No Matter What Happens in the World, Ukraine Will Be Strong; This Is the Most Important Thing – Address by the President

15 October 2024 – 18:45

I wish you health, fellow Ukrainians!

Today, I held a meeting of the Staff – an Energy Staff – to discuss all the key issues of winterization and the protection of energy facilities. Each service and all institutions have clear tasks. Reports were provided on each level of energy system protection. The Prime Minister, the Minister of Energy, and representatives of regional authorities from the most vulnerable regions reported. There was a report by the Commander of the Air Force on air defense: shooting down missiles and drones, as well as our electronic warfare system. We discussed the format for strengthening air defense, and we already have certain decisions regarding “Shahed” drones and some types of missiles. Today, the CEO of Naftogaz, Chernyshov, also reported on the accumulation of gas in storage facilities, and relevant infrastructure protection issues. All elements of winterization – electricity, gas, coal – the things we expect, the things we are preparing for, and the things we need help with from our partners – are absolutely clearly defined.

There was a mandatory report by Commander-in-Chief Syrskyi. Regarding the frontline. The situation is challenging, but we are holding our positions, and I am grateful to every brigade, every soldier, sergeant and officer who ensures our resilience. The Kursk operation was mentioned separately. We continue to carry out the defined tasks.

Today, the Minister of Defense delivered a report. Regarding my instructions to increase funding for our domestic Ukrainian arms production. Drones, electronic warfare, artillery. Attracting investment from our partners. Our capabilities. By the end of this month, we will have specific new contracts in our Ukrainian defense production. And this is one of our top priorities. No matter what happens in the world, Ukraine will be strong. This is the most important thing.

And one more thing.

Yesterday, I spoke with Mark Rutte, NATO Secretary General. We coordinated our positions on strengthening Ukraine. Thank you, Mark, for your support!

I thank everyone who stands with Ukraine! I thank all our people – those who are fighting, those who are working, those who are helping.

Glory to Ukraine!

Here’s is the executive summary of the Carnegie Endowment’s Michael Kofman’s assessment of Russian military adaptation in 2023:

Before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the Russian military had made choices and trade-offs in its force design that positioned it poorly for the type of war it ended up fighting. These choices were compounded by the unworkable concept of operations being executed during the invasion and the political assumptions that drove it. For most of 2022, the Russian military struggled with the consequences of these decisions, its own shortcomings, and a structural manpower deficit. Initial adaptations yielded poor results in the prevailing operating environment. But, by late 2022, the Russian political leadership committed to a prolonged conventional war. The military began to demonstrate a capacity for learning and adaptation, enabled by Russia’s partial mobilization of 300,000 personnel, and increased defense-industrial production.

During the second year of the war, Russian military leaders revised prior decisions on force structure, experimented with small unit tactics, adopted new technologies, and developed specialized assault detachments. Initially, mobilization stabilized the front lines and closed manpower gaps within the Russian armed forces, but it did not restore offensive potential to the force, which continued to demonstrate tactical rigidity and doctrinal inflexibility. Yet, the monthslong battle for Bakhmut, fought primarily by the Wagner Group, led to the systematic adoption of assault groupings, and expendable convict-staffed formations across the Russian military. This eventually resulted in new types of assault tactics, and units, with those practices expanding across the force.

Russian forces proved more flexible and effective in the conduct of defensive operations in 2023 through a combination of maneuver and positional defense to halt Ukraine’s offensive. Russian units expanded significantly, integrated new types of formations, and mounted a doctrinally modified defense with successful use of support elements. Despite this, the Russian military remained committed to the concept of an active defense, defending forward and aggressively counterattacking in a manner that proved costly to the force. Ukraine’s offensive failed, but Ukrainian units were able to inflict significant losses to defending Russian forces over the course of four months.

In the Russian military combined arms integration improved at the lower unit level, but could not enable maneuver by larger formations. Russian forces also adapted relatively quickly in employing uncrewed aerial systems and deploying new types of electronic warfare systems on the battlefield. By late 2023, they were increasingly capable of dynamic targeting at the tactical level, with better integration of reconnaissance, fires, and electronic warfare. Despite this evolution, the Russian military struggled to attain a decisive advantage in offensive actions. Fundamental problems in force quality persisted, with offensives largely relegated to small scale unit action, or costly mechanized assaults that failed to achieve breakthroughs. Despite tactical adaptations, assaults on prepared defenses led to grinding battles. The net effect was incremental Russian gains at high cost, as Russian forces proved unable to attain operationally significant breakthroughs when possessing quantitative advantages in manpower, materiel, and munitions.

