To add more protection, we are providing greater capabilities to our mobile firing groups – address by the President of Ukraine

12 February 2024 – 19:53

I wish you health, fellow Ukrainians!

Today, I held the first meeting of the Staff with the participation of the new military commanders. Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi, Chief of the General Staff Anatoliy Barhylevych, along with the commanders of the sectors. They reported on the situation at the front. Kupyansk direction, Lyman, Bakhmut. Of course, Avdiivka. Maryinka direction, Zaporizhzhia direction. A separate report concerned our actions in the south, particularly in Kherson region.

There was a detailed report on the protection of critical infrastructure – energy, heating and water supply facilities. Everything that is a constant target for Russian missiles and drones. To add more protection, we are providing greater force and capabilities to our mobile firing groups. We will increase the number of such groups. They are one of the pillars of our defense against Russian terror, and I am grateful to all those who serve in the mobile firing groups, train them and provide assistance.

As always, one of today’s reports at the Staff meeting focused on the provision of all our units: ammunition, drones, electronic warfare. Everyone in Ukraine who can produce effective electronic warfare systems deserves full state support at all levels: at the central level – from the government – and in every region with such potential. I am grateful to all representatives of local authorities and to every Ukrainian entrepreneur, to all Ukrainian developers of electronic warfare systems.

Today I spoke with President Ramaphosa, the head of the Republic of South Africa. First of all, we discussed our global efforts to restore a real, just peace in Ukraine. The kind of peace that every nation deserves and for the sake of which Ukraine has proposed the Peace Formula. Ten points encompassing all aspects of Russian aggression against our country. I thanked President Ramaphosa for the participation of the representative of the Republic of South Africa in the meetings of the advisors on the Peace Formula. I told him about our agreement and joint work with Switzerland on the organization of the Global Peace Summit. And we agreed to further maintain a sufficient level of engagement to bring a just peace closer and make global efforts productive. Africa must be represented in all global processes.

And one more thing.

Today I held a lengthy meeting on our international activities in February. In particular, we are preparing for the Munich Security Conference, an important platform not only for Europe, but also for the world. Ukraine will present its vision of this year. A decisive year in many ways – the vision of prospects that all of us, all free nations, have, and which should not be lost. Cooperation matters. And I am grateful to everyone in the world who realizes this, to everyone who helps, to every leader, every state that seeks a fair peace as much as Ukrainians do.

Glory to all those who have defended and keep defending Ukraine! Glory to everyone who is fighting for our country and people!

Glory to Ukraine!

I’m becoming more and more convinced, as President Zelenskyy makes announcements about changes in personnel, policy, and strategy, that there was a much larger plan to change direction. I would expect that a fair amount of this comes as a result in the change in Defense Minister last year.

The cost:

https://twitter.com/OlenaHalushka/status/1756980307394220302

For those of you interested in Ukrainian history:

https://twitter.com/HURI_Harvard/status/1756076365063856522

Norway has published its 2024 strategic defense assessment. Here’s an excerpt:

Norway is facing a more serious threat environment now than it has in decades. As the war in Ukraine enters its third year, Russia is about to gain the military upper hand. The Russian military industry is running at full steam, and China, Belarus, Iran and North Korea are providing considerable materiel support. Russia is better positioned in the war than it was a year ago, and the Russian armed forces remain the main military threat to Norway’s sovereignty, its people, territory, key societal functions and infrastructure.

The relationship between Russia and the West is at a historic low point and can best be described as a clash of opposing values and security interests. The prospect of any genuine dialogue seems distant, and Russia’s policies towards the West and Norway are expected to become more unpredictable in the years to come. Thus far, Russia’s military conduct in the north has been restrained, but distrust of the West and of allied military activities in the Arctic could alter Russian military behaviour in areas close to Norway. This could increase the risk of misunderstandings, accidents and escalation.

Russia and China have a revisionist agenda in which they seek to reshape the international order to safeguard their own interests. These two countries share a belief that the United States is containing Chinese and Russian ambitions.

A less predictable neighbour

Russia refers to Norway as an ‘unfriendly country’ dictated by the anti-Russian policies of the great powers in the West.

The Russian authorities will seek to maintain those few remaining points of contact it has with Norway, such as Svalbard and the annual negotiations on fisheries. Nevertheless, Russia’s policies towards its neighbouring countries have become even more centralised. There are fewer bilateral points of contact between the countries, giving Russia less insight into Norway’s perspectives and policies. This, in turn, makes Russian policies towards Norway less predictable.

Russia has a continued interest in maintaining its presence and activity on Svalbard and a stated ambition to set up an international research and education centre at the former Soviet coal mining settlement Pyramiden. Russia could therefore choose to cooperate more with non-Arctic states on Svalbard.

