. This may well suggest some kinds of escalation 10/ 
Not the nuclear option, but more mobilisation or, arguably more militarily logical but politically dangerous, also deploying conscripts. They are better trained and equipped than most mobiks! 11/ 
(c) Putin doesn’t understand/care about his officer corps. If you keep appointing, rotating, burning your (relative) stars, setting unrealistic expectations, arbitrarily demoting them, that’s not going to win loyalty 12/ 
Here and now, I don’t see that as a crucial issue, but as with the anger and demoralisation of the Rosgvardiya (because they feel they were used as cannonfodder), it’s one of those issues which may bite Putin in a real crisis. 13/end 
Oh, and obligatory PS: NO, THERE IS NO GERASIMOV DOCTRINE! ;)

And here’s Marine vet and FPRI Senior Fellow Rob Lee’s take:

And that’s enough for tonight.

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Open thread!

Reader Interactions

72Comments

  1. 1.

    J R in WV

    Holy Cow, frist instead of last?

    ETA: A miracle has happened ! Now I gotta go do dinnner, Mongolian beef. Later guys.

    Also, thanks Adam, great work keeping this tradition going, so glad most of the news is favorable to the Ukrainian side!

  3. 3.

    trollhattan

    You put your general in, you take your general out.

    Is that what the hokey-pokey is all about? Glad I don’t need to keep track of the leadership, and I wonder if they can?

  6. 6.

    prufrock

    Regarding Wagner Group, I think Putin will come to learn why nation states mostly stopped using mercenaries in large numbers as long ago as the Napoleonic Wars. They are only a loyal as their paycheck, and they have no regular place in the chain of command.

     

    Not great for maintaining a reliable, disciplined force.

  13. 13.

    Amir Khalid

    This isn’t going to change anything about how the war is going, is it? They’re just playing musical chairs in Moscow. It’s not going to fix any of the numerous problems, there or on the ground in Ukraine, that keep the military from winning. the leadership in Moscow is flailing, simple as that.

  24. 24.

    TheMightyTrowel

    @WaterGirl: There’s a lot of magical thinking among the small minded, power hungry and status driven. The worst part of working in a university is watching a bunch of people you thought were smart enacting the “but it might work for us!” meme over and over without learning anything from their own experiences or those of others because THEY are the ones smart enough to overcome the bad politics/structural inefficiencies/sheer institutional stupidity and profit.

    I’d posit an Iron Bladder system where no one wants to be in charge because everyone sees how bad the institution is is fundamentally healthier than one full of little Tobias Funke’s assured of their own exceptional abilities to succeed where all others have failed.

  25. 25.

    Ken

    @WaterGirl: I think the options are:

    Say “no” — get shot for defying Putin.

    Say “yes” and do a great job, becoming popular with the troops — get removed or shot, as a rival to Putin.

    Say “yes” and do a bad job — eventually get replaced but maybe not shot. At least, not by Putin.

  27. 27.

    Roger Moore

    @prufrock:

    Plenty of nation states still use mercenaries.  They call them funny names, like “military contractors” or “Gurkhas”, but they’re still out there in larger numbers than you might think.  The key is to make sure you keep enough regular troops that the mercenaries don’t get any ideas.

  30. 30.

    NutmegAgain

    A question:  If the general sense is that the Russians will engage in a spring offensive, perhaps with up to 150K mobiks … isn’t there time between now and whenever in the spring for those troops to (theoretically) become more trained? I mean compared to the guys who got to each shoot a gun one time etc.

  31. 31.

    dibert dogbert

    Interesting to see the medic M113 in action.

    I started working on the first production versions in 1960.  They last a long time.

    Also the video of the Solar/Wagner troops getting hammered.  Yes bunch up and get killed in mass.

  32. 32.

    dr. luba

    Patron:

    I became friends with Tom three years ago.

    He likes to bite/nip and to watch football.

    He likes animals (especially me) and sitting in weird positions.

    And to hunt fish in the aquarium

    To chew on cardboard boxes and sit in a plastic bag.

    And his toy toucan.

    He likes to ponder important things.

    And he likes me.

    He has gray fur

    And gray eyes.  

