Easter Greetings by the President of Ukraine

5 May 2024 – 09:01

Great People of Great Ukraine!

Today we celebrate a significant holiday — the Resurrection of the Lord. Easter. Easter symbolizes the liberation of the human soul from the slavery of evil and darkness. It symbolizes the victory of goodness and justice, the victory of life over death.

We have been fighting for all of this for 802 days in a row. 802 days of freedom standing up to darkness, valor standing up to terror. 802 days of our resistance, which can be described by the words from the Gospel of John: “The light shines in the darkness, and the darkness has not overcome it…”

The exact same words are dedicated to one of the exhibitions at St. Sophia Cathedral, where I am now. Together, this exhibition and the other works by various Ukrainian artists convey a deep meaning. These are the icons on ammunition boxes. They are saturated with the smoke of our land and the spirit of our people. They are the symbols of great trials and great power that helps us overcome them. Each of these icons is like a divine manifestation, a proof that the heavens are with us, an answer to the question of why Ukrainians have withstood. It is because in the most difficult circumstances and in the darkest times we are able to create light. We can do it on boards scorched by fire and grief, that came from Ukrainian cities and villages exhausted by suffering. We can do this by combining the seemingly incompatible: the war and the Lord, by overcoming evil with faith, overcoming adversity with hope.

When taking a closer look at these icons, one can understand the feelings of our entire nation. It’s a mirror that reflects our reality in times of war, the path we have already taken, and this Easter, and our entire present. This is what our amulets look like today. This is how we feel that God is protecting us through the hands of our warriors. This is how we see the protection of the heavenly forces, embodied in the Security and Defense Forces of Ukraine, every Ukrainian who devotes themself to the sacred cause of defending their native land from darkness and evil.

These icons bear the names of heroes who sacrificed their lives to protect us. They showed that Ukrainians kneel only to pray. And never do they kneel in front of invaders and occupiers.

The Bible teaches us to love our neighbor. And the present has shown us the true meaning of this word. When we support and help each other even hundreds of kilometers away from one another. We protect each other. We pray for each other. When we all have become closer to each other, we have become each other’s neighbors. And our former neighbor, who was always making us take him for a brother, remains distant from us for centuries. They have broken all the commandments, coveted our house, and come to kill us. The world sees it.

God knows it. And we believe that there is a chevron with the Ukrainian flag on the shoulder of God. Therefore, with such an ally, life will definitely prevail over death.

As we overcome a common path and experience common pain, we are all united today by one common prayer. We pray for all our warriors who are celebrating Easter in the trenches and on the positions. We pray for our warriors of light, who restrain demons in all directions. We pray for those who keep another commandment in their lives: to defend Ukraine. We pray that they all come back alive.

We pray for all our civilians who work hard every day to strengthen our state and ensure that it successfully overcomes evil. We pray for those who live and work for this purpose.

We pray for all our children, for all the boys and girls brave far beyond their years, whose childhood was stolen from them by Russia, but who, despite everything, have not forgotten how to smile and believe in miracles.

We pray for all our mothers and fathers who were robbed of a happy, peaceful aging, and who, despite everything, are holding on and taking care of us.

We pray for all our cities and villages, that should feel the Lord’s grace, not the constant terror of evil, and which have black clouds hanging over them, and bombs and missiles coming from those who belong in hell, not in the Ukrainian sky.

We pray for our lands and our people, whose spirit cannot be broken. And we remember the words written in St. Sophia Cathedral above the Oranta image, which came true in our lives: “God is in the midst of the city, and it will not be shaken. God will help it before dawn.”

Today, we are praying for all Ukrainians who are waiting for this dawn and will certainly see it. They will find peace, truth, and God, who will return to the scorched land, the land scarred with craters and trenches. He will return with peace, tranquility, and flowers instead of mines in the fields. He will return with children’s laughter instead of the roar of an air alarm. The light that will return to all of our Lord-given land, to all the territories that are temporarily occupied by the devils. God will return to Mariupol. To the slag heaps and the seashores. It has always been so. It will definitely be so. I believe in this every day, especially on this glorious day in this glorious place, the history of which reminds us that neither the Horde invasion, nor the Nazi occupation, nor the Russian terror will be able to wipe us off the face of the Earth.

