I don’t know about you, but I need a little time off from the crazy. So here’s a yellow cardinal that has shown up in Alabaster, Alabama.
Open thread for anything but politics!
Cheryl Rofer wrote at Balloon Juice from 2017-21.
Cheryl is a retired chemist who has has been particularly active with nuclear policy. Cheryl has her own blog, Nuclear Diner, and she also posts at Lawyers, Guns & Money.
Twitter: @CherylRofer
This post is in: Open Threads, All we want is life beyond the thunderdome
I don’t know about you, but I need a little time off from the crazy. So here’s a yellow cardinal that has shown up in Alabaster, Alabama.
Open thread for anything but politics!
This post is in: Open Threads, All Too Normal, Bitter Despair is the New Black, Bring On The Meteor
Vladimir Putin gave a talk today. What I am picking up from Twitter is that it was mostly about improving social conditions in Russia, but Putin seems to have though he needed to get into the “My button is bigger than yours” discussion.
The nuclear trolling at the end of Putin’s address seems to be entirely aimed at gathering as many alarmist and jingoistic headlines and comments in the West as possible and then contrasting them on Kremlin TV against the overall progressive nature of the speech.
— Leonid Ragozin (@leonidragozin) March 1, 2018
Early Morning Nuclear War Open ThreadPost + Comments (228)
He claims, as he had before, that Russia has a missile that can hop-skip-jump around any defenses the United States may offer. And he may have said that it’s nuclear-powered, which is possible but absurd. He also claims a doomsday weapon that will stealthily proceed underwater to the east coast of the United States, where it will explode in a radioactive tsunami. Until we see a bit more on these weapons (like US satellite photos of their tests), I remain agnostic as to whether they actually exist.
Here’s the trippy, animated video Putin showed (to great applause) of the new missile Russia has (allegedly) developed. https://t.co/E1wkchmXD5
— Mike Eckel (@Mike_Eckel) March 1, 2018
«Как вы понимаете, ничего подобного в мире ни к кого нет»: Вот так, покашливая, Путин отправил в корзину всю систему ПРО и не только ее pic.twitter.com/HB9mPLDnFh
— Дмитрий Смирнов (@dimsmirnov175) March 1, 2018
The missile over green hills looks photoshopped or animated to me, but I’ll wait until the experts on such things weigh in before that’s a firm conclusion.
My Twitter feed is having fun with this in predictable ways.
Putin has just announced a web contest to name Russia's new underwater nuclear drone weapon pic.twitter.com/8HqcaTVkTs
— Alec Luhn (@ASLuhn) March 1, 2018
I think this is the wisest advice on all this, which I doubt American media will follow.
Re Putin’s remarks: They’re clearly bad. But how bad? An accurate word-for-word translation is critical here. Don’t trust news reports to get the details correct. And the details matter.
— (((James Acton))) (@james_acton32) March 1, 2018
This post is in: Rofer on Nuclear Issues, Into the weeds
On the Nuclear Posture Review. He goes on about more aspects of it than I did yesterday, but his conclusions in that area are very similar to mine.
Moreover, I find the elaborate scenarios that nuclear strategists dream up to justify new weapons to be both militarily and politically unrealistic. They tend to assume that complex military operations will go off without a hitch the very first time they are attempted (and in the crucible of a nuclear crisis), and they further assume that political leaders in the real world would be willing to order the slaughter of millions for something less than existential stakes. My main concern has been that some gullible politician would actually believe that one of these elaborate scenarios would actually work and might therefore be tempted to try it. Just as bad: An adversary might think the United States thought it could win such a war and might decide it had no choice but to try to hit it first.
I also find the obsession with matching capabilities at every rung of some hypothetical “escalation ladder” to be slightly absurd. Is it realistic to think that U.S. leaders defending vital interests against a possible Russian threat would be stymied because they didn’t have a capability that exactly mirrored whatever Russia had or was threatening to do? Would a top advisor really say to the president: “Oh dear, sir, Russia just threatened to attack with a nuclear weapon with a yield of 7.2 kilotons. We have lots of 5-kiloton bombs and lots of 11-kiloton bombs all ready to go, but if we use the little one, they’ll think we’re wimps, and if we use the big one, then the onus of escalation will be on us. I guess they’ve got us over the whing-whang, sir, and we’ll just have to do whatever Putin says. If only we had built more 7.2 kiloton bombs than they did!”
His second question and answer are good.
