(Image by NEIVANMADE)
I’ve had a busy day and been offline for most of it. I am aware of the big breaking news. Tonight’s update is going to be brief/just the basics.
Just fourteen more shopping days until the first part of the government shutdown.
Someone asked in comments last night if President Biden could – as in has the authority – to call Congress back into session. The answer is yes he does. The answer to would he do so is no. The reason for that is that Speaker Johnson would either ignore him or they’d come back into session and then immediately gavel themselves back into recess. The other reason is that starting under the Obama administration, the House of Representatives never actually goes into recess when the GOP controls it. One of the Republican representatives from Maryland or Virginia who lives close to DC will come in every day and gavel the House into session and then immediately gavel them out. This is to prevent President Biden, just as it was intended to prevent President Obama, from making any recess appointments. As long as they do this Congress is never really in recess. Technically Congress isn’t in recess now, rather it is adjourned subject to recall from the chair.
President Zelenskyy visited France and Germany today. There is no daily address posted yet, often when he’s traveling these post after I’m done with the update. But here’s his joint press conference with French President Macron.
And here’s President Zelenskyy’s joint press conference with Senator Coons German Chancellor Scholz:
The text of the security agreement with France will be after the jump.
Agreement on security cooperation between Ukraine and France
16 February 2024 – 22:15
Ukraine and France, hereinafter referred to individually and respectively as the “Ukrainian Participant” and the “French Participant” and jointly as the “Participants”,
Reaffirming their solidarity in the face of the armed aggression by the Russian Federation against Ukraine in violation of international law, the Charter of the United Nations, the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris;
Reaffirming Ukraine’s inherent right of self-defence, in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations;
Recognising that Russia’s illegal and unprovoked large-scale invasion of Ukraine is a threat to international peace and security and a flagrant violation of international law, including the United Nations Charter;
Reaffirming their unwavering commitment to the strategic objective of a free, independent, democratic and sovereign Ukraine, within its internationally recognised borders as of 1991, capable of defending itself and deterring any future aggression;
Recognising the importance of the fundamental principles for a just and lasting peace laid out in Ukraine’s Peace Formula, in line with international law;
Reaffirming their deep commitment to democratic principles, the rule of law, good governance, respect for fundamental freedoms and human rights;
Reaffirming the objective of Ukrainian accession to the European Union and the fact that the security of Ukraine is an integral part of European security and the Euro-Atlantic region;
Recalling the historic decisions of the European Council of 23 June 2022 and 14 December 2023 to grant Ukraine the candidate status and open accession negotiations with Ukraine, underlining that enlargement is a geo-strategic investment in peace, security, stability and prosperity;
Considering the Joint Declaration of Support for Ukraine adopted in Vilnius on 12 July 2023 by the G7 Leaders that 25 countries have since endorsed as of February 16 2024;
Have jointly determined to strengthen their bilateral long-term security cooperation by pursuing the measures set out in this Agreement:
I. Introduction
The Participants confirm that they support the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognised borders as of 1991. They wish to reaffirm the sovereign right of each State to freely choose its security arrangements.
With this Agreement, Ukraine and France will deepen their cooperation and partnership, which are based on their common interests in the defence of international law and order, peace, and the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms.
The Participants reaffirm that Ukraine’s security is integral to Euro-Atlantic and global security. France confirms that Ukraine’s future membership of NATO would make an effective contribution to peace and stability in Europe. The Participants will coordinate and strengthen joint efforts to support Ukraine’s accession to NATO.
The main components of the long-term security commitments provided to Ukraine by France in this Agreement are as follows:
- provision of comprehensive assistance to Ukraine for the protection and the restoration of its territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders, as well as economic recovery and reconstruction;
- prevention and active deterrence of, and counter-measures against, a new aggression by the Russian Federation;
- support for Ukraine’s integration into European and Euro-Atlantic institutions, including by supporting Ukraine’s accession to the EU and interoperability with NATO.
II. Cooperation in the security field
1. General cooperation in strengthening Ukraine’s security
The French Participant will provide military and civil assistance to enable Ukraine to defend its sovereignty, its independence and its territorial integrity in the face of the aggression by the Russian Federation, bilaterally through agreements and through the institutions and organisations to which it is a party.
The French Participant will contribute to building the military capabilities, the resilience and the economic stability of Ukraine, so as to discourage any future aggression.
In order to more effectively ensure the realisation of this cooperation, the Ukrainian Participant will continuously and effectively maintain and develop its ability to resist an armed attack, with the assistance of the French Participant.
2. Cooperation in strategic communication and in the fight against foreign interference and manipulation of information
The Participants recognise that the Russian Federation continues to manipulate information in support of its war on Ukraine and will seek to continue to mutually support each other’s efforts to counter Russian digital interference and manipulation of information as well as propaganda globally.
The French Participant will assist Ukraine in joining collective instruments for countering foreign interference and manipulation of information.
The Participants will collaborate to improve Ukraine’s capabilities to counter foreign interference and manipulation of information, primarily Russian propaganda and disinformation campaigns, exchange experience and promote the development of joint educational and training programmes for information integrity professionals.
3. Cooperation in the sphere of cyber security
The Participants will work together to enable Ukraine to detect, deter and disrupt any cyber aggression, cyber espionage, including through greater cyber resilience and critical infrastructure protection from cyber attacks, while supporting the modernisation and reform of Ukraine’s security architecture, and through the provision of international technical assistance to Ukraine.
The Participants will work together to raise the cost of the irresponsible use of cyber capabilities by the Russian Federation and other hostile state and non-state actors against the Participants. They will also increase their operational cooperation in the fight against cybercrime.
The Ukrainian Participants will work towards deepening Ukraine’s cooperation with EU and NATO structures on cybersecurity.
4. Protection of critical infrastructure
The French Participant will contribute to the development of Ukraine’s critical infrastructure protection capabilities, including by military means, prioritising, but not limited to, modern air defence capabilities.
The Participants will explore joint educational and training programmes for critical infrastructure protection specialists.
The Participants will strengthen their cooperation in the field of improved resilience and preparedness of both government and civil entities, including through information sharing, exchanges on best practices and experience feedback. The Participants will also deepen their cooperation on assessing vulnerabilities of vital supply chains, retro-engineering of critical goods and services, the constitution of strategic stockpiles, as well as the corresponding logistic issues.
The French Participant will work with Ukraine to identify sources of funding to develop the protection and resilience of critical infrastructure, including through the grant facility for reconstruction and restoration of critical infrastructure set up by the French Participant for Ukraine.
5. Intelligence and Counterintelligence Cooperation
The Participants will continue and will strive to deepen their cooperation in the field of intelligence and counterintelligence in accordance with the framework based on bilateral agreements, without prejudice to their national interests and in compliance with the legislation of each Participant.
6. Cooperation in the sphere of combating serious and organised crime
The Participants will take actions to counteract the activities of SOC, in particular individuals and groups that are trying to infiltrate across Ukrainian society, have criminal influence in certain regions, including the temporarily occupied ones, and are actively used as a tool of hybrid warfare to counteract the processes of recovery and reconciliation in Ukraine.
In order to counter the activities of SOC, the Participants will take measures to:
- conduct joint operations to detect and suppress SOC;
- analyse the criminal situation in the countries and identify the main risks from SOC;
- identify and trace the proceeds and instrumentalities of SOC in view of facilitating seizure and, where appropriate, confiscation;
- create joint working groups and joint investigation teams of prosecutors and other parties, based on identified needs;
- facilitate the provision of training and sharing of best practice.
The above measures are not exhaustive, and the Participants may pursue other forms of cooperation to achieve their goals in combating SOC.
ІІІ. Cooperation in the event of future armed attack
Any future Russian invasion would violate the UN Charter and fundamental principles of international law, and would grievously undermine Euro-Atlantic security, including that of France.
In the event of future Russian armed attack against Ukraine, at the request of either of the Participants, the Participants will consult within 24 hours to determine measures needed to counter or deter the aggression.
In those circumstances, and acting in accordance with its legal and constitutional requirements, the French Participant would provide Ukraine with swift and sustained security assistance, modern military equipment across all domains as necessary, and economic assistance; impose economic and other costs on Russia; and consult with Ukraine on its needs as it exercises its right to self-defence enshrined in Article 51 of the UN Charter.
In order to ensure the widest and most effective collective response to any future armed attack, the Participants may amend these provisions in order to align with any mechanism that Ukraine may subsequently agree with its other international partners, including the participants in the Joint Declaration of 12 July 2023.
IV. Cooperation in the military and defence industry
7. Defence and military cooperation
The Participants will work together and with other partners of Ukraine to ensure that the Ukrainian defence and security forces are able to fully restore Ukraine’s territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders as of 1991, as well as to increase Ukraine’s resilience so that it is sufficient to deter and defend against future attacks. This will include, but is not limited to, working together so that Ukraine’s military and non-military security institutions are able to perform effectively to European and Euro-Atlantic standards and are fully accountable to the Ukrainian people, Parliament and Government.