And the conclusion:

Over the course of 2023, the Russian military demonstrated both its significant limitations, and the ability to adapt, or learn from the battlefield. This adaptation was apparent in its rapid adoption of new technologies and tactics, particularly the use of uncrewed aerial systems and electronic warfare. Russian armed forces developed new types of force structures for the conduct of assault operations, leveraging the use of expendable forces and evolving those formations. They similarly evolved the force to better integrate UAS, and EW, and deployed new systems across the force. They redressed a number of the problems demonstrated in their force design choices and conduct of operations in 2022. These included significant adjustments and reconsideration to prior force design, deployment of new types of capabilities, and doctrinal modifications, especially in the conduct of defensive operations. The Russian military and the Russian state as a whole invested in adjustments to conduct a protracted conventional war, addressing structural manpower issues, increasing munitions production, facilitating equipment repair, and to an extent mobilizing the defense industry (although some sectors continued to struggle).

In general, the Russian military appeared more capable in conducting defensive operations than in restoring its offensive potential in 2023. Mobilization in 2022 and a successful national recruitment campaign enabled Russian force structure expansion. This created the conditions for force structure adjustments and allowed Russia to generate new units. Throughout the year, the Russian military expanded the use of convicts on the battlefield, instituting convict formations as a post-Wagner phenomenon, as well as volunteer units of various types. Use of convicts by Wagner was seen as a successful way to field expendable forces on the battlefield, with many of the tactics and practices adopted by the Russian military. Dependency on convict-staffed formations, and assault units of various stripes, engendered greater specialization in small-unit assault tactics. Despite occasional large-scale attacks by mechanized formations, much of the day-to-day fighting was carried by small detachments in the absence of a better capacity to conduct offensive operations at scale.

The Russian military proved effective at copying successful Ukrainian tactics or adopting the types of systems employed and scaling defense-industrial production to deploy them across the force. Ukrainian forces were advantaged in bottom-up innovation and integration via indigenously produced software. The interaction between Ukrainian civil society, and a military that empowered junior leadership, led to greater ease of adoption and use in conjunction with existing commercial applications, or those developed by Ukrainian companies. The Russian military took longer to adapt, but the defense-industrial complex was overall better at scaling up production when directed to provide solutions. The likely reason is Russia had more capital, more industrial capacity, and much greater state control over both parts of that equation. Western support for Ukraine did not translate into funding for its industry or defense sector. Russia was also able to expand production lines of successful systems or develop new variants over the course of the war. Much the same could be said for the Russian deployment of counters to Western precision-strike capabilities and steady improvement of its ability to engage in dynamic targeting on the battlefield. On the whole, in 2023 the Russian military fared better in its ability to implement operational concepts and translate into practice some of the tactical approaches that the force could not execute in the first year of the war.

However, the net effect of these changes was insufficient to restore Russian ability to conduct ground force operations at scale, overcome prepared defenses, or break through Ukrainian lines to achieve operationally significant gains. The Russian military continued to struggle with force quality and the loss of experienced officers, particularly as Ukrainian defensive capabilities and tactics matured. Neither force has been standing still, and as both improved their ability to mount an organized defense, the challenge of conducting offensive operations grew in proportion. In 2022 and early 2023, the Russian military conducted its assaults with formations that cobbled together what fighting capacity remained across the force. This further wasted remaining combat power and degraded the force quality, which would take time to recover. This was evidenced by the steady transition of Territorial Troop units from being used to replace losses, to holding parts of the defensive line, and eventually evolving to conduct offensive operations alongside the regular active duty force. Leveraging convicts, developing new tactics and structures for their employment, and expanding the use of expendable units was a successful, but ultimately negative adaptation during this period. These approaches have persisted and were expanded in 2024. But despite a significant advantage in manpower, only a small portion of the Russian military is being used in any given time to conduct offensive operations.

