Today, we are initiating a new tool to communicate with entrepreneurs – the Ukrainian Economic Platform – address by the President of Ukraine

26 January 2024 – 21:00

I wish you good health, dear Ukrainians!

Today, I held a Supreme Commander-in-Chief’s Staff meeting. The main focus was on the frontline situation. The reports were detailed, covering every direction, our defensive operations and active actions in general. Everyone in Ukraine knows where the intensity is currently the highest – Avdiivka, Maryinka, Kupyansk direction, southern directions – the highest attention to each.

We also analyzed all issues related to ammunition at the meeting – closing gaps, supplying the troops, agreements with partners, and domestic production. It’s crucial to note that Ukrainian arms and ammunition production shows upward trends. I am grateful to everyone involved, to each and every one working for our own capabilities in Ukraine.

Separately, we discussed the defense of our state against Russian air terror today – both at border cities and our frontline positions. We are working to increase the number of air defense systems, providing appropriate ammunition for protection against Russian aircraft and missile strikes. Control in the sky is, in many ways, a response to control on the ground.

The second for today. I held a meeting regarding our collaboration with partners in the European Union and relations with neighboring countries. Rationality in relationships is a priority, and we are preparing our corresponding steps.

The third was a meeting on the financial situation, the work of the tax authorities, and tax receipts. A report for the past year and priorities for this year were discussed. The main goal for the state and our entire society is to ensure that every Ukrainian entrepreneur has opportunities for more active economic work. This, in turn, allows Ukrainian budgets to better rely on the strength of our economy. The state, government institutions, and every official are obligated to do everything possible to support legal business.

I am grateful to all our entrepreneurs, everyone in Ukraine who stays in the country, preserves their businesses, and jobs. Decent jobs in Ukraine, the work of every business that remains in the legal field, are one of the key foundations of Ukrainian strength.

So, today we are initiating a new tool to communicate with entrepreneurs. And not only with those who are most visible. We are founding the Ukrainian Economic Platform, which will represent small-, medium-, and large-sized businesses, as well as various regions of our state. Investors and relocated enterprises will also be included. “Made in Ukraine” is not just a brand; it is a large community of people, millions of Ukrainians working in businesses. These are our people who establish enterprises, create job opportunities for others. The entire business community will be represented on this new platform.

The government, together with the Office, regional state administrations, and experts will organize the platform’s functioning. The main task is for it to be an effective communication tool. The communication should always be supported by operational decisions – what state institutions are doing or changing, and what will create a new, normal story of relations, especially between law enforcement bodies and entrepreneurs.

We need more confidence for businesses and a larger legal, “white” economy for Ukraine. We need more Ukrainian production facilities, more Ukrainian products from various industries. I have just signed decrees that will enable the creation of this communication tool – the Entrepreneurship Council, as defined in recent decisions of the National Security and Defense Council (NSDC), and the Ukrainian platform to vitalize entrepreneurship and our Ukrainian products.

I thank everyone who is fighting and working for Ukraine, all our people, our society in all its diversity. I’m grateful to each and every one who understands that only the continuous strengthening of Ukraine brings us closer to the end of this war, the fair end with our Ukrainian victory. Glory to our people!

Glory to Ukraine!

A reminder that the vast majority of the military aid for Ukraine has been spent in the US:

The funds “for Ukraine” primarily go to US companies. There is a detailed map obtained by Politico and also a map, which I made last year, showcasing that fact. These are top twelve which benefit the most:

1. Arizona: $1.978 billion
2. Pennsylvania: $1.964 billion
3. Arkansas:… pic.twitter.com/JDFv076QSS

— (((Tendar))) (@Tendar) January 26, 2024

The funds “for Ukraine” primarily go to US companies. There is a detailed map obtained by Politico and also a map, which I made last year, showcasing that fact. These are top twelve which benefit the most:

1. Arizona: $1.978 billion

2. Pennsylvania: $1.964 billion

3. Arkansas: $1.272 billion

4. Wisconsin: $1.021 billion

5. Florida: $0.987 billion

6. Texas: $0.930 billion

7. Mississippi: 0.924 billion

8. West Virginia: $0.763 billion

9. Michigan: $0.737 billion

10. California: $0.724 billion

11. Missouri: $0.692 billion

12. Ohio: $0.684 billion

This is US tax payer money for US jobs. It is investment in those states so that US allies can fight a war so that US soldiers do not have to fight. It is a win-win for both sides, the US and their allies. Everyone saying something differently, is not only lying but trying to obstruct this successful endeavor. And currently Republicans have put this on hold.

That are simple facts.

#USA #Arizona #Pennsylvania #Arkansas #Wisconsin #Florida #Texas #Mississippi #WestVirginia #Michigan #California #Missouri #Ohio #Ukraine

France:

France delivered two additional LRUs (French designation of the MARS2 MLRS) to Ukraine.