May the heavens strengthen our will in the battle against thralldom. May they give us courage for new achievements and wisdom to appreciate all that we have already gained. May they give us the strength to maintain unity, and give us unity to enhance our strength. May God grant eternal rest to all those who gave their lives for Ukraine and everlasting peace to their descendants, to all our children and grandchildren, and to all our future generations. They have the sacred right to know what a peaceful Easter in a peaceful Ukraine is.

Today we pray for it and we fight for it.

And the light shines in the darkness…

Happy Easter to all of you, dear Ukrainians!

Christ is risen!

He is risen indeed!

Happy Easter! pic.twitter.com/Im2Yq43dwA

— Defense of Ukraine (@DefenceU) May 5, 2024

Facing our third Easter in this new reality, it's still hard to accept. But we hold onto hope: one day, good will triumph over evil, life over death. Wishing us all strength, faith, and perseverance. Christ is Risen! pic.twitter.com/Bm3BLBH6w7

— Maria Avdeeva (@maria_avdv) May 5, 2024

Ukrainian Defenders send holiday packages with Easter cakes to their brothers-in-arms in Krynky (Russian-occupied part of Kherson region where Ukrainian Army has a stronghold) using drones.

📹: libkos/instagram https://t.co/kR9ouWxi0p pic.twitter.com/mnwaOmHpkW

— Anton Gerashchenko (@Gerashchenko_en) May 5, 2024

https://twitter.com/shashj/status/1787023423618650605

The Financial Times via the Wayback Machine because of the paywall: (emphasis mine)

European intelligence agencies have warned their governments that Russia is plotting violent acts of sabotage across the continent as it commits to a course of permanent conflict with the west. 

Russia has already begun to more actively prepare covert bombings, arson attacks and damage to infrastructure on European soil, directly and via proxies, with little apparent concern about causing civilian fatalities, intelligence officials believe. 

While the Kremlin’s agents have a long history of such operations — and launched attacks sporadically in Europe in recent years — evidence is mounting of a more aggressive and concerted effort, according to assessments from three different European countries shared with the Financial Times.

Intelligence officials are becoming increasingly vocal about the threat in an effort to promote vigilance.

“We assess the risk of state-controlled acts of sabotage to be significantly increased,” said Thomas Haldenwang, head of German domestic intelligence. Russia now seems comfortable carrying out operations on European soil “[with] a high potential for damage,” he told a security conference last month hosted by his agency, the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution.

Haldenwang spoke just days after two German-Russian nationals were arrested in Bayreuth, Bavaria, for allegedly plotting to attack military and logistics sites in Germany on behalf of Russia.

Two men were charged in the UK in late April with having started a fire at a warehouse containing aid shipments for Ukraine. English prosecutors accuse them of working for the Russian government.

In Sweden, security services are meanwhile investigating a series of recent railway derailments, which they suspect may be acts of state-backed sabotage.

Russia has attempted to destroy the signalling systems on Czech railways, the country’s transport minister told the FT last month.

In Estonia, an attack on the interior minister’s car in February and those of journalists were perpetrated by Russian intelligence operatives, the country’s Internal Security Service has said. France’s ministry of defence also warned this year of possible sabotage attacks by Russia on military sites.

“The obvious conclusion is that there has been a real stepping up of Russian activity,” said Keir Giles, senior consulting fellow at Chatham House, the think-tank.

“One cannot tell if that’s a reflection of the fact that the Russians are throwing more resources at it; whether they are being more sloppy and getting caught; or whether western counter-intelligence has simply become better at detecting and stopping it,” he added. “Whatever it is though — there is a lot going on.”

One senior European government official said information was being shared through Nato security services of “clear and convincing Russian mischief”, which was co-ordinated and at scale. 