The Participants will work together on ensuring a sustainable force capable of defending Ukraine now and deterring Russian aggression in the future, through the continued provision of security assistance and modern military equipment, across the land, air, sea, space and cyber domains — prioritising, but not limited to: air defence, artillery, long-range firepower, armoured vehicles, air force capabilities and other key capabilities.
The French Participant will, alongside other international partners, help Ukraine to enhance its ability to deter and defend against external aggressors by developing modern Future Defence Forces that are increasingly interoperable with NATO and contribute to NATO forces. This includes the development of a modern defence sector in Ukraine, and a pathway to a future in NATO.
The French Participant will assist Ukraine with preservation of its qualitative defence and military capabilities amid rapid, uncertain and challenging regional political and security transformation.
In the military field, without prejudice to their position in the context of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, the Participants propose to establish cooperation enabling the Ukrainian Participant to develop comprehensive military capabilities in the following fields, which are not exhaustive:
- Military equipment, including through industrial cooperation, and particularly in the fields of artillery and air defence, but also in the fields of armoured vehicles, maritime security, military medical support, information technologies and mine clearance;
- Training of the Ukrainian defence and security forces, in a national capacity and in the European framework, including train-the-trainers programme, specialised training in fields such as artillery, air defence, armoured vehicles, air forces and maritime security, new technologies and mine clearance;
- Initial support and support for the launch of maintenance by manufacturers, on the ground where necessary;
- Structural support for reform of the defence sector;
- Support for cyber defence and resilience initiatives, including to address hybrid threats;
- Assistance to the Ukrainian system of medical support for the treatment and rehabilitation of Ukrainian servicepersons;
- Support to the development of the Ukrainian defence and security forces including, but not limited to: future force design, a move towards NATO concepts and operating procedures, command and staff training, combined exercises, and enhanced compatibility and interoperability with NATO Allies;
- Support for border protection and defence, its engineering and fortification, surveillance, monitoring of enemy troop movements, post-war reconstruction of border infrastructure, demining and disposal of explosive ordnance;
The French Participant will support plans and governance structures for Capability Coalitions in the framework of the Ukraine Defence Contact Group, by playing a leading role in the coalitions on Artillery and Air Defence, and by participating in the coalitions on Air Force and Maritime Security, and other coalitions, to which the French Participant may contribute, both to deliver the future force and to bring more coherence to the provision of capability in the current war.
The bilateral fund for security and defence assistance to Ukraine, in good coordination with the European Peace Facility, will help support these cooperation efforts in the relevant fields.
France provided Ukraine with a total of €1.7 billion in military aid in 2022 and of €2.1 billion in 2023. In 2024, France will provide up to 3 billion euros in additional support.
The Participants will seek to ensure that Ukraine’s military capabilities are at such a level that, in the event of external military aggression against France, Ukraine is able to provide effective military assistance. The terms, format and scope of such assistance will be determined by the Participants.
The French Participant will continue its support to Ukraine for the ten-year duration of this Agreement.
8. Defence industry cooperation
The Participants will strive to cooperate in the field of the defence and security industry, including with the objective of promoting cooperation between their defence industries and strengthening standardisation and interoperability of their defence equipment. The Participants will seek, as far as possible, to develop an industrial partnership involving French and Ukrainian defence businesses and, as far as possible, free of restrictions from third parties.
The French Participant will contribute to the development of Ukraine’s defence industrial base, including through French investments, the localisation of production in Ukraine as well as joint production for manufacturing of priority weapons and ammunition. The Participants will facilitate the creation of joint ventures, including for maintenance and repair of weapons and military equipment.
The French Participant will work with Ukraine to identify funding sources required to enable the development of Ukraine’s defence industrial base and to encourage investments into new capacities.
The Participants will work together to address existing defence materials supply chain bottlenecks impeding developing capacity and capability of both France and Ukraine for manufacturing of priority weapons and ammunition. To that purpose, the French Participant will work with its Defence industry and Ukraine to strengthen the supply chain for critical materials required for manufacturing of ammunition and other priority weapons, in particular large calibre ammunition.
The Participants will work together to strengthen protection of the transferred technologies and intellectual property rights.
The Participants will promote the exchange of information on their respective defence related research and development efforts in order to implement joint projects and programs to develop new armament and equipment. With this objective, the dialogue between the Ministry of Armed Forces of France and the Ministry of Strategic Industries of Ukraine will be strengthened. The dialogue between the Direction Générale de l’Armement and the Defence Procurement Agency will also be enhanced, in line with the Letter of Intent signed between the two organisations during the visit of France’s Minister of Armed Forces in Kyiv in September 2023.
The French Participant will support Ukraine’s efforts to integrate its defence industry into NATO and EU defence and security frameworks.
V. Cooperation in the civil field
9. Humanitarian assistance
The French Participant will continue its humanitarian assistance to fulfil the immediate needs of the Ukrainian population in the face of the armed aggression by the Russian Federation. It will also contribute, alongside its partners, to the economic recovery, reconstruction and modernisation of Ukraine, in order to restore and strengthen its economic stability, reduce its dependencies and vulnerabilities and build a more solid, innovative, sustainable and resilient economic and industrial base, particularly in the context of negotiations for the accession of Ukraine to the European Union.
The French Participant will seek to continue over time the support underway for Ukraine, including in the transport, energy, agriculture, water, humanitarian mine clearance, critical infrastructure, digital, housing and health sectors.
The French Participant will use the economic and financial instruments at its disposal, in cooperation with all relevant international organisations and its partners.
10. Support to Ukraine’s reform agenda
The French Participant welcomes the decision to open accession negotiations with Ukraine and commends the substantial progress that Ukraine has made towards meeting the objectives underpinning the accession process.
The Ukrainian Participant will strive to continue its ambitious reform path, particularly in the framework of its European Union accession process, to meet the obligations required for EU membership. The Ukrainian Participant will continue its systemic reforms in the defence and security sectors, including as regards civil control of the armed forces and the efficiency and transparency of the defence institutions and defence industry of Ukraine. It will strive to deepen the key reforms in the fields of justice and rule of law, the fight against corruption and money laundering, the modernisation of its state apparatus, decentralisation, the protection of the rights of persons belonging to minorities, transparency and good governance in both the economic sector and the defence and security sector. The implementation of these reforms will contribute to strengthening democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the modernisation and resilience of the Ukrainian economy.
The French Participant reaffirms its intention to fully support the objective of Ukraine’s accession to the European Union. With this in mind, the French Participant will provide technical support for the implementation of the necessary reforms, particularly as regards the rule of law, justice sector reform, the fight against corruption, the modernisation of the state apparatus, decentralisation, transparency and civil control in the defence sector, including demining. To this end, the French Participant will provide for the deployment of technical experts embedded in the Ukrainian administration.
11. Ukraine’s recovery and reconstruction
The French Participant will strive to continue fostering the involvement of private companies, local government bodies and non-governmental organisations in the reconstruction process, following on from the actions launched at the Conference for Ukraine’s Resilience and Reconstruction that was organised in Paris on 13 December 2022.
The Participants recognise the need to unite efforts aimed at protecting the population and territories of Ukraine from the negative consequences caused by mines and undetonated explosive ordnance.
To this end, the French Participant will make use of the appropriate bilateral tools, in good coordination and optimising as far as possible the leverage effect with European and private sector funds, including in the framework of the European Union’s Ukraine Facility which aims at preparing Ukraine for future membership of the Union by supporting its accession process.
The Ukrainian Participant will continue the implementation of all the reforms required in the framework of its European Union accession process and the Ukraine Plan.
The French Participant will support Ukraine to plan for the reintegration of temporarily occupied territories, to contribute to the vital stabilisation and socioeconomic renewal, particularly in liberated and frontline areas and areas bordering Russia, to promote an inclusive social recovery and to meet the needs of the most vulnerable, including through work to support women, social protection systems and veterans.
12. Compensation for losses, injuries and damages caused by Russian aggression
The Participants reaffirm the Russian Federation must pay for the long-term reconstruction of Ukraine. Consistent with France’s legal system, Russian sovereign assets in France’s jurisdiction remain immobilised until the Russian Federation has paid for damage it has caused to Ukraine. The French Participant, working with its partners, will continue to explore all lawful routes consistent with applicable contractual obligations and in accordance with EU and international law through which Russian assets could be used to support Ukraine.
As a priority, the Participants will continue to work together, along with G7 states and others, towards the establishment of a compensation mechanism to provide compensation for damage, loss or injury caused by Russia’s aggression, as envisaged by the Statute of the Register of Damage Caused by the Aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine adopted by the Resolution of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe CM/Res(2023)3. In this regard, the Participants will explore appropriate options for the financing of a compensation mechanism to provide prompt and adequate compensation to victims of aggression.
13. Sanctions
The Participants recognise the value of sanctions in restricting the Russian Federation’s and other aggressor-states’ access to the finance, goods, technology and services it is utilising in its aggression, in bearing down on Russia’s revenue streams, and to deter future attacks. The Participants will continue to work to ensure that the costs to Russia of its aggression continue to rise, including through sanctions and export controls.
