Americans seem to have once again suddenly discovered that there is a place called Afghanistan. This only happens when something either really bad happens to Americans in the US because of something related to Afghanistan or because something really bad happens to Americans in Afghanistan. The rest of the time it doesn’t exist. It is one in a long list of Schroedinger’s states and societies that only exist if Americans pay attention to it. Which itself really only exists if America’s news media pays attention to it in such as way as to make it impossible to ignore. And right now America’s news media finally have a story they can use to show that President Biden is just like every other president and politician, so they’re going to run with it. Major’s nipping didn’t catch on. Neither did going less than 90 minutes to his long time US Secret Service fortified home in Delaware so he could see his grandkids. Neither did the attempt to make Republican representatives, senators, governors, and state legislators efforts pushing anti-COVID response garbage – from anti-masking to anti-vaccination – somehow Biden’s failing. But now they’ve got Afghanistan and they’re going to make as much hay with it as they possibly can.
Unfortunately the only parts of their jobs they tend to be good at is the access journalism and narrative framing part. I cannot tell you how many versions of “Biden saw Obama get rolled by the generals in 2009 and decided he wouldn’t let that happen to him” framing as to why Biden made the decisions he made that is allowing what is happening is happen right now. This is a lie. How do I know, because I know exactly what the Army Force Generation Cycle (AFORGEN) for deployments to Afghanistan was as of the end of January 2009. How do I know this? I know this because at the end of January 2009 I was sitting in the lobby of the Omni Hotel in Newport News on a break from the organizational planning team (OPT) I was the senior subject matter expert on and I received a call from the Chief of Staff of the US Army Human Terrain System (HTS) where I was employed and whose OPT to fix the program’s predeployment training was meeting in one of the conference rooms at the Omni because they were doing repairs to the meeting spaces at the program offices down the street. The Chief of Staff told me she’d just been contacted by the G5 – that’s the officer in charge of planning – from the 101st Airborne Division. He had contacted her because they wanted HTS to send one of the social scientists to do several predeployment prep courses for them at their Commanders’ Conference in July 2009. She pushed it to me as, at that time, I was the go to for handling these types of requests. What is the Commanders’ Conference? It is the predeployment preparation for the division command group (Commanding General, Deputy Commanding General, Command Sergeant Major, Division staff), each brigade combat team commander, deputy commander, executive officer, and command sergeant major, and each battalion commander, executive officer, and command sergeant major, and then an assortment of the officers and senior enlisted from the division, the brigades, and the battalions drawn from the intel and operations/planning sections (the 2 and 3 shops). Everything the 101st leadership formally received as predeployment prep on the politics, culture, society, religion, economy/economics, kinship groups and dynamics, which is how the DOD broadly defines culture, as well as extremism and counter-extremism and how to use open source information, what today is generally called open source intelligence (OSINT) about all of these categories, they got from my briefings in July 2009.
Why is this important? Because I was informed in January 2009 that the 101st Airborne was going to Afghanistan, minus one brigade that was going to Iraq. That’s about 10,000 personnel. Between January and July 2009 the generals requested a surge of Forces into Afghanistan similar to the 2006 surge in Iraq. President Obama even went to West Point to announce it in an address to the Corps of Cadets regarding how his nat-sec team was revising the US strategy in Afghanistan. When he announced the 30,000 number everyone in the news media immediately began opining about how he’d given the generals everything they wanted, how this is what happens with a neophyte president. That was then and is now a lie. What President Obama actually approved was 20,000 additional personnel because the 101st had already been set to go for several months. President Obama didn’t get rolled by the generals, he actually rolled them.
If the news media and all the commenters and talking heads and think tank “experts’ – everyone needs to remember O’Hanlon’s actual specialty is budget analysis, not low intensity warfare, the Middle East, and/or Central Asia – cannot get these simple facts right, which were not a state secret as everyone in the communities around FT Campbell knew for months that the 101st was going – the schools, the stores, the various community organizations, one of which came and made a presentation at that conference in July 2009 about the services available to assist the spouses and families of the Soldiers who would be deploying – then what else are they getting wrong?
