We managed to free over 200 of our people – warriors and civilians – from Russian captivity – address by the President of Ukraine

3 January 2024 – 19:14

I wish you health, fellow Ukrainians!

Today, despite everything, despite all the challenges, there is long-awaited good news. We managed to free over 200 of our people from Russian captivity. Warriors and – very importantly – civilians. We remember all Ukrainians held in Russian captivity. There was a long pause in the exchanges, but there was no pause in the negotiations regarding the exchanges. We seize every opportunity, try all mediation options. At every international meeting that can help the cause, we raise the issue of returning our captives. And we will continue this work to return our people… All our people.

Now I am glad that we managed to unblock the exchange. We brought home warriors of the Armed Forces and the National Guard, border guards and Navy servicemen. Most of them are soldiers and sergeants. But there are also officers. It is a really good day for Ukraine. Some of these warriors are defenders of Mariupol and Azovstal. Some of those freed today were not even initially known to be in captivity. They were considered missing. It is very important to keep hope alive.

I thank the entire team that has worked and is working for the exchanges to continue! Budanov, Yermak, Usov, Malyuk, Klymenko. And of course, I thank each of our warriors on the front line who take the occupiers prisoner and replenish our exchange fund. The more Russians we take prisoner, the more effective the negotiations on exchanges will be.

Glory to Ukraine!

Among over 200 Ukrainian POWs freed today, there are defenders of Snake Island, as well as national guardsmen taken prisoner in the Chornobyl Zone in the earliest days of Russia's full-scale invasion in February 2022.

Imagine their surprise now as they come back home to Ukraine…

— Illia Ponomarenko 🇺🇦 (@IAPonomarenko) January 3, 2024

Among over 200 Ukrainian POWs freed today, there are defenders of Snake Island, as well as national guardsmen taken prisoner in the Chornobyl Zone in the earliest days of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022.

Imagine their surprise now as they come back home to Ukraine – which is still holding 80% of its territory, has defeated Russia at Kyiv, Chernihiv, Sumy, Kharkiv, northern Donbas, Kherson, in the Black Sea, has acquired dozens of western-provided types of equipment and weapons from artillery to jet fighters, has the world’s most masterful missile defense, and keeps combating the world’s largest nuclear power with the world’s 3rd military budget.

Ukraine lives on!

48 Ukrainian prisoners of war released today were considered missing in action.
Now they’re coming home.
Imagine the immense joy that their families had as they learned that their loved ones are alive and would be included into POW exchange lists.

— Illia Ponomarenko 🇺🇦 (@IAPonomarenko) January 3, 2024

Norway is presenting two F-16 fighter jets that will train and educate Ukrainian personnel in Denmark.

We are grateful to our Norwegian friends for their unwavering support!

🇺🇦🤝🇳🇴 https://t.co/WFbGp4xS0a

— Defense of Ukraine (@DefenceU) January 3, 2024

Here’s the details:

Defence minister Bjørn Arild Gram visited the airfield in Bodø this week, where the remaining preparations for the F-16s are being conducted before a mission. Norway is presenting two F-16 fighter jets that will train and educate Ukrainian personnel in Denmark. Norway is also sending down ten instructors that will aid in the training and education. – The contribution of F-16 from the military sector is nothing more than impressive, states the defence minister.

The Norwegian government has decided that it will aid Ukraine in developing a modern air force, with the long-term goal for Ukraine to establish a lasting defence without the need for international support. This will be of vital importance to European security and stability. This aid will happen trough different frames of international support lead by the US, Denmark and The Netherlands. Norway has decided to follow Denmark, Belgium and The Netherlands and will also be donating F-16s to Ukraine, and the training and education of pilots is an important part of the donation.

-Ukrainian pilots have experience with a different fighter jet and will now be trained to use the F-16 systems. At the same time, Ukrainian technicians will be trained in Denmark, USA and Belgium. Allied partners and states will work day and night with the goal of establishing a lasting and modern air force for Ukraine, says Gram.

Training of pilots will be done in Denmark

The Norwegian Air Force has already presented instructors that will take part in the training, which will take place in Skyldstrup. This program is multinational and will be led by Denmark. – The span of this deployment to Denmark will be decided through dialog with the other partners of this program, says the defence minister.

– Ukraine has for a considerable period requested support for the establishment of a modern air force. This is necessary for the country to ensure its own security. Such an independent Ukrainian capability will also be crucial for broader European stability and security.

