I signed a decree initiating the establishment of a separate branch of forces – the Unmanned Systems Forces – address by the President of Ukraine

6 February 2024 – 19:22

I wish you health, fellow Ukrainians!

A brief report on this day.

I held a meeting on our country’s international activities in February – the entire month has been scheduled in great detail, essentially every day. There will be numerous negotiations, meetings, and new agreements for Ukraine aimed at strengthening our warriors.

Today, I also convened a meeting on new security commitment agreements for Ukraine – right now we are working with several countries. These agreements are potentially quite ambitious, featuring substantive content. And I am grateful to the diplomatic teams involved. In the coming months, we need to show a result in building the architecture of security agreements that will convey the necessary positive signals for the entire year – signals of effective support for Ukraine, long-term support. Signals of our partners’ absolute confidence in Ukraine’s ability to defend itself from Russian aggression. The world is willing to help only those whose strength is obvious.

Today I had several international meetings. The first one was with Portugal. The Portuguese Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Education visited Ukraine. I had a meeting with them to express gratitude for the level of cooperation achieved between our countries, for their trust in Ukraine and our people. One of the issues discussed was Portugal’s participation in Ukraine’s recovery. In particular, in the reconstruction of educational institutions in Zhytomyr region. We really hope that such reconstruction projects will be implemented as soon as feasible.

The second meeting today was with IAEA Director Grossi. He plans to visit the Zaporizhzhia NPP. We discussed in detail the situation at the plant and the current security challenges: the Russian occupation of the ZNPP must come to an end, as this is the primary condition for reinstating radiation safety across our entire region. I thanked Mr. Grossi for supporting the Peace Formula and for the participation of the IAEA representative in the work of the advisors on the Formula. It is very important that Ukraine was elected to the IAEA Board of Governors. This is a clear sign that the world acknowledges our ability to restore stability and contribute to security efforts.

The third meeting today involved the Secretary-General of the OECD, one of the most reputable international organizations comprising the world’s most developed countries. I expressed gratitude for supporting our state and for opening the Organization’s office in Ukraine. We are continually enriching our cooperation and are moving towards full membership in this club, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Today we also discussed raising funds for Ukraine’s recovery.

One more thing. A strategic issue. I have just signed a decree initiating the establishment of a separate branch of our Defense Forces – the Unmanned Systems Forces. This is not a matter of the future, but something that should yield a very concrete result shortly. This year should be pivotal in many ways. And, obviously, on the battlefield as well. Drones – unmanned systems – have proven their effectiveness in battles on land, in the sky and at sea. Ukraine has truly changed the security situation in the Black Sea with the help of drones. Repelling ground assaults is primarily the task of drones. The large-scale destruction of the occupiers and their equipment is also the domain of drones. The current list of tasks is clear: special staff positions for drone operations, special units, effective training, systematization of experience, constant scaling of production, and the involvement of the best ideas and top specialists in this field. This is a task for the army, the Ministry of Defense, and the government as a whole. And to ensure the necessary coordination in the Defense Forces, to ensure the proper level of planning and quality of logistics, the Unmanned Systems Forces will be established within the AFU. The relevant proposals will be submitted for consideration by the NSDC.

We continue the reboot of the state system – those elements that are necessary for Ukraine to achieve its goals. Totally fair goals. Ukraine can win. Ukraine must win. And we must do everything for this! I thank everyone who helps! Glory to everyone who fights and works for our country!

Glory to Ukraine!

I want to set this next section up with excerpts from one article and one analytical essay.

The first is a deep dive by Politico into what the foreign diplomatic corps thinks of what is happening in the US. (emphasis mine)

When I asked the European ambassador to talk to me about America’s deepening partisan divide, I expected a polite brushoff at best. Foreign diplomats are usually loath to discuss domestic U.S. politics.

Instead, the ambassador unloaded for an hour, warning that America’s poisonous politics are hurting its security, its economy, its friends and its standing as a pillar of democracy and global stability.

The U.S. is a “fat buffalo trying to take a nap” as hungry wolves approach, the envoy mused. “I can hear those Champagne bottle corks popping in Moscow — like it’s Christmas every fucking day.”

As voters cast ballots in the Iowa caucuses Monday, many in the United States see this year’s presidential election as a test of American democracy. But, in a series of conversations with a dozen current and former diplomats, I sensed that to many of our friends abroad, the U.S. is already failing that test.