    He has long whiskers, Like a catfish. (If you find this interesting.)

    He’s a wonderful friend.

    And there’s no doubt about that.

  36. 36.

    Adam L Silverman

    @Mallard Filmore: The Ukrainians escaped encirclement, are pounding Wagner’s positions, and, as a result, are holding most of Soledar. Which was my point in the title of the post and the update.

  38. 38.

    Adam L Silverman

    @NutmegAgain: Yes, 1/2 the mobiks from the Fall conscription have been held back and are getting trained in Russia or at Russian bases in Belarus with the intention of having better or proper trained soldiers for the spring offensive.

  39. 39.

    Anonymous At Work

    Adam,

    Can you explain the tactical significance if RU loses Kremena?  That seems to be UA’s target and next big gain.

    Also, much love to dmsilev for “Spinal Tap was able to hire more drummers.”

  41. 41.

    Chetan Murthy

    Via the Great Orange Satan

    Polish President Duda is welcomed by the people in Lviv like a rockstar. Somebody in the Chancellory in Berlin should take note of. That reflex of some German politicians to not antagonize Russia has been long outdated and must be put on the trash heap of history. #Ukraine pic.twitter.com/p5OLAA5oJL
    — (((Tendar))) (@Tendar) January 11, 2023

    That video’s somethin’ !!

  42. 42.

    bookworm1398

    @41 Chetan

    Daily Kos had an article yesterday about how Germany had provided more in money and weapons than people think. What struck me about the article was how little other Western European countries have contributed. Why aren’t France, Spain, Austria, Switzerland getting hammered twice as hard as Germany?

  45. 45.

    pat

    So Russians are a large contingent of the refugees seeking asylum at the border with Mexico.  Saw that on the news tonight…

  47. 47.

    Chetan Murthy

    @pat: *Well-to-do Russians* — we know that the really poor Russians, the ones suffering from this war, who are sending their men to die b/c they’re *that* poor, aren’t exactly rich enough to fly to Mexico ….

  50. 50.

    TheMightyTrowel

    @Redshift: In a small fishtank too often one or two individuals decide they’re betta fish and try to eat everyone else. If we’d all just settle down and suck algae off the glass together there’d be room enough for all of us….

  52. 52.

    Hoppie

    @WaterGirl: Clearly the forename “l” transformed into a surname “c”, and they self-annihilated in a positron-electron collision.  Physics l-o-l.

  55. 55.

    Chetan Murthy

    @2liberal: Different people have different opinions about what qualifies as eliminationist rhetoric.  To be frank, a few commenters here believe that any adverse judgment of the Russian people for this genocidal war is eliminationist rhetoric.  Alison (IIUC) found that unacceptable, and her last comment was “I’m out”.  And they go further and argue that any celebration of the deaths of Russian soldiers conducting their genocidal war in Ukraine is ipso facto wrong.  I’m sure that no citizen of any Allied country every rejoiced in the news of some Allied victory, shouting anything like “those Jerries got what was comin’ to ’em”, nosirree.  No.  Sirr.  Eee.  They all were quite sad about the senseless loss of life of German youth, the lives cut short on the German side, yadda yadda yadda.

    Par contre, the leader of one of the non-Russian-traitor Orthodox churches in Ukraine was quoted as saying something like “after the war, there’ll be time for forgiveness, for thinking about the Russians; right now, there”s no time for it”.

  58. 58.

    YY_Sima Qian

    Pursuant to the conversation in yesterday’s thread, which is dead, reposting here as well:

    @Carlo Graziani:

    @Andrya:

    Thanks for your comments, but I think you misunderstand the order of priorities for the CCP regime. The only priority for the regime is survival, in the broadest sense, everything else follows. To ensure regime survival, in the broadest sense, the Xi & the CCP regime has to accomplish the following (in no particular order):

