It’s sort of HIMARS O’Clock:
Screenshots of the munition. Possibly a GMLRS. pic.twitter.com/aLUMFqHa9Z
— Rob Lee (@RALee85) October 16, 2022
Fine, it’s GMLRS O’Clock! I don’t have a GMLRS O’Clock graphic though, so we’re sticking with Boris Groh’s hungry, hungry HIMARS eying the Kerch Straits Bridge.
Here’s President Zelenskyy’s address from earlier today. Video below, English transcript after the jump:
Good health to you, fellow Ukrainians!
World Food Day is celebrated on October 16. This day is established in memory of the establishment of the UN special structure dealing with poverty and famine – FAO. This is the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.
For decades, the world has worked to solve the problem of famine. And it is unlikely that any of the founders of the UN could have thought at the time that in the XXI century all of us in the world will again be forced to fight the threat of mass famine, moreover artificial famine!
A famine for which only one country in the world is responsible – Russia – and its terrorist war against the free world.
When Russia blocked our Ukrainian ports and disrupted normal food supply chains, it returned the world to a situation as if these decades of work for international food security had never existed.
Fortunately, Ukrainian ports started working again for the export of agricultural products. Since July, we have been supplying exactly the amount of food that restores stability to the world market. And precisely to those segments of the food market that ensure the consumption of some of the most fragile countries in Africa and Asia.
And although our export capabilities are still far from complete, we managed to export almost 8 million tons of food by sea – that’s more than 300 ships. 60% of this volume was directed to Africa and Asia. This is the global mission of our country: and thanks to Ukrainian supplies, entire regions of the world maintain social and political security.
And I want to thank everyone who ensures this: first of all our farmers, our transporters, port workers, our diplomats and government officials. Of course, our defenders, who hold the south and restore safety to the sea. And I want to thank our partners who managed to help with this initiative. In particular, UN Secretary-General Guterres and President of Türkiye Erdoğan.
We must do everything so that Ukrainian grain exports only expand. These are jobs for our people and export income. Plus funds to ensure a sowing campaign next year. And for the whole world this is one of the key guarantees of stability.
The way Ukraine helps maintain normal life in the world only strengthens the reputation of our state and makes it easier for us to establish new ties in different regions. This upcoming week, I expect new international results for our state.
And for the past week, it is worth noting the strengthening of contacts with Saudi Arabia. There are significant agreements. Among other things, this is the decision of the partners to provide a package of humanitarian support in the amount of 400 million dollars. It is very important. Right now we have the most meaningful relations with Saudi Arabia in 30 years.
The situation on the frontline has not undergone significant changes over the past day. The key hotspots in Donbas are Soledar and Bakhmut, where extremely heavy fighting continues. The occupiers threw everyone they could against our forces, including 2,000 “prisoners” – they are among the mercenaries right there.
And these are “convicts” with long sentences for serious crimes. They are kept at the front not only with money, but also with the promise of amnesty.
This is how the Russian state sponsors terror – it looks for murderers in prisons and promises them freedom if they kill again. Does anyone in the world still doubt whether Russia should be officially designated as a terrorist state? I don’t think so.
I thank all our warriors who are heroically holding their positions near Bakhmut, near Soledar and in all other directions where military clashes are currently ongoing – in the east, in the south of the country.
Today, in the Southern direction, I especially want to celebrate the 60th Inhulets Infantry Brigade, the 17th Separate Kryvyi Rih Tank Brigade named after Kostiantyn Pestushko, the 128th Separate Mountain Assault Zakarpattia Brigade and the 59th Separate Motorized Infantry Brigade named after Yakov Handziuk for coordinated actions in the Kherson direction and effective destruction of enemy equipment. I thank you, warriors!
I also thank the Kherson anti-aircraft missile brigade for successfully protecting our skies from Iranian drones and Russian aircraft.
Separately, I would like to note today those units that provided us with the result of replenishment of the exchange fund. This is extremely important – everyone who captures the Russian military provides us with the opportunity to release our heroes.
I thank the 54th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion named after Mykhailo Tysha, the 80th Separate Airborne Assault Brigade and the 92nd Separate Mechanized Brigade, which during the offensive significantly increased our ability to return Ukrainians home.
We remember our people detained in Russia. We must liberate them, and we must liberate them all, leaving none to the enemy. But for this we need to capture the occupiers – as many as possible.