Although, notably, the Russian military restored its ability to integrate combined arms at lower echelons (the platoon, company, and in some cases battalion levels), conducting such operations at scale remained challenging. One possible reason is that force regeneration creates a catch-22 whereby the most experienced formations are often exhausted, and short of assault capable units while newly generated formations are well-equipped but inexperienced. Units are given Storm assault companies to use in offensives, but these are largely limited to small unit infantry tactics. Experienced formations seek to minimize their losses, preserving equipment, and therefore tend to use expendable combat power where possible. Newer units have the personnel, and equipment, but are likely to suffer high losses early on because they are in experienced and led by green officers.

Russian forces have also not been able to regenerate the necessary enablers to overcome a prepared defense, and heavy investments in UAS only deepened the static nature of the fight over the course of 2023. Rather than providing a decisive advantage, the expansion of UAS in various roles on the battlefield reinforced the observed preference for destruction-oriented approaches and a war characterized much more by attrition than maneuver. Superficially, Ukraine’s recent Kursk offensive may seem a counterpoint to this overall assessment. Ukraine’s breakthrough at Kursk does suggest the direction that force employment is taking with better integration of novel capabilities, but Kursk is not reflective of the prevailing conditions and density of defenses typically encountered in this war. Neither side has enjoyed great success in overcoming a prepared defense when properly organized, manned, and backed by fire support.

Russian forces continued to experiment with ways to attain breakthroughs, but these remained focused on small formations, employing improvised assault vehicles on the basis of modified tanks or infantry fighting vehicles. Assault vehicles were used to clear lanes through mines and soak up FPV drone strikes ahead of those vehicles delivering troops. Other experiments involved high mobility in open terrain, using motorcycles or all-terrain vehicles to deliver troops quickly to assault defense positions. Both approaches showed limited effectiveness and were quite costly to either men or equipment. To be clear, the Russian military has not abandoned mechanized assault backed by fire support as a means of effecting beaches in opponent’s lines. Through 2023 and 2024 Russian forces continued to mount mechanized assaults, typically as reinforced companies, but these often led to losses rather than breakthroughs. The loss of equipment and personnel would then force a shift back to small-unit tactics, and efforts to incrementally shift the line of control.

Yet, Western planners and military leaders would do themselves a disservice to interpret this war as one of two forces struggling with challenges that Western militaries could easily overcome. The problems observed are not uncommon, and offer important observations, if not enduring lessons. Prolonged conventional wars come down to attrition, reconstitution, and defense industrial mobilization. They are also cycles of innovation and adaptation, as new capabilities are introduced and countered. The Russian military’s degradation is a result of the attrition suffered and the difficulty of restoring force quality. The need to replace losses competes with the requirements to generate new formations. This war illustrates the difficulty of scaling adaptation across an increasingly uneven force and translating tactical innovations into new warfighting concepts. Western militaries could face similar pressures and dynamics in a prolonged conventional conflict.

Overcoming a prepared defense remains a central challenge to consider after the initial period of any war. Western forces should review current capabilities, tactics, and assumption on how they would deal with traditional challenges, backed by UAS, and non-line of sight precision strike munitions. Geography continues to matter significantly, whether the difficulty of overcoming rivers, fighting in forests, or conducting sieges in urban terrain. Emphasis on long range precision strike can lead to a degree of blindness regarding difficulties observed in the close battle. In short, being effective in the “deep battle” represents only one piece of the puzzle. The absence of air superiority for either side should not be taken as an alibi, assuming that were it present it could have a talismanic effect on the battlefield. Airpower is one of the West’s principal advantages and areas of investment but air superiority needs to be achieved, and maintained. Some challenges, such as mass employment of small UAS at low altitudes for reconnaissance and strike purposes, do not have obvious airpower solutions.

Finally, after the Russian military’s initially dismal performance in 2022, it became commonplace among Western planners and military leaders to overcorrect previous assessments of the Russian military or presume that analysts simply did not know much about the Russian armed forces. In fairness, there was a large gap between predictions, and outcomes in the initial period of war. Knowledge of any adversary military is incomplete at best, and in some cases it is clear that Russia’s military leadership itself did not know or understand the weakness within their own force. Knowledge of any military does not necessarily translate to foresight in how it will perform in a specific context, given the need to factor in military strategy, political assumptions, choices made by individual leaders, the opposing force, and that which often comes down to contingency, among other variables. Initial impressions, as is often the case in war, were based on incomplete information and the anchoring effect of early diagnoses of Russian failures. Causality was not well-established, and little was known about the battles that proved decisive in shaping outcomes. Those interpretations had some evidentiary basis, but the narrative of Russian inability to learn was oversubscribed. Much of the same can be said about notional assumptions regarding Russian morale and its implications for the force’s staying power.