Question 2: Why doesn’t the United States have more faith in nuclear deterrence?
Answer: Because threat-inflators are more numerous than threat-deflators.
It’s easier in today’s Washington, DC, to say “We don’t know that Russia/China/North Korea isn’t beefing up their arsenal so as to get an advantage on us” than it is to work out what the situation most likely is in a real world with real constraints. So you’ll see again and again that North Korea could have 60-80 nuclear weapons ready to go. That derives from a statement of estimated fissile material, divided by the amount that might be needed for a bomb, both very uncertain numbers. It ignores the time and facilities it takes to build the weapons. I did a more realistic estimate a while back.
There’s also a macho edge that we have to have more/better than anyone else, exacerbated by Trump’s insecure masculinity. Chest-pounding is IN.
Walt’s article is longer than mine, but very worth reading.
Cross-posted at Nuclear Diner.
This post is in: Rofer on Nuclear Issues, Into the weeds
The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) mentions some variant of “deter” 279 times. Deterrence is supposedly what today’s nuclear arsenals are about. The idea is that we have enough nuclear weapons so that if an enemy attacked us, we could still destroy them. That standoff, established after the nearly world-ending Cuban Missile Crisis, seems to have worked. Or it’s possible that the reason for no nuclear war in the past 56 years is that nations recognize that destroying the world is in nobody’s interests.
Levels of DeterrencePost + Comments (118)
The NPR argues that deterrence requires several new nuclear weapons. What can be confusing about discussions of deterrence is that they take place on several levels. The broadest is that the point of deterrence is to avoid a nuclear war. With a little more detail, we can talk about conventional weapons and nuclear weapons, and the generalities of what it takes to extend American nuclear deterrence to our allies. The deterrence theorists get far down in the weeds of pitting one particular weapon against another. For a reality check, those levels need to be cross-correlated.
If we don’t want a nuclear war, there are a number of things we can do. Eliminating nuclear weapons is one. That would require setting up a strategy to get there and a complicated series of negotiations. I think it could be done, but the Trump administration wouldn’t be able to do it.
Another way to defend against nuclear war would be to convene negotiations to agree on conventions for when the use of nuclear weapons might be appropriate. Limiting or banning various types of delivery vehicles might also be a subject of talks. Making more information available about plans for their use would also be helpful. Information is a key to stabilizing the world against nuclear weapons.
Much of the discussion in the NPR and in discussions I’m seeing on Twitter is at the most detailed level. Here’s one example, from page 7 of the NPR.
While nuclear weapons play a deterrent role in both Russian and Chinese strategy, Russia may also rely on threats of limited nuclear first use, or actual first use, to coerce us, our allies, and partners into terminating a conflict on terms favorable to Russia. Moscow apparently believes that the United States is unwilling to respond to Russian employment of tactical nuclear weapons with strategic nuclear weapons.
This has been called the escalate-to-deescalate strategy. The idea is that Russia would use a small nuclear weapon on an aircraft carrier group or a city like Warsaw or Tallinn. That would prove that they are serious about using nuclear weapons, the United States would shy away from a nuclear response, and Russia would gain an advantage.
The situation that this applies to is where war is in progress between the United States and Russia, and Russia fears losing. So it is some distance down the escalation trail. There are other assumptions that I’ll skip over to focus on why some analysts believe that this is what Russia would do.
Strategists on both sides infer doctrines and intentions from the other’s words and actions. Although some strategies are explicit, others are not. Deterrence is bolstered by clear statements of the retaliation certain actions will bring, but keeping the other side guessing has its own benefits.
Olga Oliker and Andrey Baklitskiy explain how some US analysts have inferred the escalate-to-deescalate strategy. A combination of a paper in a 1999 Russian military journal, particular interpretations of military exercises, Russia’s larger number of nonstrategic nuclear weapons, and Vladimir Putin’s rhetoric lead those analysts to conclude that Russia would use such a strategy. However, the official doctrine does not mention such a strategy, and the other evidence can be interpreted against its existence.
Bruno Tertrais also examines the evidence and comes up with the same conclusion: That the escalate-to-deescalate strategy is not part of Russia’s nuclear doctrine.
But the authors of the NPR believe that it is and that they know the way to counter it. From page 31,
To correct any Russian misperceptions of advantage and credibly deter Russian nuclear or non-nuclear strategic attacks—which could now include attacks against U.S. NC3 [Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications]—the President must have a range of limited and graduated options, including a variety of delivery systems and explosive yields.
