Ukraine Needs at Least 7 Patriot Systems – Address by the President

27 April 2024 – 19:53

Dear Ukrainians!

We endured another massive missile attack today – 34 Russian missiles of various types. The main target is the energy sector, various facilities of the industry: both the electricity grid and the gas transit facilities, the very gas facilities that, in particular, ensure the security of deliveries to the European Union.

We managed to shoot down some of the missiles today, and I am grateful to each of our warriors who were really accurate and reacted in time. The trajectories of the missiles and the nature of the attack were calculated by the Russian terrorists in order to complicate the work of our air defense system as much as possible. Each missile downed today is a significant result.

Of course, I am grateful to all the partners who have already helped us with air defense: now every system for protecting the sky, every anti-missile is literally a lifesaver. And it is important that all new agreements with partners that are already established to strengthen our air defense, every initiative of friends of Ukraine to help, in particular, with the search and supply of Patriots, is implemented as soon as possible. Ukraine needs seven systems – this is the bare minimum. Our partners have these Patriots.

Russian terrorists are aware that our partners, unfortunately, do not have the same determination to protect Europe from terror that they have demonstrated in the Middle East. However, it is still possible to provide the necessary quantity and quality of air defense systems. No time should be wasted – the necessary signal of determination must be sent.

I would also like to thank all the countries and leaders who are working hard to restrict Russia’s schemes for circumventing sanctions. I thank all the politicians and public figures, journalists who report on how Russia is importing components for missiles and other weapons violating the world’s sanctions. Every piece in the media about sanctions circumvention schemes, every public call for tougher sanctions, all the political work for this purpose that leads to results, limits not only Putin’s terror, but also terror in general. And this is the global meaning of our cooperation – of all partners.

Right now, power engineers and repair crews are working in many regions of our country – Lviv region, Ivano-Frankivsk region, Kharkiv and the region, Dnipropetrovsk region. All the relevant services are involved to restore the generation and distribution systems that were destroyed by the Russian strikes. Everyone will definitely do their best. And I thank all those who are working now and have been working all day.

It is crucial that such strikes like today’s do not become routine for the world. I am grateful to all the leaders who respond to them, who condemn Russian terror, who contact partners having air defense systems that could operate in Ukraine and the appropriate missiles. For the terrorists to lose, the solidarity of leaders in the defense against terror must work 24/7, just like the people who are eliminating the consequences of the strikes, and like our soldiers who are doing everything they can to make the most of the forces available in Ukraine every day and every night.

And one more thing. I want to thank Australia for announcing a new support package for our country and people. It is a military support that will strengthen our air defense, also drones and military equipment. Thank you! Today, the Prime Minister of Ukraine held talks with the Deputy Prime Minister of Australia, Minister for Defence. They took place here, in our country. I am waiting for the Prime Minister’s report.

We are also preparing for a new communication with our other partners: tomorrow and the next week will be quite active. Every day our country should gain strength. Every day we have to reinforce certain Ukrainian positions. We need to make Moscow realize that the war will give them nothing. And we can achieve this only by strength. All Ukrainians. All partners. And all being equally determined.

I thank everyone who stands with Ukraine! I thank everyone who is in combat, at combat posts, on combat missions! I thank everyone who trains our soldiers, and who convinces the world to be as decisive as possible so that this war comes to a just end.

Glory to Ukraine!

Estonia:

https://twitter.com/DavidPriess/status/1784001481118540007

The Ukrainian Marine who tweets as Kriegsforscher has posted an assessment of how he thinks things will go for the rest of 2024. From the Thread Reader App: (I am copying and pasting this verbatim, the second half of the post was in Ukrainian and I have machine translated it. And am copying and pasting that part verbatim as well. So this is your warning for foul/offensive language.)

The second part of this year will be the hardest since May 2022 I assume.

Russians are able to push at different directions (Donetsk oblast is a strategic goal for this year). And they do it.

I am sure that we will see new directions such as Northern Kharkiv👇 

RUAF right now have enough forces to move them from, for example, Kreminna to Avdiivka without loosing the advancing potentional.

New CAA, new AC, new divisions. They are creating more and more forces. They will reach success this year. 

The situation is worse than it used to be during the battle for Avdiivka. Much worse. They concentrate a lot of forces in one place to be able to breakthrough. We just don’t have enough brigades to manoeuvre and react. 