The diplomats are aghast that so many U.S. leaders let their zeal for partisan politics prevent the basic functions of government. It’s a major topic of conversations at their private dinners and gatherings. Many of those I talked to were granted anonymity to be as candid with me as they are with each other.

For example, one former Arab ambassador who was posted in the U.S. during both Republican and Democratic administrations told me American politics have become so unhealthy that he’d turn down a chance to return.

“I don’t know if in the coming years people will be looking at the United States as a model for democracy,” a second Arab diplomat warned.

Many of these conversations wouldn’t have happened a few months ago. There are rules, traditions and pragmatic concerns that discourage foreign diplomats from commenting on the internal politics of another country, even as they closely watch events such as the Iowa caucuses. (One rare exception: some spoke out on America’s astonishing 2016 election.)

But the contours of this year’s presidential campaign, a Congress that can barely choose a House speaker or keep the government open, and, perhaps above all, the U.S. debate on military aid for Ukraine have led some diplomats to drop their inhibitions. And while they were often hesitant to name one party as the bigger culprit, many of the examples they pointed to involved Republican members of Congress.

As they vented their frustrations, I felt as if I was hearing from a group of people wishing they could stage an intervention for a friend hitting rock bottom. Their concerns don’t stem from mere altruism; they’re worried because America’s state of being affects their countries, too.

“When the United States’ voice is not as strong, is not as balanced, is not as fair as it should be, then a problem is created for the world,” said Ronald Sanders, Antigua and Barbuda’s longtime ambassador in Washington.

Donald Trump’s name came up in my conversations, but not as often as you’d think.

Yes, I was told, a Trump win in 2024 would accelerate America’s polarization — but a Trump loss is unlikely to significantly slow or reverse the structural forces leading many of its politicians to treat compromise as a sin. The likelihood of a closely split House and Senate following the 2024 vote adds to the worries.

The diplomats focused much of their alarm on the U.S. debate over military aid to Ukraine — I was taken aback by how even some whose nations had little connection to Russia’s war raised the topic.

In particular, they criticized the decision to connect the issue of Ukrainian aid and Israeli aid to U.S. border security. Not only did the move tangle a foreign policy issue with a largely domestic one, but border security and immigration also are topics about which the partisan fever runs unusually high, making it harder to get a deal. Immigration issues in particular are a problem many U.S. lawmakers have little incentive to actually solve because it robs them of a rallying cry on the campaign trail.

So now, “Ukraine might not get aid, Israel might not get aid, because of pure polarization politics,” said Francisco Santos Calderón, a former Colombian ambassador to the United States.

Diplomats from many European countries are especially unhappy.

They remember how, when Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, many Republicans downplayed concerns about the far-right fringe in their party that questioned what was then solid, bipartisan support. Now, as the debate over the aid unfolds, it seems the far-right is calling the shots.

There’s a growing sense among foreign diplomats that moral or national security arguments — about defending a country unjustly invaded, deterring Russia, preventing a bigger war in Europe and safeguarding democracy — don’t work on the American far-right.

Instead, some are stressing to U.S. lawmakers that funds for Ukraine are largely spent inside the United States, creating jobs and helping rebuild America’s defense industrial base (while having the side benefit of degrading the military of a major U.S. foe).

“If this doesn’t make sense to the politicians, then what will?” the European ambassador asked.

A former Eastern European ambassador to D.C. worried about how some GOP war critics cast the Ukraine crisis as President Joe Biden’s war when “in reality, the consideration should be to the national interests of the United States.”

Foreign diplomats also are watching in alarm as polarizing abortion politics have delayed the promotions of U.S. military officers and threaten to damage PEPFAR, an anti-AIDS program that has saved millions of lives in Africa. That there are questions about America’s commitment to NATO dumbfounds the diplomats I talked to. Then, there are the lengthy delays in Senate confirmations of U.S. ambassadors and other officials — a trend exacerbated by lawmakers from both parties.

“There was always a certain courtesy that the other party gave to let the president appoint a Cabinet. What if these courtesies don’t hold as they don’t seem to hold now?” a former Asian ambassador said. “It is very concerning.”

When Republicans and Democrats strike deals, they love to say it shows the system works. But simply having a fractious, lengthy and seemingly unnecessary debate about a topic of global security can damage the perception of the U.S. as a reliable partner.

“It is right that countries debate their foreign policy stances, but if all foreign policy issues become domestic political theater, it becomes increasingly challenging for America to effectively play its global role on issues that need long-term commitment and U.S. political capital — such as climate change, Chinese authoritarianism, peace in the Middle East and containing Russian gangsterism,” a third European diplomat warned.