Source: https://t.co/iRwj7mkHef#France #Ukraine pic.twitter.com/85Fd6bgDC6

— (((Tendar))) (@Tendar) January 25, 2024

Rob Lee, Dara Massicot, and Michael Kofman have a new assessment of Ukraine’s current military capability and its strategic consequences.

Wrote about the current state of the war with @KofmanMichael and @MassDara. Ukraine likely will not have the resources for a strategic-level offensive in 2024, but could set the conditions for one in 2025 if critical decisions are made now.https://t.co/0prsTtiSKF

— Rob Lee (@RALee85) January 26, 2024

This winter, Ukraine’s military is visibly running on fumes, as recent reporting shows M109 Paladin artillery outside Bakhmut receiving only smoke shells for ammunition. When we were last there in November, shell hunger was widespread along the front, and the situation has only gotten worse. Following months of hard fighting, Ukraine’s offensive in 2023 proved a missed opportunity. The current situation is also not sustainable long term. It is clear Ukraine and the West need a new strategic vision. This means planning beyond the next six months or the next offensive operation. While the current state of the war has been described as a stalemate, spurring an animated debate over what that means, Russia holds material, industrial, and manpower advantages in 2024, along with the initiative. However, with tailored Western support, Ukraine could hold against Russian forces this year and rebuild the necessary advantage to conduct large-scale offensive operations in 2025, recreating another opportunity to deal Russia a battlefield defeat. Conversely, without major adjustments, or if Western support falters, the current path holds a high risk of exhaustion over time and Ukraine being forced to negotiate with Moscow from a position of weakness.

Currently, Ukraine is focused on reconstitution and digging in to defend against continued Russian attacks. Western supplies of artillery ammunition have diminished significantly, leading to shell hunger across the front. After spending several months on the offensive, Ukraine lacks enough artillery ammunition and combat-effective units to go back on the offensive any time soon. Russian forces have seized the initiative along stretches of the front, but they too have struggled to make progress. Although Ukraine’s summer offensive failed to achieve its minimum goals, Russia’s winter offensive last year, and lackluster attacks this fall, also failed to achieve a breakthrough. The year 2023 ended with Russia taking marginally more territory than Ukraine, but it is still far from its official goal of seizing the entire Donbas. Territorial control is one measure of progress toward one’s objectives, but the balance of attrition, capacity for reconstitution, defense industrial mobilization, and the ability to employ force effectively at scale are more important determinants of long-term success. This is why what happens in 2024 is likely to determine the future trajectory of the war.

Uncertainty over Western military and economic assistance means Ukraine needs to further husband its resources and make hard decisions in 2024. Yet despite this gloomy reality, with Western support Ukraine can regenerate combat power and possibly retake the advantage in 2025. If this year is used wisely, core problems are addressed, and the right lessons are applied from the 2023 offensive, Ukraine can take another shot at inflicting a major defeat on Russian forces. However, this demands a new strategy, premised on three central elements: hold, build, and strike. Holding will require a well-prepared defense, consolidating, and rationalizing the Ukrainian armed forces’ diverse park of equipment. Building focuses on reconstituting force quality, training, and expanding defense industrial capacity. Finally, the strike element will degrade Russian advantages and create challenges for Russian forces far behind the front lines, as Ukraine works on rebuilding its capacity to resume offensive operations. Ideally, Ukraine can absorb Russian offensives while minimizing casualties and position itself to retake the advantage over time.

A Better Vision

The strategic context in 2024 is starkly different from that of 2023. Kyiv is unlikely to have the artillery ammunition, manpower, or equipment for another strategic offensive. Conversely, Russia will be materially advantaged in 2024, and Russian spending on national defense, at 10.8 trillion rubles, is a substantial increase over previous years, bringing it officially to 6 percent of gross domestic product (various estimates put the real figure at 8 percent). This may not be enough to offer Moscow a decisive edge on the battlefield, but Russia has made a structural shift in the economy toward significantly increased spending on national defense, converting energy export revenue into defense industrial mobilization. No less important, in 2023, Russia was able to replace its losses and generate additional combat power over time. This included managing to recruit contract soldiers for new formations (not just mobilizing soldiers). Russian forces may experience similar difficulties in overcoming Ukraine’s defenses in 2024 as they did in 2023, but Russian advantages will begin to mount over the course of this year and the next.

This is why the strategy should begin with a hold to hedge against Russian offensives this year, and relative advantages in materiel. This consists of, first, building a more fortified defense-in-depth, which will make it easier to defend the nearly 1,000-kilometer front line, allowing Ukraine to rotate forces, free up its best units, and reduce the ammunition required to defend. Ukraine has started to dig in, but these efforts are nascent when compared to the defense-in-depth fortified positions established by Russian forces. Russia has dedicated engineering brigades that construct and improve fortifications, whereas in the Ukrainian military, defenses are the responsibility of each maneuver brigade. Stronger defenses, including underground bunkers and tunnels, will also compensate for Russia’s advantage in artillery and glide bombs. This will also require the right policies in place, since defenses have to be coordinated with regional authorities, property issues must be addressed, and so forth. This may be surprising, but in Ukraine, farming and business activity carries on close to the front, as two of us observed during our field research.