There is a hight possibility that RUAF will start a new offensive from Belgorod oblast. No, the goal is not to capture Kharkiv.

The point is to make us to decide what and where we must sacrifice. They may use ~40K personal for this advance. And that’s a lot. 

So I ask you to help the armed forces of Ukraine.

I am very thankful that the US support was approved cause we would be fucked. Wait extra 6-7 months till new election would be close to death for us. Will be easier.

Help the Armed forces of Ukraine. 

And now let’s guess, after the president delayed so much with the mobilization, will the new recruits really be able to study for three months in the NC?

Weapons and equipment are given, but there is no one to hold those weapons in their hands. Clinic. 

You can talk for a long time about how bad the Americans are, but in 7-10 days the enemy will take Krasnohorivka. Where is the concrete, where are the factories. Which could be held. A city, not a village of 1,500 called Novomykhailivka.

But the fault here is not in the absence of BC for artillery, etc. 

And the fact that for half a year the mobilization was not carried out in the normal way, according to the new “law” (which, by the way, did not have to be developed, but only to amend the existing one). 

But there is one constant variable – the Armed Forces (no, no more positive pathetic text).

Because what happened in Ocheretyn (in fact, the issue here is not only up to 115) is not a matter of Biden or the (political) leadership of Ukraine. This is a separate branch of pussies. 

Here’s Rob Lee’s take on the supplemental aid bill that just passed. From the Thread Reader App:

Some thoughts about the supplemental bill. This is good news, but it will primarily help Ukraine defend in 2024 and into 2025. Russia will still likely make further gains this year, and it doesn’t fix all of Ukraine’s issues. It should be seen as one part of a long-term strategy. 

Ukraine has had three main problems since Russia seized the initiative in October: ammunition, manpower, and fortifications. Ukraine is making progress building fortifications and multiple defensive lines, but defenses on many of the key parts of the front are still underdeveloped, contributing to Russian advances. 2/ 

The bill and first PDA aid package announced this week will provide a quick boost to Ukraine’s defenses. But it is important to keep in mind that the limitations aren’t just appropriated funds but also production capacity and size of stockpiles. Greater artillery ammunition deliveries will help reduce Russia’s 5-6:1 artillery advantage, but it will not give Ukraine parity. 3/ 

The PDA package will also provide other critical ammunition like anti-tank mines and Javelin/TOW ATGMs. Recent Russian advances have demonstrated that increased numbers of FPVs cannot replace artillery, mines, and ATGMs. Russia’s assault on Vuhledar in 2023 and Ukraine’s offensive last summer demonstrated how effective mines can be for defending forces. 4/

Further deliveries of armored vehicles will also be important. Many Ukrainian brigades don’t have sufficient armored vehicles, and combat losses often aren’t replaced. This leads to higher casualties. Bradleys are very popular, armored humvees will help, and further M113 would be very useful for CASEVAC. 5/

Air defense is another critical Ukrainian need. Russia has resumed its missile campaign against Ukrainian energy infrastructure and UMPK glide bombs, which played a key role in Russia’s seizure of Avdiivka, are a serious problem. More recently, Russian Su-25 attack aircraft have been operating closer to the front than normal, which indicates a lack of SHORAD and MANPADS. 6/

Unroll available on Thread Reader

The USAI package announced today includes Patriot and NASAMS missiles and the PDA included Stinger MANPADS and RIM-7/AIM-9M missiles reportedly for FrankeSAM systems. Stingers could help push Su-25 further from the front line, and Patriots are critical both for defending cities and infrastructure from Russian ballistic missiles and also to counter Russian Su-34 bombers that drop UMPK glide bombs. 7/

The question is whether production of these missiles is sufficient to meet Ukraine’s continued air defense needs over time, especially with increased Russian production of Shahed UAS and missiles. F-16 fighters and their airbases will be another priority target for Russian missiles that will require air defense coverage. It also depends how successful the various FrankenSAM programs prove to be. 8/

Manpower has become the most pressing issue though, which was exacerbated by reduced deliveries of ammunition and equipment over the winter. Ukraine’s summer offensive primarily culminated when it ran out of infantry, and Ukraine has struggled to replace combat losses since then. 9/