The current and former diplomats said their countries are more reluctant to sign deals with Washington because of the partisan divide. There’s worry that a new administration will abandon past agreements purely to appease rowdy electoral bases and not for legitimate national security reasons. The fate of the Iran nuclear deal was one example some mentioned.

“Foreign relations is very much based on trust, and when you know that the person that is in front of you may not be there or might be followed by somebody that feels exactly the opposite way, what is your incentive to do long-term deals?” a former Latin American diplomat asked.

“The world does not have time for the U.S. to rebound back,” the former Asian ambassador said. “We’ve gone from a unipolar world that we’re familiar with from the 1990s into a multipolar world, but the key pole is still the United States. And if that key pole is not playing the role that we want the U.S. to do, you’ll see alternative forces coming up.”

Russia’s diplomats, meanwhile, are among those delighting in the U.S. chaos (and fanning it). The Eastern European ambassador said the Russians had long warned their counterparts not to trust or rely on Washington.

And now what do they say? “We told you so.”

More at the link.

The second is an analytical essay published at Foreign Affairs: (emphasis mine)

As Russia’s war in Ukraine enters its third year, Europe has performed far better than expected. For decades after World War II, it counted on the United States to be the ultimate guarantor of its security. The continent relied on Washington to guide NATO policy, provide nuclear deterrence, and forge consensus among European countries on controversial questions such as how to resolve the 2009–12 European debt crisis. Europe continued to take the U.S. security umbrella for granted after the Cold War ended, slashing defense spending, failing to stop the Bosnian genocide in the early 1990s, and refusing to play a political role in resolving the crisis in Syria, even as it remained the region’s biggest provider of humanitarian aid. After Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, many anticipated that Europeans might balk at helping Kyiv. The last time Russian President Vladimir Putin marched over Ukrainian borders—annexing Crimea in 2014—Europe responded with weak sanctions and halfhearted attempts at diplomatic compromise while increasing its dependence on Russian gas.

But over the last few years, the world has seen a glimpse of a stronger Europe. European countries have sustained a united front in resisting Russia’s aggression, hosting millions of refugees, coordinating painful decoupling from Russian gas supplies, imposing strong economic sanctions and export restrictions on Russia, training Ukrainian soldiers, and inviting Ukraine to join the European Union. The $53 billion EU aid package to Ukraine that was slated for approval in February set Europe’s combined economic and military assistance to Kyiv, including its multiyear commitments, at double the amount the United States is providing. For the first time since 2007, the EU has even gathered the confidence to substantially enlarge itself. In December 2023, it extended candidate status to Georgia and launched accession talks with Moldova and Ukraine.

These steps were undergirded by a solid transatlantic relationship. But European leaders cannot count on a friendly United States. They must prepare for the possibility that, a year from now, the United States will again be led by Donald Trump. During his GOP primary campaign for president, Trump has suggested that if he is reelected in November 2024, he will negotiate with Russian President Vladimir Putin to end the Ukraine war “in 24 hours,” demand that Europe reimburse the United States for ammunition used in Ukraine, withdraw from the Paris climate accords, and roil the global economy by imposing a ten percent tariff on all imports.

Last December, the U.S. Senate passed a measure making it harder for Trump to unilaterally pull the United States out of NATO. But Europeans cannot depend on smooth military collaboration with a Trump administration: Trump directs special ire toward the alliance, and when he chooses his staff, he will likely pass over seasoned bureaucrats in favor of loyalists. Putin would likely interpret even the slightest hint that Trump may not fully honor the U.S. commitment to NATO’s Article 5 as an invitation to test the robustness of the transatlantic alliance, possibly even in the Baltic states.

Well before Russia invaded Ukraine, European leaders knew they had to grow up—which meant, in part, relying less on the United States. The European debt crisis motivated the EU to more fully integrate its banking systems. In some ways, the first Trump era spurred the EU toward greater self-reliance as Trump demonstrated that his only alliance was with his own interests. The EU established a European defense fund and a more constructive relationship with NATO. During the COVID-19 pandemic, European countries tasked the EU Commission with buying vaccines, and for the first time, the commission borrowed on a large scale to fund Europe’s economic recovery.