Holding is about not just positional defense, but also consolidation. This year can be used to consolidate and rationalize the force. With Western support and transfer of industrial capacity like 3D printing machines, Ukraine can increasingly maintain and produce new components for Western kit. Ukraine has a combination of military– and volunteer-run repair and upgrade facilities involved in helping to maintain the force. However, Ukraine received a diverse arsenal of equipment from Western countries, with 14 different types of artillery as just one example. In 2023, this diversity was further increased with Western tanks (Leopard, Challenger, and Abrams variants), infantry fighting vehicles, various types of mine-resistant ambush-protected vehicles, and so on. This makes for a logistical and maintenance nightmare, which reduces the amount of equipment that is serviceable at any one time. Given the critical role played by private charities like Come Back Alive and the Prytula Foundation, greater cooperation between them and Western governments and defense companies would help keep Western equipment serviceable.

Second, Ukraine will have to revisit its policies on mobilization and recruitment to address long-standing issues in the structure and quality of its forces. This is currently under debate, but time is of the essence, and it is slipping away. So far, Ukraine’s lawmakers have rejected a proposal to mobilize 450,000 to 500,000 men. What’s clear is that Kyiv will have to consider not just the numbers being mobilized, but the average age, to restore force quality. The Ukrainian military will struggle to conduct offensive operations if the average age continues to climb well into the 40s. Some of the older mobilized soldiers are in poor physical shape and have health issues that limit their ability to fight. Brigades may appear to have large rosters, but many of the soldiers in practice can’t effectively conduct assaults or perform other combat-related functions, limiting their offensive potential. Policies also need to address sustainable rotation, so that personnel can expect to be taken off the line. Ideally, Ukrainian brigades will have a rotation of battalions on the line, in reserve, and being formed. Most important, the system needs to preserve an experienced core of soldiers and junior leaders in every unit as the basis of new formations and training efforts.

Third, working with Western countries, Ukraine can scale up and reform existing training programs, restoring combat effectiveness to its forces. This means expanding local training efforts, revising Western programs, combining training materials, and looking for ways to address the growing deficit of professional military education for officers and junior leaders. These programs need to include not just the tactical requirements of Ukraine’s combat operations, but also the ability to operate as units, and staff training for the brigades. Although Ukrainian servicemen and officers have significant combat experience, they often lack training in the fundamentals, which becomes a greater problem as they swiftly get promoted to replace combat losses. Increased horizontal connections between the Ukrainian and U.S. militaries at the brigade level and below would help ameliorate these issues as well. Company, battalion, and brigade commanders and their staffs cannot be properly trained in a short period of time, which further necessitates looking to 2025 for Ukraine’s next strategic offensive.

As in most wars, the burden of this war falls heavily on the infantry. Infantry mans trenches in defense regardless of the weather, and they suffer the highest rate of attrition. Although ammunition and equipment were a constraint, Ukraine’s summer offensive culminated due to attrition among its infantry forces. This led to commanders forming assault groups piecemeal this fall from soldiers with different specialties, such as artillerymen, to continue offensive operations. A larger pool of trained infantry is critical to reduce the burden on the current force, some of whom have been fighting for nearly two years with minimal time away from the front. Without addressing these issues, problems with morale and exhaustion will grow over time, threatening any future offensives. Manpower management for both sides will be a key factor as the war stretches into 2025 and beyond.

Fourth, Ukraine can work with Western partners to significantly increase production of drones, as well as counter-drone electronic warfare systems, that will allow it to partially offset deficits in artillery ammunition and reduce its vulnerability to future disruptions in aid. Ukraine can produce first-person-view strike drones in large numbers, but they require funding and ammunition for them, which is a problem that is much easier to solve with Western help than the slowly increasing production of 155mm rounds. European nations could fund drone production facilities in Ukraine or in bordering states. This could partially compensate for the lack of artillery ammunition being provided. Larger quantities of mines, including artillery-fired scatterable mines, would also strengthen Ukrainian defenses.

The West should focus on providing proven capabilities needed in larger quantities that reduce casualties like protected mobility, air defense, or mine-clearing equipment. Ukraine still has a deficit of basic armored vehicles, especially tracked armored personnel carriers, to properly equip many of its units, which leads to unnecessary casualties. This is particularly an issue for National Guard and Territorial Defense brigades that are frequently employed as a normal Ukrainian mechanized brigade out of necessity but are not properly equipped for such a role. Armored vehicles are also needed to serve as ambulances. In some cases, it takes several hours before wounded soldiers can be evacuated because artillery fire is too intense, and there aren’t enough armored vehicles to spare. The transfer of greater quantities of M113 or armored Humvees, which are easy to maintain, would have an outsized effect.