While the Russian Federation’s aggression towards Ukraine continues, the French Participant will remain committed, in the European framework, to pursuing robust sanctions against sectors of the Russian economy and those in the Russian Federation and outside who are supporting or profiting from the war, or assisting in sanctions circumvention in third countries. The French Participant will also take determined action with partners to tackle all forms of sanctions circumvention as well as to reinforce its own domestic resilience against Russia-linked illicit finance and elites.
The Participants will provide each other with up-to-date appropriate information on the grounds for sanctions and other relevant information, in compliance with relevant obligations and national laws.
14. Accountability
The Participants reaffirm their commitment to holding the Russian Federation accountable for causing losses or damage to individuals and entities, as well as to the state of Ukraine, as a result of its internationally unlawful acts in Ukraine or against Ukraine, including its aggression in violation of the Charter of the United Nations.
The Participants reaffirm that there must be no impunity for war crimes and other atrocities and that the Russian Federation must bear the legal responsibility, including making reparation for any damage caused by such acts, which will also help deter future attacks and support Ukraine’s recovery.
The Participants will seek to hold to account those responsible for war crimes and other international crimes, committed in or against Ukraine in the context of Russia’s war of aggression, consistent with international law, including by supporting the work of the Office of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine and the International Criminal Court to ensure allegations of war crimes are fully and fairly investigated by independent, effective and robust legal mechanisms.
The Participants will continue their engagement in the “Core group on options for the establishment of a tribunal on the crime of aggression against Ukraine”.
VI. Implementation of cooperation
The Participants will implement this cooperation in accordance with their international and national obligations, as well as France’s European commitments.
The Participants will, if necessary, designate authorised bodies for the development and implementation of bilateral agreements in accordance with the areas of cooperation specified in this Agreement.
The Participants will inform each other through diplomatic channels of the competent authorities responsible for implementing this Agreement.
These authorities will conduct consultations in order to discuss, make the necessary decisions and take the required actions within the framework of this Agreement.
The authorised bodies of the Participants can conclude executive and technical agreements on specific areas of cooperation within the framework of the implementation of this agreement.
VII. Timeframe and other provisions
This Agreement is valid for ten years from the date of its signature.
In accordance with the G7 Joint Declaration of 12 July 2023, the Participants intend this Agreement to remain in effect as Ukraine pursues its path to future membership in the Euro-Atlantic community.
In the event that Ukraine becomes a member of NATO before the end of this Agreement, the Participants will decide on its future status.
This Agreement may be terminated by either Participant by giving written notice of its intention to terminate the Agreement to the other Participant. This Agreement shall be terminated six months from the date of receipt of such notice.
This Agreement may be amended and supplemented by mutual agreement of the Participants, which shall be made in writing.
This Agreement will come into effect immediately upon signature.
Signed in Paris on 16 February 2024, in duplicate, in the French and Ukrainian languages.
For Ukraine: President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy
For France: President of the French Republic Emmanuel Macron
And here’s the agreement that has been signed between Ukraine and Germany.
Agreement on security cooperation and long-term support between Ukraine and the Federal Republic of Germany
16 February 2024 – 14:16
Ukraine and the Federal Republic of Germany (“Germany”), hereinafter “the Participants”, condemn in the strongest possible terms the unjustified, unprovoked, illegal and brutal war of aggression by Russia against Ukraine, by which Russia seriously violates international law, including the UN Charter.
Germany is unwavering in its support for Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity within borders, which have been internationally recognised since 1991, including the territorial sea and free economic (maritime) zone.
The Participants acknowledge the sustainable, decisive support provided by Germany as well as European, G7 and international partners to strengthen, equip and train Ukraine’s security and defence forces as well as the comprehensive non-military assistance provided to the people of Ukraine to mitigate the humanitarian, social, economic and fiscal consequences of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine.
Together they will continue to strive for a just and lasting peace in Ukraine as well as for peace, security and stability on the European continent.
The Participants recall that Ukraine will continue to implement an ambitious reform programme and that Germany is dedicated to supporting Ukraine’s reform efforts. These are essential for its European and NATO aspirations.
The Participants underline their willingness to further strengthen their bilateral relations across all fields, including economic cooperation, strengthening resilience, supporting recovery, reconstruction and sustainable development as well as cultural exchange and cooperation, including fostering understanding and cooperation between the people of Ukraine and Germany.
They express grave concern in light of the mine contamination comprising up to 170.000 square kilometres of the territory of Ukraine.
Based on this, the Participants have jointly determined to strengthen their security cooperation through bilateral security arrangements and long-term support measures as set out in this Agreement:
I. Scope
1. This Agreement is intended to further the Joint Declaration launched by Germany and other members of the G7 in Vilnius on 12 July 2023 and subsequently joined to date by a further 25 states.
2. With this Agreement Germany and Ukraine have decided to affirm, deepen and expand their cooperation and partnership, which are based on their common interests in the defence of international law and order, peace, and the protection of fundamental human rights and freedoms.
3. Germany intends to provide unwavering support for Ukraine for as long as it takes in order to help Ukraine defend itself, restore its territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders, secure its free and democratic future, enable Ukraine to continue providing services to its people and to uphold a functioning Ukrainian economy, and deter future Russian aggression.
4. Germany recalls that national budgetary provisions apply and require explicit authorisation from the German Bundestag.
II. Security and military assistance
1. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, Germany has been one of the largest suppliers of military aid to Ukraine. Germany will continue to support Ukraine in its efforts to defend itself for as long as it takes. The Participants recall the inherent right of states to individual and collective self-defence and the unlawfulness of all attempts to redraw borders by force. They reaffirm that Ukraine’s security is integral to Euro-Atlantic and global security.
2. Germany underlines its intention to provide long-term military support to the Ukrainian security and defence forces to fully restore Ukraine’s territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders and to equip and train Ukraine’s future forces with the capabilities they need in their effort to increase Ukraine’s resilience so that it is sufficient to deter and defend against future attacks and coercion.
3. Germany will continue to promote joint procurement and other forms of armament cooperation together with European and international partners to strengthen the Ukrainian security and defence forces in particular through the lead nation model, and will encourage wide international participation in these ongoing German procurement efforts. Germany will continuously evaluate potential synergies and economies of scale in its national military procurement to the benefit of the Ukrainian security and defence forces. Germany will alongside other international partners continue to participate and actively engage in international formats such as the Ramstein Ukraine Defence Contact Group (UDCG) to closely coordinate international military support for Ukraine.
4. The Participants acknowledge that the military support provided by Germany will only be used in compliance with the United Nations Charter and in strict accordance with all relevant obligations for both Participants under international law. Any military support will be bound by end-use agreements. The Participants share the opinion that the illicit diversion of military items must be avoided. Germany acknowledges the prevention efforts of the Ukrainian side and international partners and intends to support these efforts where needed, through establishment of an appropriate end-use monitoring programme and required equipment.
5. In 2022, Germany provided Ukraine with military assistance worth a total value of 1.68 billion euro funded by the Federal Government’s security capacity building initiative. In 2023, Germany provided military assistance with a total value of more than 5 billion euro. In 2024, Germany has decided to provide financial means for military assistance worth a total value of 7.1 billion euro. Moreover, since 2022 additional authorisations to enter into commitments in the following years amounting to several billion euro have been made.
6. Germany will continue its support to Ukraine for the duration of this Agreement.
Ukraine’s future force capabilities
1. The Participants share the aim of establishing modern, interoperable and sustainable Ukrainian Defence Forces. Germany will support the development of the Defence Forces of Ukraine including (but not limited to): future force design, a move towards aligning concepts and operating procedures, command and staff training, and enhanced compatibility and interoperability with Euro-Atlantic partners.
2. The Participants will work together on ensuring a sustainable force capable of defending Ukraine now and deterring future aggression in the future, through the continued provision of security assistance and modern military equipment, across the land, air, sea, and cyber domains – prioritising air defence, artillery, armoured vehicles, including ammunition, and other key capabilities, and by promoting increased interoperability with Euro-Atlantic partners.
3. Germany will continue to support the Ukraine Future Forces Initiative, has taken over the lead role in the Capability Coalition “Integrated Air and Missile Defence” and contributes significantly to other Capability Coalitions, such as “Artillery”, “Armour”, “Maritime Security”, “IT”, “Drones” and “Demining”. Both the number and the type of participation in Capability Coalitions can be expanded in the future to include other Capability Coalitions.
4. Germany will support plans and governance structures for Capability Coalitions, both to deliver the future force, and also to ensure greater coherence in the provision of capability in the current war. Germany is working alongside other international partners to develop the governance framework for the Capability Coalitions. All the Capability Coalitions will improve the interoperability of Ukrainian and NATO forces.
Training and exercises
1. Germany will continue and where necessary expand its support in strengthening the capacity of Ukrainian security and defence forces personnel in particular but not exclusively under the framework of the EU Military Assistance Mission. Germany strives to provide individual and collective trainings to Ukrainian forces including train-the-trainers programmes, particularly on weapon systems supplied by Germany. The training will also promote increased interoperability with Euro-Atlantic partners. Training will be provided in close cooperation with partners within EU and NATO and in compliance with applicable national, EU and international law.