The time had come to “raise awareness and focus” about the threat of Russian violence on European soil, he added.

Nato issued a statement on Thursday declaring its deep concern about growing “malign activities on allied territory” by Russia, citing what it said was an “intensifying campaign . . . across the Euro-Atlantic area”.

The growing fears over Russia’s appetite for physical damage against its adversaries follow a spate of accusations against Russia over disinformation and hacking campaigns.

On Friday, Germany vowed consequences for Moscow — in a statement backed by the EU and Nato — over a 2023 hacking attack on the social democratic party of chancellor Olaf Scholz.

A scandal exposing Russian attempts to co-opt far right European politicians ahead of upcoming European elections is meanwhile still unfolding.

One intelligence official said Moscow’s sabotage efforts should not be seen as a distinct from other operations, saying the ramp-up in activity reflected Russia’s aim to exert maximum pressure “across the piece”.

Putin is currently feeling “emboldened” and will seek to push lines as hard as he can in Europe, on multiple fronts, he said, whether through disinformation, sabotage or hacking. 

Increased aggression from Russian intelligence also reflects the desire for the country’s spymasters to reassert themselves after their most serious setback since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

In the weeks following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, more than 600 Russian intelligence officers operating in Europe with diplomatic cover were ejected, dealing serious damage to the Kremlin’s spy network across the continent.

In a recent report, analysts at the UK’s Royal United Services Institute highlighted the efforts to which Russia had gone to reconstitute its presence in Europe, often using proxies. Those include members of the Russian diaspora as well as organised crime groups with which the Kremlin has long-standing ties.

A key strategic shift has also occurred, with so-called “Committees of Special Influence” coordinating intelligence operations country-by-country for the Kremlin, drawing together what were previously piecemeal efforts by the country’s fractious security services and other Kremlin players.

With Russia’s stepping up operations, security services have been on high alert over threats and are looking to identify targets they may have missed.

Questions have been raised, for instance, over a so-far unexplained explosion at a BAE Systems munitions factory in Wales that supplies shells used by Ukraine. In October 2014 a Czech arms depot where weapons for Kyiv were being stored was destroyed; Russian military intelligence agents were later revealed to have planted explosives at the site.

A huge fire broke out on Friday at a factory in Berlin owned by the arms company Diehl, which also supplies Ukraine. More than 160 specialist firefighters were called to tackle the blaze, with residents in a huge swath of the west of the capital told to keep windows closed due to possible toxic fumes.

“As ever with Russia, it’s wise not to look for a single explanation of why they are doing anything. There’s always a combination of things going on,” said Giles.

“These pinprick attacks we’ve seen so far are of course to create disruption, but they can also be used for disinformation. And then there is what Russia learns from these attacks if they want to immobilise Europe for real . . . They’re practice runs.”

The US, its NATO and EU allies, and many of its non-NATO and non-EU allies have been in a world war since at least 2011, if not 2009, which is when the shaping operations began in the information domain. This world war was declared by Putin at the 2007 Munich Security Conference. In his declaration of war he framed the conflict as the US and its EU and NATO allies having begun the way by attacking post-Soviet Russia. It’s key and overarching strategic objective is to remake the international order to be much more favorable for Putin, Russia, and Putin’s surrogates, trusted agents, and catspaws. Russia has largely waged this war by using the elements of national power (the DIME-FIL) other than military power – diplomatic, information, economic, financial, intelligence, and legal – while deemphasizing the use of military power except where it has been assessed that using it will be resource efficient. Which had been the case until Putin ordered a speed run on Kyiv in February 2022. As such, the effects of Putin’s world war have not been normally distributed and, as a result, often ignored as just politics or economics or business as usual. The leaders of the US, NATO, the EU as a whole and its member states, and a number of other states and societies need to get their heads around the fact that we are in a decades spanning world war, that the instigator of that world war shows no indications that he is going to relent anytime soon, and they need to get their citizenry focused on the reality of what is going on. Otherwise Putin will continue to wage his war. And he’ll continue to reap the benefits as Tymofiy Mylovanov, the head of the Kyiv School of Economics, explains via the Thread Reader App:

There are three popular arguments behind “de-escalation” doctrine with Russia. All three are wrong

1. Fear of nukes and World War 3

2. The person after Putin could be worse than Putin

3. The entire region might become destabilized. 1/

But first let’s admit the obvious: The US deescalation doctrine doesn’t work.