This means that Ukrainian brigades are understrength, and Ukraine lacks sufficient reserves to respond to Russian advances, so units are pulled from one part of the front to attempt to stop advances elsewhere. Ukrainian infantry need to be rotated more often or there will be a growing risk of exhaustion. 10/

Ukraine has passed a new mobilization bill that provides incentives for volunteers and increases the pool of men available to be drafted. Hopefully, this will improve the manpower situation, but it will take time to mobilize and train soldiers/units. 11/

More concerning is that the manpower issue has been known for some time, but has not been fixed. The longer it takes to improve the manpower situation, the less likely it becomes that Ukraine can conduct a offensive in 2025. The new NATO-trained/equipped brigades last summer did not have enough time to train together, and Russian defenses will still be strong. New soldiers/units need to be mobilized to replace current losses and trained for 2025. 12/ 

At the same time, one of the most important factors in the war last year was that Russia was able to significantly improve its manpower situation, recruiting more than 300,000 volunteers. 13/

It isn’t just involuntary mobilized soldiers and prisoners, they are mostly getting volunteers who are willing to go into costly assaults. The quality, of course, varies, but the quantitative advantage is a serious problem. 14/

Without this manpower advantage, Russia’s artillery and airpower advantage would not be sufficient for Russia to make gains on the battlefield. The relative manpower situation is likely the most important factor that will determine the war’s trajectory, particularly if Russia can sustain recruiting 20-30k a month. 15/ 

The immediate problem is that Russia continues to advance on the battlefield, and has reached important locations while Ukraine faced ammunition shortages. Russia is bringing up reserves to Chasiv Yar, and will likely soon begin an assault on the city. 16/

Russian forces are also expanding their foothold in Ocheretyne, which threatens Ukrainian positions nearby, and they have advanced into Krasnohrivka and have made recent gains on the Marinka-Novomykhailivka front. 16/
deepstatemap.live/en#12/48.1163/…

DeepStateMAP | Map of the war in UkraineNews of Russia’s war against Ukraine on the maphttps://deepstatemap.live/en#12/48.1163/37.4383

Even with increased ammunition deliveries/expenditure, Ukraine might not be able to hold Chasiv Yar and other of these towns/cities, and Russia faces more favorable terrain once they get past Chasiv Yar, which could lead to an increase in the rate of advance. If Chasiv Yar falls, it will also put Ukrainian positions south of the city at risk. This is true for further Russian advances elsewhere. The delays in aid/mobilization have been costly. 18/

If Ukraine can stabilize the front and fix the manpower situation in 2024 when Russia has a number of advantages, 2025 could be more favorable because Western production capacity will increase and Russian equipment losses could become a greater issue. If the manpower situation does not improve, then the second half of 2024 will likely be more difficult for Ukraine than the first half. 19/ 

This bill will be vital, but it needs to be part of a broader long-term strategy for Ukraine. Western countries need to consider how to help Ukraine compensate for Russia’s current advantages, including increased deliveries of long-range missiles. 20/

And here is Tatarigami’s and his team’s assessment of what is going on with the Russian offensives at Chasiv Yar, Kurakhkove, Ocheretyne. From the Thread Reader App:

Why have Russian forces advanced in multiple directions and what are the implications? What are the future prospects? Today’s analysis by Frontelligence Insight centers on Chasiv Yar, Kurakhkove, and Ocheretyne

Before proceeding, please like and share to aid visibility. 🧵Thread

2/ Ukrainian forces retreated from Ocheretyne and Solovyove. While the 115th brigade was blamed, the core issue is that many brigades are not in a condition to hold the enemy with disproportional advantage in personnel, artillery, vehicles, and air support along the frontline

3/ Our team has received reports of poor communication, coordination, and leadership. These problems are rooted in deeper systemic issues, like personnel shortages and challenges in preparing skilled officers for senior roles promptly and in holding them accountable 

4/ Our assessment suggests that Russians are attempting to flank and launch a frontal assault on Chasiv Yar, similar to Bakhmut and Avdiivka. Additional Russian troops are reinforcing the area, likely aiming to take over the southern and northern sectors of Chasiv Yar.

5/ If Chasiv Yar falls to Russia, particularly the southern part, they could advance towards Kostyantynivka, disrupting logistics for the force south of Bakhmut. The situation could worsen if Russians move from Ocheretyne towards the road as well.