And one more thing worth talking about today.
Due to the Russian missile terror in some cities and regions of Ukraine, energy workers have to limit the supply of electricity so that the entire system works stably. But it will be possible to avoid such stabilization blackouts if all of us in Ukraine consciously treat our consumption during peak hours. This is a small thing for every person’s life – but extremely tangible within the entire energy system. For example, this Saturday residents of the Chernihiv region limited their electricity consumption by 20 percent. I am very grateful to you. And in general in the country on average – by 10 percent. Kyiv and the region – only by 7 percent. Please do more – if you have the opportunity. From 17:00 to 23:00 we must reduce our electricity consumption. This is a step that, along with others, will ensure the failure of Russian terrorist plans.
I am grateful to everyone who defends Ukraine!
I am grateful to everyone who fights, works and helps for our victory! Unity and joint actions are our strength, the strength of Ukraine!
Glory to Ukraine!
Last night in comments I posted reporting/analysis by Jay Smart that was then quote tweeted with further analysis by Chuck Pfarrer. Several of you reacted a bit strongly to this. I added those in comments because a few minutes before I did Cole started texting asking if I’d seen anything on it. I found three legit references. Smart’s, Pfarrer’s, and one by Konrad Muzyka. Muzyka runs a security consultancy in Poland and has been focusing on Ukrainian and Russian issues since the invasion. By legit, I mean I know who they are and I can validate their credentials even if I don’t always agree with their analysis.
As I indicated in the comments, I think there are two equally plausible explanations. The first is that Smart, Pfarrer, and Muzyka are correct and the Russians, with the Belarusians in tow this time, are staging for a relatively imminent attempt to make another push to Kyiv. This would be stupid, but we’ve not exactly seen smart out of the Russians since the re-invasion started. We’ve seen brutal. We’ve seen ineffective. We’ve seen horrific. We’ve rarely seen smart. The other option is that the Russians are once again using Belarus to stage troops being moved from Russia and by doing so near the border in combination with Belarusian forces, it serves to divert Ukraine’s attention and resources just in case Russia decides to do more than use these forces as a distraction.
With the clarity that only time can bring, Andrew Roth provides further information about what seems to be going on:
Interesting OSINT report about the arrival of Russian troops in Belarus: what we can see are mobilized Russian reservists arriving at training bases, not units with offensive capabilities at the borders. Raises questions: is Belarus supposed to be simply a training site? https://t.co/wHM4ib7Ksh
— Andrew Roth (@Andrew__Roth) October 16, 2022
However, there’s also this, which could be an indicator of equipment being moved for the training of the Russian troops referenced by Roth or for a new assault as suggested by Smart, Pfarrer, and Muzyka:
The transfer of military equipment with new tactical signs was noticed near Minsk, Belarus. pic.twitter.com/a40UTGfkhn
— UkraineWorld (@ukraine_world) October 16, 2022
This is something to continue to watch and see what develops.
One further point on this before we move on, when information comes in from credible sources and initial analysis is done, analysts often default to the most deadly course of action (MDCOA) that is plausible given the information at hand. I actually had to do this for a client on Friday. Basically I was provided with a set of verifiable facts and asked what it meant. I gave two plausible explanations. The most deadly one and a completely innocuous one/least deadly one. I explained that I could, with the data I had, make equally forceful arguments for each. I wasn’t trying to have my cake and eat it too. I was trying to give my client the best answer I could given the limited, though accurate and verifiable, information I was provided. In this case, while I gave you all both of those possibilities in the comments last night, Smart, Pfarrer, and Muzyka gave only the most deadly possibility. And the reason for that is, if you don’t do worst case while a war is raging, then you will definitely be unpleasantly surprised if/when it turns out the innocuous explanation wasn’t the correct interpretation of the information. Last, last thing on this: this type of work is as much artisanry as science. So just keep that in mind too. I’m not asking you to agree with everything or everyone I post, but please remember this type of analysis isn’t an exact science. And is as much art as science.