And thus (page 55)
DoD and NNSA will develop for deployment a low-yield SLBM warhead to ensure a prompt response option that is able to penetrate adversary defenses.
This option presents a number of problems of its own. For example, once a nuclear exchange starts, it is not clear whether the two sides will distinguish between strikes with lower or higher yields. But those problems are not considered in the NPR.
Let’s move the focus out. We already have flexibility in the yields of existing nuclear weapons. Overall conventional and nuclear deterrence is strong. A new capability is likely to provoke Russia and possibly China to develop new weapons of their own.
Deterrence cannot be numerically measured. Russia has more nonstrategic nuclear weapons, but we have more weapons in storage. The differences come about because of differences in our situations and the history of developing the nuclear arsenals. Russia feels it needs those weapons to defend near its long continental borders; we have weaknesses in our production complex.
There are other similar issues in the NPR. The calculus of deterrence is subjective and can be bent to justify new weapons. Little is said in the document about the arms control agreements that limit the numbers and types of weapons. The likely Russian violation of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty is met with a proposal for an equally violating American weapon to be developed.
The comparisons are not only of one weapon to another. Nor should all the arguments be of adding or subtracting particular weapons; a broader perspective is needed. That is simply a response to the other side and lacks leadership, either for stronger deterrence or moving away from nuclear weapons. It is a recipe for an arms race and escalation to full nuclear war if armed conflict occurs.
Graphic source. The cartoon is in homage to an earlier one of John Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev.
Cross-posted at Nuclear Diner.
This post is in: Ammosexuals, domestic terrorists, Enhanced Protest Techniques, Open Threads
A number of companies have associated themselves with the NRA. Now they’ve changed their minds about that.
You might want to contact the ones that haven’t dropped out yet. Full details here.
Update: Oh, and we need an open thread, so here it is!
This post is in: Open Threads, Russiagate, All we want is life beyond the thunderdome
Here’s the red meat for you to chew on.
A summary – not sure if this is going to be readable, but worth a try.
NEW: Here are all 32 new charges Mueller brought against MANAFORT and GATES pic.twitter.com/horISUm6f4
— Kyle Cheney (@kyledcheney) February 22, 2018
Pretty curious decision by Gates not to take a deal with this on the way and little ability to pay his lawyers. Good time to ask the WH whether there have been any discussions of pardons with him or Manafort. https://t.co/BywHcQ6mYV
— Matthew Miller (@matthewamiller) February 22, 2018
And Gates fired his lawyer. Again.
NEW: Gates' new lawyer is Barry Pollack of Miller Chevalier (Kevin Downing's old firm) https://t.co/XYNDIMDVYU
— Betsy Woodruff (@woodruffbets) February 22, 2018
So it looks like whatever plea deal was made with Gates is falling apart. Meanwhile, the judge rejected Manafort’s latest offer of bail.
And open thread!
New Indictments Against Manafort And GatesPost + Comments (106)
This post is in: Women's Rights Are Human Rights, Assholes, Blatant Liars and the Lies They Tell
Jill Abramson goes back to reporting and gives us a long-form look at Clarence Thomas’s other accusers. She refers to Moira Smith’s story, very similar to Anita Hill’s, which was published in Fall 2016, just before James Comey made his news.
Abramson wrote a book in the mid-nineties about “ three other women who had experiences with Thomas at the EEOC that were similar to Hill’s, and four people who knew about his keen interest in porn but were never heard from publicly.”
A good case can be made that Thomas lied to the Senate during his confirmation hearing. Some Democrats, during the 2016 campaign, wanted to bring up the issue of his possible impeachment.
Before we consider impeachment, though, we have to consider how Thomas might be replaced. So it’s not for now.
Buzzfeed outed another abuser today. Lawrence Krauss is a professor of physics at Arizona State University and a well-known (among those folks, anyway) proponent of scientific atheism. He’s also been whispered about by women for a long time. Melody Hensley’s story is featured in the article, but others are mentioned.
Krauss is a cosmologist, and he is heading up a multidisciplinary effort on “the origins of the universe, life, and social systems.” I am a chemist who has had to deal with far too many know-it-all physicists, but my observation of physicists in positions like this is that they try to devolve everything to physics, while claiming a broad view. It’s tiresome.
He has denied any wrong-doing with women, but there are quite a few incidents listed in this article. I find them persuasive, along with the whispers.
Listen To The Women – Anita Hill EditionPost + Comments (58)