2. Germany will on demand also provide training and train-the-trainer sessions for law enforcement agencies, like Ukrainian National Guard and State Border Guard Service, and will continue material support to partner agencies in the law enforcement area.
Defence industries
1. The Participants recognise the importance of the cooperation of defence industries. Germany will examine ways to encourage and facilitate engagement of its defence industry to contribute to the development of Ukraine’s defence industrial base, including through German industrial investments and incentives to invest as appropriate, and strive to identify opportunities for closer defence industrial partnerships, and collaboration including for mutual commercial benefit and coordination. Germany will work with Ukraine to strengthen efforts to reduce existing barriers for cooperation, encourage its defence industry to invest, taking into account the general security situation and legitimate interests of its industry, including by evaluating options for supporting the localisation of production in Ukraine, as well as by exploring opportunities for joint production.
2. Germany will examine with Ukraine measures to mitigate existing supply chain bottlenecks impeding the development of capacity and capability of both Germany and Ukraine for manufacturing of priority weapons and ammunition.
3. Germany will encourage its defence industry to work with Ukraine, provide assistance to its industry to identify potential areas for cooperation, and further explore localising repair and maintenance in Ukraine, taking into account the general security situation and legitimate interests of its industry. Germany will work with Ukraine to strengthen protection of the transferred technologies and intellectual property rights. At the same time, Ukraine will protect these technologies and intellectual property.
4. Germany and Ukraine will consider ways to enable Ukraine’s defence industry to contribute effectively to restoring its territorial integrity, acting as a major driver in economic recovery and to contribute to effective deterrence of future aggression, as well as the alignment of standards and improving interoperability with Euro-Atlantic partners.
Security and defence sector reform
1. Germany recognises the significant progress Ukraine has made in implementing reforms in the security and defence sector. Ukraine reiterates that it will continue to engage in comprehensive democratic reforms in the security and defence sector, in particular:
- advance defence reforms and modernisation, including by strengthening democratic civilian oversight of the security sector, and
- improve efficiency and transparency across Ukraine’s defence institutions and industry.
2. Germany will continue to assist and advise the reform and further development of Ukraine’s future forces, bilaterally and with partners.
Countering CBRN risks and cyber and hybrid threats
1. The Participants intend to further expand their existing bilateral cooperation to strengthen Ukraine’s resilience against nuclear, biological and chemical weapons-related risks. Germany intends in particular to continue its support to Ukraine in enhancing the nuclear safety and security of its nuclear plants, developing its civil protection capabilities against CBRN-related risks and enhancing its resilience against biosecurity risks.
Germany and Ukraine intend to identify, detect and counter hybrid threats and to deter and disrupt Russian conventional aggression, espionage and hybrid warfare. The Participants will work together to secure IT infrastructure from cyber-attacks, while supporting the modernisation and reform of Ukraine’s security and intelligence architecture, including on cyber and information security issues and the provision of international technical assistance to Ukraine. The Participants strive to strengthen their resilience and law enforcement cooperation with regard to cyberattacks, cybercrime, and disinformation and to provide secure public services online. The Participants will continue their cooperation in providing IT-security training to Ukrainian cybersecurity experts based on EU standards.
2. The Participants intend to strengthen their cooperation to counter information security threats, including propaganda and other forms of foreign malign interference, including disinformation.
Intelligence and security cooperation
The Participants will enhance the cooperation in the field of intelligence and security in accordance with applicable legal requirements and possibilities. This will be achieved through, but not limited to, intelligence sharing and cooperation, including in the field of counterintelligence.
III. Economic stability, resilience and reconstruction, sustainable development
Economic cooperation
1. To strengthen and expand their existing economic cooperation, the Participants strive for their respective socio-economic wellbeing, promotion of small and medium sized enterprises (SME) and will provide a secure legal and institutional framework for substantial private sector investments, economic prosperity and economic integration of Ukraine as well as a conducive business environment for domestic and international investment in Ukraine.
2. In view of Ukraine’s European perspective, Germany will provide assistance for Ukraine to harmonise its regulations with EU standards. In addition, intensification of cooperation is intended in areas such as the construction industry, cybersecurity, digital transformation/Industry 4.0, the chemical industry, electronics/electrical engineering, the energy industry, agriculture, mechanical engineering, arms industry and green energy/hydrogen.
3. In addition to close and regular policy dialogue, this Agreement is expected to facilitate, inter alia, people-to-people exchanges on best practices and knowledge in order to encourage mutual learning, the shared development of effective policies; bilateral trade and investment; as well as joint research, development and demonstration.
Resilience of energy and other critical infrastructure
1. Energy supply security remains crucial for Ukraine’s resilience. Building upon the G7+ support for Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, Germany will continue to provide long-term support to Ukraine’s overall energy sector with a special focus on green energy transition.
2. The Participants will work to accelerate both short-term commitments and long-term economy-wide net zero goals, identify areas for enhanced bilateral cooperation and facilitate energy efficiency, renewable energy as well as innovative and sustainable energy and climate technologies and services to support economic growth and well-paid jobs in both countries. Germany will support Ukraine in enhancing the resilience of its critical infrastructure, particularly energy, water and heat infrastructure.
3. Germany will contribute to the development of Ukraine’s critical infrastructure protection capabilities, as well as to the access of Ukrainian specialists to relevant international programmes. Germany will engage Ukrainian specialists with experience in critical infrastructure security to implement relevant projects on its territory and in partner countries. The Participants will launch joint educational and training programmes for critical infrastructure protection specialists.
4. Germany will work with Ukraine to identify sources of funding for grant programmes to develop the protection and resilience of critical infrastructure in various sectors.
5. The Participants will contribute to the development of Ukraine’s capabilities to defend against, deter and respond to threats to critical infrastructure by facilitating the availability of modern technological solutions in the field of critical infrastructure protection for its cybersecurity actors, including through the provision of international technical assistance to Ukraine.
Information security
1. The Participants will continue mutual cooperation in the field of countering Russian and any other information manipulation and propaganda.
2. They will jointly promote the development of Ukraine’s capabilities to counter information security threats, take common measures to counter disinformation by foreign states and organisations, and strive to develop joint educational and training programmes for experts in the field of strategic communication and public diplomacy, regular exchange of experience and professional events involving experts in the field of strategic communication and public diplomacy.
Cooperation in the sphere of combating serious and organised crime
1. The Participants recognise that serious and organised crime (SOC), particularly Illicit Finance, to finance actions aimed at undermining Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as its internal stability, but also other types of SOC, pose a threat to Ukrainian society.
2. The Participants intend to take actions to counteract the activities of SOC, in particular individuals and groups that are trying to infiltrate across Ukrainian society, have criminal influence in certain regions, including the temporarily occupied ones, and are actively used as a tool of “hybrid warfare” to counteract the processes of recovery and reconciliation in Ukraine.
3. In order to counter all types of activities of SOC, the Participants will take measures to:
- conduct joint operations to detect and suppress SOC;
- analyse the criminal situation in the countries and identify the main risks from SOC;
- identify assets that may be seized in criminal proceedings or recognised as unjustified assets;
- create joint working groups and joint investigation teams of prosecutors and other parties; and
- facilitate the provision of training and sharing of best practices.
4. The above measures are not intended to be exhaustive, and the Participants may pursue other forms of cooperation to achieve their goals in combating SOC.
Recovery, reconstruction and sustainable development
1. Germany will together with its international and European partners and in close coordination with relevant International Organisations and International Financial Institutions continue to support Ukraine throughout its path from early to long-term recovery, with these efforts being aligned with Ukraine’s European perspective and its status as an EU candidate country. Germany and Ukraine will therefore continue to strengthen the Multi-agency Donor Coordination Platform initiated by the G7 as well as other coordination mechanisms for joint international efforts for reconstruction and encourage Ukraine’s reform agenda as well as private sector led growth.
2. Germany has been a major contributor to humanitarian and military demining in Ukraine. The Participants recognise the need to unite efforts aimed at protecting the population and territories of Ukraine from the negative consequences caused by mines and explosive remnants of war as a result of the Russian armed aggression and alleviating the devastating consequences after its completion. Given the extraordinary scope of the challenge caused by Russia’s massive contamination of Ukrainian soil through mines, ammunition and other explosive ordnance, Germany aims to continue providing substantial funding to humanitarian demining efforts alongside partners. Germany, in cooperation with other partners, will support Ukraine in developing and sustaining international demining standards in its operations.
3. Germany will continue to support recovery and reconstruction with the aim of supporting the use of regenerative materials and renewable energy sources, applying safe and sustainable climate-neutral technologies and protecting the natural resources and the vulnerable environment of Ukraine. The Participants will therefore also employ innovative approaches to recovery, and support digital transformation as well as energy efficiency and green energy transition. They concur that the recovery process needs to be transparent and accountable to the people of Ukraine and the international community.