Think about it! There hasn’t been a single instance of Russia deescalating in response to any action by Ukraine or the West. 2/ 

The Black Sea gain deal, partial easing of sanctions on energy and agriculture, the U.S. restrictions on Ukraine to strike deep in Russia, delays in supply Ukraine with weapons that it asked for – none of it resulted in deescalation by Russia 5/ 

Perhaps, the most telling example is the recent delay in the $61 billion U.S. support for Ukraine. From the perspective of Russia, it is within the U.S. deescalation doctrine. 6/ 

The U.S. blamed it on its politics, and it is true – the politics were the reason. But regardless of the U.S. issues, a delay in this aid is a de-escalation or self-containment action. What did Russia do in response? Pushed forward, took cities, bomber civilians. 7/ 

In the history of this war, whenever the West or Ukraine hesitated and gave Russia physical, geographical, and technological space to escalate – it did. 8/ 

Russia understands force. It retreats when pushed back. It doesn’t attack when there is air defense and artillery to strike back. The de-escalation doctrine is fundamentally flawed because it assumes that Russia can be reasoned with, that they will respond to diplomacy. 9/ 

But if they do, why do they declare Zelensky wanted this week? What kind of diplomatic or symbolic moves is this? A sign that they are open to diplomacy by undermining legitimacy of the Ukrainian president among its own domestic base? No, it is a move to commit not use diplomacy/ 

Indeed, how could Russia negotiate with a wanted criminal?

Ok, so, in my view the West continues to be in self-denial. And it will pay dearly for its mistakes. 10/ 

Here is a case in point: U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan says the $61 billion in military aid will help Ukraine hold the line against Russian advances in 2024 and mount a counteroffensive in 2025 to recapture lost territory 11/
ft.com/content/6fd110…

https://www.ft.com/content/6fd11006-01db-4548-96d6-76343f38aea8

What counteroffensive? In what political climate? It is uncertain if the U.S. will ever provide any additional support? With the coming elections, the U.S. has its hands full with its domestic politics. Regardless of the outcome, the election will be contested. 12/ 

Consequently, there will be serious disruptions foreign policy continuity. The U.S. can’t honor the commitments it makes in foreign policy because of political instability domestically. Perhaps, it is time to admit it and become realistic. 13/ 

The deescalation contrive requires commitment and strategic patience, which the U.S. doesn’t have.

So, if there is no patience and commitment, then the appropriate doctrine is sprint – to give Ukraine everything it needs ASAP, not “stand by as long as it takes” 14/ 

Let’s now turn back to the reasons that make de escalation doctrine so appealing.

The fundamental appeal is the myth of “we can go back to normal” with Russia not being a militaristic adventurous regional power. 15/ 

Of course, while the U.S. is debating with itself in policy and academic circles whether Russia can be reasoned with, Russia is increasing hostile actions against Europe. 16/ ft.com/content/c88509…

https://www.ft.com/content/c88509f9-c9bd-46f4-8a5c-9b2bdd3c3dd3

European intelligence agencies have warned that Russia is plotting violent acts of sabotage across Europe, including covert bombings, arson attacks, and damage to infrastructure, with little concern about civilian casualties. 17/ 

Recent (suspected and proven) Russian sabotage incidents: arrests in Germany and the UK related to attacks on military and logistics sites and a suspected railway sabotage in Sweden 18/ 

Then, there is also an attack on Estonia’s interior minister’s car, and warnings of possible attacks on French military sites. 19/ 

Intelligence officials believe there has been a significant increase in Russian sabotage activity in Europe 20/ 

NATO has expressed deep concern about growing “malign activities on allied territory” by Russia. The sabotage efforts are seen as part of a broader Russian campaign to exert maximum pressure on Europe through disinformation, hacking, and other means 21/ 

Security are investigating recent incidents at munitions factories and arms depots supplying Ukraine.