Lastly, Western defense companies are more innovative than Russia’s defense industry, but they need the proper demand signals from Western governments to become more engaged. Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense is also working through long running issues in contracting, and is trying to address them under new leadership. Foreign defense companies are testing weapons in Ukraine, but often in relatively small numbers and without a sense of urgency. To fix this, Western governments may need to sign contracts for the production of systems for Ukraine, which, ideally, Western militaries may also need themselves. For example, these can include jamming-proof modules and terminal guidance software for drones, electronic warfare systems, and remotely operated means of detecting and destroying mines. Such efforts dovetail with Ukrainian commander-in-chief Gen. Valeriy Zaluzhny’s call for technological innovation as one pillar of the approach to break out from the relatively static battlefield dynamic.

A defensive-only strategy will not prove sufficient, but Ukraine will have to make careful choices. Strategy often reveals itself best in what you choose not to do. While there is a general consensus that Ukraine should pursue an “active defense,” what that means in practice needs to be defined. It should not translate into operations whose purpose is to simply fight for initiative or to apply pressure at the cost of manpower and ammunition that Ukraine cannot afford to expend. Conducting localized offensives may seem appealing, but only under the right conditions to attain a better position at low cost. Fighting for the initiative makes little sense if there are no resources to exploit it. In theory, localized offensives maintain pressure on Russian forces, limiting their freedom of action, but in practice, they could impede rebuilding the combat power of the Ukrainian military. It is also unlikely that localized offensives would prove more effective, or efficient, at constraining Russian force regeneration than just maintaining a good defense. From a manpower, equipment, and ammunition perspective, offensive operations require considerably more resources, of which Ukraine will be in short supply, compared to maintaining a defense. They can also be counterproductive for morale and recruitment, because soldiers intuitively know when taking the next tree line is not in the service of a wider operation or a strategy.

In 2024, the best defense is not likely to be a good offense, but rather one that maximizes efficiency and creates the right opportunities down the line. Ukraine can play to its advantages while defending, leveraging improved long-range strike capabilities — enabled by Western intelligence support — to target Russian bases and critical infrastructure far behind enemy lines. Essentially, the active component of the strategy is comprised of an extended strike campaign that helps set the conditions in 2025. Ukraine can steadily decrease Russia’s airpower advantage by targeting bases in Crimea and near its borders. Kyiv now holds the initiative in the northern parts of the Black Sea and can build on the success of a strike campaign against Russia’s Black Sea Fleet. To this end, the West should help Ukraine ramp up production of its own long-range strike drones and revisit policies constraining the Ukrainian ability to employ Western-supplied missiles, which de facto make Russia a sanctuary.

However, a long-range strike campaign is a way of applying pressure and creating challenges for the Russian military, not a substitute for a major ground offensive. Ukraine will still have to overcome Russian defenses in the south, and achieve a breakthrough, to put Russian forces in Crimea in a precarious position. Even if successful, taking down the Kerch Strait Bridge or other ground lines of communication is unlikely to lead to a collapse of Russian positions in the south without the added pressure of a sustained ground campaign. That said, in the coming months Ukraine will have to avoid being fixed into unfavorable attritional fights that would undermine any prospects for success in the long term. Russia has more resources, and Western support is increasingly uncertain, so Ukraine cannot afford to fight in 2024 as it did in 2023.

Much, much more at the link!

Hal Brands of Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) has published a piece that compares the geo-strategic reality of the late 1930s with those of today. Here are some excerpts.

The post-Cold War era began, in the early 1990s, with soaring visions of global peace. It is ending, three decades later, with surging risks of global war. Today, Europe is experiencing its most devastating military conflict in generations. A brutal fight between Israel and Hamas is sowing violence and instability across the Middle East. East Asia, fortunately, is not at war. But it isn’t exactly peaceful, either, as China coerces its neighbors and amasses military power at a historic rate. If many Americans don’t realize how close the world is to being ravaged by fierce, interlocking conflicts, perhaps that’s because they’ve forgotten how the last global war came about.

When Americans think of global war, they typically think of World War II—or the part of the war that began with Japan’s strike on Pearl Harbor in December 1941. After that attack, and Adolf Hitler’s subsequent declaration of war against the United States, the conflict was a single, all-encompassing struggle between rival alliances on a global battlefield. But World War II began as a trio of loosely connected contests for primacy in key regions stretching from Europe to the Asia-Pacific—contests that eventually climaxed and coalesced in globally consuming ways. The history of this period reveals the darker aspects of strategic interdependence in a war-torn world. It also illustrates uncomfortable parallels to the situation Washington currently confronts.

The United States isn’t facing a formalized alliance of adversaries, as it once did during World War II. It probably won’t see a replay of a scenario in which autocratic powers conquer giant swaths of Eurasia and its littoral regions. Yet with wars in eastern Europe and the Middle East already raging, and ties between revisionist states becoming more pronounced, all it would take is a clash in the contested western Pacific to bring about another awful scenario—one in which intense, interrelated regional struggles overwhelm the international system and create a crisis of global security unlike anything since 1945. A world at risk could become a world at war. And the United States isn’t remotely ready for the challenge.