Looking at the Russian military’s shortcomings, adaptation, and capacity for learning in 2023 provides a useful corrective and helps balance the conversation. However, this remains an exploratory study, as much of the record is incomplete and will undoubtedly be revised or corrected over time. The Russian military continues to undergo periods of degradation and reconstitution. Operations provide new information from the battlefield for both sides. A given view of Russian military performance is not necessarily wrong, but needs to be mindful of context, and the period of war it is based on. What was true in 2023 may not hold for 2024, and beyond. Therefore, the conclusions here should be taken with the appropriate caveats, rather than as an attempt at a definitive account or an appeal to sole authority on this subject.

Former British diplomat Tim Willaset-Wilsey has a published a no holds barred strategic assessment of what Ukraine is facing at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI). Let’s start with the conclusions:

What would a betrayed Ukraine look like? At least it would retain some 82% of its territory. A guilty West would doubtless provide aid to rebuild infrastructure. It might be given a pathway to eventual EU membership (unless that option had been bargained away at the negotiating table), but joining the Western club may have lost its appeal at that point. Ukraine’s corrupt oligarchs would re-emerge from hibernation. The old post-Soviet cynicism would replace the youthful enthusiasm of the Maidan generation. There would be antagonism towards those returning from abroad after avoiding the fight, and – of course – thousands of grieving families.

This should have been Europe’s war to manage. In spite of decades of discussion about European defence, it proved too convenient to rely on US largesse. This made Europe a prisoner of US electoral factors. It also caused Europe to shirk the difficult decisions that helping win the war entailed: the big increases in defence expenditure, the 24-hour working in ammunition factories, the hikes in food and energy costs and the political risks such as seizing frozen assets. What remains now for Europe is to secure a place at the negotiating table and to argue for NATO membership for Ukraine as part of any settlement.

Failing that, the West will have years to repent the betrayal of the courageous Ukrainians, whose only crime was their wish to join the Western democratic order.

And here’s some of the build up to them.

The new NATO Secretary General, Mark Rutte, lost no time in visiting Kyiv after he assumed office, where he ‘pledged continued support for Ukraine in its war with Russia’. Doubtless his words were sincerely intended, but he knows there are serious political headwinds across Europe and the US.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky senses this too as he briefs his ‘Victory Plan’ around European capitals following a mixed reception in Washington.

The forthcoming presidential election in the US represents the point of maximum danger. A win by Donald Trump could see him placing a phone call to Russian President Vladimir Putin as early as 6 November. Any such call would set expectations of a negotiated settlement, with discussions possibly beginning in the early months of 2025.

Nobody should want this war of ‘meat grinder’ savagery to continue a day longer than necessary. However, Zelensky would have much to fear from a deal negotiated by Trump. The 2020 Doha Accords with the Afghan Taliban have been described as the worst diplomatic agreement since Munich in 1938. Fortunately, Trump was prevented from reaching a similarly disastrous deal with Kim Jong-un of North Korea.

In any such deal, Zelensky would be unlikely to secure the recovery of Crimea and the Donbas, reparations for the massive damage to his country, war crimes trials or membership of NATO. He might be able to bargain the Kursk salient in return for control of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant. But, without NATO membership and its Article 5 guarantee, there would be nothing to stop Putin from continuing the war after a couple of years of recovery and rearmament.

For Europe, too, there would be peril. Both Georgia and Moldova look particularly fragile and vulnerable to Russian active measures or hybrid warfare. Even the Baltics would be justifiably nervous, in spite of their NATO status.

However, it would be misleading to blame everything on Trump. There have been plenty of prior indications of trouble ahead.

US support has always been too little, too late. Given the sheer scale of Washington’s military support this might sound absurd, but President Joe Biden’s hesitancy in allowing Storm Shadow missiles to be used against targets inside Russia is indicative of a general trend. As the head of a global superpower, Biden has always had one eye on ensuring that the war does not get out of hand and become nuclear. The result has been that Ukraine feels it has been given enough not to lose but not enough to win.