So, yes, let’s talk deescalation. It has worked so well so far and is bound to be a success in the future. 22/ 

This brings me point 3 above: the fear that the region will become destabilized unless we de escalate.

This a good through, but it is naive and innocent. The problem is that the region is becoming destabilized anyway and de escalation efforts failed 23/ 

You can of course argue that the alternative is worse. That if the West tries to stand up to Russia it will escalate and destabilize even more. This is a theoretical argument that has no evidence. In fact, the events of the war in Ukraine prove the opposite 24/ 

Look at the Russia Black Sea Fleet! When everyone was nice and tried to keep Russia in the gain deal, it used its warships left and right to pound Ukraine.

Once Russia pulled out, Ukraine pushed back the warships into their harbors with seadrones and sinker a bunch of them 25/ 

Russian response? None! Now Russian warships are not a threat to the Black Sea anymore. This is how real de escalation works. 26/ 

Let’s now talk nukes and war world 3. Russia has threatened time and time again to use them if a red line is crossed.

This matter should be taken seriously. But the notion of the nuclear deterrence is mutual.27/ 

If the U.S. doesn’t commit to punish Russia extremely harsh for a use of nuke, then the U.S. cannot deter Russia from using nukes. Clear deterrence and deterrence to use nukes tactically has nothing to do with what happens in Ukraine, but with the US will to act and be unafraid/ 

But it is in fact Russia who mastered tactical nuclear deterrence. It deters the U.S. and allies from acting by threatening to use nukes. The West has been played and has been unable to offer a decent response. 29/ 

The only realistic response to Russia is in fact through Ukraine. If Russia is stopped and loses in Ukraine, the U.S. will show that Russia could be deterred

But that’s not the U.S. current thinking. 30/ 

Finally, the argument that a person after Putin can be worse is frankly laughable. With that type of logic every tyrant shouldn’t be dislodged. This is exactly the story that all tyrants tell people they oppress: the environment is tough, I am your best deal. 31/

dsd

Kharkiv:

My hometown today💔
Please speak out about Kharkiv and do not allow russian war crimes to become normalized. pic.twitter.com/opqNML0wqU

— Iryna Voichuk (@IrynaVoichuk) May 5, 2024

Donetsk Oblast:

Easter in Donetsk region, where Russians are actively advancing, destroying town after town. Ukrainian soldiers do not have opportunity to celebrate this day with their families, but they don’t lose faith.

5 May 2024 pic.twitter.com/NLIVSBHmgK

— Vasilisa Stepanenko (@VasilisaUKR) May 5, 2024

Bakhmut:

Gut-wrenching to see Bakhmut destroyed like this. I’ve seen countless such videos and photos now and it hits hard every time. This is what Russia has wrought on Ukraine. This video shows the central blocks of what used to be a vibrant city of 80,000 residents. It’s filmed heading… pic.twitter.com/czttwrbHiU

— Christopher Miller (@ChristopherJM) May 5, 2024

Gut-wrenching to see Bakhmut destroyed like this. I’ve seen countless such videos and photos now and it hits hard every time. This is what Russia has wrought on Ukraine. This video shows the central blocks of what used to be a vibrant city of 80,000 residents. It’s filmed heading east on Tsiolkovskoho Lane, then turning south on Nezalezhnosti (Independence) Street, and then east on Bazarna Street. I walked these streets every day for years. The vehicle drives by the back entrance to my second apartment; past New York Street Pizza; it scans toward the office where I saw many friends get married; past the central square and Palace of Culture; past the Silpo grocery and central market; then finally past the bus station.

