As Betty wrote this morning, and as I’ve written about here and here, Congressman Nunes and his staff have put together a cherrypicked memo, based on classified information provided to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence by the Department of Justice and the FBI. They are threatening to release it against the objections of the DOJ and the FBI. The purpose of the memo, and the selected leaking by Congressman Nunes and his partners in crime – Congressman Meadows and Jordan of the Freedom Caucus, Congressman Gaetz and DeSantis of Florida, and others – is to accuse senior career officials of the the DOJ and FBI of acting improperly in an attempt to undermine these two agencies and by extension Special Prosecutor Mueller and his investigation. From yesterday’s reporting we now have confirmation that the central charge of Nunes as stated in his memo involves now Deputy Attorney General Rosenstein’s allegedly using information from the Steele Dossier to get a FISA warrant for Carter Page. Either Congressman Nunes, despite chairing the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, doesn’t understand how the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) approves or extends warrants under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act or he’s being disingenuous in pursuit of political objectives.
Former FBI Special Agent Asha Rangappa, who worked counterintelligence investigations, has done a couple of twitter postings explaining the process. She also went on CNN today to explain how this all works. The video and the timelines are below, but the Bottom Line Up Front, is that the DOJ and FBI have an internal team that vets FISA warrant applications for warrants and extensions to approved warrants before they’re brought before the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. One of the reasons that the FISC approves over 90% of the warrant applications brought before it, is because the ones that don’t survive a high level of presubmission review scrutiny don’t make it to the FISC.
Here’s the video:
Here are the narrative explanations, but for those that would rather not read tweet storms, she also wrote an explainer about this at Just Security.
This first one is in regard to the overall FISA warrant application process:
3. Because you are not necessarily intending to gather evidence of a crime the standard is not as high as a criminal wiretap (Title III).
— Asha Rangappa (@AshaRangappa_) September 18, 2017
5. For U.S. persons (USPERS), the std is slightly higher: that the target is "knowingly engaging in clandestine intelligence activities"
— Asha Rangappa (@AshaRangappa_) September 18, 2017
7. in fact, obtaining foreign intel regarding the alleged intelligence activities. (For nonUSPERS, there is a 90 day check-in, and then it
— Asha Rangappa (@AshaRangappa_) September 18, 2017
9. The CNN report suggests that Manafort was at least under investigation going back to 2014, though unclear when monitoring started.
— Asha Rangappa (@AshaRangappa_) September 18, 2017
11. foreign intel was being obtained and shown (repeatedly) to a court.
— Asha Rangappa (@AshaRangappa_) September 18, 2017
13. IMO it just shows that the checks were working and the court taking its oversight seriously. If there was a 90-day period where there
— Asha Rangappa (@AshaRangappa_) September 18, 2017
15. Having explained the process, it's worth noting that Manafort plays a central role in the so-called Steele Dossier
— Asha Rangappa (@AshaRangappa_) September 18, 2017
17. (though without knowing what it picked up, doesn't confirm every allegation in Dossier)
— Asha Rangappa (@AshaRangappa_) September 18, 2017
19. b/w Russia and Manafort (and potentially others). But note that gap happened to cover time of Trump Tower meeting.
— Asha Rangappa (@AshaRangappa_) September 18, 2017
21. Second, identities of USPERS picked up in communications are "masked"…UNLESS knowing who they are is relevant to understanding intel
— Asha Rangappa (@AshaRangappa_) September 18, 2017
CORRECTION: In point #8 I meant *isn't* obtained, sorry
— Asha Rangappa (@AshaRangappa_) September 18, 2017
This second one is basically the narrative rundown of the video above:
4. In deciding whether to approve an extension of surveillance, the DOJ has to show the FISA court that the surveillance has yielded actual, valuable foreign intelligence information that is relevant to the underlying case, and that target is acting on behalf of foreign intel.
— Asha Rangappa (@AshaRangappa_) January 29, 2018
6. KEY PIECE OF INFORMATION: Keep in mind that once a FISA begins on a USPER, the DOJ has to check in with the court *every 90 days* and provide evidence that they are getting foreign intel in order to extend the FISA for longer. Why is this important?
— Asha Rangappa (@AshaRangappa_) January 29, 2018
8. Again, that December extension would have been reviewed and approved by a federal FISA court judge. And it would have happened well before Rosenstein came on the scene. (This also reveals that the original FISA application had a valid basis.)
— Asha Rangappa (@AshaRangappa_) January 29, 2018
10. In approving an application for an extension in March 2017, Rosenstein would have been looking at whether there was enough new intel from Dec-Mar to justify going back into court. Again, nothing to do with dossier, completely std, and if approved by FISC, clearly warranted.
— Asha Rangappa (@AshaRangappa_) January 29, 2018
Stay frosty!
Open thread.
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