In Europe the support has been varied. Some countries, such as the Baltics, the Scandinavian states, the UK and Poland, have done better than others. Hungary has been hostile, and may soon be joined by Slovakia and Austria. Germany has provided the most weapons but has been politically unreliable. Its refusal to supply Taurus missiles and its public debate about reducing its defence budget have sent all the wrong messages. German companies continue to retain significant interests in Russia, and the advance of Alternative for Germany in elections in Thuringia, Saxony and Brandenburg reminded Chancellor Olaf Scholz that there is little support for the war in Eastern Germany. President Emmanuel Macron of France, having been mercurial about Ukraine from the outset, received a similar jolt from the far left and far right in legislative elections in July.

The most visible sign of a failure of collective determination to defeat Russia was the decision not to seize Russian financial assets frozen in Western banks, but instead to use them as collateral to raise a much smaller loan. Yes, there would have been a theoretical risk of undermining faith in the Western-dominated financial system, but few countries are yet ready to entrust their savings to Chinese or Indian banks. Furthermore, it would have sent a message to Putin not to invade other countries.

Meanwhile, the crisis in the Middle East has diverted foreign policy and public attention. In Iraq and Afghanistan 20 years ago, the West demonstrated that it does not have the policy bandwidth to cope with two simultaneous campaigns. The events since 7 October 2023 have done untold damage to Ukraine’s prospects and to the West’s much-vaunted rules-based international order.

More at the link.

Here is Tatarigami’s most recent strategic assessment:

I’ll say what many might think but hesitate to voice: Ukraine is currently losing the war, and the trend is negative unless drastic measures are taken.

Debates over what constitutes loss or victory can be had, and yes, Ukraine’s survival so far is a big win. But even if Russia…

— Tatarigami_UA (@Tatarigami_UA) October 15, 2024

I’ll say what many might think but hesitate to voice: Ukraine is currently losing the war, and the trend is negative unless drastic measures are taken.

Debates over what constitutes loss or victory can be had, and yes, Ukraine’s survival so far is a big win. But even if Russia halts advances and goes on the defensive, we lack the resources to reclaim territories to the 2022 borders, let alone the 1991 borders. This is due to many factors: delayed mobilization, insufficient aid, weak sanctions enforcement, a lack of political will in the West, poor military decisions, delayed aid due to de-escalation concerns, and the sheer reality of fighting a country with four times our population, with superior numbers in almost all domains and one of the largest military industries, supported by regimes like North Korea, which contribute more than some European countries with far larger GDPs.

Manpower shortages are another issue, but that’s a separate discussion. Ukrainian leadership bears a good part of the responsibility for these problems. Still, if the West can’t supply the 14 brigades Zelensky requested, why discuss drafting hundreds of thousands more? We need to completely re-arm way more existing brigades. Who’s going to pay for them? Let’s be honest – there’s little enthusiasm in the U.S. or Europe to fund this.

If Russia retains its occupied territories, it will undermine one of Europe’s core security principles: that borders cannot be redrawn by invading force. In 2014, Russia violated this order, leading to the 2022 invasion. This time, it’s not just Ukraine that will have failed – it’s Ukraine, the U.S., and Western Europe’s failure to defeat Russia.

Some might cite Finland’s Winter War, as an example of what Ukraine should have done, but that war lasted three months and ended with Finland ceding territory, paying reparations in the form of machinery, and renting a port to the Soviets. Ukraine’s demographics today are also very different: the 18-25 age group is among the smallest, a reality across modern Europe.

Unless Ukraine and the West create a serious plan to radically increase aid to support mobilization – where Ukraine commits to mobilizing more people on the condition that they are properly armed and trained, and the West provides robust air defense to intercept missiles as decisively as the U.S. does for Israel – Ukraine will lose the war of attrition. This will force unfavorable peace, and mass migration from Ukraine to other countries, setting a dangerous precedent, and making it look like the West lost to Russia in the eyes of the world, especially among the enemies of the West

None of the above is a mystery to President Zelenskyy or the other senior leaders in Ukraine. Which provides the real context for this portion of his address today:

No matter what happens in the world, Ukraine will be strong. This is the most important thing.

President Zelenskyy is preparing the Ukrainians for a future where they may have to go it alone.