Novoprovs’ke:

That tank went out like a warrior, taking all kinds of hits that'd send a T-90 to a fiery, immediate grave. We have thousands of these. We give 31.

— John Jackson (@hissgoescobra) May 5, 2024

Footage posted yesterday showing a Ukrainian M1A1 Abrams tank damaged/destroyed near Novopokrovs’ke. It was targeted by FPVs, a Lancet, Krasnopol artillery rounds, and a possible ATGM. The footage shows the crew abandoning the tank. A Bradley was also destroyed nearby.
https://t.me/lost_warinua/75376
https://t.me/rusich_army/14425
https://t.me/blackhussars/1828
https://t.me/btr80/16556
https://t.me/mod_russia/38255

The Avdiivka-Pokrovsk front:

The below map is bad for many reasons. But one particular reason it’s bad is that the Russians are now less than 10km/6 miles from the strategically important T0504 highway connecting key Donetsk region cities of Pokrovsk and Kostyantynivka, Druzhkivka, Kramatorsk and Slovyansk.… https://t.co/tquZtKU6A6 pic.twitter.com/yGRqoGRRNB

— Christopher Miller (@ChristopherJM) May 5, 2024

The below map is bad for many reasons. But one particular reason it’s bad is that the Russians are now less than 10km/6 miles from the strategically important T0504 highway connecting key Donetsk region cities of Pokrovsk and Kostyantynivka, Druzhkivka, Kramatorsk and Slovyansk. Having fire control over it would make logistics difficult for Ukrainian forces on the eastern front. Also, as Russian forces strengthen their flanks and push north from Ocheretyne and Arkhanhelske, it will put the embattled towns of Niu-York and Toretsk under greater pressure and make it harder to supply troops holding them.

 

The Dnipro River, Kherson Oblast:

/2. Full video by 406th Brigadehttps://t.co/qz6Q4UJFdj pic.twitter.com/38Q5LptzFx

— Special Kherson Cat 🐈🇺🇦 (@bayraktar_1love) May 5, 2024

Kramatorsk:

Frontline Easter celebration: Easter cakes in ammo boxes and helmets instead of baskets.

This is how Easter is celebrated in Kramatorsk.

📷: armyinform, Donetsk region. pic.twitter.com/aHCPviuBWb

— Anton Gerashchenko (@Gerashchenko_en) May 5, 2024

Odesa:

Russia has attacked Odesa with ballistic missiles several times this week. Despite anything, people there are baking Easter cakes and treating our Defenders.

The video shows only some of the Easter breads that the author of the video gave away at the Odesa railway station,… pic.twitter.com/U82EPt8gf3

— Anton Gerashchenko (@Gerashchenko_en) May 3, 2024

Russia has attacked Odesa with ballistic missiles several times this week. Despite anything, people there are baking Easter cakes and treating our Defenders.

The video shows only some of the Easter breads that the author of the video gave away at the Odesa railway station, while the rest were sent to the soldiers at the frontlines.

📹: _yana_ukraine/TikTok

For those of you logistics enthusiasts, here’s a long accounting of Russia’s AFVs. Via the Thread Reader App:

1/ It’s time to show the rest of BMPs and BTRs left in Russian storage. Here’s my final thread on AFV counts.

2/ Here you have the numbers at the remaining storage bases storing BMPs and BTRs which I haven’t covered until now, with outdated dates in orange. First BMPs:

3/ And BTRs:

4/ Here are the prewar quantities @HighMarsed and I found:

5/ After having posted in recent threads the total numbers of MT-LBs, MT-LBus, BRDM-2s and BTR-50s counted by me and @HighMarsed, and also the number of BMPs and BTR-60/70/80s at the bases analyzed along with @Vishun_military, now it’s time to look at the remaining armor left in storage.

6/ As you can see, BMPs are mostly stored at the usual tank and IFV bases, such as the ones I already covered with newer footage bought by Vishun, aka the 22nd, 1295th, 111th, 2544th, 769th and 3018th/6018th.