One of the things they’re getting wrong is making this all about the US. Even the foreign correspondents like Richard Engel do this. To be really honest and really fair, almost everything we’ve done in Afghanistan since the initial months of the operation to scour the country for bin Laden and reduce the operational capabilities of al Qaeda and the Taliban has actually not been about the US. It has been about Afghanistan. Unfortunately this has all to often occurred through the prism of the US. Yes, it is certainly true that it is in the US’s best interests if there is a stable, small “d” democratic Afghanistan that exists and functions within the socio-cultural context of how all the various ethnic elements in Afghanistan might understand democracy. But that only works if the most senior host country nationals the US is partnering with actually care about all of that.
You want a good understanding of what is happening right now in Afghanistan and why – one you aren’t going to get from Richard Engel or Andrea Mitchell or anyone on CNN, let alone Fox – well here’s one from the guy who was the governor of Afghanistan’s Central Bank until yesterday. I’m going to copy and paste the thread:
1/The collapse of the Government in Afghanistan this past week was so swift and complete – it was disorienting and difficult to comprehend. This is how the events seemed to proceed from my perspective as Central Bank Governor.
2/Although much of the rural areas fell to the Taliban over the past few months, the first provincial capital to fall was just 1 week and two days ago! On Friday August 6th, Ziranj fell. Over the next 6 days, a number of other provinces fell – particularly in the north.
3/There were multiple rumors that directions to not fight were somehow coming from above. This has been repeated by Atta Noor and Ismael Khan. Seems difficult to believe, but there remains a suspicion as to why ANSF left posts so quickly. There is something left unexplained
Ahmady is referring to these two tweets from Ata Ahmad Noor, the former governor of Balkh province:
My dear countrymen! Despite our firm resistance, sadly, all the government & the #ANDSF equipments were handed over to the #Taliban as a result of a big organised & cowardly plot. They had orchestrated the plot to trap Marshal Dostum and myself too, but they didn’t succeed. 1/2
Marshal Dostum, myself, Balkh Govenor, Balkh MPs, Head of Balkh Provincial Council and few other officials are in a safe place now. I have a lot of untold stories that I will share in due course. Thanking all who proudly resisted to defend their land. Our path won’t end here.
Back to Ahmady’s thread:
4/Currency volatility and other indicators had worsened, but DAB were able to stabilize the macroeconomic environment relatively well during the last week – given the deteriorating security environment. Then came last Thursday
5/I attended my normal meetings. Ghazni fell in the morning. I left work, and by the time I went home – Herat, Kandahar, and Baghdis also fell. Helmand was also under serious attack
6/Friday – we received a call that given the deteriorating environment, we wouldn’t get any more dollar shipments. People spread rumors that I had fled on Friday. On Saturday, DAB had to supply less currency to the markets on Saturday, which further increased panic.
7/Currency spiked from a stable 81 to almost 100 then back to 86. I held meetings on Saturday to reassure banks and money exchangers to calm them down. I can’t believe that was one day before Kabul fell
8/On Saturday night, my family called to say that most government had already left. I was dumbfounded. A security assessment accurately forecast Taliban arrival to Kabul within 36 hours and its fall within 56 hours I got worried & purchased tickets for Monday as a precaution
9/On Sunday I began work. Reports throughout morning were increasingly worrisome. I left the bank and left deputies in charge. Felt terrible about leaving staff. But arrived at airport & saw that Mohaqeq, Rahmani, Massoud, etc were already there! Head of parliament seems content
10/Saw VP Danish leaving – reportedly for Qatar. By then it was rumored that VP Saleh had left. Ministers + others were waiting for a Fly Dubai & Emirates flights. Both were cancelled I secured a Kam Air flight Sunday 7pm. Then the floor fell: the President had already left
11/I knew right then my flight would be cancelled and there would be chaos. As expected employees & military left posts. Everyone ran through gates to on Kam Air flight. 300+ passengers boarded for a 100-seat plane. The plane had no fuel or pilot. We all hoped it would depart
12/However, I decided to disembark and spotted another military plane. It was surrounded by people trying to board, while the guard forces held people back and boarded their embassy staff. There was a rush. Some shots were fired. Somehow, my close colleagues pushed me on board.