    1. Prevent the emergence of alternative centers of power & credibility
    2. Prevent any internal dissent from ever gaining critical mass
    3. Assuage/address issues causing mass anxieties & discontent
    4. Improve the material conditions for the vast majority of the population
    5. Improve the experience that the vast majority of the population have from interfacing w/ the government bureaucracy (by improving quality of local governance, tentatively increasing transparency & predictability of the function of the local bureaucracy, stronger implementation of rule by law which is not to be confused w/ rule of law)
    6. Maintain domestic stability (such as by reducing domestic crime, & allowing means for people to vent their frustration on an ad hoc basis)
    7. Maintain nationalist credibility (which includes preventing separatism from gaining momentum, fulfill the century+ old nationalist dream of recovering & keeping Taiwan/Hong Kong/Macau, standing up to & responding to perceived foreign slights, fulfill the 2 centuries old nationalist dream of reestablishing & maintaining China as a great power on the world stage)

    Like every other country, Chinese foreign policy primarily serve domestic priorities, so Chinese foreign policy goals are (in order):

    1. Maintain a peaceful international environment (it used to be maintaining a benign environment) that is conducive to China’s domestic development (which means preventing Sino-US relations from deteriorating into a Cold War-like relationship, preventing consolidation of an anti-China coalition for containment, defeat US attempts at pressure & coercion which is where partnership w/ Russia comes in)
    2. Maximize as much as possible access to foreign markets, technology, & inputs (be they commodity materials or high tech components)
    3. Increase Chinese influence in the Global South & the world at large
    4. Shift the rules based international order to be more friendly to Chinese interests & views (via active participation in the UN & gaining leadership in the myriad international agencies under its aegis, active participation in the World Bank/IMF/Asia Development Bank, establishing & strengthening alternative multilateral institutions such as the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank/New Development Bank/BRICS grouping/Shanghai Cooperation Organization), leverage its influence & sympathy in the Global South in so doing

    5 years ago, Xi had already clarified the priorities for Chinese foreign policy engagement to achieve positive outcomes – neighboring countries, the developing world, then the West, in that order. That is why China has spent so much effort in the past 5 – 10 years courting members of the ASEAN (despite the disputes in the South China Sea) via the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, Central Asia via the SCO, & Africa/LatAm/Pacific Islands via the Belt & Road Initiative.

    The goal of Chinese engagement w/ western countries, then & now, (contra the title of the FT article) is not to establish friendships, but to prevent the formation & consolidation of a containment coalition. That is a realistic goal because as of right now there is little appetite outside of the US for a coalition to contain China, economically or technologically. There is a shared anxiety concerning China’s rising power & influence, there is shared anxiety concerning the potential for PRC aggression against Taiwan, there is shared anxiety about the concentrated exposure to supply chains from & through China, & there is shared anxiety about the rapidly rising technological sophistication of Chinese industries jeopardizing the privileged positions of their own industries. There is some agreement on the general direction for policy changes, such as tightened export controls to China, tightened screening of inbound/outbound investment related to China, tightened screening of academic/technological partnerships w/ Chinese entities, challenging Chinese attempts to gain leadership positions at UN agencies & organizations, & provide alternatives to China’s BRI to the Global South. However, there is little agreement on what tools to use, no agreement on how far to go in the applications of those tools, & most importantly, no agreement on to what end. If you think otherwise, then you have been reading far too much US-centric reporting/analysis.

    In the linked talk, Evan Feigenbaum laid out the central tension between the Biden Administration’s China policy & what anyone not named “the US” calculate to be in their interest. He thinks the US will resort to coercion to attempt to bring its allies & partners in line vis-a-vis China, via extraterritorial application of US laws & regulations, which I agree. We do not know how far US allies & partners are willing to bend under US coercion. BTW, Feigenbaum is the director of the Asia Program at the Carnegie Endowment. He has established a tremendous team of analysts & researchers at the program over the past few years, & is producing incredible work.