The fascist powers initially had little in common except illiberal governance and a desire to shatter the status quo. In fact, the vicious racism that pervaded fascist ideology could work against the cohesion of this group: Hitler once derided the Japanese as “lacquered half-monkeys.” And although these countries, beginning in 1936, would seal a series of overlapping security pacts, through the late 1930s they were as often rivals as allies. Hitler’s Germany and Prime Minister Benito Mussolini’s Italy worked at cross-purposes in crises over Austria in 1934 and Ethiopia in 1935. As late as 1938, Germany was supporting China in its war of survival against Japan; the next year, it signed a tacit alliance with the Soviet Union, then fighting an undeclared conflict against Tokyo in Asia. (Moscow and Tokyo later signed a non-aggression pact in April 1941, which held until 1945.) Only gradually did regional crises merge, and rival coalitions cohere, because of factors that might sound familiar today.

First, whatever their specific—and sometimes conflicting—aims, the fascist powers had a more fundamental similarity of purpose. All were seeking a dramatically transformed global order, in which “have not” powers carved out vast empires through brutal tactics—and in which brutal regimes surpassed the decadent democracies they despised. “In the battle between democracy and totalitarianism,” Japan’s foreign minister declared in 1940, “the latter . . . will without question win and will control the world.” There was a basic geopolitical and ideological solidarity among the world’s autocracies, which thrust them—and the conflicts they sowed—closer together over time.

The parallels between this earlier era and the present are striking. Today, as in the 1930s, the international system is facing three sharp regional challenges. China is rapidly amassing military might as part of its campaign to eject the United States from the western Pacific—and, perhaps, become the world’s preeminent power. Russia’s war in Ukraine is the murderous centerpiece of its long-standing effort to reclaim primacy in eastern Europe and the former Soviet space. In the Middle East, Iran and its coterie of proxies—Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis, and many others—are waging a bloody struggle for regional dominance against Israel, the Gulf monarchies, and the United States. Once again, the fundamental commonalities linking the revisionist states are autocratic governance and geopolitical grievance; in this case, a desire to break a U.S.-led order that deprives them of the greatness they desire. Beijing, Moscow, and Tehran are the new “have not” powers, struggling against the “haves”: Washington and its allies.

Two of these challenges have already turned hot. The war in Ukraine is also a vicious proxy contest between Russia and the West; Russian President Vladimir Putin is buckling down for a long, grinding struggle that could last for years. Hamas’s attack on Israel last October—enabled, if perhaps not explicitly blessed, by Tehran—triggered an intense conflict that is creating violent spillover across that vital region. Iran, meanwhile, is creeping toward nuclear weapons, which could turbocharge its regional revisionism by indemnifying its regime against an Israeli or U.S. response. In the western Pacific and mainland Asia, China is still relying mostly on coercion short of war. But as the military balance shifts in sensitive spots such as the Taiwan Strait or the South China Sea, Beijing will have better options—and perhaps a bigger appetite—for aggression.

As in the 1930s, the revisionist powers don’t always see eye-to-eye. Russia and China both seek preeminence in central Asia. They are also pushing into the Middle East, in ways that sometimes cut across Iran’s interests there. If the revisionists do eventually push their common enemy, the United States, out of Eurasia, they might end up fighting among themselves over the spoils—just as the Axis powers, had they somehow defeated their rivals, surely would have then turned on one another. Yet for now, the ties between revisionist powers are flourishing and Eurasia’s regional conflicts are becoming more tightly interlinked.

More recently, the war in Ukraine has also enhanced other Eurasian relationships—between Russia and Iran, and Russia and North Korea—while intensifying and interweaving the challenges the respective revisionists pose.

Drones, artillery ammunition, and ballistic missiles provided by Tehran and Pyongyang—along with economic succor provided by Beijing—have sustained Moscow in its conflict against Kyiv and its Western backers. In exchange, Moscow appears to be transferring more sensitive military technology and know-how: selling advanced aircraft to Iran, reportedly offering aid to North Korea’s advanced weapons programs, perhaps even helping China build its next-generation attack submarine. Other regional tussles are revealing similar dynamics. In the Middle East, Hamas is fighting Israel with Chinese, Russian, Iranian, and North Korean weapons that it has been accumulating for years. Since October 7, Putin has declared that conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East are part of a single, larger struggle that “will decide the fate of Russia, and of the entire world.” And in another echo of the past, tensions across Eurasia’s key theaters stretch U.S. resources thin by confronting the superpower with multiple dilemmas simultaneously. The revisionist powers aid each other simply by doing their own things.

Another crucial difference is that East Asia still enjoys a tenuous peace. But with U.S. officials warning that China could become more belligerent as its capabilities mature—perhaps as soon as the second half of this decade—it is worth considering what would happen if that region erupted.