Here is the aforementioned Chuck Pfarrer’s, former NAVDEVGRU Squadron Leader, most recent assessments of the situations in Izium and Kherson:
IZIUM/1300 UTC 16 OCT/ UKR forces have consolidated control of the H-26 HWY and the rail line leading to the city of Svatove. RU combat engineers are constructing trench systems west of the P-66 HWY between Svatove and Kremenna, indicating a local shift to defensive operations. pic.twitter.com/hvHQGYfIsH
— Chuck Pfarrer | Indications & Warnings | (@ChuckPfarrer) October 16, 2022
KHERSON/1415 UTC 16 OCT/ Today’s briefing of the UKR general staff reports a significant uptick in Close Air Support (CAS) and Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD) sorties. 35 strike missions hit 24 RU military targets, including the interdiction of 8 RU air defense complexes. pic.twitter.com/cmGI1Aob8R
— Chuck Pfarrer | Indications & Warnings | (@ChuckPfarrer) October 16, 2022
And for those who have been questioning Pfarrer’s sources, here you go:
OPSEC/ NOTE ON SOURCES: Today’s maps on Kherson and Izium reflect information revealed in [today’s] 16 OCT tactical brief of the UKR General Staff. To determine disclosure levels, you may wish to consult:https://t.co/EjejU4EFd9 pic.twitter.com/u7ytTRm6n5
— Chuck Pfarrer | Indications & Warnings | (@ChuckPfarrer) October 16, 2022
This is interesting:
Comparison of Russian and Ukrainian attack schemes:
I decided to compare the offensive of Russia in the spring and the counteroffensive of Ukraine in September in order to understand the reasons for such different results 1/17 #RussiaUkraineWar #kharkivcounteroffensive pic.twitter.com/VcOIVOidfW— Volodymyr Dacenko (@Volodymyr_D_) October 15, 2022
Here’s the rest from the Thread Reader app:
2/ Russia
From the very beginning of the war, Russia built its offensive operations along the main highways and key population centers. This is understandable because the Russian offensive relied primarily on heavily armored vehicles.3/ In this war we saw tank columns trying to storm a city without any infantry, air, or artillery cover. Which is an absolutely failed strategy.
4/ This led to the fact that tank columns were ambushed. Large forces could be blocked in narrow directions, as we saw near Kyiv, where a column of equipment stretched for tens of kilometers.5/ Since May, Russia has somewhat changed its tactics, increasingly using assault groups of light infantry (mainly mobilized in Luhansk and Donetsk). The task of which is to find a weak spot in the defense for further breakthroughs of the main forces.6/ The attacks were accompanied by massive artillery fire. In May-June, Russia apparently reached the peak of the use of its artillery. At that time, the number of shots reached 50-65 thousand shells per day, if we rely on the data of the Ukrainian military.7/ But the concept of the Russian attack remained unchanged. Russia moves from one settlement to another, moving along the main roads.
The disadvantage of this strategy is:
1) high military losses (because the Russians carry out a lot of assaults, most of which are unsuccessful);8/
2) high dependence on Soviet artillery, which requires intensive logistics and a large number of warehouses;
3) the slowness of the war (instead of one attack, the Russians have to repeat the same sequence with each subsequent city).9/ All this led to the fact that in July-August Russia no longer had enough forces to continue the massive offensive. In July, the Russians called it an “operational pause”, but later the “pause” turned into a retreat and flight of Russian soldiers from Kharkiv Oblast10/ Ukraine
Ukraine has built a completely different concept of attack. Many mobile groups move not on the main roads but on forest and steppe roads. These groups “fill the space” between Russian forces, cut supply routes and create the effect of a local encirclement.11/ After breaking through the defensive line, the second offensive line attacks the Russian positions from different directions.
This requires high coordination of actions and reliable communication in order to understand where one’s own/someone else’s is.12/ Russia has very poor intelligence and coordination. After the breakthrough of the defense line, the military command often does not understand the operational situation, receives information with a significant delay, and therefore makes many wrong decisions13/ Often, the Russian military retreats when they should rush into battle. And vice versa – they continue the fight when they should retreat.
This leads to high military losses during the retreat.14/ Result:
Russia has a significant advantage in the number of armored vehicles and artillery, but this creates big problems for logistics. The Russian army needs a lot of fuel and ammunition.15/ Because of this, the Russian army is “clumsy”. Poor coordination, intelligence, and training of soldiers only worsen the situation.16/ The Ukrainian army is much more mobile and organized. Ukraine has better intelligence, which allows you to accurately assess the situation on the battlefield.17/ But the insufficient number of armored vehicles leads to the fact that a large part of the army is made up of light infantry, which is unprotected from artillery fire (especially during the offensive).