NATO has supported Ukraine's request for an extraordinary NATO-Ukraine Council meeting in response to Russia's mass air strikes. One of the key topics will be strengthening Ukraine's air defense. An important sign of Euro-Atlantic unity in the face of Russian terror escalation.

— Dmytro Kuleba (@DmytroKuleba) January 3, 2024

It will be interesting to see what, if anything, comes of this NATO-Ukraine Council meeting.

It isn’t all good news.

Ukraine armed with ATACMS and/or TAURUS would be able to reach every square meter of Russian-occupied Ukraine. No Russian HQ or rocket launcher or ammunition storage site would be safe. No Russian ship would be safe. It's only our lack of political will that stops this. https://t.co/RGxzi6jXzo

— Ben Hodges (@general_ben) January 3, 2024

..is how Putin would react if #Ukraine was able to strike more targets on Crimea and in Russia. Yes, the uncertainty causes self-deterrence and the risks of non-delivery are high, too. Still, would be interested in your thoughts on a possible Russian reaction, @PhillipsPOBrien

— Anna Sauerbrey (@annakatrein) January 3, 2024

US & Europe “can either make an immediate plan to bolster the training they provide to the Ukrainian military … and underwrite Ukraine’s materiel needs through 2025, or they can continue to falsely believe the war is in a stalemate, dithering and ceding the advantage to Russia.” https://t.co/w2yDKRX5Kh

— Christopher Miller (@ChristopherJM) January 3, 2024

RUSI’s Jack Watling in Foreign Affairs:

Since the failure of offensives in 2023 by both Ukraine and Russia, a narrative is coalescing that the war in Ukraine has reached a stalemate. The perception of an indefinite but static conflict is causing a sense of fatigue in the capitals of Ukraine’s partners: if neither side is likely to make substantial progress, the status quo appears stable, demanding little urgent policy attention.

This perception of stalemate, however, is deeply flawed. Both Moscow and Kyiv are in a race to rebuild offensive combat power. In a conflict of this scale, that process will take time. While the first half of 2024 may bring few changes in control of Ukrainian territory, the materiel, personnel training, and casualties that each side accrues in the next few months will determine the long-term trajectory of the conflict. The West in fact faces a crucial choice right now: support Ukraine so that its leaders can defend their territory and prepare for a 2025 offensive or cede an irrecoverable advantage to Russia.

Uncertainty about the long-term provision of aid to Ukraine risks not only giving Russia advantages on the battlefield but also emboldening Moscow further. It has already undermined the goal to push Russia to the negotiating table because the Kremlin now believes it can outlast the West’s will. Unless clear commitments are made in early 2024, the Kremlin’s resolve will only harden.

What the United States and Europe do over the next six months will determine one of two futures. In one, Ukraine can build up its forces to renew offensive operations and degrade Russian military strength to the degree that Kyiv can enter negotiations with the leverage to impose a lasting peace. In the other, a shortage of supplies and trained personnel will mire Ukraine in an attritional struggle that will leave it exhausted and facing eventual subjugation.

Ukraine’s international partners must remember that the first outcome is desirable not only to Ukrainians. It is necessary to protect the international norm that states do not change their borders by force. A mobilized and emboldened Russia would pose a sustained threat to NATO, requiring the United States to indefinitely underwrite deterrence in Europe. That would constrain the United States’ capacity to project force in the Indo-Pacific and substantially increase the danger of conflict over Taiwan. The West can choose which direction history takes. But first it must acknowledge the gravity of the decision it currently faces.

It is essential that Kyiv and its partners establish a realistic shared understanding of what materiel and training can be provided, and when. Over the past two years, Kyiv’s Western allies wasted the time advantages they did have, squandering much of 2022 and 2023 basking in the euphoria of Russia’s early setbacks and imagining that they could avoid a protracted conflict. Rather than seeking to expand industrial capacity in NATO member states, Kyiv’s friends mainly sourced munitions from national stockpiles and the international market and channeled them to Ukraine.

Now these stockpiles of munitions are running low. To continue to achieve localized artillery superiority, Ukraine will need about 2.4 million rounds of ammunition per year. But Ukraine’s international partners, including the United States, will struggle to provide half that in 2024.