Such a conflict would be catastrophic in multiple respects. Chinese aggression against Taiwan could well trigger a war with the United States, pitting the world’s two most powerful militaries—and their two nuclear arsenals—against each other. It would wrench global commerce in ways that make the dislocations provoked by the wars in Ukraine and Gaza look trivial. It would further polarize global politics as the United States seeks to rally the democratic world against Chinese aggression—pushing Beijing into a tighter embrace with Russia and other autocratic powers.

Most critically, if combined with ongoing conflicts elsewhere, a war in East Asia could create a situation unlike anything since the 1940s, in which all three key regions of Eurasia are ablaze with large-scale violence at once. This might not become a single, all-encompassing world war. But it would make for a world plagued by war as the United States and other defenders of the existing order confronted multiple, interlocking conflicts spanning some of the most important strategic terrain on Earth.

But thinking through the nightmare scenario is still worthwhile, since the world could be as little as one mishandled crisis away from pervasive Eurasian conflict—and because the United States is so unprepared for this eventuality.

Right now, the United States is straining to support Israel and Ukraine simultaneously. The demands of these two wars—fights in which Washington is not yet a principal combatant—are stretching U.S. capabilities in areas such as artillery and missile defense. Deployments to the waters around the Middle East, meant to deter Iran and keep critical sea lanes open, are taxing the resources of the U.S. Navy. Strikes against Houthi targets in Yemen are consuming assets, such as Tomahawk missiles, that would be at a premium in a U.S.-Chinese conflict. These are all symptoms of a bigger problem: the shrinking ability and capacities of the U.S. military relative to its numerous, interrelated challenges.

During the 2010s, the Pentagon gradually shifted away from a military strategy meant to defeat two rogue-state adversaries at the same time, opting instead for a one-war strategy aimed at defeating a single great-power rival, China, in a high-intensity fight. In one sense, this was a sensible response to the extreme demands such a conflict would entail. But it has also left the Pentagon ill equipped for a world in which a combination of hostile great powers and serious regional threats are menacing multiple theaters at once. It has also, perhaps, emboldened more aggressive U.S. adversaries, such as Russia and Iran, which surely realize that an overstretched superpower—with a military desperate to focus on China—has limited ability to respond to other probes.

Of course, the United States wasn’t ready for global war in 1941, but it eventually prevailed through a world-beating mobilization of military and industrial might. President Joe Biden evoked that achievement late last year, saying the United States must again be the “arsenal of democracy.” His administration has invested in expanding the production of artillery ammunition, long-range missiles, and other important weapons. But the harsh reality is that the defense industrial base that won World War II and then the Cold War no longer exists, thanks to persistent underinvestment and the broader decline of U.S. manufacturing. Shortages and bottlenecks are pervasive; the Pentagon recently acknowledged “material gaps” in its ability to “rapidly scale production” in a crisis. Many allies have even weaker defense industrial bases.

Much more at the link!

The Financial Times has published with the David Pressman, the US Ambassador to Hungary.

The US ambassador to Hungary has accused Prime Minister Viktor Orbán of running a “fantasy foreign policy” that serves the interests of the Kremlin and harms the unity of the Nato alliance.

In an interview with the Financial Times, David Pressman said the Hungarian government’s approach to international affairs was premised upon “imagined invaders” and a “fantasised Hungarophobia”. It served Orbán’s domestic political purposes and explained some of his policy positions, Pressman said. “But at the end of the day, it’s a fantasy.”

He also criticised Orbán for “actively participating” in the US election campaign with his open support for Donald Trump and calls for President Joe Biden to quit, saying it was “not something we expect from allies”.

The Hungarian government’s decision to politicise its bilateral relationships with allies, including with the US, had left it “more isolated and more alone than it has been in a very long time”, he said.

The unusually candid comments from the US ambassador lay bare the frustration in Nato and EU capitals about Orbán’s efforts to thwart further EU aid to Ukraine and his foot-dragging on the ratification of Sweden’s membership of the Atlantic alliance, as well as his weakening of democratic standards and the rule of law in Hungary.

On Tuesday, Hungary became the last holdout on ratifying Stockholm’s membership after Turkey’s lawmakers voted for it. Orbán says he is committed to the Scandinavian country’s accession but invited his Swedish counterpart Ulf Kristersson to Budapest to “negotiate”.

Pressman said: “When you look at Hungary’s foreign policy, whether it be suggesting raising questions about Ukraine’s EU accession, stymying efforts to provide financial support to Ukraine, meeting with Vladimir Putin, resisting efforts to diversify off of Russian energy, resisting sustained efforts to close Kremlin platforms inside of Hungary, all of these have something in common. And it’s something that is leaving Hungary more isolated from its partners within Nato and its partners within the EU.”

He added: “These policy choices, without question, are helpful to Putin and harmful to careful efforts to keep the alliance and our partners together in standing up in the face of his aggression.”