4. The Participants underline the importance of the involvement of the private sector as well as of civil society and municipalities as drivers of an ambitious, inclusive, decentralised reconstruction process. The Participants aim to promote business-to-business as well as civil society exchanges between the two countries. Germany aims to support Ukraine by offering expert advice with a focus on good corporate governance, proactive management of state-owned companies, privatisation of state-owned companies and the professional management of funds for reconstruction. This includes capacity building with a particular focus on development and SME finance, building on successful existing initiatives such as the Business Development Fund. Efforts will also include education, professional training, psychosocial needs to overcome trauma, health support and assistance to vulnerable parts of the population, including veterans.
Humanitarian aid, civil defence and resilience
1. The Participants reaffirm that, as Ukraine begins early recovery and reconstruction, they will ensure the continuation of well-coordinated life-saving humanitarian aid where it is needed. The Participants will work together to ensure a better prioritised, targeted humanitarian response which delivers to those most in need, including in hard-to-reach areas.
2. The Participants reaffirm the aim to strengthen the Ukrainian state’s resilience and civil defence. Germany will continue its stabilisation engagement especially in liberated and frontline areas. German support will include responding to immediate needs, e.g. by providing protective equipment, supporting investigation and documentation of human rights violations and war crimes in relation to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine as well as support for Ukraine’s civil society.
Compensation for losses, injuries and damages caused by Russian aggression
1. The Participants reaffirm that the Russian Federation is to be held accountable for the damages inflicted on Ukrainian territory. Russian sovereign assets should remain immobilised until the Russian Federation has paid for the damage it has caused to Ukraine. Germany, working with its partners in the European Union and within the G7, aims to continue to pursue all lawful routes through which revenues from Russian assets can be used to support Ukraine, in accordance with European and international law.
2. The Participants recognise the need for the establishment of an international mechanism for reparation of damages, loss or injury caused by Russian aggression, as envisaged by the Statute of the Register of Damage Caused by the Aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine adopted by the Resolution of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe CM/Res(2023)3. The Participants will continue to work together with others, including G7 members, to explore all possible avenues to aid Ukraine in obtaining compensation from Russia, consistent with their respective legal systems and international law.
IV. Technical and financial support, reforms
Technical and financial support
1. Germany will persevere to support existing international and European frameworks and institutions in their endeavours to continue providing regular and predictable financial support to Ukraine.
2. The Participants intend to strengthen their cooperation in the field of customs, as well as in the field of financial market supervision, including public sector banks.
Ukraine’s reform process
1. The Participants reaffirm that inclusive reform is indispensable for Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations as well as for its future security, prosperity, its democracy, and the resilience of its institutions.
2. Ukraine will continue its ambitious reform process with a particular focus on the reform areas set out for accession to the European Union (EU) and outlined in the European Commission’s recommendations of 8 November 2023, most notably justice, the rule of law, decentralisation, the fight against corruption and money laundering, security sector and state management which underscore Ukraine’s commitment to democracy and the rule of law, respect for human rights and media freedoms.
3. All reforms will be undertaken according to the priority reform areas set out for accession to the EU and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) benchmarks, and in close coordination with major donors, in particular the International Financial Institutions, the EU and the G7. Germany will continue to support Ukraine on this path.
V. Political cooperation
A just peace
1. The Participants recognise that Ukraine and the whole of Europe will not be secure until there is a just peace that respects Ukraine’s rights under international law and the UN Charter. Ukraine and Germany will therefore work together for a just and lasting peace that has broad global support.
2. Germany welcomes Ukraine’s efforts to create a just and sustainable peace, based on the principles of Ukraine’s Peace Formula. Germany is willing to play a leading role in taking forward steps to implement initiatives that reflect the principles of the UN Charter.
Accountability
1. The Participants underline their firm dedication to bringing to justice those responsible for war crimes and other atrocities committed in connection with Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. They concur on the need to ensure accountability for such crimes under international law committed by the Russian leadership and other Russian nationals and in particular by the members of the Russian armed forces on the territory of Ukraine through appropriate, fair and independent investigations and prosecution at the national or international level, and to ensure the indiscriminate enforcement of international humanitarian law with the view to prevent future crimes. The Participants will continue supporting the work of the Office of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine and the International Criminal Court to ensure that allegations of war crimes and other international crimes are fully and fairly investigated by independent, effective and robust legal mechanisms.
2. The Participants share the conviction on the need to ensure accountability for the crime of aggression against Ukraine and the establishment of a tribunal to ensure effective accountability. Therefore, Germany will continue its engagement in the “Core group on options for the establishment of a tribunal on the crime of aggression against Ukraine”.
3. The Participants recall that Ukraine will ratify the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court including the Amendments on the crime of aggression adopted by the Review Conference of the Rome Statute held in Kampala, Uganda on 11th June 2010 by Resolution RC/Res.6, as mentioned in the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement and on the way to its membership in the EU.
VI. Future aggression
1. In the event of future Russian armed attack against Ukraine, at the request of either of the Participants, the Participants will consult within 24 hours to determine appropriate next steps.
2. Germany affirms that in those circumstances and acting in accordance with its legal and constitutional requirements and in accordance with international and European law, it would provide Ukraine as appropriate, with swift and sustained security assistance, modern military equipment across all domains as necessary, and economic assistance, seek agreement in the EU to impose economic and other costs on Russia, and consult with Ukraine on its needs as it exercises its right of self-defence enshrined in Article 51 of the UN Charter.
3. In order to ensure the widest and most effective collective response to any future armed attack Germany and Ukraine may amend these provisions in order to align with any mechanism that Ukraine may subsequently agree with its other international partners, including the participants in the Joint Declaration of 12 July 2023.
VII. Bilateral Relations and European Integration
Bilateral relations
1. The Participants will further develop their close and friendly relations in all areas, based on shared values, and an unshakeable solidarity in the face of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and of common threats and challenges.
2. The Participants seek to work together even more closely in the future in the political, economic and cultural spheres. The future of Ukraine and its citizens lies in the EU, and Germany and Ukraine will engage together for a strong and unified Europe.
3. The Participants will further deepen their bilateral relations by further strengthening regular consultation formats.
European support, sanctions and European integration
1. In addition to this Agreement, Germany will also contribute to ongoing and future support to Ukraine provided by the EU.
2. The Participants will continue working to ensure that the costs to Russia for its aggression continue to rise, including through sanctions and export controls. The Participants recognise the value of sanctions in restricting the Russian Federation’s access to the finance, goods, technology and services it is utilising in its war of aggression, in bearing down on Russia’s revenue streams, and to deter future attacks. Germany will work within the EU and G7 framework on upholding sanction pressure on Russia and on the fight against sanction evasion as long as Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine continues and Ukraine’s territorial integrity is not restored. Germany will seek determined action within the EU to tackle all forms of sanctions circumvention as well as to reinforce its own domestic resilience against Russian-linked illicit finance and Kremlin-linked elites. Germany and Ukraine will provide each other with up-to-date information on the grounds for sanctions and other relevant information, in compliance with relevant obligations.
3. Germany will continue to support Ukraine on its path towards EU membership and to offer practical guidance.
4. Germany intends to support Ukraine’s efforts towards aligning with the EU Single Market with the overall goal of Ukraine’s accession to the EU. With a view to shared values, among which is an unwavering commitment to freedom, democracy and the rule of law, Germany and Ukraine will regularly review and update the implementation of this Agreement consistent with Ukraine’s international and bilateral commitments.
5. Germany will remain resolute in supporting Ukraine’s long-term efforts to secure its free and democratic future – for as long as it takes.
VIII. Final Provisions
Executive and technical arrangements
The Participants will, if necessary, designate authorised bodies for the development and implementation of bilateral agreements in accordance with the areas of cooperation specified in this Agreement.
Timeframe of the Agreement
1. This Agreement is valid for ten years from the date of its signature.
The Participants can jointly decide to extend this Agreement through notification no later than 6 months prior to the lapse of the 10-year period.
2. At the same time and in accordance with the G7 Joint Declaration of 12 July 2023, the Participants share the opinion that this Agreement is without prejudice to Ukraine pursuing a pathway toward future membership in the Euro-Atlantic Community
3. This Agreement may be amended and supplemented by mutual consent of the Participants, which will be made in writing.
4. The provisions of this Agreement will come into effect immediately upon signature.
5. This Agreement may be terminated by either Participant at any time. They should inform the other Participant by giving written notice to the other at least six months prior.
Signed, in Berlin on 16 February 2024, in duplicate in the German, Ukrainian and English language, all texts being equivalent.
For Ukraine: President Volodymyr Zelenskyy
For the Federal Republic of Germany: Federal Chancellor Olaf Scholz
If I’m reading these correctly, they do not create a bilateral mutual defense structure between Ukraine and Germany and Ukraine and France. If that reading is correct, I expect it was done in order to not create problems for France and Germany in regard to their NATO obligations.
A number of aid packages from Germany and Spain were also announced today, which is good because the House of Representatives is in recess until 28 FEB 2024.