The Ukrainians are continuing to crowd source their war effort,

Hello,

It seems donations have come to a halt, and my latest fundraiser for engineering equipment is struggling—likely due to the political season in the U.S. and declining global interest in Ukraine’s situation.

🎯$71500/$120000

So, I wanted to show you just how much impact a… pic.twitter.com/7M14Lh0Sk9

— ✙ 🔼Constantine 🔼✙ (@Teoyaomiquu) October 15, 2024

Hello,

It seems donations have come to a halt, and my latest fundraiser for engineering equipment is struggling—likely due to the political season in the U.S. and declining global interest in Ukraine’s situation.

🎯$71500/$120000

So, I wanted to show you just how much impact a single excavator—purchased with your help—can make and how essential it is to our efforts.

Right now, it’s being used to build new fortifications, dig trenches, and move logs and construction materials. It’s helping address manpower shortages and reducing the strain of heavy labor, which is critical since the average age of our soldiers is around 38.

I truly appreciate your support, no matter what form it takes—whether it’s a like, a comment, or a retweet.

Please don’t forget the ongoing struggle our nation faces—not just against Russia but now against North Korea as well.

Your shares, donations, and engagement mean the world to us. Thank you.

Donation link: https://paypal.com/donate?campaign_id=QDECASZZQPXK8

I see at least a half dozen posts like this a day without even looking for them. All from legitimate fundraisers.

This unfortunate reality, the Ukrainians’ need to crowd source their defense, provides the context to this portion of Willaset-Wilsey’s strategic assessment: (emphasis mine)

US support has always been too little, too late. Given the sheer scale of Washington’s military support this might sound absurd, but President Joe Biden’s hesitancy in allowing Storm Shadow missiles to be used against targets inside Russia is indicative of a general trend. As the head of a global superpower, Biden has always had one eye on ensuring that the war does not get out of hand and become nuclear. The result has been that Ukraine feels it has been given enough not to lose but not enough to win.

The Ukrainians recognize this reality, which is more than I can say for the Biden administration, most Americans, Olaf Scholz, and far too many other leaders of the EU.

Right before my interview, BBC aired report from the stabik (field hospital) around Pokrovsk. How much more do these soldiers need to do to get the message across? Wake up – Russia isn’t stopping pic.twitter.com/sL1ltrpq9q

— Maria Avdeeva (@maria_avdv) October 15, 2024

Finland:

If we allow Russia to win in Ukraine, then essentially we end the credibility of our deterrence.

My interview with the @FT https://t.co/NXMv8ZcVRL

— Elina Valtonen (@elinavaltonen) October 15, 2024

From The Financial Times:

Today, Finland’s foreign minister warns me of the dangers of rising fatigue among western states regarding assistance to Ukraine, and our Rome correspondent reports on the fallout from Italy’s first migrant boat being outsourced to Albania.

Ukraine fatigue
Western states are tiring in their support for Ukraine and increasingly hoping for some form of conflict resolution, Finland’s foreign minister has warned, as she urged her colleagues in western states to redouble their efforts to help Kyiv.

Context: Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and President Vladimir Putin has vowed to maintain the war of attrition in the country’s east. Some western officials have begun privately discussing ways to reach a ceasefire despite Putin’s troops occupying about a fifth of Ukraine’s territory.

“It’s real,” Elina Valtonen said of western fatigue. “And increasingly so.”

She said the ongoing conflict in the Middle East had diverted both attention and resources, and for example dominated discussions at the recent UN General Assembly last month.

“These two conflicts are, of course, very much linked, but for us Europeans it would be important to realise that if we allow Russia to win in Ukraine, then essentially we end the credibility of our deterrence,” she said.

“There is support for Ukraine, but what is sufficient? That is the question,” she said. “Quite many [countries] would like to think, since especially with the war waiting in the Middle East, it would be great if we found an answer to this war that Russia is waging.”

Valtonen said western countries also needed to tighten up sanctions designed to hurt Russia’s economy, particularly Moscow’s growing “shadow fleet” of uninsured oil tankers used to circumvent restrictions on lucrative crude oil sales.

“These uninsured and low-quality vessels are circumventing the price cap but they also really jeopardise . . . the environment, especially in the Baltic Sea which we actually are really worried about. So definitely more should be done,” she said.