    Going back to the specific own goals about the “Wolf Warrior” diplomacy & crack down in Hong Kong, the CCP regime carried them out because they served domestic priorities, & arguably part of foreign policy priorities. “Wolf Warrior” diplomacy was abrasive to Western (& Indian) audiences, but they played extremely well domestically, & they played well in many part of the Global South (to the extend anyone paid attention). People in these parts are sick & tired of lecturing from the US & the West in general, & happy to see pushback. On the crack down in Hong Kong, the CCP regime felt the need to crush the challenge to its authority, since the protestors took uncompromising positions of demanding the Hong Kong government backing down on all fronts. The regime was also alarmed by the increasing displays of separatism (flying the colonial era flag for Hong Kong, UK & US flags, etc.), challenges to the symbol of the PRC authority (burning the PRC national flag, defacing the national emblem, parodying the national anthem), & increasing violence (arson, vandalization of Mainland Chinese businesses, harassment & physical assault of Mainlanders on the streets, Mandarin speakers, & other Hong Kongers who disagreed w/ the protestors). These shifts in the nature of the protest movement also decided alter Mainlander opinion of the protests, from apathy & slight sympathy to strong antipathy. Before the protests of 2019, no one in Hong Kong or the Mainland thought the CCP regime was in a hurry to impose a National Security Law (NSL) in Hong Kong, despite such a law being stipulated by the Hong Kong Basic Law (its mini-constitution) & having been stalled for 2 decades. Before 2019, there were attempts to squeeze Hong Kong, such as Phoenix TV turning into another CCP propaganda outlet, but anti-CCP tabloids still published freely, the government funded Radio Hong Kong consistently took anti-government positions, Falun Gong protestors camped out daily at the tourist hot spots, Mainland Chinese dissidents still operated out of the territory, & the US/UK ran their intelligence operations targeting China out of their consulates there. Post-protests, Xi clearly saw an opportunity to correct the situation w/ the NSL, so that Hong Kong would no longer serve as a haven for anit-CCP regime forces, & would no longer be in danger of falling into anarchy. Before 2019, Hong Kong might be termed a soft authoritarian system a la Singapore; after the imposition of NSL, Hong Kong now has a hard authoritarian system, whose edges are harder & sharper than even on the Mainland in certain aspects. (It is still softer in other respects: internet is still uncensored in Hong Kong, foreign social media platforms still unblocked, the South China Morning Post still routinely publish articles & commentaries critical of the CCP regime, the foreign press is not harassed as they are on the Mainland.)

    It’s not that Xi & the CCP regime are unaware of the cost in Western opinion (popular & elite) of these actions, but positive Western opinion is very low the CCP regime’s priority list. It is not that Xi or the CCP regime is unaware of the impact that a harsh crack down in Hong Kong would have on popular opinions on Taiwan, or the electoral chances of the KMT there. Crushing the challenge to its authority in Hong Kong was a far higher priority. The “One Country Two System” formula was always bankrupt, toxic even to the KMT supporters, well before 2019. The CCP regime’s priority or Taiwan is deterring de jure independence in the short to medium term. That is accomplished via the threat of economic punishment & military action, the crack down in Hong Kong does not affect that deterrence one way or the other. The long term goal is eventual “reunification”/absorption, “peacefully” (as in non-kinetically, not necessarily coercion-free) strongly preferred. That has not changed. Here are a few great analyses that pushes back on the alarmist rhetoric coming out of DC wrt a purportedly self-imposed timeline by Xi to conquer Taiwan:
    IS CHINA PLANNING TO ATTACK TAIWAN? A CAREFUL CONSIDERATION OF AVAILABLE EVIDENCE SAYS NO
    LISTEN TO XI JINPING ABOUT TAIWAN
    How We Would Know When China Is Preparing to Invade Taiwan
    The central dilemma for CCP regime is that, while it has a strong & credible strategy for deterring de jure independence for Taiwan, but it does not have a credible or executable strategy for peaceful (even if “peaceful” only means non-kinetic) “reunification” w/ Taiwan. However, that is a problem for the long term.

    The CCP regime certainly seeks to fan nationalist fervor at times to shore up its legitimacy, but it also has to carefully ride the nationalist current & tamp it down at other times, it is an interactive process. The nationalist currents in China far predate Xi, the PRC’s founding by the CCP, or even the fall of the Qing Empire. It is the raging water that can lift the boat that is the CCP regime, but also threatens to capsize it.