🇪🇸🇺🇦 The Minister of Defense of Spain, Margarita Robles, announced the new military aid package for Ukraine, which includes:
◾️M-113 Armored Personnel Carriers
◾️2 M-113 APCs transformed into ambulances
◾️Firefighting vehicles
◾️Snow plowing vehicles
◾️Personnel transport… pic.twitter.com/shCBPJA1Se— Defense of Ukraine (@DefenceU) February 16, 2024
🇪🇸🇺🇦 The Minister of Defense of Spain, Margarita Robles, announced the new military aid package for Ukraine, which includes:
◾️M-113 Armored Personnel Carriers
◾️2 M-113 APCs transformed into ambulances
◾️Firefighting vehicles
◾️Snow plowing vehicles
◾️Personnel transport vehicles
◾️2 light boats
◾️Electric generator
◾️Water purification plant
◾️Weapons for anti-aircraft defense, air-to-air, and naval operations.We are grateful to our Spanish partners for their staunch support.
We stand united in our fight for freedom.
@Defensagob
We are grateful to our German friends for the recently announced short-term support package worth over €100 million, which includes:
◾ Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles
◾ ammunition to arm small drones
◾ 77 MULTI 1A1 trucks
◾ medical supplies
◾ spare parts packages… pic.twitter.com/HCfPDwOhMx— Defense of Ukraine (@DefenceU) February 16, 2024
We are grateful to our German friends for the recently announced short-term support package worth over €100 million, which includes:
◾ Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles
◾ ammunition to arm small drones
◾ 77 MULTI 1A1 trucks
◾ medical supplies
◾ spare parts packages for various weapon systems
Vielen Dank!
🇺🇦🤝🇩🇪
@BMVg_Bundeswehr
More good news from Germany!
Our friends from @BMVg_Bundeswehr have provided another package of military aid for Ukraine, which includes:
◾️18 Armored Personnel Carriers
◾️3 WISENT 1 mine clearing tanks
◾️1 DACHS armored engineer vehicles
◾️9 mine ploughs
◾️10 VECTOR… pic.twitter.com/uo4OecfRC2— Defense of Ukraine (@DefenceU) February 16, 2024
More good news from Germany!
Our friends from @BMVg_Bundeswehr have provided another package of military aid for Ukraine, which includes:
◾️18 Armored Personnel Carriers
◾️3 WISENT 1 mine clearing tanks
◾️1 DACHS armored engineer vehicles
◾️9 mine ploughs
◾️10 VECTOR reconnaissance drones with spare parts
◾️30 RQ-35 HEIDRUN reconnaissance drones
◾️11 Primoco ONE reconnaissance drones
◾️7 SONGBIRD reconnaissance drones
◾️4 border protection vehicles
◾️4,000 rounds 155mm ammunition
◾️500 LED lamps
◾️IT equipmentThank you for standing by our side.
Together, we are stronger.
President Zelenskyy also spoke in regard to the situation at Avdiivka while in Germany.
President on the situation in Avdiivka: Military leadership must do everything to protect our people
16 February 2024 – 16:40
President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy said that in the situation around the defense of Avdiivka in Donetsk region, the military leadership must act to minimize losses and preserve the lives of Ukrainian defenders.
“As for Avdiivka, this is not the first day the situation there has been dire. We are well aware of what Russia is doing to our towns and villages. They will not stop until they have completely destroyed all life there. Our people, our military, are heroically defending strategic things, logistical routes that can lead to the enemy’s advance,” Volodymyr Zelenskyy said during a meeting with media representatives in Berlin following the negotiations with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz.
The Head of State emphasized that he is constantly in contact with the military leadership and is thoroughly informed on the current situation in Avdiivka.
“I won’t tell you what new approaches they are taking. Their task is to do everything to protect our people first and foremost. And this is the main signal from me. Our military is the most important thing we have. This is our main weapon,” the President emphasized.
“First and foremost, we need to ensure that we minimize our losses. Our military is what is the most important. This is exactly the message I am sending to the leadership. And then, on the battlefield, we have professionals who know what to do,” added the Head of State.
Colonel-General Syrsky has ordered the Ukrainian forces in Avdiivka to fall back to their next lines of defenses to avoid a rout:
Виходячи з оперативної обстановки, яка склалася довколо Авдіївки, з метою уникнення оточення та збереження життя і здоров’я військовослужбовців, прийняв рішення про виведення наших підрозділів з міста й переходу до оборони на більш вигідних рубежах.https://t.co/I7VinCnWQf pic.twitter.com/8w4fWT5OnE
— Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (@CinC_AFU) February 17, 2024
Based on the operational situation around Avdiyivka, in order to avoid encirclement and preserve the lives and health of servicemen, I decided to withdraw our units from the city and move to defense on more favorable lines.
https://facebook.com/CinCAFofUkraine/posts/pfbid0297TQuBtGFx1XHxc5L5MqTcfLjgfntsUJUTKihZZmL9sPiqygaqHGLr6rZNns5dsKl
Avdiivka is under relentless attack, dubbed "Avdiivka Hell." The Third Assault Brigade seeks shelter in Koksokhim basements as Russia throws 60-80 KAB bombs daily. This brutal assault recalls Azovstal pic.twitter.com/pXy9ovGHzz
— Maria Avdeeva (@maria_avdv) February 16, 2024
Avdiivka at night.https://t.co/oyavlAFzxm pic.twitter.com/L096a5r5J2
— WarTranslated (Dmitri) (@wartranslated) February 16, 2024
I wasn't writing about Avdiivka, hoping those responsible for the aid package know perfectly well that this is beyond critical. Every shell counts; Russia is throwing in everything. Starting the recess now is more than just ignorance pic.twitter.com/3swtUlZgEc
— Maria Avdeeva (@maria_avdv) February 16, 2024
🐷Противник зайняв Авдіївську залізничну лікарню і міський парк. Також, ворог має просування на територію Авдіївського заводу металевих конструкцій, в районі Ласточкиного та Невельського.
⚔️ Кацап продовжує великою кількістю піхоти тиснути з усіх сторін на позиції українських… pic.twitter.com/CtwCjfDm8A
— DeepState UA (@Deepstate_UA) February 16, 2024
🐷 The enemy occupied the Avdiiv railway hospital and the city park. Also, the enemy has an advance on the territory of the Avdiiv factory of metal structures, in the area of Lastochkino and Nevelsky.
⚔️ Katsap continues to press the positions of the Ukrainian military from all sides with a large number of infantry.
Ukrainian forces have retreated from the Donetsk water filtration station east of Avdiivka – Russians have seized the ruined facility. pic.twitter.com/6ye6ZwHIPW
— Illia Ponomarenko 🇺🇦 (@IAPonomarenko) February 16, 2024
It took Russia 9 years of war to finally seize strongpoint Zenith south of Avdiivka.
That includes two years of a full-scale invasion and particularly four months of a giant battle focused on Avdiivka.
It’s been longer than the entire duration of World War II since I first… pic.twitter.com/afzeMOkIbf
— Illia Ponomarenko 🇺🇦 (@IAPonomarenko) February 15, 2024
It took Russia 9 years of war to finally seize strongpoint Zenith south of Avdiivka.
That includes two years of a full-scale invasion and particularly four months of a giant battle focused on Avdiivka.
It’s been longer than the entire duration of World War II since I first visited Zenith amid fighting in 2017.
The 3rd Assault in Adviivka is also looking for help: https://t.co/57jdt19rlc
— Illia Ponomarenko 🇺🇦 (@IAPonomarenko) February 16, 2024
If you see a credible and reliable fundraising campaign to help the defenders of Avdiivka and other Ukrainian formations, be it medical aid or equipment – please don’t hesitate.
Movers and shakers of the free world are not doing enough, unfortunately.
So we in Ukraine invite all people of good will to participate and save our common future. History is being written right now.
Specifically if you want to help buy FPV drones, which are of insane help to mitigate Ukraine’s critical lack of ammo, I recommend going to @jana_skhidna and @sternenko
All info available, including PayPal!— Illia Ponomarenko 🇺🇦 (@IAPonomarenko) February 16, 2024
Let’s convert our love into hell for those who try to throw the world into the abyss of hatred and terror.
Support our fundraiser with @Liberov for 500 FPV-drones for Ukrainian defenders on the Kupiansk and Avdiivka fronts.
💝 Donate here: https://t.co/cPQ9Bv4DGg pic.twitter.com/nCjUxG8LkM
— UNITED24 Media (@United24media) February 14, 2024
Don’t forget to support fighters in Avdiivka.
Jana personally goes to Avdiivka and delivers drones to our troops there.
If you are willing to assist our people in this critical moment, please consider donating to Jana.
Her Ppal: [email protected] https://t.co/DWxtJduBvO
— Tatarigami_UA (@Tatarigami_UA) February 16, 2024
Russian occupied Donetsk Oblast:
Twice as many Russian units as Ukrainian forces are in Donetsk Oblast, a crucial observation from the OSINT organization Rochan Consulting, shared by @konrad_muzyka. This supports yesterday's analysis, affirming Russia's significant numerical advantage in personnel and vehicles. pic.twitter.com/acAOBBbpHV
— Tatarigami_UA (@Tatarigami_UA) February 16, 2024
The Kreminna front:
DeepState about Russian attack on the Kreminna front.
