Open Threads

More from the Czech Defense Policy Chief:

Jires on Czech finding ammo for Ukraine: "we have been able to identify a huge number of already existing artillery ammunition…sitting in non-western countries. Most of these countries [are] unwilling to support Ukraine directly for political reasons so they need a middleman."

— Paul McLeary (@paulmcleary) February 28, 2024

LtGen Kosinski, Joint Chiefs logistics, on US planning next Ukraine package:
"We are still meeting every day still tracking everything that we would need to be able to send once that gets approved. We're working with industry to be able to have an understanding of what's needed"

— Paul McLeary (@paulmcleary) February 28, 2024

https://twitter.com/shashj/status/1762888596606853575

The Brits are trying to carefully straddle the line between get everyone focused and pointed in the right direction and causing a panic:

https://twitter.com/shashj/status/1762847157160194157

https://twitter.com/shashj/status/1762852629686739430

Germany:

Tweets followed by machine translation.

Jene die wissen wie Missionsplanung & Ausführung von Langstreckenangriffen mit anderen 🇪🇺 Marschflugkörpern in der 🇺🇦 im Detail abläuft, wissen aber auch, dass ohne Änderung dieser Einsatzkonzepte es praktisch schwierig sein wird ein tieferes 🇩🇪 Engagement zu vermeiden.

— Franz-Stefan Gady (@HoansSolo) February 27, 2024

Letzterer Aspekt geht mir ein bisschen ab in der Debatte.

— Franz-Stefan Gady (@HoansSolo) February 27, 2024

On the Taurus cruise missile debate: It is true that on a technical level, the presence of German personnel in Ukraine is in theory not necessary, at least after system integration.

Those who know how mission planning & execution of long-range strikes with other 🇪🇺 cruise missiles in the 🇺🇦 works in detail also know that without changing these operational concepts it will be practically difficult to avoid a deeper 🇩🇪 engagement.

The 🇺🇦 / partner deployment concepts could of course be adapted. And of course the 🇺🇦 needs more cruise missiles. But in order to have an objective and well-founded debate on the topic, you should first know how these systems are used in Ukraine.

I miss the latter aspect a bit in the debate

https://twitter.com/shashj/status/1762410314971111716

https://twitter.com/shashj/status/1762558023795360224

The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) has a new assessment of Western security assistance to Ukraine: (emphasis mine)

Evolving Russian tactics and sustained pressure along the frontline have pushed Ukrainian forces onto the defensive in 2024. If the West wants to keep Ukraine in the fight, it must adapt its security assistance accordingly.

A Javelin anti-tank missile costs almost $200,000 and will destroy one Russian tank. The average battlefield drone – with upgraded sensors and other modifications – costs around $2,000 and is equally effective under most circumstances. Hence, $200,000 would enable the Ukrainians to buy and deploy 100 drone systems and cause a commensurate amount of damage to Russian vehicles. While presenting this disjuncture at an irregular warfare conference in Washington about the growing problems of cost, scale and benefits of weapons systems in December 2023, a Ukrainian Colonel approached one author of this article to express agreement that their military needs to shift towards cheaper and more sustainable approaches to defeating the Russians. The Ukrainian Colonel noted that early in the war, more expensive systems such as the $5 million Turkish TB2 drone were highly effective and useful. However, the Russians have adapted to this system, limiting its impact over the past year. Likewise, the Colonel mentioned that the Ukrainians no longer use Javelins as much because Russian armour tactics have changed.

Such developments point to a concerning trend. Since August 2021, our US Department of Defense Minerva team has interviewed hundreds of NATO, US and Ukrainian military personnel and policymakers across Europe and in Western capitals. Recent interviews paint a picture of a war that is shifting to a more dangerous phase as frustration grows between Western leaders and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. Security assistance efforts are presently at risk for a set of political reasons we review below. Policymakers, planners and operators we speak to also tell us of a growing mismatch between this assistance and Ukrainian needs – often the product of slow bureaucratic processes, risk aversion and organisational resistance to the valuable lessons of two years of intensified combat against rapidly evolving Russian forces. They tell of a reality – which several of us have seen firsthand – of a battlefield increasingly littered with drones and electronic warfare, requiring a major shift in tactics that no Western military is prepared for. At the heart of the problem is a tendency for Western assistance to reflect the war that Western policymakers and planners would prefer to fight, rather than the war Ukraine’s military is fighting. Our project’s key purpose and the reason for this article is to illuminate this reality and point to a better path.