This morning it was reported that Iran is transferring ballistic missiles to Russia. There is no longer any doubt where Israel should stand in this bloody conflict. The time has come for Ukraine to receive military aid as well, just as the USA and NATO countries provide.
— נחמן שי- Nachman Shai (@DrNachmanShai) October 16, 2022
Shai is the Israeli ambassador to the Jewish diaspora. Whether the Israeli government will heed his counsel I cannot say.
Here is the Middlebury Institute’s non-proliferation subject matter expert, Jeffrey Lewis’s, analysis:
We've created detailed models of both Iranian missiles, using official statements (in table below), mensuration, and computer modeling. Comments welcome; we're constantly iterating these models. I've shared the parameters of the models are in the next couple of tweets. pic.twitter.com/FR8myxwIPY
— Dr. Jeffrey Lewis (@ArmsControlWonk) October 16, 2022
- The Fateh-110 is capable of delivering a 500 kg payload to about 300 km. Our model, below, suggests this might understate its performance. Combat use in Ukraine might answer some questions we have. https://sketchfab.com/3d-models/fateh-110-c633c991879e42af9fa778869944df8b
- When @fab_hinzwas still at CNS, we made an estimate of the Fateh-110’s accuracy (circular error probable) based on the missile strike against Ain Al Assad. I think it’s quite likely the missile has a CEP of about 15 m, as Iranian sources have stated.
- The Zolfaghar can carry a 600 kg payload to about 700 km. Our model suggests that Iran achieved that by both making the missile bigger and, more importantly, by using a wound-filament airframe. https://sketchfab.com/3d-models/zolfaghar-321f08ac70ae406393c86d57fe4a7ee1
- One of the happier days I’ve had a work was when I learned our best measurers could reliably estimate the size difference between the Fateh-110 (610 mm) and the Zolfaghar (680 mm) under favorable conditions — a difference of just ~10 percent.
- Our performance estimates, using STK Missile Toolkit, indicate that the range extension is more about the reduced weight of the airframe than the larger size of the missile. Missile Toolkit is is one hell of a piece of software.
There are tables and images at Lewis’s thread if you want to see them.
Speaking of ATACMS, file this under plausible, but in need of further validation:
NOTE: ATACMS were provided to Romania in recent months. Many analysts, including Indications & Warnings, have concluded that UKR used ATACMs systems against the Saki airfield and the Kerch Straits bridge. https://t.co/Ap05mNnmu2 pic.twitter.com/BQgUcV2Na7
— Chuck Pfarrer | Indications & Warnings | (@ChuckPfarrer) October 16, 2022
What’s Russian air defense doing?
SEADs of DESTRUCTION: UKR's Gen'l Staff revealed today thatin the last 24 hrs, eight RU air defense systems were destroyed in Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD) missions. This TOR battery was hit in Kherson- likely by a NATO supplied HARM (High speed Anti-Radiation Missile). https://t.co/JwCrhyPS1p pic.twitter.com/VrHRkmGPsI
— Chuck Pfarrer | Indications & Warnings | (@ChuckPfarrer) October 16, 2022
Blowing up!
And speaking of Kabooms:
Footage of Donetsk mayor’s office after Ukrainian strikes today. pic.twitter.com/uS2lnXlexA
— Leonid ХВ Ragozin (@leonidragozin) October 16, 2022
Nothing like a little urban renewal.
Bounty on Igor Girkin (Strelkov) has been increased to 100,000 USD. That will make a more valuable target for his “fellow” soldiers. #Ukraine pic.twitter.com/UhPsjw8CgP
— (((Tendar))) (@Tendar) October 16, 2022
Girkin is one of the people responsible for Russia’s initial invasion of Ukraine in 2014. He’s a member of the Black Sea Cossacks – one of the free ones, not the service ones* – and cut his teeth doing these types of dirty deeds in Moldova in the early 1990s when he helped the Soviet dead enders break away and form Transnistria. He is overdue for a comeuppance.
The last thing for tonight, before what you’re really here for (Patron…), is the AP’s deep dive into Russia’s theft of Ukrainian children: (emphasis mine)
Olga Lopatkina paced around her basement in circles like a trapped animal. For more than a week, the Ukrainian mother had heard nothing from her six adopted children stranded in Mariupol, and she was going out of her mind with worry.