Ukraine’s shortage of artillery shells gets the most attention. But its resource limitations are by no means confined to ammunition. To regenerate offensive capacity and defend itself against Russian attacks, Ukraine will need approximately 1,800 replacement artillery barrels per year. The handful of barrel machines in Europe cannot meet this demand. The numerous fleets of vehicles gifted to Kyiv over the past two years also need a reliable supply of spare parts. Air defense interceptors will be a persistent requirement, too: Russia is now producing over 100 cruise and ballistic missiles and 300 attack drones per month. To contain the damage from these weapons, Ukraine will need resupplies of Western air-defense systems. If Western countries do not increase their capacity to produce these systems, Russia will gain the upper hand.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, fearing that U.S. support will end with the upcoming American presidential election, has declared that all Ukrainian territory occupied by Russia must be liberated by October 2024. This is not achievable, given the materiel available to Ukraine or the time that its military needs to properly train its troops. But it is not reasonable for Kyiv’s Western allies to demand that Ukraine’s generals create a detailed longer-term plan before they commit to offering new support. Without being sure of what equipment they can rely on receiving, Ukraine’s military leaders cannot determine what kind of operations they can mount, and when. In short, preparing for the next phase of the war has become a chicken-and-egg problem between Kyiv and Washington.

A realistic plan would involve resourcing Kyiv to maintain a defensive posture throughout most of 2024 while units are trained and equipped to mount offensive operations in 2025. Beyond the certainty this plan would offer Ukraine’s generals, it would also signal to the Kremlin that it cannot count on winning a years-long war of attrition against an increasingly thinly resourced Ukraine. A U.S. commitment to supporting Ukraine through 2024 would also shift European allies’ incentives toward investing more deeply in increasing the capacity of their weapons industries, reducing the burden on the United States through 2025.

Western leaders must emphasize that longer-term investment in manufacturing capacity is both affordable and ultimately benefits Ukraine’s allies. The total defense budgets of the 54 countries supporting Ukraine well exceed $100 billion per month. By contrast, current support for Ukraine costs those states less than $6 billion monthly.

The biggest barriers to ensuring that Ukraine does not lose the war are political. Funding Ukraine has often been framed as merely giving money to Kyiv. This is, however, deeply misleading. Much of the aid that Ukraine will need constitutes an investment by its partners in their own domestic defense manufacturing and will be spent at home. A significant proportion of aid to Ukraine will eventually be recovered by the recipient in taxes while boosting manufacturing jobs across NATO’s member countries. At a time of economic strain, such investment should be widely welcomed by publics in countries supporting Kyiv.

It has also often been suggested that U.S. support for Ukraine comes at the expense of the American military’s readiness to deter China. But if China sees that the United States is unable to sustain a military effort, whether in Europe or Asia, deterrence is eroded, so expanding manufacturing to meet Ukraine’s needs is vital.

The United States has a treaty obligation to come to the defense of its European allies. Europe’s defense production does not match Russia’s, especially as Russia has moved to a war footing. In time, U.S. leaders must push Europe to reduce its dependence on the United States so that the U.S. military can prioritize deterrence in the Indo-Pacific. But this must be a managed transition. If that transition comes at the cost of Ukraine’s defeat, the United States risks having to support a Europe unable to defend its eastern flank while China simultaneously escalates tensions in the Taiwan Strait.

Some leaders in Western capitals now argue that it is time to negotiate an end to the war in Ukraine. This line of thinking, however, misses both the extent of Russia’s goals and what the Kremlin would realistically offer. Moscow is not interested in simply seizing some Ukrainian territory: Russian President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly stated that he wants to change the logic of the international system.

If the United States asks its partners to make concessions to Russia to obtain a token cease-fire, two things will likely happen. First, Russia will persistently breach the cease-fire, as it did with all iterations of the 2015 Minsk agreements, while rebuilding its military to finish the task of occupying Kyiv. Second, Russia will argue to its allies that the United States can be beaten through perseverance. This will likely lead many U.S. security partners to seek an insurance policy, reducing the United States’ influence around the world.

Russia does not want a direct conflict with NATO, but the Kremlin is increasingly looking to expand the scope of its indirect confrontations with the West. Since Yevgeny Prigozhin halted his June 2023 mutiny, Russia has only doubled down on its ambition to compete with the West globally. In fact, Prigozhin’s failed rebellion may have advanced these ambitions: the remnants of his force have now been reorganized into an “expeditionary corps” under the direct control of the GRU, Russia’s military intelligence agency. Since the summer of 2023, Russia has been engaging extensively with governments in western and central Africa, promising them military support in exchange for the expulsion of Western forces and economic interests.