6/ In the Vuhledar-Donetsk area, Russians aim to cut off Kurakhove – a key logistical hub. The establishment of fire control over the road might severe logistics to Kurakhove. The loss of Kurakhove can put the entire grouping of forces in the Vuhledar area into a risky situation.

7/ Russians are trying to exploit the current unfavorable situation to achieve ambitious operational goals. How did Ukraine find itself in this situation? It’s the result of several factors: delayed mobilization efforts, delayed Western aid, and inadequate fortifications

8/ Trenches provide good protection, but with the excessive use of munition-dropping and kamikaze drones, it’s crucial to have proper top cover for dugouts and trenches, along with concrete structures and drone-catching nets. It requires resources that understaffed brigades lack 

9/ Can the Russians realistically achieve these objectives in 2024? According to the military theory, once defenses are breached, mechanized units can exploit the opening and move into an “operational space” – a geographical area where units can relatively freely maneuver. 

10/ Overall, due to losses in vehicles and problematic frontline logistics, the Russian army is unlikely to conduct deep maneuvers into Ukrainian territory as they did during the initial invasion stage. Instead, they will likely focus on attempting to envelop Ukrainian forces 

11/ The situation on the frontline is expected to stabilize with the arrival of new ammunition, weaponry, and freshly mobilized but trained recruits. However, it is unlikely that we will see stabilization anytime soon, as it takes time to arm, train, and prepare new recruits 

12/ The situation should not be taken lightly, as the Russian military still has a reserve force equivalent to at least two corps, which could be deployed anywhere, including the Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts, or to reinforce existing axes of advance if weak spots are identified. 

13/ It’s one of the most favorable situations for Russia. Failing to capitalize on it would be an indication of their inability to achieve their goal of seizing the entire Donbas region in the foreseeable future. This, in turn, could force a reassessment of their own end goals 

Thank you for taking the time to read this thread. We appreciate your support and would like to kindly ask for your help. Please consider donating to help us cover the costs of essential resources like licenses and satellite imagery to keep us running

Tatarigami_UA is All Source Public IntelligenceSatellite imagery and other expenses https://buymeacoffee.com/frontelligence

https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1784301704151748901

Orcheretyne, Donetsk Oblast:

https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1784346478166618515

https://twitter.com/Gerashchenko_en/status/1784255307977269530

«Russians managed to break through and gain a foothold in a certain part of Ocheretyne, Donetsk region» – Khortytsia operational-strategic group representative

According to him, the AFU are taking measures to kick the enemy out from Ocheretyne, heavy fighting is underway. The Russian Federation has deployed four brigades there. Ukrainian troops have also pulled up additional means and forces from the reserve.

Serebryansky Forest:

https://twitter.com/DefenceU/status/1784241090490737027

Odesa:

https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1784284407190139173

Militarynyi has the details:

In the Odesa region, a Yak-52 piston trainer aircraft shot down a Russian reconnaissance drone.

The corresponding videos were released by local Telegram channels.

The published videos show the moment of descent of an enemy reconnaissance drone on a parachute, which most likely opened due to the operation of automation, around which the Yak-52 was circling.

It can be assumed that the shooting was carried out by the second crew member with a gun or automatic weapon.

Modernization of the Yak-52 with the installation of a heading machine gun in the wing or board is unlikely due to the need for significant and technologically complex interference with the airframe.

Targeting can be performed by third-party targeting via radio communication and a situational awareness system, followed by visual identification of the target.

It is worth noting that the Yak-52, the modification of the Yak-52B, still has the ability to suspend GUV-8700 pods with machine guns or UB-32 with unguided rockets, but such a version existed in a single copy.

Yak-52

Yak-52 is a two-seat single-engine trainer aircraft with a low-wing and three-wheel landing gear, which was mass-produced from 1979 to 1998.

It has a low stall speed of 100-140 kilometers per hour, which allows it to chase drones and, at the same time, to maneuver at relatively low speeds.

The aircraft has a maximum permissible speed of 470 kilometers per hour, a range of up to 500 kilometers and a flight duration of 2.5 hours.

The length of the Yak-52 is 7.745 meters, the wingspan is 9.3 meters, and the wing area is 15 square meters.

The mass is 1035 kilograms, and the maximum takeoff and landing weight is 1315 kilograms.