Finland, Denmark and other Baltic Sea states are in ongoing discussions over ways to tighten sanctions related to the shadow fleet, but rules of maritime passage mean blocking Russian ships transiting the key straits would be against international law.

Valtonen said more ships and related entities would be added to sanctions lists, and that Brussels should also target financial institutions that were facilitating transactions involving the trade.

“It’s really a true worry, now especially with the Baltic Sea freezing in the winter,” she added. “It just increases the risk of accidents and incidents.”

Germany:

And still Berlin blocks the ending of Schengen travel privileges for Russian ‘diplomats’
Meaning that 🇷🇺spies & agents of chaos can travel freely from EU state to state. https://t.co/iovZHrH54d

— Benjamin Tallis 🇺🇦 (@bctallis) October 15, 2024

Kyiv:

Return of the Shaheds: After a few nights of relative peace in Kyiv city, Russian/Iranian attack drones are again menacing the Ukrainian capital. Air defense units have been heard at work, and are filmed firing here on the outskirts of the capital. pic.twitter.com/PeN5NDA2lx

— Euan MacDonald (@Euan_MacDonald) October 15, 2024

Kupiansk, Kharkiv Oblast:

While all eyes are on Donetsk front, Kharkiv just called for a full evacuation of Kupiansk and nearby towns. The military situation’s getting worse daily, and the heating can’t be provided because of constant Russian attacks pic.twitter.com/Menu0zNaaJ

— Maria Avdeeva (@maria_avdv) October 15, 2024

The head of the Kharkiv Regional Military Administration today ordered a mandatory evacuation of all civilians from Kupyansk and three neighboring communities‼️

He said it is due to the worsening humanitarian situation. Our region is unable to provide essential services such as…

— Kate from Kharkiv (@BohuslavskaKate) October 15, 2024

The head of the Kharkiv Regional Military Administration today ordered a mandatory evacuation of all civilians from Kupyansk and three neighboring communities‼️

He said it is due to the worsening humanitarian situation. Our region is unable to provide essential services such as heating, electricity, and humanitarian aid to residents in the area as service workers are immediately shelled when they try to fix anything.

Considering how fast the frontline is moving in our direction, I am not sure this is the sole reason for the evacuation order 😔

Zaporizhzhia Oblast:

/2. Some (or actually a lot of) Ukrainian telegram channels have a strong desire to call evry HIMARS cluster munition strike an ATACMS strike, forgetting that M30 cluster missile exists.

First video shows ATACMS strike, other videos show some examples of what is more likely to… pic.twitter.com/j9yYK09ic1

— Special Kherson Cat 🐈🇺🇦 (@bayraktar_1love) October 15, 2024

/2. Some (or actually a lot of) Ukrainian telegram channels have a strong desire to call evry HIMARS cluster munition strike an ATACMS strike, forgetting that M30 cluster missile exists.

First video shows ATACMS strike, other videos show some examples of what is more likely to be M30 cluster munitions strikes. ATACMS has much more bomblets and radius of the area covered.

Obligatory:

Kherson:

Ukrainian civilians are being targeted by russian drones in a horrifying #HumanSafari. The world’s indifference only fuels the brutality!! https://t.co/OzSoevRiiQ

— Iryna Voichuk (@IrynaVoichuk) October 15, 2024

Kharkiv:

Explosions reported in Kharkiv! Russian troops just struck the city with four glide bombs!

— Iryna Voichuk (@IrynaVoichuk) October 15, 2024

The head of the Kharkiv Regional Military Administration today ordered a mandatory evacuation of all civilians from Kupyansk and three neighboring communities‼️

He said it is due to the worsening humanitarian situation. Our region is unable to provide essential services such as heating, electricity, and humanitarian aid to residents in the area as service workers are immediately shelled when they try to fix anything.

Considering how fast the frontline is moving in our direction, I am not sure this is the sole reason for the evacuation order 😔

Vuhledar:

This is how the town of Vugledar (Ugledar) looks like after it was captured by the Russian army

Until 2022 it was an ordinary quiet Ukrainian town with a population of 15,000

Now it is a dead ruin. Local residents have been killed or have become refugees. Such “help” from Putin pic.twitter.com/ux5XoIbn5l

— Денис Казанський (@den_kazansky) October 15, 2024

That’s enough for tonight.

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