The United States and its European allies face a choice. They can either make an immediate plan to bolster the training they provide to the Ukrainian military, clarify to their publics and to Ukraine that the October 2024 deadline to liberate territory must be extended, and underwrite Ukraine’s materiel needs through 2025, or they can continue to falsely believe the war is in a stalemate, dithering and ceding the advantage to Russia. This would be a terrible mistake: in addition to expanding its partnerships in Africa, Russia is strengthening its collaboration with China, Iran, and North Korea. And if a loss in Ukraine ends up demonstrating that the West cannot meet a single challenge to the world’s security architecture, its adversaries will hardly believe it can deal with multiple crises at once.

There is much more at the link!

Here’s a great end of the year assessment of the war for Ukraine by King’s College London’s Senior Lecturer in War Studies Ruth Deyermond. First tweet from the thread, the rest from the Thread Read App. Pay particular attention to point #4!

Since it’s that time of year again, 12 end-of-year and start-of-new-year thoughts about Russia’s war against Ukraine and its implications. A long 🧵

— Ruth Deyermond (@ruth_deyermond) December 31, 2023

1. Russia can’t win. In recent months, there’s been a lot of discussion in the West about Russian victory, but the Russian govt’s objectives were unrealistic from the start, and impossible to achieve almost as soon as the fighting started. 

The explicit aims of the invasion were: reset the strategic map of Europe in Russia’s favour; stop “genocide” in Eastern Ukraine; create a pro-Russian Ukraine, including a puppet govt in Kyiv (i.e. “denazify” Ukraine). 

Other aims were the strengthening of Russian dominance in the states formerly part of the USSR and strengthening Russia’s global great power status. 

Instead of achieving these goals, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has expanded NATO and hugely increased NATO and EU accession prospects for Ukraine and Moldova. 

The govt in Kyiv has never looked less likely to become pro-Russian, and Ukraine has never looked more likely to be politically and normatively integrated into what we might call a common European home (minus Russia and Belarus). 

Rather than stop a genocide that wasn’t happening, Russian forces have raped, tortured, and killed many thousands of the people they claimed to be protecting.

Rather than “denazifying” Ukraine, Putin has nazified Russia.

Rather than strengthen its regional dominance, Russia’s war against Ukraine has weakened its position in it’s so-called “near abroad”. 

Instead of reinforcing its claims to great power identity, the war has rapidly increased dependence on China. Economically and diplomatically, Russia looks less like a partner of China and more like a client state. Measured against all its war aims, Russia has lost, and can’t win 

2. But Ukraine can still lose. The fact Russia can’t win on its original terms means Putin – whose presidency is now tied to the war – is having to find new aims Russia *can* achieve and can present as a victory. 

To do this, Russia will continue to kill Ukrainians and destroy the Ukrainian economy, Ukrainian infrastructure, cultural sites, and the environment. Ukraine could – and without continued meaningful Western support, will – lose more territory. 

3. The West can also lose. If Russia can convince itself and others that it is winning in Ukraine, the West – both collectively and individual states, above all the US – will look, and therefore be, weaker. 

Anything but Russian defeat in Ukraine will have acute security implications for NATO members in all sorts of areas, from the security of the Black Sea to the integrity of domestic democratic processes. 

4. One reason for that is that the Russian govt has decided the West (the US, NATO, the EU) is not just an enemy, it’s *the* enemy. That’s now baked in both to the conduct of and external justification for the war, and its domestic rationale inside Russia. 

Whether states like France or Germany want to be Russia’s enemy is irrelevant. As long as the Russian govt has existential reasons to frame the West as the enemy, there’s nothing the West can do about it except decide whether to resist or capitulate to Russian aggression. 

5. Western govts therefore need to recognize that European security is a priority again, and that comes with a significant financial cost, including for those NATO members that have engaged in free riding for decades. 

The alternative (trying to force Ukraine into a settlement so Europe can go back to business as usual) will only defer and increase costs, because Russia has defined itself against an enemy West. Western govts need to communicate this to their citizens, however unpalatable it is. 

6. Western govts and media need to recognize that this is a major war and that major wars are long and complex and expensive. There will always be defeats as well as victories. 