    Everything I wrote above applies to Xi’s predecessors, too. In fact there is great continuity from Deng, to Jiang, to Hu, to Xi in terms of their visions for the CCP’s centrality to the Chinese polity, China’s ultimate position in the world, approach to Taiwan, & deep distrust of the motives of the US. Jean Christopher Mittlestaedt at Oxford has been posting excerpts from past Jiang & Hu speeches on Twitter to highlight the continuity to Xi. Deng’s advise for China “to hide its strengths & bide its time” was always contingent upon China being relatively weak, & not intended to last forever. Susan Shirk in her Overreach: How China Derailed Its Peaceful Rise documented the increasing assertiveness in Chinese foreign policy to post-GFC in 2008, in the middle of Hu era. Xi has been even more assertive because China has become more powerful. It can no longer “hide”, & few people in China at the leadership or popular level want to “hide” anymore.

    On to some specific comments:

    The party leadership has always appeared to suffer from some intellectual blockage that prevents it from even attempting to understand the West in its own terms.  In this, it is unlike the policy “blob” that you decry in DC, which certainly may be blinkered about policy ends, but does make every effort to understand the CPC (and, more broadly, Chinese political trends) in its own terms, so as to at least have some understanding of how its own ends can best be attained.

    I agree that Xi & the CCP regime have trouble understanding the West in its own terms. The greatest gap is actually engagement w/ civil society, & not just in the developed West but also in the Global South, likely because civil society is so weak China. I disagree that the US & much of the West is capable or inclined to understand stand the CCP regime or China on their own terms. There is excellent scholarship in academia & parts of the think tank world that do, although understanding China’s political economy on its own terms is sorely lacking, but there is little evidence that their outstanding output has penetrated the “Blob”, be it the Administration or Congressional staff. So, you have Biden’s SecState, Ambassador to the UN & NatSec Advisor all continuing to use decades old talking points (dating to the GWB administration) about China’s engagement w/ the Global South being “debt trap diplomacy” that delivers “shoddy infrastructure” & uses “Chinese labor”, even though such talking points are demonstrably false & have been for decades, & have had zero purchase in the Global South for just as long.

    For years US/Europe based scholars & think tankers have been warning that the US faces a huge disconnect between its threat perception of China & its planned responses versus that of virtually everyone else’s, & those voices have been getting louder over the past year, to no noticeable effect. The Biden administration did hold Summits w/ the African & Pacific Island nations, that exceeded the low expectations going in. It has encouragingly started to center the agency & the needs of the African & Pacific Island nations, as opposed to situating them in the context of the great power competition w/ China. We will have to see if the administration (& Congress) can maintain the discipline & focus here going forward.

    The CPC, by contrast, seems utterly indifferent to any outlook other than its own, and repeatedly trips itself up on misunderstandings of Western policy goals (such as support of democracy) that it cannot take seriously because it cannot understand how anyone could take them seriously.

    Honesty, I don’t think anyone outside of the West thinks “support of democracy” is a serious Western policy goal.

    In that consensus, China is an aggrieved, yet rising power in an international context within which a sclerotic, declining power (the US/the West) is straining every fiber to contain and prevent its rise.  Each territorial/economic expansionary action, whether in the South China Seas, on the Indian border, or with respect to Taiwan, is just on its own merits, requires no discussion or negotiation with any other power, and in fact any preexisting international framework regulating such matters are self-evidently part of the containment structure set up by the US to hold China back, and needs to be torn down post-haste.

    China has in fact negotiated ends to land border disputes w/ Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Myanmar & Vietnam, mostly in the late 90s to early aughts, including relinquishing claims to territories it does not control. It is an open secret in China that the standing offer to India for resolving the land dispute is for China to relinquish claims to Arunachal Pradesh in the eastern Himalayas (that India controls) & for India to relinquish claims to Aksai Chin in the western Himalayas (that China controls). However, that exchange is politically infeasible in India due to the humiliating defeat it suffered in ’62. There are Stone Age & Iron Age skirmishes along the disputed borders because the Lines of Actual Control are not demarcated, & India & China have conflicting ideas as to where the LACs lie. So Chinese troops routinely patrol to its definition of LAC, which is inside of the Indian definition of the LAC, & vice versa. Right now, the local military commands from the two sides are holding an interminable series of meetings to disengage from the disputed borders sector by sector. It has been accomplished in the sector that saw the skirmishes in Apr. 2020 which resulted in loss of life on both sides, but other sectors remain pending. It is a contest of wills & stamina, & both sides will press for advantage over the other to force concessions, & neither are above instigating incidents to exert such pressure. It is stupid & meaningless game to play in the grand scheme of things, but it is the game the two sides insist on play for the past few decades.