“Fighters of the 63rd Brigade shared footage of the destruction of the Russians east of Terny
The enemy continues to carry out assaults with the help of equipment and infantry. This time, the attack attempt failed before it… https://t.co/LtYoUohgF9 pic.twitter.com/6zrawj5Z5E
— Special Kherson Cat 🐈🇺🇦 (@bayraktar_1love) February 16, 2024
DeepState about Russian attack on the Kreminna front.
“Fighters of the 63rd Brigade shared footage of the destruction of the Russians east of Terny
The enemy continues to carry out assaults with the help of equipment and infantry. This time, the attack attempt failed before it even started, because the Ukrainian military met them on the way to the front line.
During the repulse of the attack, up to 7 tanks were destroyed, including two T-90 , 2 units of BMP and TOS-1A”
https://t.me/DeepStateUA/18859
Novoshakhtinsk, Rostov Oblast, Russia:
Intensive activity of Russian air defence systems in Novoshakhtinsk, Rostov region. pic.twitter.com/Am7qNjQXWN
— Special Kherson Cat 🐈🇺🇦 (@bayraktar_1love) February 16, 2024
It appears that Alexei Navalny has been killed by Putin via his treatment in Russia’s penal system on top of the repeated assassination attempts:
Russians in Moscow are lining up to lay flowers in memory of Alexei Navalny at a memorial to Gulag victims outside the FSB headquarters.
Given the extent to which the Kremlin has suppressed all dissent since invading Ukraine, this is a not insignificant crowd. https://t.co/L805SmdZPk
— max seddon (@maxseddon) February 16, 2024
Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny has died in prison, the country’s prison service said Friday, following a yearslong struggle against official corruption and President Vladimir Putin’s government that saw him survive several poisoning attempts.
He was 47.
Navalny was poisoned with a military nerve agent while on a business trip in Russia in 2020 — an attempt on his life that he blamed directly on Putin — and spent his final years behind bars as the Russian leader reshaped the country to rally behind his war in Ukraine.
News of his death, which comes as the Kremlin is preparing to orchestrate another election victory for Putin in March, drew outrage from the West, where many leaders blamed Putin. President Joe Biden said he was “both not surprised and outraged.”
The Kremlin responded, decrying what it said were “absolutely rabid statements.”
Navalny was serving a combined 30 ½-year jail sentence when he died. He went missing in Russia’s penal system in December, eventually turning up at a high-security penal colony in a remote town above the Arctic Circle.
Russia’s Federal Penitentiary Service said in a statement that Navalny had died after feeling unwell following a walk Friday.
“On February 16, 2024, in penal colony No. 3, convict A.A. Navalny felt unwell after a walk, almost immediately losing consciousness,” the prison service for the Yamalo-Nenets region, where Navalny was moved, said in a statement on its website.
“The facility’s medical workers immediately arrived at the scene and an emergency medical team was called in. All necessary resuscitation measures have been carried out, but they did not yield positive results. Emergency medics confirmed the death of the convict,” the statement added.
There was no immediate information about what exactly caused Navalny’s death, with the region’s investigative committee saying it has launched a “procedural investigation.”
Navalny’s wife, Yulia, received a standing ovation at the Munich Security Conference, where Western officials gathered Friday.
“I don’t know whether I should believe the news,” she said, explaining it had come from state sources she said were known for lying.
If it’s true, she said, she wants Putin and his allies “to know that they will be punished for what they have done with our country, with my family and with my husband. They will be brought to justice, and this day will come soon.”
Navalny’s allies have long raised concerns about his health and poor conditions in jail, where they said he had to spend many days in crammed “punishment cells” for the most minor of conduct violations.
But he appeared healthy as he addressed a court via video link from the penal colony Thursday, laughing and cracking jokes.
Navalny’s mother said that her son had also been “healthy and happy” when she last saw him on Monday, according to Russian media.
“I don’t want to hear any condolences. We saw him in prison on the 12, in a meeting. He was alive, healthy and happy,” Lyudmila Navalnaya wrote in a Facebook post on Friday according to the Russian newspaper Novaya Gazeta.
A spokesperson for the opposition leader said on X that they did not have any confirmation of his death and that Navalny’s lawyer was traveling to the town where he was held. “Russian authorities publish a confession that they killed Alexey Navalny in prison,” Leonid Volkov, a close ally of many years, said in a post on X.
Navalny's wife Yulia at the Munich security conference:
"If it's true, I want Putin, his entourage, Putin's friends and his government to know they will be held responsible for what they have done to our country, my family, and my husband. And that day will come very soon." pic.twitter.com/ivZnoGwzr6
— max seddon (@maxseddon) February 16, 2024
Biden answering a question about the circumstances of Navalny's death: "We don't know exactly what happened but there is no doubt that the death of Navalny was something that Putin and his thugs did."
— Christopher Miller (@ChristopherJM) February 16, 2024
Whatever happened to Navalny it was always Putin's intention that he should die, like all the other opposition figures Putin threw into prison after his goons failed to murder them. Let's not get distracted from that with a debate on exactly how he died, murder is the system.
— Eliot Higgins (@EliotHiggins) February 16, 2024
Guessing some barely enforced sanctions that the corrupt Russian elite has already figured out how to avoid anyway. Maybe a strongly worded statement. pic.twitter.com/9HlpKxlTPb
— Eliot Higgins (@EliotHiggins) February 16, 2024
Politkovskaya, Litvinenko, Magnitsky, Nemtsov, Navalny are only some of the most well-known names on the long list of critics killed by Putin.
There was outrage after each murder, but Putin eventually got away with it, and world leaders shook his hand again. This encouraged him…
— Dmytro Kuleba (@DmytroKuleba) February 16, 2024
Politkovskaya, Litvinenko, Magnitsky, Nemtsov, Navalny are only some of the most well-known names on the long list of critics killed by Putin.
There was outrage after each murder, but Putin eventually got away with it, and world leaders shook his hand again. This encouraged him to continue killing people.
Today, some voices continue to call for Putin to be heard and negotiated with. It is time to end the naiveté. Before any meaningful engagement with Moscow can begin, Russia must be defeated in Ukraine and Putin must finally learn a lesson.
putin is the ultimate evil who is afraid of any competition. The lives of russians are nothing to him.
Everyone who calls for negotiations must realize that he cannot be trusted. The only language he understands is force.
— Andriy Yermak (@AndriyYermak) February 16, 2024
What a schmuck!
Tucker Carlson, when asked about Alexei Navalny, opposition leaders and journalists in Russia: “Every leader kills people. Some kill more than others. Leadership requires killing people.”pic.twitter.com/pE4SIKdaIO
— Julia Davis (@JuliaDavisNews) February 16, 2024
That’s enough for tonight.
Your daily Patron!
There are no new Patron tweets or videos tonight. However, here is more on Bagira, the rescued German Shepherd: (h/t: Lyrebird)
Here is a machine translation of the text above the pictures:
Olga Valentinovna
September 22, 2023
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Bagheera the sheepdog, a symbol of the Kakhovka Reservoir tragedy, is still without a family
Support her with a repost, give her a chance to be seen by her People 🙏🏡🙏
And here is a machine translation of the text below the pictures:
Ludmila Melnikova
September 14, 2023
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Odessa!
Sheepdog Bagira, a symbol of the tragedy of the Kakhovka reservoir is looking for a home and a family!
Absolutely healthy, vaccinated, treated for parasites, has a passport and chip.
Bagheera is settled in a family without other animals, financially secure, knowing the characteristics of the breed and with a desire to love her with all their heart. A kindred soul, call me back! Bagheera is waiting for you. If you have no family and you are looking for a friend for life – Bagheera will gladly offer you friendship.Such a dog, sometimes, the only creature ready to save you from loneliness.You will realize it immediately after acquaintance.Contact phone number:0671606323 Ludmila Melnikova.
Open thread!
Alison Rose
Tucker’s campaign slogan when he runs for president in 2028.
I hate Republicans. Even the ones who aren’t the worst, because by staying in the party and voting for other Republicans, they actually are the worst.
Thank you as always, Adam.
hrprogressive
Appreciate what you do. Have a non-shitty weekend, to the extent that you can!
AlaskaReader
Thanks Adam
YY_Sima Qian
It is good that European countries continue to step up in providing military aid to Ukraine, & in substantial financial terms despite most of their budgets & economies are under stress. However, it is striking just how pitifully inadequate the qty. are relative to Ukrainian need.
At this point, I am not sure NATO, including the U.S., can sustain a war of attrition against a peer level opponent (which Russia fortunately is not). The Western MIC has become too exorbitantly expensive, & the industrial base too atrophied.
glc
I have a pretty basic question, to which I certainly don’t expect an off-the-cuff reply.
Namely, what do these formal agreements achieve, and in particular, if the situation worsens, what will they mean? On the surface at least they seem aspirational; with a good deal of reaffirmation of principles.