These things are inconvenient for electoral and modern news cycles, but successful outcomes depend on recognizing them and explaining them clearly to people who understandably want the war to be over. 

7. The capacity to determine the outcome of the war – a pivotal moment for European security and global stability – rests with the West: both the US and Europe. 

The Russian govt understands this, which is why it’s working to undermine Western commitment and cohesion. The West needs to understand it, too, and develop a coherent, common strategy for combatting that interference. 

8. Russia and the US will both have presidential elections in 2024. Only one of these will matter. 

The election of Trump, or another candidate who shares his dislike of NATO and his admiration for Putin and other autocrats, would be the most destabilizing international event for decades. It would make a wider war in Europe more likely and would further weaken the US itself. 

American political elites, analysts, and voters with any concern about the security of their country, their allies, and the international stability on which the US depends, need to shake off the late-1930s-France-style fatalism visible in many people who should know better. 

9. There’s no chance of negotiations that will end the war. Anyone in the West who thinks there is, doesn’t understand very much about the Russian govt (and needs to go and read @samagreene) or its 30 year use of negotiations and frozen conflicts.

Unroll available on Thread Reader

@samagreene 10. Western states need to recognize that paying attention to Russia isn’t a distraction from China – the two challenges are now connected. 

Before 2022, even after 2014, foreign policy elites in the US and elsewhere in the West too often treated paying attention to Russia as a temporary diversion from more serious business. The temptation to return to that mindset needs to be challenged robustly. 

11. The West needs to recognize that Putin won’t last forever so they need to start planning now for a post-Putin Russia: what it means for Western security and international stability, and how they respond to it. 

The Russian media claim that Western govts want to bring down Putin; in fact, there’s deep anxiety about what will happen if Putin goes. Significant sections of Western political elites seem to see Putin as the least worst option and worry about the effects of destabilizing him. 

This is short-sighted. Putin’s 71, he’s not going to be president, except maybe as a figurehead, for very many more years. If he’s lucky, he could probably expect one more election victory after 2024. A post-Putin Russia is coming sooner than many in the West acknowledge or want. 

12. Most importantly – because everything else depends on it – the West needs to decide what winning in Ukraine looks like. This has become a cliché of Western analysis and discussion, but for the very good reason that it’s correct. 

Since 2014, the US and its European partners have fudged the issue of how Russian aggression against Ukraine is finally resolved. That’s not a viable option any more (not that it ever was). 

Do Washington, Paris, Berlin, and other capitals think victory in Ukraine is a return to pre-2022 borders, pre-2014 borders, or the complete expulsion of Russian military forces from Ukrainian territory (something that has never happened in the 32 years since the USSR dissolved)? 

They need to decide now, because the future of Ukraine, Europe, and NATO all depend on it. 

All of these things involve making unpleasant choices and, just as importantly, communicating difficult messages to electorates. But pretending they are easier or less painful will only make future costs higher and US and European security more fragile. 

Tatarigami has a long, in depth analysis of the frontline dynamics in 2024. First tweet from the thread, the rest from the Thread Reader App:

Analyzing the early 2024 Frontline Dynamics.
🧵Thread

Ukrainian troops started this year with some challenges. Russian offensives and missile attacks seal a strategic initiative shift, but the overall outlook is acceptable for the AFU, despite upcoming Russian tactical gains pic.twitter.com/s2Y86u0NKl

— Tatarigami_UA (@Tatarigami_UA) January 3, 2024

2/ We expect Russian forces to continue assaults in areas like Kupyansk-Lyman, Bohdanivka-Kostyantynivka, Novobakhmutivka-Novomykhailivka, and potential counter-attacks in the southern regions, particularly the Robotyne area and Krynky. 

3/ Winter 2023 also saw a strategic initiative shift to Russian forces after Kherson’s liberation, leading to sustained offensives in Vuhledar, Kreminna, and Bakhmut. While Bakhmut was captured, humiliating defeats occurred in places like Vuhledar. 

4/ Synkivka, Kharkiv Oblast.

Russia persists in assaulting Syn’kivka, Kharkiv oblast, a defense point northeast of Kupyan’sk. Satellite imagery shows intense artillery damage and scorch marks on both sides. Current data suggests a significant Russian troop presence.

5/ Avdiivka, Donetsk oblast.