The ambassador added that “Kremlin propaganda and disinformation” was being “routinely” spread by Hungarian media controlled or supported by the government.

One example, Pressman said, was an outlandish claim made by Orbán last month that billions of euros of EU funds due to Hungary but blocked by Brussels over rule of law concerns could be sent to Ukraine instead to the ultimate benefit of US arms manufacturers. “Where there are Americans there’s money, and where there’s meat there are flies,” Orbán said.

The claim “could come from Kremlin propaganda” and was “beyond unfortunate”, Pressman said.

The ambassador said the US cared about Hungary and regarded it as an ally but it was highly unusual to have one that refused to engage with US security concerns. Orbán’s government “would prefer to wait out the current administration”.

More at the link!

Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, Russian occupied Zaporizhzhia Oblast:

The nuclear safety and security situation at Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhya NPP remains extremely fragile with “very real” potential dangers of a major accident, DG @rafaelmgrossi told the @UN Security Council ahead of his 4th mission to the site early next month. https://t.co/J9NFYAQTr6 https://t.co/QKvyP3R2uw

— IAEA – International Atomic Energy Agency ⚛️ (@iaeaorg) January 26, 2024

The Kreminna front:

Another previously undocumented accumulation of Russian losses on the Kreminna front. 2xBTR-82AT, BMP-2, BMP-3 and T-72B3 mod.2022. https://t.co/gzQfO7N0Zz https://t.co/dAgS5s5nA2 pic.twitter.com/QZLjz5XPT8

— Special Kherson Cat 🐈🇺🇦 (@bayraktar_1love) January 26, 2024

Oleshki Forest, Russian occupied Kherson Oblast:

Bombardment of Russian 330Zh Zhitel EW system and D-30 howitzer in Oleshki forest, Kherson region.https://t.co/dOz9yLNHnb pic.twitter.com/c1B5DlqdYD

— Special Kherson Cat 🐈🇺🇦 (@bayraktar_1love) January 26, 2024

 

More on the downed IL-26:

Putini suggests Il-76 couldn't be shot down by Russian air defence "by definition" due to friend-or-foe systems.

Apparently, no one told him about the A-50, which the Russians argued furiously was taken down by own air defence. pic.twitter.com/upyNAnJhPq

— WarTranslated (@wartranslated) January 26, 2024

So, it's been almost two days since the Ilyushin Il-76 crash near Russia's Belgorod.

As of now, Russia still has not provided any rock-solid and unresistible proof behind its claim regarding 65 Ukrainian POWs killed on board.

International agencies like the Red Cross have not…

— Illia Ponomarenko 🇺🇦 (@IAPonomarenko) January 26, 2024

So, it’s been almost two days since the Ilyushin Il-76 crash near Russia’s Belgorod.

As of now, Russia still has not provided any rock-solid and unresistible proof behind its claim regarding 65 Ukrainian POWs killed on board.

International agencies like the Red Cross have not been admitted to the crash site.

The UN has no answers. The U.S. has no answers.

Ukraine demands an international inquiry into the incident.

We do know for sure that a large prisoner swap was to take place on that day.

We do not know if the downed Russian aircraft was really transporting Ukrainian POWs for the swap. We don’t even know if the Il-76 was departing or arriving in Belgorod.

The abovementioned remains the key question in the incident.

However, here’s another key question: if Ukrainian POWs were really on board — had or had not the Russian side warned Ukraine about the airborne transportation of POWs in a highly dangerous zone within the reach of Ukraine’s air defense?

Was this airborne transportation (the timing, the route etc) coordinated with the Ukrainian side during preparations for such a large prisoner swap that reportedly involved over 190 Ukrainians in exchange for over 190 Russians?

Was it or was it not?

I still find it doubtful that the Ukrainian air defense had no idea that a swap was to take place on that day?

Could it be possible that there was a grave miscommunication between Ukraine’s military intelligence that deals with such highly sensitive operations and the Ukrainian air force?

Possible but still not likely, IMO.

Why?

Because we know it for certain that Russia used to transport Ukrainian POWs to Belgorod with Il-76s for prisoner swaps.

The latest took place as recently as January 3, 2024. And it happened as planned. We have hard evidence from very Ukrainian troops that were onboard and returned home safely on that day.

That said, there have been instances of proper communication within the Ukrainian military and therefore, of a proper agreement with the Russian side regarding a no-fire zone around Belgorod.

In other words: “Warning, Russian aircraft will be transporting POWs for swap, hold your fire here and there.”

I repeat: the previous swap involving a POW airlift to Belgorod was successful and safe.

And according to the 3rd Geneva Convention 1949, a warring party is obliged to ensure the complete safety of POWs, including during POW swaps, including in terms of sticking to agreed procedures and informing international humanitarian agencies like the Red Cross.

Naturally, it includes restricted airspace dozens of kilometers away from the hostile territory that is Russia’s Belgorod.