As the Russo-Ukrainian War drags into a third year, Western capitals have become increasingly concerned about providing open-ended assistance to Ukraine, particularly as initially strong public support for this assistance has waned and aid to Ukraine has become wrapped up in various domestic issues such as debates about border controls in the US and agricultural subsidies in Poland. Leaders in Kyiv are frustrated with Western expectations and constraints on how they are supposed to conduct the defence of their country against Russian aggression. Many Ukrainian soldiers we speak to complain about their Ministry of Defense (MoD) not properly equipping and supplying them on the front. This problem has led to the emergence of informal security assistance; most Ukrainian units rely on volunteers, charities and non-governmental organisations for lethal and non-lethal aid and training. Despite such pessimism, one cannot ignore the fact that over $100 billion in military aid from Western backers has translated into Russia losing over 350,000 troops and over 6,000 main battle tanks during the war.

In this article, we assess the last year of the war and what lies ahead in Ukraine regarding Western security assistance. We highlight the difficulties, shortcomings and impacts of US ‘strategic dithering’. We soberly assess Ukraine’s situation and forecast what Ukraine needs in 2024 to fend off a painful Russian offensive. Ukraine’s future requirements centre on five issues: Ukrainian overall resilience; a focused and effective security assistance plan; preparing a robust Ukrainian defence in the face of an unrelenting Russian offense; espionage operations against Russian military-related infrastructure; and scaling up the use of cheaper and smarter autonomous weapons.

As Eliot Cohen has noted, ‘Western diplomats need to stop whining about Ukraine. Allies can be exasperating. But try being invaded by your neighbour and lectured by everyone else’. Similarly, Phillips P Obrien has identified how the US micromanages the war in Ukraine by reluctantly providing needed weapons systems at a much slower pace relative to the Europeans. For example, the US provided Ukraine with 31 Abrams tanks, but it only sent downgraded variants out of fear that the technology would be captured and exploited by the Russians. However, the UK provided 28 Challenger 2 tanks, and various European militaries and the Canadians sent Ukraine over 100 Leopard 2 tanks with their best kit (sensors, software and so on) to maximise their combat effectiveness for the Ukrainians. The US approach to Ukraine is best described as strategic dithering: doing enough so Ukraine doesn’t lose, but not enough to help it win.

External pressure on Kyiv to produce results with the tens of billions received in military aid has pushed it into a paradoxical position of using Western equipment and training against under-equipped and under-trained but well dug-in Russian troops. The tension caused by external expectations and pressure to perform against Russian forces likely put Zelensky in the position of having to dismiss the head of Ukraine’s ground forces, General Zaluzhny, just to appease Western capitals. Additionally, Russia has the benefit of airpower, with significantly more helicopters and attack aircraft. Within months of the summer 2023 counteroffensive, the Ukrainians gave up on Western battle tactics because they lacked sufficient airpower to counter Russian air forces and defences. The critical factor, however, has been the persistent inability to mass forces without detection. This reality – a product of technological innovations and organisational adaptation that was not difficult for our team and certainly not for Ukrainian forces to detect early in the full-scale invasion – doomed the offensive from the start.

Unfortunately, even with Ukraine slated to receive some F-16s in early 2024 out of the total of 60 pledged, these US-made fighter jets will not be a ‘silver bullet’, primarily because it will take Ukrainian pilots hundreds of hours of flight time to become proficient in combat. Much like the downgraded Abrams tanks, the Ukrainians will receive older F-16 variants (last upgraded between 2003 and 2005) which lack advanced avionics, software and sensors, and the most advanced medium-range air-to-air missiles will not be supplied until 2026. Thus, even with the addition of more airpower, the Ukrainians will not be able to field enough F-16 sorties to deter or shoot down Russian Tu-95s that attack Ukrainian cities with hypersonic air-launched ballistic missiles from a considerable standoff distance. If Washington wants improved outcomes, the dithering on properly helping, arming and training leaders in Kyiv should be unshackled from crossing Russia’s imaginary ‘red lines’. Not providing appropriate aircraft squanders the opportunity to achieve strategic ends after the decision to equip Ukrainians with F-16s sent the political signal to Russia’s leadership that Western leaders were at least willing to test that Russian red line.

The lack of Western airpower is only one of the failures of security assistance. Much of the equipment sent to Ukraine lacks crucial components. For example, over 40 US Bradley infantry fighting vehicles arrived on the front with bad batteries and poor wiring. Ukrainians near the front relayed to us that many M777 155mm howitzers arrived without the prerequisite aiming equipment. The lack of adequate maintenance and repair parts compounds the difficulties, with some Ukrainian troops telling us about US-made M-4 rifles breaking down after a week of use in the trenches. Many of these issues could have been avoided if there were sergeants doing a common-sense check of equipment before it was sent across the border into Ukraine.