Unroll available on Thread Reader

https://x.com/Jonpy99/status/1784519287291384213

7/ And also at the 349th and 103rd/2546th, which are gonna be covered in this thread.

Unroll available on Thread Reader

8/ Most of the other BMPs are stored in artillery depots, like the 94th arsenal. Probably all armor stored there are artillery support vehicles like PRP-3s in the case of BMP-based armored vehicles:

9/ And some actual BMPs are also stored in small numbers in bases that HighMarsed and I are unsure if are storage or active bases: the 245th, 187th, 5349th/104th, 7022th, 230th, 237th, 243th (bis) and 247th. These small bases have been almost entirely depleted by now.

10/ In the case of BTRs, as you can see in the table, while there are many at tank/IFV and artillery depots, they are also spread out over a huge number of other storage facilities. I couldn’t find a clear pattern as to why is that.

Unroll available on Thread Reader

https://x.com/Jonpy99/status/1769299608771916105

11/ Now that that’s explained, let’s get into the actual analysis. First I’ll start with the 394th. Based on ground footage from a decade ago, equipment stored here is pretty rundown, but the lack of good footage make it impossible to prove it:

12/ This base was already covered by HighMarsed back in the day, and what he and @CovertCabal found was an increase in the number of stored BMPs:

13/ We discussed this while recounting together this base and came to the conclusion that footage of this storage base is always so mind-shattering that, although the spots we identified as more BMPs can’t be certainly identified as such, we rather overcount equipment than undercount it. This picture is proof enough to understand what I mean by that:

14/ There has been speculation that Russia has been buying armor from Central Asian countries and that the increase in BMPs in the 349th, being so near from the Kazhak border, could be due to that.

15/ However, a new article from Vishun proved that Kazakhstan’s stored equipment is still there since 2022, so maybe it’s just that Russia (understandably) is consolidating part of their stored equipment:

https://x.com/Vishun_military/status/1786471287201636754

16/ All in all, the number of BTRs in the 349th in October 2023 decreased from 276 to 259, and the number of BMPs increased from 316 to 600 (284 more BMPs in total). Once again, consider what I said about us being unsure of our figures of this base due to the bad quality of satellite imagery.

17/ Next is the 103rd/2546th base. The equipment stored in this one, like in the 349th, looks pretty rough already some years ago.

18/ In the case of this storage depot, in October 2023 the amount of BMPs decreased from 613 to 359, or 254 BMPs less. The number of BTRs apparently increased in 7 units, from 162 to 169. Some sections of the base are almost entirely empty after removing so many BMPs (and tanks).

19/ Now that the two main bases featuring on this thread have been shown, let’s take a quick look at other interesting ones. Let’s start with the 94th arsenal, with footage from January 2024. In this huge artillery base the number of PRP-3s and BTR-60 1V18/1V19s (unsure if the IDs are correct) has barely shifted. Just 26 less PRPs and, coincidentally, also 26 less 1V18/19s.

20/ No surprise here, as I already said in one of my first threads, these outdated vehicles are almost useless in a modern battlefield.

21/ Omsk also hosts another two storage yards inside the city, both holding more BTR-60s and 70s. Not a single one has been retrieved from these:

22/ I think I found some more specialized BTR-60 AND BMP-based vehicles at other artillery arsenals, such as the Sverosovkhoz or the 216th:

23/ With both the 349th-103rd/2546th and artillery bases covered, now let’s first see a bit of the decline of BMPs stored at minor bases. First, the former Ukrainian depot near Sevastopol.

Unroll available on Thread Reader

https://x.com/Jonpy99/status/1769272075741434013

24/ I recently found footage of this one thanks to @waffentraeger. This base now only stored a bunch of cannibalized and totally broken BMP-2s, MT-LBs and BTR-70s, although there were still 8 apparently well preserved BTR-70s here as of September 2023.