The kids had spent their vacation at a resort in the port city, as usual. But this time war with Russia had broken out, and her little ones — always terrified of the dark — were abandoned in a besieged city with no light and no hope. All they had now was her oldest son, Timofey, who was still himself just 17.
The questions looped endlessly in her head: Should she try to rescue the children herself — and risk being killed, making them orphans yet again? Or should she campaign to get them out from afar — and risk them being killed or falling into the hands of the Russians?
She had no idea her dilemma would lead her straight into a battle against Russia, with the highest stakes of her life.
Russia’s open effort to adopt Ukrainian children and bring them up as Russian is already well underway, in one of the most explosive issues of the war, an Associated Press investigation shows.
Thousands of children have been found in the basements of war-torn cities like Mariupol and at orphanages in the Russian-backed separatist territories of Donbas. They include those whose parents were killed by Russian shelling as well as others in institutions or with foster families, known as “children of the state.”
Russia claims that these children don’t have parents or guardians to look after them, or that they can’t be reached. But the AP found that officials have deported Ukrainian children to Russia or Russian-held territories without consent, lied to them that they weren’t wanted by their parents, used them for propaganda, and given them Russian families and citizenship.
The investigation is the most extensive to date on the grab of Ukrainian children, and the first to follow the process all the way to those already growing up in Russia. The AP drew from dozens of interviews with parents, children and officials in both Ukraine and Russia; emails and letters; Russian documents and Russian state media.
Whether or not they have parents, raising the children of war in another country or culture can be a marker of genocide, an attempt to erase the very identity of an enemy nation. Prosecutors say it also can be tied directly to Russian President Vladimir Putin, who has explicitly supported the adoptions.
“It’s not something that happens spur of the moment on the battlefield,” said Stephen Rapp, a former U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues who is advising Ukraine on prosecutions. “And so your ability to attribute responsibility to the highest level is much greater here.”
Even where parents are dead, Rapp said, their children must be sheltered, fostered or adopted in Ukraine rather than deported to Russia.
Russian law prohibits the adoption of foreign children. But in May, Putin signed a decree making it easier for Russia to adopt and give citizenship to Ukrainian children without parental care — and harder for Ukraine and surviving relatives to win them back.
Russia also has prepared a register of suitable Russian families for Ukrainian children, and pays them for each child who gets citizenship — up to $1,000 for those with disabilities. It holds summer camps for Ukrainian orphans, offers “patriotic education” classes and even runs a hotline to pair Russian families with children from Donbas.
“It is absolutely a terrible story,” said Petro Andryushchenko, an adviser to the Mariupol mayor, who claims hundreds of children were taken from that city alone. “We don’t know if our children have an official parent or (stepparents) or something else because they are forcibly disappeared by Russian troops.”
The picture is complicated by the fact that many children in Ukraine’s so-called orphanages are not orphans at all. Ukraine’s government acknowledged to the U.N. before the war that most children of the state “are not orphans, have no serious illness or disease and are in an institution because their families are in difficult circumstances.”
Nevertheless, Russia portrays its adoption of Ukrainian children as an act of generosity that gives new homes and medical resources to helpless minors. Russian state media shows local officials hugging and kissing them and handing them Russian passports.
It’s very hard to pin down the exact number of Ukrainian children deported to Russia — Ukrainian officials claim nearly 8,000. Russia hasn’t given an overall number, but officials regularly announce the arrival of Ukrainian orphans in Russian military planes.
In March, Russian children’s rights ombudswoman Maria Lvova-Belova said more than 1,000 children from Ukraine were in Russia. Over the summer, she said 120 Russian families had applied for guardianship, and more than 130 Ukrainian children had received Russian citizenship. Many more have come since, including a batch of 234 in early October.
Much, much, much more at the link. Including video and pictures.
Your daily Patron!
Dancing Sunday from Ukraine 🇺🇦 pic.twitter.com/KZ3dPtIPXa
— Patron (@PatronDsns) October 16, 2022
And a new video from Patron’s official TikTok:
@patron__dsns Ось так! #славаукраїні #песпатрон #патрондснс
The caption machine translates as:
That’s right! #SlavaUkraini #PatrontheDog #PatronDSNS
Open thread!
* To quickly explain and definitely oversimplify, free cossacks are those born into a cossack family. Service cossacks are non-cossacks who sign a contract to become cossacks.
War for Ukraine Day 235: Another Day, Another Russian War CrimePost + Comments (99)