13/It did not have to end this way. I am disgusted by the lack of any planning by Afghan leadership. Saw at airport them leave without informing others. I asked the palace if there was an evacuation plan/charter flights. After 7 years of service, I was met with silence
14/During last days, I feared not only risks related to Taliban, but fear of transition period once there is no chain of command. Once president’s departure was announced, I knew within minutes chaos would follow. I cannot forgive him for creating that without a transition plan
15/ I did not criticize them until now, but key figures Fazly & Mohib were too inexperienced in their roles, & was President’s failure that he never recognized such weaknesses. He himself had great ideas but poor execution. If I contributed to that, I take my share of the blame.
16/And it seems it’s only gotten worse today at HKIA.
And this. I will be trying to support any requests for assistance, but worry that given my personal experience at airport that any support for friends and colleagues be limited
Did I have a reason to worry? This is the text someone sent me: “Taliban come to <area> and were looking for you. They were asking about Ajmal Ahmady DAB Governor.” Whatever their personal views, I also had many personal enemies. Or maybe they just wanted to greet me
As Ahmady clearly indicates, as an Afghan government official, if the senior leadership of the Afghan government is not going to stay and do their jobs, let alone fight, why should any of their subordinates stay at their posts?
It also doesn’t help that the Russians and the PRC appear to have cut a deal with the Taliban:
Currently, only the embassies of Russia and China are functioning in Afghanistan. Both are being guarded by the Taliban, Russian ambassador to Kabul Dmitry Zhirnov told state TV channel Rossiya-1.
Not everything in Afghanistan is lost, however.
I knew it. I knew the lions of Panjshir wouldn’t back down. I knew they’d shelter Afghan women and minorities. What a bunch of fucking warriors. https://t.co/xLPK0N8Fmh
— John Phipps: Dr. Respectful (@GameDadJP) August 16, 2021
There are Afghans who will resist the Taliban. Massoud will not roll over. Afghans that can escape the Taliban will flee to the Panjir and swell his ranks. But the resistance of Massoud and his people show the reality that far too few Americans – elected officials, appointed officials, self declared subject matter experts on low intensity warfare, Afghan culture, etc – have ever been willing to actually internalize: only Afghans can ultimately determine what Afghanistan will be. If we show up with pallets of cash and C130s full of weapons and equipment they will gladly take it. But at the end of the day Afghanistan belongs to the Afghans, not to America. And it is Afghans that have to determine what it is they want it to be and if they are willing to fight for whatever that vision of Afghanistan is.
If I was advising anyone involved in this right now, and I am not, my recommendations would be to slowly and carefully rotate into Panjir Special Forces Operational Detachments-Alpha (ODAs), Civil Affairs Teams-Alpha (CAT-As), and Tactical PSYOP Teams (TSTs) comprised of Special Forces, Civil Affairs, and PSYOP Soldiers with significant Afghanistan experience, and with as many of the new 38G (military support to government*) military occupational specialty Civil Affairs personnel as possible on the CAT-As, into the Panjir. No more than 200 total personnel. Embed them with Massoud and his people. Let these very specialized Special Operators do what they’re best at in working with Massoud and his people because as we saw with ISIS’s caliphate in Iraq and Syria, the Taliban’s rule will quickly become unpleasant and unwelcome. And when that happens Massoud will have an opening.
President Biden will be giving a televised address on Afghanistan at 3:45 PM EDT today. Until then:
Open thread!
* Full disclosure: I was assigned, under Temporary Assigned Control (TACON) in October of 2012 to serve as the Cultural Advisor and subject matter expert to the Chief of Civil Affairs Branch to assist with the development of the 38G military occupational specialty (MOS), as well as the concepts and doctrine to support it. The 38G MOS is intended to take Civil Affairs back to its roots in World War II when it played a key role in helping to set the conditions to secure the peace after World War II ended and then assisted with the implementation of the Marshall Plan.