Military positioning in the High North and Baltic Sea region
According to Russian military thinking, the High North and the Baltic Sea constitute a continuous area. With the NATO enlargement, one of Russia’s most important goals in the Baltic Sea has been lost, namely to preserve the region as a geographic and political buffer against the alliance. The enlargement reduces Russia’s military freedom of action in the region. For NATO, southern and central Norway have become more important for the ability to carry out operations in the Baltic Sea, which also means these areas have become more important to Russia.

At the same time, new Russian force dispositions could further alter the dynamics. The Kremlin has stated that it will respond to the NATO enlargement and plans to re-establish the Moscow and Leningrad military districts.

Russia’s behaviour in the Baltic Sea is somewhat confrontational, as it is in the Black Sea, and clearly aimed at allied activity. In the High North, Russia’s response to allied operations has mostly been reserved, though Russia is increasingly distrustful of allied activity in the north. This could lead to more belligerent Russian military behaviour and more persistent Russian intelligence operations.

Arctic powerplay

The Arctic is strategically important to both Russia and China. This region is especially important to Russia because of natural resources and the way Russia has shaped its nuclear deterrence capabilities. Defending the northern bastion and having access to the Atlantic will remain vital to Russia’s concept of security. Russia wants to be the dominant actor in the Arctic. At the same time, Moscow considers its position in the region to be more vulnerable than a few years ago.

Allied military activity in the Arctic and the High North has increased, while Russian authorities seek to counter political isolation by inviting in new actors on the civilian side, especially the BRICS countries. On top of Russia’s distrust of allied military activity, there is now a more complex set of actors entering the scene. This increases the risk of misunderstandings, accidents and escalation of conflicts.

Land forces from the Kola Peninsula have been redeployed to fight in Ukraine, significantly diminishing Russia’s land power on the Kola Peninsula. Following the attack on Ukraine, the Northern and Baltic Fleets have become more important to demonstrate Russia’s naval power in the north, as well as in the Atlantic and the Baltic Sea region. This means that the naval forces will have a more prominent role in Russia’s strategic and conventional deterrence and strategic communication towards NATO.

As Russia’s conventional land power is weakened, its strategic forces become more important. With its proximity to NATO’s core areas, the Northern Fleet has many of these in its possession.

China does not constitute a military threat to Norway, but it has an interest in establishing a political, economic and, in time, military foothold in the Arctic. Recent investments in polar capabilities, including icebreakers, have given China the opportunity to operate more independently in the region.

Developing the Northeast Passage for commercial traffic will save shipment time to European markets, reduce dependence on other traffic arteries and facilitate transport of raw materials. Chinese actors have shown an interest in developing infrastructure related to this shipping route in Norway as well.

The Arctic already plays an important role in China’s space programmes, both civilian and military. Beijing will continue to seek access to Arctic infrastructure in order to support its activities in space. Thus far, China has not conducted any military operations in the region, but developing the ability to carry out military operations is a long-term goal.

The intelligence threat to Norway

The sanctions and limited diplomatic presence in Europe have left Russia with fewer platforms for interaction and contact with the West. Access to information about Western and Norwegian affairs rely more on Russian intelligence and security services than before. These services have been mapping out Norwegian targets for years, directing their activities at many sectors in the digital and physical space. Russian actors seek information about Norwegian politics, energy, the High North, allied activities and defence. Russia is also interested in Norwegian technology in areas they themselves want to develop.

Russia also employs a high number of civilian ships for intelligence operations. These ships have lawful access close to Norwegian infrastructure and the coast of Norway. Uncovering whether civilian ships are carrying out intelligence activity in addition to their lawful undertakings can be a challenging task.

Chinese intelligence services operate all over Europe. Their activities include political intelligence and industrial espionage, and cyberspace is the main gateway. Chinese intelligence services use a combination of actions to keep their activities and objectives concealed, such as commonly available tools and digital infrastructure that conceal the actor.

Chinese services also have source handlers in Europe. Chinese diplomats, travel delegations, private individuals, businesses and special interest groups regularly carry out assignments on behalf of Chinese services. There are close links between Chinese intelligence services and Chinese corporate entities.

Beijing has the institutional resources and legal framework to use Chinese businesses and individuals for government purposes. All Chinese companies and individuals are required by law to assist China’s intelligence and security services.

Iran has an unremitting intention of targeting people opposed to the regime around the world. Tehran could also seek to attack Israel-affiliated targets across the world, especially in times of heightened tension between Israel and Iran. This means there is a constant risk of Iranian intelligence and security services orchestrating attacks against opposition figures, especially in countries that are vocal in their criticism of Iran or give residence permits to dissidents.

Norway is not a country of special interest to Iranian security services. However, this could change if individuals targeted by Iranian services travel to Norway, or if Norwegian policies are perceived as more hostile towards Iran.