    China has indeed put itself into a corner in terms of domestic politics wrt to the South China Sea & the Spratley Islands, by putting the Nine Dashed Line & the dots that represents the “islands” onto the Chinese passport, & by encouraging the rhetoric of “land bequeathed by our ancestors, not one speck less”. OTOH, while the Chinese Navy, Coast Guard & Maritime Militia have been aggressive in interfering w/ fishing & oil/gas exploration activities by the other claimants, it has not tried to push the other claimants off the rock features that they have occupied. The vast majority of features in the Spratley are still occupied by Vietnam & the Philippines. All claimants have refrained from occupying any hitherto unoccupied features, which would be deemed highly escalatory by all the others. China & the rival claimants (excluding Taiwan/ROC) have been working on a Code of Conduct for the South China Sea for several years, which is intended minimize escalatory activities & reduce risk of conflict. For China, such a code of conduct will lock in place the existing tactical & operational advantages that the island building has achieved. For other claimants, it will prevent an island building contest that they won’t win against China, & place some constraint on Chinese behavior. It was hoped that it would be concluded in 2022, but is likely to be done in 2023, the Philippines appears to be the last claimant that still has concerns w/ the current text. We shall see. China prefers to negotiate the Spratley dispute bilaterally, where it will have overwhelming advantage. The other claimants understandably have no intention to oblige. So we have a stalemate, the island building was an effort to tilt the board in its favor, so that any ultimate negotiated solution will be much closer to China’s preferred terms.

    As for US containment effort against China. Well before the Oct. semiconductor restrictions, every US/EU based China scholar I follow had always dismissed of the fears from their Chinese counterparts about the US trying to keep China down as baseless paranoia (so did I). After the semiconductor restrictions, a common reaction was that Biden has just proven their Chinese counterparts right after all.

    What the CPC has accomplished by the new assertive “Wolf Warrior” diplomacy under Xi is pretty much the opposite of the goals that it set out.  It created a Western consensus for some kind of containment, which certainly did not exist before, not even in the US.  It alarmed all of its own neighbors, driving  Japan to rearm, essentially evoking the Quad, and pretty much creating the conditions for US trade protectionism to finally find a justification in National Security.  A set of more flagrant strategic own-goals would be difficult to imagine.

    I think you are ignoring the fact that this has been an interactive process, & overestimating the level of consensus outside of the US. Both sides have contributed to the collapse in relations, in their actions & reactions, & neither side wants to acknowledge their own responsibility. Some of the forces driving toward rivalry are structural.

    Japan has always wanted to rearm, especially the revanchist right wing that is currently hugging the US the tightest, the same revanchist right wing that was chafing the hardest against the “yoke” of the US alliance in the 80s when Japan was ascendant. Japan does indeed fear a China willing to use military force, & fear a Chinese attack on Taiwan. OTOH, China is also a convenient sheen for its own normalization effort, to override domestic opposition to rearming as well as any potential concerns that the US might have w/ a more independent Japan. This dynamic becomes clearer when you read scholars based in East Asia, as opposed to think tank output from DC, or pronouncements by Japanese officials to their US counterparts. That does not mean Japan is enthusiastic about following the US on tech restrictions on China (at least to the same extent), actions that would be detrimental to its economic interests.

    Now, no one, least of all the Taiwanese, would believe such a commitment.  Clearly, President Xi did not understand that democracy, freedom, and the rule of law actually matter to people who currently have them.

    No he does not. But neither did Deng, Jiang or Hu.