25/ Another one is the 245th. Here there were only 31 BMPs left in July 2023, compared to 148 before the war:

26/ Another interesting base is the one at Novaya Stanitsa, in the outskirts of Omsk. This one could possibly be a training ground. Both BTRs and BMPs went down here. Here’s a good in detail analysis of said base:

27/ One final minor BMP storage base, and then we jump to BTRs: the 247th. Here they dropped from 50 to 14 by November 2022, including 3 clearly broken:

28/ Now let’s see the situation regarding BTR-60/70/80s. First, as you can see in my table, most of the stored BTRs are 70s. 60s appear to be mostly specialized versions, as they are almost exclusively stored at artillery depots. 

29/ BTR-80s were almost exclusively stored at the 22nd, and they are well on their way to extinction:

Unroll available on Thread Reader

30/ So, let’s now take a look at some minor storage bases that hold BTRs. Let’s start with the one at Saigrajewo: all 198 BTR-70s stored here were cannibalized at some point during this war.

31/ This points to what I’ve said multiple times: BTR-70s are increasingly in use in the rear due to the increasing lack of more modern armor to replenish losses:

32/ Another interesting base is the 4998th. Here all 33 BTRs (some BTR-70s but mostly BTR-60 BTR-60 R-145BM) were gone by May 2022.

33/ Another BTR storage depot is the one near Rzhanitsa. 114 BTR-70s were stored here before the war, and all but one remained there by 2023 (Yandex doesn’t specify the date).

34/ At the 245th the number of BTR-70s also went down from 49 to just 2.

Unroll available on Thread Reader

https://x.com/Jonpy99/status/1786802135138542036

35/ One final base to look at and then let’s jump to the conclusion of this thread: the one near Yekaterimburg. Here the number of BTR-70s also stayed mostly the same: 58 before the war, 57 in September 2023.

36/ Here’s a table with the total count of all AFVs:

37/ As I already said in my previous thread on BMPs and BTRs analyzing Vishun’s footage, the rate of BMP cannibalization and removal from storage has gone up recently. massivhttps://x.com/Jonpy99/status/1784523892167414122 

38/ Even with most footage in this thread being a lot older than Vishun’s, you can see BMPs decreased in total from 6021 before the war to 4325 in the most recent footage. 1696 less BMPs in storage in a little over two years.

39/ And a huge share of what remains are broken vehicles or specialized versions which aren’t useful in combat. And BMP-2s are almost gone, with most of what remains being BMP-1s.

40/ In the case of BTRs, BTR-80s are too almost entirely gone from storage facilities, and BTR-70s have slowly started to appear in the frontlines, though IMHO it’ll still take for them to arrive in big numbers.

41/ With over 1500 BTR-70s in storage as of latest footage, they can still replenish losses with these for a long time, although it remains to be seen how many can be converted to the modernized BTR-70M version, with BTR-80 rear hull section and turret and a diesel engine, far better than the baseline BTR-70.

42/ I doubt we’ll see BTR-60s ever, not in significant amounts. Maybe at some point we’ll see some here and there, but that’s it. They’re too old, not as many as BTR-70s and probably mostly broken and/or cannibalized for spare parts to export to BTR-60 user countries.

43/ And after this and the recent BTRZ update thread, that’s it for the counting and analysis of Russian AFV storage bases! Next and final thread should be about the odds of the Russian war effort in the medium/long term, based on how their industry will be able to cope with ever mounting losses and a smaller pool of replacement armor and spare parts and the like.

44/ Wrt this table, remember what I said in my MT-LB thread: a lot of footage is pretty low, numbers are probably much lower now (I estimate 300-500 in the case of MT-LBs).

Unroll available on Thread Reader

That’s enough for today.

Your daily Patron!

There are no new Patron tweets, so here’s some adjacent material from the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense:

Sunday sunny vibes.

📷: 241st @TDF_UA Brigade pic.twitter.com/mGw2Q4Q8rg

— Defense of Ukraine (@DefenceU) May 5, 2024

And a new episode of Patron’s official cartoon!

Open thread!