For you drone enthusiasts:

https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1784306879075623134

Here’s the whole thread on the orlans from The Thread Reader App:

“Orlan” is one of the main Russian reconnaissance drones in the war against Ukraine

Among scientists and analysts studying changes within the russian army and their weapon systems during the military conflicts of recent decades, 2014 is considered a turning point. It can be argued that as early as 2008, after the invasion of Georgia, the russian invaders drew conclusions in preparation for further expansion against their neighbours. Alongside the adoption of the new military doctrine, they realised the opportunities of the intense use of aerial reconnaissance. 1/

In 2013, the “Orlan-10” aircraft-type unmanned aerial system (UAS) was taken into service by the russian armed forces. Although it can hardly be called a technological crown in the industry, nevertheless, in 2014, during the active warfare in Donbas, the system allowed russians to achieve a striking advantage over Ukrainian forces, which, at a certain point, were close to eliminating the russian enclave in the territory of Donetsk and Luhansk regions. 2/ 

With the help of these systems, the russians constantly conducted reconnaissance of the Ukrainian territory and, most likely, corrected artillery that fired at our units. Later, “Orlan” became a mass solution for the russian army. Today, its various versions (such as “Orlan-10”, “Orlan-30”, “Mosquito”, etc.) operate on a daily basis on the battlefields of russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine. 3/ 

Despite that fact, one can often find quite strange technical solutions in devices that were shot down or captured by the AFU. For example, a Canon SLR camera or a plastic bottle used as a gas tank. (Yes, these things fly on gasoline). Because of this, “Orlans” became the object of many jokes, kind of, “look, the russians are feeding them with junk”. Looking ahead, I would say there are not so many reasons to laugh about. “Orlan” is a tool widely and often effectively used against us. 4/ 

Versatility of application

Let’s skip the technical characteristics which can be easily found in the open source, except for specific modifications and what the military conveyor of the occupiers is supplying now. At least 5 km of flight altitude, 120 km of video signal transmission distance, and the ability to fly autonomously for hundreds of kilometres along a defined route (here, the Japanese SLR camera allows obtaining excellent reconnaissance material) make this, far from the most perfect in the world of UAVs thing, an effective and even formidable weapon against us. 5/ 

“Orlan” is a multi-purpose complex. It is used as a target designator, providing intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance, as an aerial photographer, and as EW/ES when needed. For instance, the Leer-3 EW system includes up to three “Orlan” UAVs which carry reconnaissance and GSM jamming equipment on board. 6/ 

Many missile attacks and shelling of Kyiv during the battle for the capital were carried out based on the results of reconnaissance, conducted by these UAVs. According to various estimations, at the beginning of the full-scale invasion, the number of these UAVs, owned by the russians, ranged from 1500 to several thousand vehicles. 7/ 

Production and UAV special features

There is no doubt that the production of “Orlans” continues today. That is because, firstly, “Orlans” are being lost. Sometimes, they are being shot down, captured, as was in the case of the Kharkiv offensive operation. In other cases, they fall due to technical reasons. There is nothing new or surprising here, as in this war, UAVs are nothing more than consumables. So they are needed in large quantities and literally everywhere. 8/ 

Secondly, the russians are exporting “Orlans” which may also indicate that production has been running in one way or another.

As for the production itself, today, it is known that the russians are able to produce an aerodynamic body without any problems. (Like us, by the way.) Another issue is its “filling” with the components, such as electronics, chips, communication, payload (camera modules, etc.), anti-jamming, and more. Despite Western sanctions, the russians somehow continue receiving components on which this equipment depends. From the open sources, one can learn that the UAVs contain components from the U.S., Japan, China, and a number of European countries. However, it is necessary to understand that the crucial thing is the possibility of using this equipment for its intended purpose. 9/ 

“Kometa”, an invention of the russian engineers, can serve as a simple example. One of its modifications is installed on the UAV’s board. It is known that “Kometa” has the details designed by U.S. and Taiwanese companies. This so-called CRPA (controlled radiation pattern antenna) has a clearly defined and very important function – to protect the device from the effects of EW measures, which, in turn, attempt to jam the drone’s navigation signal and knock the drone off the course. 10/

Imagine you are the operator of such a UAV. To control it from a long distance, you need to have both navigation and video signal. When one of these things is jammed, you still can return the drone (the mode known as RTL, or Return to Launch mode). But if there is neither one nor the other, you are dealing with a big problem. In case you need to work out a UAV mission for a distance of hundreds of kilometres deep into the enemy’s rear, where it has to work in autonomous mode, the lack of navigation simply makes it impossible to conduct the mission. 11/ 