The situation in Avdiivka stays stable, without breakthroughs or collapses. Despite losses, including 211 destroyed vehicles from October to November, Russians advanced near the AKHZ plant, towards Novobakhmutivka, Stepove, and the industrial zone.

6/ Avdiivka, Donetsk oblast.

Satellite imagery and ground reports confirm a sustained Russian assault towards Novobakhmutivka and Stepove, evident from visible scorch marks. Infantry assaults continue in the AKHZ area.

7/ The Bakhmut area

The Bakhmut area is likely to become a hot zone this winter, as Russians concentrate forces on the offensive. They aim to reclaim lost positions. With Khromove falling and progress in Bohdanivka, increased pressure is expected in the direction of Chasiv Yar.

8/ Russian forces possess an advantage in ammunition and artillery numbers potentially leading to tactical successes. The defense of Klischiivka and Andriivka is challenging as both are ruined, rendering structures barely usable for defense

9/ Mariinka, Novomykhailivka, Vulhedar

Amid Mariinka’s critical situation and progress in Novomykhailivka, the Russian army aims to cut Vuhledar’s rear and logistics, intending to initiate a siege and compel defenders to retreat.

10/ While our team refrains from definitively assessing the likelihood of success, it is apparent that the Russians have succeeded in pushing Ukrainian artillery far enough to hinder their effective engagement of the railroad between Donetsk and Mariupol. 

11/ The current situation for Ukrainian troops is difficult due to personnel shortages from mobilization setbacks and ammo shortages stemming from the US Congress’s failure to approve aid. While some may view this as catastrophic, our team has a relatively positive outlook 

12/ Russian forces lack the advantage for a strategic shift, reducing the likelihood of their successes. Tactical losses are expected, resembling Ukrainian successes near Bakhmut earlier in the summer, where gains didn’t alter the overall balance of forces. 

13/ The full analysis is accessible on the website listed in my bio. Kindly consider supporting us through BuyMeaCoffee, as our expenses rely solely on your public support, and maintaining quality without financing is still challenging for us.

Don’t forget to share and like!

Avdiivka:

Fresh footage of the Bradley IFV using the 25mm cannon against Russian forces, presumably in Avdiivka operational area.https://t.co/Tjcm7hN1gW pic.twitter.com/HRC5IZSd3t

— WarTranslated (@wartranslated) January 3, 2024

Zaporizhzhia Front:

FPV strike on a group of Russian tourists near the lost Leopard 2. Video by the 33rd Brigade. Zaporizhzhia front. https://t.co/VrmvNPsWkR pic.twitter.com/DwcH8A5KkM

— Special Kherson Cat 🐈🇺🇦 (@bayraktar_1love) January 3, 2024

HIMARS strike on a Russian Zala UAV operators. Zaporizhzhia front. https://t.co/Xx8AgOpL41 pic.twitter.com/8Lv4tyPB3O

— Special Kherson Cat 🐈🇺🇦 (@bayraktar_1love) January 3, 2024

You know what this means!

Novomykhailivka, Russian occupied Donetsk Oblast:

Detonation of a Russian MT-LB kamikaze. Near Novomykhailivka, Donetsk region. https://t.co/ayUaofvFqe pic.twitter.com/EcqwdeDOII

— Special Kherson Cat 🐈🇺🇦 (@bayraktar_1love) January 3, 2024

Somewhere in Ukraine. Most likely a Russian occupied area.

The Russian army lost another one of its rare "Zoopark-1" counter-battery radar systems. The destruction took place in December 2023 and has been documented only now.

Since the full-scale invasion in February 2022, Russia lost 7 vehicles of that type.

Source:… pic.twitter.com/asfP39mPiR

— (((Tendar))) (@Tendar) January 3, 2024

The Russian army lost another one of its rare “Zoopark-1” counter-battery radar systems. The destruction took place in December 2023 and has been documented only now. Since the full-scale invasion in February 2022, Russia lost 7 vehicles of that type.

Source: https://t.me/dosye_shpiona/468…

#Ukraine

That’s enough for tonight.

Your daily Patron!

There are no new Patron tweets or videos today, so here’s some adjacent material from the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense:

Every day is the best day in the year.

📷: 59th Motorized Brigade pic.twitter.com/bIzETLYqz9

— Defense of Ukraine (@DefenceU) January 3, 2024

Open thread!