    I do find this obsessive focus on the impact of the personality of Xi himself as evidence of an inability to understand the CCP regime on its own terms, a failure to understand Chinese history, or appreciate the structural forces driving rivalry. In her book, Susan Shirk contended that features of the collective leadership under Hu drove aggressive behavior by weakly supervised parts of the bureaucracy, while the individualized leadership under Xi drove aggressive behavior at Xi’s behest. The obvious critique to her analysis is that if China behaved w/ increasing assertiveness under both collective leadership & strongman rule, then perhaps there structural forces (such as China’s increasing strength) & exogenous factors (such as US’ attempts at balancing) at play, rather than the personalities involved.

    Over the past 3 years we have seen a number of outlandish notions about Xi’s plans from Western MSM & analysts, including by China scholars that I normally respect (& still do respect):

    1. The nationwide lockdowns in Spring 2020 was a power play by Xi to institute complete control over the population – the lockdowns ended when the domestic outbreaks were eliminated
    2. The true intention of the health code system & the associated movement restrictions was control of people & not control of transmission – they have now all been dismantled as China reopened
    3. China closing borders & restricting the issuing of new passport is evidence that Xi intends to return China to Mao era autarky – the borders are now open & process of obtaining new passports has returned to pre-pandemic norms (there is a long line, understandably)
    4. Xi will be unwilling to climb down from poor economic decisions such as cracking down on internet platforms & real estate that damaged the Chinese economy – internet platforms & AI companies are now constrained by published regulations rather than targeted assault; the real estate bubble needed to be deflated, but the Chinese government is implementing policies to provide some support, not to re-inflate the bubble but to form a floor & increase market activity
    5. Hu Jintao getting hauled off at the end of the 20th Party Congress means he was publicly purged, Xi flexing his Mafia muscle as a signal to the rest of the CCP leadership – never mind that Hu was shown on national TV that evening submitting his votes, he was prominently placed next to Xi at the memorial service for Jiang Zemin, & a photo showing Xi, Hu & Jiang was placed in the background during Xi’s New Year address (just in case anyone missed their significance, Xinhua New Service published a run down detailing what each photo behind Xi meant, including the one I alluded to)

    That is a staggering level of mistaken analysis, but I have not seen much introspection from MSM or the China watching community on how they could have gotten the analyses so wrong, or why they thought the original analyses were plausible to begin w/. Yes, the opacity of the CCP regime pose severe challenges, but that does not excuse substituting evidence free speculation for informed analysis.

  59. 59.

    YY_Sima Qian

    @Gin & Tonic:

    Considering the history between Western Ukraine (Halychyna, a/k/a Galicia) and Poland, this is astonishing.

    Shouldn’t be. The Vietnamese welcome Americans (even the French!) these days, too.

  60. 60.

    YY_Sima Qian

    Looks like my long reply to Carlo’s & Andrya’s comments yesterday are stuck in moderation. I would greatly appreciate it if WaterGirl, Adam or A.L. can wave it through.

  61. 61.

    Andrya

    @YY_Sima Qian:  Adam has asked that commenters refrain from flaming each other.  And this series is about Ukraine, and only incidentally about China and the Chinese government- so it would be extra bad if we start flaming about a topic that is not even the primary topic.  Although you are obviously very knowledgeable, we disagree ferociously about what I see as the Chinese government’s violations of international law and human rights.  To avoid inciting flame wars that would damage the discussion, I have a rule that I never reply to your posts.  (Obviously I’m making a one time exception here.)  I respectfully request that you do the same as regards my posts.

    I am not asking that you refrain from posting defenses of the Chinese government, just that you not directly reply to me.  It’s pointless anyway- neither of us is going to convince the other.

  62. 62.

    YY_Sima Qian

    @Andrya: That is fine. I mean, I don’t disagree that the CCP regime carries out horrendous violations of human rights in its bid for regime survival, or that Chinese foreign policy is full of hypocrisy & disrespects international laws & norms whenever it is in its interest to do so.

  64. 64.

    WaterGirl

    @2liberal: Alison Rose said that if anyone asked about her, I should let you know that she is okay.  She said she is taking some space from the blog.

    Maybe we’ll see her in an On the Road post, that seems like a safe space.

  67. 67.

    Carlo Graziani

    @YY_Sima Qian: For what it’s worth, I have found every one of your post useful and informative, including ones like the one above that I have a few serious disagreements with.