That is why russians seek to gear up their equipment with modules to protect this signal. This allows “Orlan” to perform the function of an aerial photographer for hundreds of kilometres deep into our territory, bringing back the data that the enemy uses, among all, for the conduction of missile strikes. 12/ 

Proven by years of experience

A lot can be said about the pros and cons of this UAS. However, a few facts are indisputable:

●      “Orlan-10” and its other modifications should be considered a massive and fairly effective solution which, at various stages of the confrontation between the russian federation and Ukraine, either gave the russians a complete advantage in the aerial reconnaissance component, or did not allow to lose it.

●      The enemy has a significant number of the “Orlan” UAVs and vast opportunities for their use both at the frontline and in Ukraine’s rear.

●      The use of “Orlan” type UAVs by the russians in Ukraine (since 2014) and in Syria allowed them to gain a lot of practical experience in such application which was significantly expanded during the full-scale war against Ukraine. This enables russians to make not only military but also engineering decisions. This is especially important given the fact that the enemy possesses large resources and an extensive system of companies and design bureaus that implement and improve these solutions, often quite quickly.

●      There are still no sufficiently effective solutions to protect Ukraine against the activity of these UAVs and the consequences of this activity.  13/ 

What to oppose?

Despite anything, as of today, we have no analogues of even such an imperfect UAS. It refers to both the technical specifications of this technical solution and the scale, that is, the number of UAVs produced. The point here is that it is not enough to just create a working sample that would bring results. The functioning of mass production and the ability to supply troops and carry out standardisation are necessary. The latter is specifically needed to make it a rather pleasant bonus out of the existing “zoo” of various UAS within the AFU than a problem. 14/ 

All this should encourage the Ukrainian Defence forces, designers, manufacturers, and state bodies to intensify their work in the direction of design, deployment, and production of their own mass technical solution which would be competitive and able to properly cover the needs of the AFU and other Defence forces participating in the repulsion of russian aggression. In addition, there is a need to speed up the development of tools that would be capable of systematically countering the penetration of enemy UAVs deep into our territory, to our airfields, enterprises, etc. 15/ 

So, it can be said we are rather dealing with the “working horse” of the aggressor’s army, not with an object for jokes. Despite the certain obsolescence and dependence of “Orlan” on Western-made components, it continues performing significant work on the frontline and in the rear, posing a great danger to us. It is a multi-purpose product, capable of correcting the enemy’s artillery on the battlefield, directing missiles and drones at our infrastructure, logistics and military facilities in the rear, as well as carrying out EW/ES tasks. The mass character allows the russians to keep “Orlan” in their arsenal as a “staff” UAS that fits into the system and forms the system itself. This enables maintenance standardisation, operators training, and, at the same time, prevents shortages in UAVs. No UAV of this kind in Ukraine is so massive in numbers. 16/ 

For ASTERO ANALYTICS.

Translated by Kate Kistol

Join me in Facebook

And Telegram

Support here
linkedin.com/pulse/orlan-un…
m.facebook.com/osolonko
t.me/silukr/323

Krasnodar Krai, Russia:

https://twitter.com/Tendar/status/1784108576098632138

The Krasnodar Region, Russia, was under heavy attack last night. The Russian authorities speak of 66 UAVs. Locals reported of heavy explosions of the Slavyansk ECO refinery, which were also partially caught on video.

The administration of the Slavyansk-on-Kuban districts reports that a destillation tower of the oil refinery was struck.

Locals also claim that the Kushchyovskaya airfield was struck but there is no confirmation, yet.

Source: Telegram / Astra

https://twitter.com/maria_avdv/status/1784122790217454062

https://twitter.com/maria_avdv/status/1784126326447686004

Bryansk, Russia:

https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1784329363439198337

That’s enough for tonight.

Your daily Patron!

There are no new Patron tweets or videos today. Here is some adjacent material.

https://twitter.com/UAarmy_animals/status/1783185970340225034

https://twitter.com/UAarmy_animals/status/1782516857540362569

https://twitter.com/UAarmy_animals/status/1781447958912700480

https://twitter.com/UAarmy_animals/status/1783185841684201774

Open thread!