The first two years of the war have involved a scattered and uncoordinated, yet rapid, equipping of the Ukrainian army. The Ukrainians put an abundance of faith in Western equipment and training, delaying the summer offensive until its arrival. Not only was the training not specific to the Ukrainian theatre, but it gave time for the Russians to enhance their ‘Surovikin Line’ of defences.

There is much more at the link if you can stomach it.

Every single assessment reaches the same conclusions: the Biden administration has committed strategic malpractice in its support of Ukraine. I am well aware that a Trump administration would be a million times worse. That does not let the Biden nat-sec team off the hook for being far too risk averse, strategically incoherent, and to paraphrase, asking of Ukraine’s strategy that which the US is not and will not provide: achievable outcomes. We have double bound the Ukrainians and then give them a hard time when our unreasonable fear based constraints make it impossible for them to meet our measures of success.

This is the result:

Russian occupied Stepove and Sieverne

Russian forces continue to advance west of Avdiivka, occupying the towns of Stepove and Sieverne.https://t.co/ztvNqAZSkLhttps://t.co/daAu7KU1mN https://t.co/XhAiobeuoT pic.twitter.com/pDkgSadowL

— Rob Lee (@RALee85) February 27, 2024

Russian occupied Avdiivka:

First tweet from Tatarigami’s thread, the rest from the Thread Reader App:

Key insights from our analysis (Complete report accessible on the website provided in my bio) concerning the post-Avdiivka situation, fortifications, and anticipations.

Kindly consider liking, sharing, and following us for better visibility.

🧵Thread: pic.twitter.com/YwN7gXZeJP

— Tatarigami_UA (@Tatarigami_UA) February 28, 2024

2/ While some argue that the withdrawal was timely, our assessment suggests that an earlier retreat could have reduced losses. Some interviewed participants reported not receiving official orders and chose to retreat at their discretion due to the deteriorating tactical situation 

3/ After the fall of Avdiivka, Russian forces continued to advance. As of this analysis, settlements like Sjeverne, Lastochkyne, and Stepove are now under Russian control. Others, including Orlivka and Berdychi, remain contested as of February 27, 2024.

4/ As shown in the satellite image, the presence of fires and scorch marks extending beyond Orlivka signifies a rapid effort by Russian forces to disrupt communications with the settlement and cause harm to defenders. Additional reports suggest that Semenivka is targeted by KABs 

5/ This assertion is also backed by FIRMS data from NASA, which identifies and maps “thermal anomalies” on the ground. Utilizing this data, we have created a visual representation of the image, depicting “thermal anomalies” like fires or explosions over the past 24 hours.

6/ Frontelligence Insight notes an otable deficiency of robust fortifications, involving concrete and wooden structures on the Ukrainian side. Reports consistently indicate that combat-involved brigades are assigned to construct these defenses in their rear areas. 

7/ Constructing strategic defensive positions requires a multifaceted and professional approach beyond military efforts alone. Essential needs encompass specialized equipment like bulldozers, excavators, cranes, concrete production, trucks, wood, and logistics. 

8/. Addressing this issue demands political will and the involvement of national leadership to mobilize civilian resources. Additionally, joint efforts with the Ministry of Defense are necessary to secure the resources needed for the procurement of such a serious project 

9/ The Near Prospects

Our team observes that due to relatively dry weather, the fields are rapidly drying up, enabling the advance of Russian forces. Contrary to expectations that the muddy season might impede their progress, unfortunately, that is not the case at this moment. 

10/ Russian forces suffered disproportionately high losses during the assault on Avdiivka. According to our team’s geospatial observations, the estimated number of lost vehicles by the Russian side exceeds ~300. OSINT analyst @naalsio26 suggests that the number is over ~600.

11/ The quality of new recruits in the Russian army continues to deteriorate. As previously reported, in the final phase of the battle for Avdiivka, a group of POWs captured in February had been recruited to the Russian military in mid-January. 

12/ The situation for Ukrainian forces remains highly challenging, characterized by delayed mobilization, inadequate fortification construction, missteps during the 2023 campaign, and notably, a critical failure of partners to deliver promised ammunition despite prior commitments 

13/ Ukraine is likely to face additional territorial losses, especially in areas gained during the summer of 2023 and in proximity to Donetsk. However, we do not anticipate the front collapse, as Russians allocate resources disproportionately, even for relatively minor gains. 

14/ Despite trying to capitalize on the most favorable situation since 2022, they lack the necessary scale to generate a strategic collapse. A situation could still be favorable for Ukraine if the West provides substantial military aid to back domestic mobilization efforts. 

15/ Consider supporting us through BuyMeaCoffee, as our expenses rely solely on your public support. As the war continues, public financial support is decreasing as well.