    The pricipal one today (but it is of long standing, and I’ve noticed it often in the past)

    The CPC, by contrast, seems utterly indifferent to any outlook other than its own, and repeatedly trips itself up on misunderstandings of Western policy goals (such as support of democracy) that it cannot take seriously because it cannot understand how anyone could take them seriously.

    Honesty, I don’t think anyone outside of the West thinks “support of democracy” is a serious Western policy goal.

    This is a blind spot, in my opinion. Of course, I wrote The Resumption of History pretty much to this very point—that  “support of democracy” as a value was what was lost in the Neoliberal triumphalism at the end of the Cold War, and is being rediscovered now as the essential inoculant against global populist/nationalist movements, as “The West” finally rediscovers the political values that really unite it.

    You may scoff, and Xi—and to be sure many in the “Global South”—surely do. But they do so at their cost and peril, in my opinion, because by doing so they surrender the real potential basis for their prosperous and low-corruption development under a rule of law in favor of an economic chimera.

  68. 68.

    YY_Sima Qian

    @Carlo Graziani: The US & the West at large will have to convince the others that is indeed the case, & that won’t happen simply by asserting that is the case. That won’t happen when the US & the EU is happy to focus on China’s likely crimes against humanity against the Uyghurs, but not the massive abuses India commits in Kashmir; eager to slap Victor Orban’s slide toward illiberalism in Hungary because he flirts w/ Putin, while mum (for now at least) on Poland’s slide toward illiberalism because it is staunchly anti-Russian; Israeli abuses of Palestinians is now largely out of sight & out of mind, even as the new most extreme right wing ever government assumes power, because the US needs to consolidate the Israeli-Sunni Arab de facto alliance against Iran.

    Not that there isn’t a whole lot hypocrisy to go around, such as China’s rhetorically pro-Russian neutrality on the Russian invasion of Ukraine, despite its longstanding insistence on the primacy of respecting sovereignty & territorial integrity in international relations, or the Islamic League’s toeing of the Chinese line on Xinjiang, while happily criticizing Indian abuses in Kashmir.

  69. 69.

    YY_Sima Qian

    @Carlo Graziani: Also, many US analysts have pointed out that the Democracy vs. Autocracy framing is detrimental to waging great power competition w/ China & Russia, as many of the potential allies & partners the US will need to enlist in this competition are authoritarian or deeply flawed democracies sliding quickly toward illiberalism. It is a framing countries outside of the West generally chafe against, & it is a frame that makes it hard to prevent the Sino-US rivalry from deteriorating into a Cold War that both side says they wish to avoid.

    Biden’s NSS elides this tension by saying the US does not seek to subvert “non-democracies” that do not challenge the “rules based liberal International order”, & is indeed eager to partner w/ them. So we are left w/ the situation where the ruinous Saudi intervention into Yemen is not deemed as subverting the “rules based liberal International order” & goes unpunished. Likewise w/ Israel’s slide toward an Apartheid regime wrt the Palestinians, & whatever Modi & the BJP government is doing in Kashmir. SecState Blinken has all but stated that the US will keep its concerns w/ Kashmir to private discussion, in the interest of maintaining the Quad. That was once the preferred European approach to Chinese human rights abuses – speak softly, in private as to avoid offense, & likely to no avail.

  70. 70.

    PaulB

    @Chetan Murthy:   To be frank, a few commenters here believe that any adverse judgment of the Russian people for this genocidal war is eliminationist rhetoric.

    Nobody here has said anything remotely resembling that. Creating strawman arguments like that does not help your case.

  71. 71.

    lee

    I’ve got another detail question.

    I’m curious of what the difference in advance speed for the Russian in Ukraine versus WW2.

    I’m hanging with friends drinking sorry if thisnt clear.

  72. 72.

    Geminid

    @lee: I think you may have gotten lost! This thread is two nights old.

    It is an interesting question, though. Armored  vehicles are somewhat faster now than in the Second World War. But speed of advance is still conditioned by the defenses immediately in front, as well as the danger of counterattacks if the enemy has organized forces behind the front lines. Logistics are also a factor.

    So I guess the answer is: it depends.

     

    Don’t forget to keep hydrated!

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