More precisely, since no one can know at this point what they will achieve, the question is probably what they aim to achieve, and notably, how much the Ukrainian side feels it gains from them. Possibly a counter to Russian psychological operations in Europe. Or something quite different?
YY_Sima Qian
It’s good that Syrsky is not repeating the same mistakes made at the ends of the battles for Severodonetsk & Bakhmut, trying to holding to Avdiivka despite weakening position & unfavorable (or not favorable enough) exchange ratios. Of course, due to the manpower shortage & the even more critical munitions shortage, the Ukrainian position around Avdiivka has become untenable over the past week.
Rob Lee has some good comments on what to look for in the coming days:
Smiling Happy Guy (aka boatboy_srq)
The GQP will never move to aid Ukraine willingly now. The French are on the Ukrainian side. They’d rather boil their champagne than be on the same side as the French.
Adam L Silverman
@hrprogressive: Please repost your question from last week. With the long weekend I will definitely be able to get to it. I have not forgotten it needs answering.
Adam L Silverman
@AlaskaReader: You’re welcome.
Adam L Silverman
@hrprogressive: You’re welcome. I’m hoping for a largely quiet and uneventful weekend.
Adam L Silverman
@YY_Sima Qian: If only someone was regularly calling to put the defense sectors in these states on a war footing.
More seriously, this is a serious problem. Another one is the German constitution prohibitions on borrowing money to pay for things. Which is causing a serious problem in the funding to provide aid to Ukraine and to increase German military capabilities and capacity.
YY_Sima Qian
Denis Zakharov, a self described non-Navalny supporter, has a rather impassioned & clear eyed tribute to Navalny on Twitter:
YY_Sima Qian
@Adam L Silverman: The hit to funding to Ukraine is but one of the unfortunate effects of the German constitution. The even bigger problem is that it restricts the German government’s ability to raise spending (& thus deficit) to save the German economy. Germany will be in no position to help Ukraine, or buttress Eurozone economies under stress, or rearm itself, if its economy is in the toilet, & it is already in recession. Germany (& much of Western Europe) is undergoing de-industrialization due the perfect storm of losing access to cheap energy (that being Russian natural gas), spiraling costs due to inflation, indequate tools & means to counter industrial policies from the U.S. (in essence economic nationalism inspired by & sometimes exceeding PRC practice), & losing global market share to intensifying competition from PRC industries climbing the value chain ladder.
A debacle in economic management will also give further strength to the AfD, which will do Ukraine, Germany, the EU & NATO no favors.
This is just the funding side of the coin. Then there is the deeply entrenched pathologies on the cost side, which as gotten out of control. Unless the cost inflation spiral is addressed, there is no amount of funding that can be sufficient, & military spending will quickly start to crowd out social welfare, domestic investment, & public goods. See how government provisions of student loans/financial aid has utterly failed to arrest the cost inflation spiral in higher education.
Allied governments did not tolerate this level of profit & rent seeking from the MIC during WW II.
Sister Machine Gun of Quiet Harmony
Ironically, if young progressive activists really wanted to make a difference, they would block the local GOPers from getting to the capital to gavel in. Pity they waste their time protesting where it isn’t effective.
Dan B
I asked WaterGirl this set of questions in an email but don’t expect a response after her day: If congress comes back on the 28th I believe they have to pass a continuing resolution or something similar on the 1st of March. If they make extraordinary demands like zero Ukraine funding, total closure of the “border” (ever heard of airports dofusses?), defend the IRS, federal abortion ban, etc. There’s no time for the White House and Senate to maneuver. Suddenly we’re looking at the potential for the end of the dollar as the world’s reserve currency plus a potential worldwide recession, piled on top of all the current recessions. Blame gets piled onto Democrats with help from right wing and corporate media who, foolishly believe the GOP would never really do this but were ‘forced’ by the Democrats failure to work with the other side. This seems like the kind of brinksmanship and hostage taking that a religious zealot over his depth and in serious trouble of being deposed would eagerly grab ahold of.
Any thoughts / corrections?
No pressure to answer. I can panic just fine by my own. Have a good weekend. And there’s plenty of good news today from people who know how to play the medium and long game to help me maintain a measured perspective.
Hakeem Jeffries, Chuck Schumer, and the doddering old* Biden notice this possibility I’m certain.
*act inept, surprise with stealth and wisdom.
Adam L Silverman
@Dan B: I’m sitting here nodding off. I’ll take this up tomorrow.
YY_Sima Qian
@Dan B: It is definitely not in Trumps’s interest, or in the interest of any of the oligarchs/kleptocrats funding the GOP, to see the end of the USD hegemony. That is why the GOP never kills that particular hostage. There are limits to how far they are willing to go to advance Putin’s interests.
Eolirin
@YY_Sima Qian: If we’re excluding Russia the only peer level opponent is China then, unless the US goes mad and decides to try to invade Europe.
It is a good thing that China does not seem particularly interested in engaging in a war of attrition with the rest of the world.
Dan B
@Adam L Silverman: Thanks. I believe I’m missing some pieces as you ate missing much well deserved sleep. I / we don’t want you running on the edge. We can’t pay you what you deserve for going full speed and on the brink, even though you never seem to stumble. Amazeballs!
Dan B
@YY_Sima Qian: My concern is that a righteous ideologue like Mike Johnson would hope that destroying the world / earthly order could lead to the ascendancy of the ‘righteous kingdom’. Most of us know absolutely, and with negligible hesitation, that forcing societies down a rigid and restrictive path leads to chaos or to pain for many. I do not believe that Mike Johnson and many of his ilk believe that this could happen or would be a problem.
Eolirin
@Dan B: Huh? The government would shut down, sure.
But this isn’t a debt ceiling fight. The last set of government shutdowns during the Trump administration didn’t cause a global recession or the failure of the dollar.
If anything forcing a shutdown during an election year in which their senate counterparts have already come to a compromise position on the budget is something that might actually get a discharge petition going, and if that’s going to happen it’s going to need Democratic votes to pass, so there’s no reason why the foriegn aid supplemental can’t get tacked on. The speaker would be giving up leverage by not getting a clean CR through asap.
Granted, he might lose his speakership rather immediately by doing that. So that’s the bind he’s in. But Republicans in the house continuing to fuck stuff up this badly while their senate counterparts go on the news and blame them for it is the sort of thing that could tank Republican electoral chances across the board.
Things are going to get messy for a while, but the Democrats are actually demonstrating resolve and sticking together better than they have in decades. They’ve got the cover of broadly agreed upon bipartisan compromises to hammer them with on top of it. I think they will ultimately prevail on these issues. It’s just a question of how much damage happens in between.
Unfortunately for Ukraine that damage may be catastrophic. At minimum Avdiivka will have fallen when it didn’t need to, and we have to pray that it doesn’t lead to a bigger breakthrough for Russian forces.
Mart
@Eolirin: Don’t worry, God won’t allow the Second Coming of Mosses to fail.
Thanks Adam. First time that I called my Congress lady after emailing several times with no response. The woman was nice, of course the congresswoman is doing everything she can to help Ukraine aid to go forward. I said then don’t follow the child rapist from Illinois rule and hook up with Dems. That ended that call… Called Josh Hawley’s office and kept this one real short. Asked when Hawley was going to move home to mother Russia. Probably shouldn’t give them my name and address first…
YY_Sima Qian
@Eolirin: NATO as a whole isn’t fighting the PRC under any scenario, including a PRC invasion of Taiwan. The EU will very likely join in the sanctions.
The challenge is that NATO & the West clearly does not currently have the industrial capacity (as currently configured) to sustain a high intensity proxy war against a strong regional power, where NATO’s enormous combat potential cannot be brought to bear to achieve a relatively quick decision.
If the US gets into a high intensity war against a regional power, Iran for example, the US should be able to prevail in the conventional phase due to its overwhelming advantage in conventional arms, but could empty its entire inventory of precision guided munitions in the effort, lose some platforms, & it would take many years to replenish the stock & replace the losses.
If the US + select allies get into a peer level high intensity war, the PRC for example, the expenditure of PGMs will be prodigious & the losses of platforms (& the personnel manning them) will be horrendous. This applies to both sides, but here any disparity in industrial capacity, industrial base, & mobilization capability will be felt in replenishing the stocks & replace the losses, & qty will have a quality of its own. & the PRC will enjoy home court advantage in terms of logistics.
The situation is such that some US analysts are dusting off the Cold War playbook about using tactical nukes as deterrence (at the time to address the challenge of the seemingly endless & unstoppable Soviet armored onslaught across the Fulda Gap). This “gem” from the Gregory Weaver at the Atlantic Council.
jlowe
I’ve been writing my Republican Congressional Representative every few weeks encouraging her to support legislation funding Ukraine’s defense against Russian aggression. She has been voting the right way (there’s a vibrant Eastern European community in our district) but I’m concerned that she doesn’t use her leadership position to motivate other members of her caucus to not be Russian shills. In my next communication, I might tell her about the biggest hazard of the US failing to sustain Ukraine in its moment of need: Europe may learn to defend itself from Russian aggression without our help.