Tatarigami_UA is All Source Public IntelligenceSatellite imagery and other expenses https://buymeacoffee.com/frontelligence

add

Russian occupied Kherson Oblast:

A tragic day for 🇺🇦73rd Special Operations Center.

4 guys reportedly killed, one taken prisoner as a result of a failed mission at Tendra Spit in Russian-occupied Kherson Oblast.

We must never forget. pic.twitter.com/zu3PULGSy7

— Illia Ponomarenko 🇺🇦 (@IAPonomarenko) February 28, 2024

Robotyne, Russian occupied Zaporizhzhia Oblast:

WARNING!! WARNING!! VISIBLE BLOOD!! WARNING!! WARNING!!

Wounded soldier fights near Robotyno village in Zaporizhzhia sector

— Мисливець за зорями (@small10space) February 28, 2024

ALL CLEAR!!

Orlivka:

Ukrainian tank with a direct strike on a Russian combat vehicle in the area of Orlivka, an active battlefield to the west of Avdiivka. pic.twitter.com/fKB49umTD7

— WarTranslated (@wartranslated) February 28, 2024

Also, near Russian occupied Avdiivka:

🇷🇺Russian infantry gets destroyed by airburst and FPV-Drone strikes of the 🇺🇦Ukrainian 3rd Assault Brigade near Avdiivka, Donetsk Region. pic.twitter.com/Cwxj4o3QAl

— Cloooud |🇺🇦 (@GloOouD) February 28, 2024

Olenivka, Russian occupied Donetsk Oblast:

/1. “Yesterday, 02/27/2024, at about 19:00, there was a strike on the gathering place of personnel of the 155th separate marine brigade (military unit 30926, Vladivostok) in the settlement of Olenivka, Donetsk region.

The command held an awarding of servicemen. The strike was… pic.twitter.com/mjTwwydNrm

— Special Kherson Cat 🐈🇺🇦 (@bayraktar_1love) February 28, 2024

/1. “Yesterday, 02/27/2024, at about 19:00, there was a strike on the gathering place of personnel of the 155th separate marine brigade (military unit 30926, Vladivostok) in the settlement of Olenivka, Donetsk region.

The command held an awarding of servicemen. The strike was carried out by two HIMARS missiles. As a result of the strike, 19 soldiers were killed and another 12 were injured.

According to the source, among the dead:
• Roman Kozhukhov, lieutenant colonel, deputy brigade commander;
• Abilov Alexander, major;
• Shakhmanov Nail, captain;

The commander of the 155th Marine Brigade, Colonel Mikhail Gudkov, was wounded.

The source reports that the command was aware of the work of an enemy reconnaissance UAV in their area, but ignored this information.”

https://t.me/dosye_shpiona/495

Obligatory:

For you self propelled howitzer enthusiasts:

The Ukrainian-made Bohdana 155-mm self-propelled howitzer already demonstrates high combat effectiveness at the battlefront. Bohdana can fire five shots in one minute and is equipped, in particular, with Excalibur projectiles, which hit the enemy at a distance of up to 60… pic.twitter.com/omSZwjqbSU

— Defense of Ukraine (@DefenceU) February 28, 2024

The Ukrainian-made Bohdana 155-mm self-propelled howitzer already demonstrates high combat effectiveness at the battlefront. Bohdana can fire five shots in one minute and is equipped, in particular, with Excalibur projectiles, which hit the enemy at a distance of up to 60 kilometers.

📹: @GeneralStaffUA

Someone asked the other night if Girkin aka Strelkov had been found dead in his pre-trial detention cell. Apparently not:

Which is kinda hilarious to read, because Girkin is trying to play a smart-ass in 5D chess geopolitics but still ends up revolving around the same conspiratorial worldview dogmas he's obsessed with as a sick misanthropist and chauvinistic imperialist

— Illia Ponomarenko 🇺🇦 (@IAPonomarenko) February 28, 2024

Here’s the full text of Dmitri’s tweet:

Former presidential candidate (and internationally recognised terrorist) Girkin/Strelkov put out a massive text from prison which I honestly tried to translate but it’s too big and his metaphor game is through the roof (but not the prison roof), far more than before.
But he basically says that Trump is bad news for Russia as he will try to separate the latter from China and Iran and let Russia keep parts of Ukraine to present it as a “victory” to Russians while Ukraine will get a breather to be rearmed. In the end, he says, the “ruling RF mafia” will be tricked into concessions.

The whole thing if you have nothing better to do: https://telegra.ph/Vlazhnye-strasti-po-Trampu-posvyashchaetsya-Administracii-Prezidenta-02-28

It appears he remains alive.

That’s enough for tonight.

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