So, my question is: if dozens of Ukrainian POWs were being transported on a military aircraft (a legitimate target) within an air combat operations zone — was this information properly brought to Ukraine’s notice as necessary?

If the answer is no, and if Ukrainian POWs were indeed on board — this constitutes a severe war crime, one of so many committed by Russia in its war on Ukraine.

And if the answer is no, you decide if that was Russian criminal negligence or Russian intention.

Also, if you seriously believe that Ukraine which, over the 10 years of Russian-Ukrainian war, has had close to a dozen POW swaps with Russia (even I was privileged to be present during one of them), has fought for years to bring its soldiers home, and SUDDENLY decided to ‘eXeCUte it’s oWn mEn’ (as some twice convicted sex offenders might say) – stop it and get some help.

Moscow:

A Moscow court extended Evan Gershkovich's pre-trial detention until 30 March this morning — meaning he'll have been behind bars in a Russian prison for at least a year

📷Alexander Nemenov/AFP pic.twitter.com/VFr2vtMmbp

— Jake Cordell (@JakeCordell) January 26, 2024

“Military blogger” 🤣🤣🤣 I think he would be very offended https://t.co/kDrLpDY766

— WarTranslated (@wartranslated) January 26, 2024

Igor “Strelkov” Girkin has been sentenced to 4 years in prison. It marks the latest crack down by the Putin regime against elements who do not show fealty to Vladimir.

We cannot say that Girkin is a choir boy, in the contrary. He admitted that it was his shots who started the… pic.twitter.com/NXll2aheU0

— (((Tendar))) (@Tendar) January 25, 2024

Igor “Strelkov” Girkin has been sentenced to 4 years in prison. It marks the latest crack down by the Putin regime against elements who do not show fealty to Vladimir.

We cannot say that Girkin is a choir boy, in the contrary. He admitted that it was his shots who started the war in Donbas back in 2014. At the same time MH17 was brought down by Russian troops of the 53rd air defense brigade from Kursk while he was in charge.
The Donbas was turned into a warzone and more than 10,000 people perished in region where “separatists tendencies” never existed and were purely fabricated by Moscow.

When the full scale war started in February 2022, Girkin became quite prominent for his Telegram channel where he didn’t minced words regarding failures of the Russian army. For a few weeks he also joint the fight in Ukraine but under murky explanations left the battlefield. He was one of the first who emphasized the necessity to launch a larger mobilization which eventually kicked off in September 2022. In the next months he annoyed the Russian regime by pointing out the absolute devastating losses in Bakhmut and entered a bitter feud with Prigozhin.

This constant complaining was too much for the Russian regime and consequently he got detained. This comes at the same time when many critical TG channels were silenced. Prigozhin’s fate was the most radical version of it.

Overall, Girkin’s detention and silencing has been a stark signal the Kremlin couldn’t allow even the smallest dissenting voices any more, even when they come from veterans of the same cause. It also tells us that the situation for Russia is far worse than then the Russian propaganda is willing to admit and that it had to be silenced, especially after the Wagner uprising.

What might look like a Putin gambit showing his absolute power was rather the exposure of his weakness. The shortcomings of the Russian military described by Girkin as well as the constant miscalculations of the Kremlin turned out to be overall true and embarrassed the Russian leadership, repeatedly. What dissenting voice even for the like-minded people might cause could be witnessed with Prigozhin and Wagner, though Girkin in comparison was a minor problem compared to the powerful Wagner group back in summer 2023.

Girkin will have now enough time to contemplate whether it wouldn’t have been a better choice to be in a Western prison, instead in a Russian penal colony somewhere in the arctic.

#Russia

Girkin is a leader among the Black Sea Cossacks. In September of 1990, Girkin, along with a number of Black Sea Cossacks, created a separatist revolt in the eastern part of Moldovia, which led to the breakaway statelet of Transnistria. What Girkin did in Donestk and Luhansk in 2014 was, essentially, the same game plan. If anyone deserved to rot in a prison, Girkin most certainly does. Even if he is unlikely to ever serve time for his actual crimes, just for the ones created to protect Putin’s fragile ego.

Tuapse, Leningrad Oblast, Russia:

According to Reuters the oil refinery and terminal of Tuapse, Russia, which has been hit yesterday, has been put out of operation.

So, only 4 days after the strike against Ust-Luga, which kicked this facility out of action for the coming weeks or even months, the 2nd major oil… pic.twitter.com/Y33TzJSjnm

— (((Tendar))) (@Tendar) January 26, 2024

 

According to Reuters the oil refinery and terminal of Tuapse, Russia, which has been hit yesterday, has been put out of operation.

So, only 4 days after the strike against Ust-Luga, which kicked this facility out of action for the coming weeks or even months, the 2nd major oil facility in Russia stops working.

Things are unfolding as predicted.

Source: https://nasdaq.com/articles/russias-tuapse-oil-refinery-halted-after-fire-sources-say

#Tuapse #Russia #Ukraine

That’s enough for tonight.

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Open thread!