Much, much more at the link.

Somewhere in Ukraine:

https://twitter.com/small10space/status/1756966291389170117

https://twitter.com/Tendar/status/1757040143951634552

Avdiivka and Bil0horivka:

https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1757119077863039310

 

Musk isn’t just an antisemitic, homophobic, transphobic, racist, xenophobic weirdo and fraud, he’s also a clear and present danger to security of the US!

https://twitter.com/joshrogin/status/1757198677209199015

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@elonmusk is now urging Americans to contact members of Congress to urge them not to support Ukraine funding:

“This spending does not help Ukraine… Having all these boys die for nothing is wrong. And it needs to stop.”

Shameful stuff. Imagine telling Ukrainians fighting to protect their families and their towns they are dying for nothing. Disgraceful.

Obligatory!

There are no new Patron tweets or videos, so we’re going to finish tonight with the war cats of Ukraine. Politico has the details! First, the video from the article.

Wars are fought by soldiers using bullets, shells and missiles, but also with ideas and propaganda — which explains why cats have become the latest battlefront in Ukraine.

Ukraine’s social media are full of felines, showing how they help soldiers as emotional support animals, attract donations to the military with their fluffy cuteness, and also fight invaders — in this case mice.

Russia is fighting back by humanizing its invading soldiers — often used in “meat wave” attacks against Ukrainian positions and accused of atrocities against civilians — by showing them with their own cats.

Cats usually arrive at Ukrainian army positions from nearby villages or towns destroyed by war. Abandoned by their owners, the pets seek human protection from the constant shelling, drone strikes and minefields.

“When this scared little creature comes to you, seeking protection, how could you say no? We are strong, so we protect weaker beings, who got into the same awful circumstances as we did, just because Russians showed up on our land,” explained Oleksandr Yabchanka, a Ukrainian army combat medic.

Cats and other animals bring comfort to Ukrainian soldiers. “Some adopt them and take them home, others prefer to keep them in the trenches and even pass them on to other units during rotation,” said Oleksandr Shtupun, a Ukrainian army spokesperson.

The adopted felines also fight their own battles against the mice that infest the trenches and chew Starlink satellite comms cables and car wiring, destroy food supplies and military gear, and even nip the fingers of sleeping soldiers.

“If cats live in our trenches, mice will almost always stay away,” Yabchanka said.

Syrsky the cat

Ukrainian Army Land Forces Commander Oleksandr Syrsky is known as one of the country’s most effective combat leaders; he is less famous for having a feline namesake with a lethal reputation. Roman Sinicyn, a Ukrainian army officer and the human of Syrsky the Cat, claims the naming was coincidental.

“He got the name because he likes cheese [syr in Ukrainian]. Of course, a cat with the same name as our general has already become a military joke,” Sinicyn said.

Even General Syrsky found it funny … to Sinicyn’s infinite relief. The officer met Syrsky the cat on a combat mission in a frontline village where, for a month, soldiers had been living in an abandoned house infested with mice.

“Most of the locals evacuated, so the cats took over. We caught Syrsky and food-persuaded him to stay with us. He helped to solve our mouse problem,” Sinicyn said.

“The mice run over you while you sleep, they get into your stuff. They chew everything. We had to throw out two boxes of our packed rations because of mice,” Sinicyn explained.

Once Syrsky was installed, the soldiers would listen to his nightly patrols against rodents.

“I took him home when we left that position. Now he lives with my family in Kyiv, but he continues to help the army. We used his social media popularity to collect €147,000 for Mini Shark UAV complexes for adjusting artillery,” Sinicyn said.

Shaybyk the lover

Oleksandr Liashuk, from the Odesa region in southwest Ukraine, gave a purr-out to Shaybyk — one of four stray kittens living with his unit on the southern front in 2022.

“Shaybyk had the biggest charisma. It was getting cold, so I took him with me one night into my sleeping bag. And that’s when I fell in love with that cat,” said Liashuk, 26. “He’s not just my best friend, he’s my son.”

Since then, Shaybyk has moved to different positions with Liashuk, with the pair becoming a viral sensation for their joint patrol videos.

Liashuk describes his cat as the perfect hunter. “Once we were at the position in the forest and he caught 11 mice in one day. Sometimes [he] brings mice to my sleeping bag,” he boasted.

Despite their bond, Shaybyk remains a free cat, but he has always returned to Liashuk. In June he disappeared for 18 long days until he was found by Ukrainian soldiers at a position several kilometers away, chilling with the local felines. “He just needed some love. I call it a vacation,” Liashuk said.

Shaybyk and Liashuk also collect donations for the Ukrainian army, with Shaybyk receiving a special award in September for helping to raise money to buy seven cars and other supplies.

There is much, much more at the link. Including pictures of the cats being profiled.

Open thread!