Only after Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, however, did the European debate—and behavior—about security change dramatically. Although Europe’s combined military and financial aid to Ukraine now exceeds that of the United States, U.S. support remains vital to Ukraine’s war effort—and to Europe’s broader security. And many longer-term consequences of Trump’s first presidency are still unfolding: peace around the world is unraveling, and authoritarian leaders are becoming bolder. Azerbaijan drove 120,000 Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh unchecked. The rivalry between the United States and China has heated up. A chain of military coups in West Africa has ousted democratically elected presidents—as well as European peacekeepers. And thanks in part to policies instituted by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu—whom Trump backed—a hot war has broken out in the Middle East.

European leaders are hoping for a second Biden presidency that would protect the transatlantic bond and give them time and support to assume greater responsibility for their turbulent continent and neighborhood. But they may not get this time and support. A second Trump term may well exacerbate the instability Europe is already struggling to manage. Europeans will respect Americans’ choice of their next president. But it is in Europe’s hands to act now and take concrete steps to bulwark its security and economy. It must also increase the EU’s power, addressing institutional weaknesses that limit the organization’s capacity to lead in a world characterized by geopolitical conflict. In short, it needs to Trump-proof its future. The continent weathered four years of a Trump presidency. But a second four years will likely be much harder to sail through.

Trump’s first four years in power forced European policymakers to plan around a far less consistent and engaged U.S. president, one who took a distinctively transactional view of the transatlantic relationship. European leaders have traditionally had more in common with Democratic than Republican U.S. presidents, and the transatlantic relationship took strain long before Trump took office: think of the deep rift over President George W. Bush’s war in Iraq.

But the challenges Trump posed were new. He was the first U.S. president who did not treat Europe as family. He seemed visibly more at ease with authoritarian rulers such as Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping than with democratically elected European leaders such as German Chancellor Angela Merkel. Trump did not hesitate to withdraw from the 2015 Iran deal that President Barack Obama forged together with the EU and the E3—France, Germany, and the United Kingdom—nor to threaten to punish Europeans with sanctions if they abided by it. He also failed to consult with European leaders or even inform them before making major foreign policy moves, such as inking the 2020 Abraham Accords or withdrawing U.S. troops from Syria. Trump not only abandoned the United States’ plans for a trade deal with the EU. He instituted unprecedented protectionist measures that targeted European exporters.

And he sought to weaken multilateral cooperation in areas such as climate change, trade, migration, and human rights, withdrawing from the Paris climate accords—an EU priority. He undermined international organizations such as the World Health Organization and UNESCO, as well as the UN’s attempts to reach an agreement on handling migration and refugees. Trump’s actions had a galvanizing effect on Europe: the United States had played a star part in shaping the EU itself, but then the country seemed to withdraw from its lead role in supporting the rules-based international order.

Europe’s leaders realized their continent had to become more sovereign and autonomous—plainly put, more capable and responsible for world affairs. They had to step up to sustain the multilateral system. The EU, for example, increased its support for the World Health Organization. Trump’s threat to put economic sanctions on Europe sparked the continent’s leaders to strengthen the euro by further integrating their banks and financial systems and to sign trade agreements with new partners in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. In terms of security, Trump’s attacks on Europe’s low defense spending and his threats to leave NATO pushed the EU to take steps toward establishing institutional, legal, and financial incentives for European countries to spend more on defense. The European Peace Facility, an EU mechanism to provide military assistance to other countries—which the EU has used since 2022 to provide military aid to Ukraine—was created in response to the pressure Trump put on the continent.

But other phenomena that emerged in the Trump years proved more difficult to manage—most important, his rhetorical attacks on law and order and centrist democracy. When Trump pressured Ukraine, in 2020, to damage his Democratic rival’s candidacy, he legitimized the tactic for other actors. Populist forces in Europe read off Trump’s harsh script when it came to immigration, hobbling EU efforts to enact a general policy on migration. Overall, Trump actively supported right-wing nationalists, populists, and anti-EU voices in Europe. As the EU heads into parliamentary elections in June 2024, there is a real risk that these emboldened forces will gain significant ground, shaping the EU’s future generation of leaders. Whether they do or not, Trump’s second candidacy is already encouraging nationalist figures such as Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban. 

Trump may well be more antagonistic to Europe and European values in a second term, dramatically increasing the risks to the continent’s security and aggravating its existing difficulties. A reelected Trump would be completely unchained from the old, pro-democracy Republican establishment. He would likely surround himself with loyal administrators who do not challenge him. Moreover, the world has grown accustomed to his outrageous statements and decisions, making individual transgressions feel less shocking and less crucial to resist.

The biggest immediate danger presented by a second Trump term is clear: Trump has already indicated he would end U.S. support for Ukraine. Although Europeans have been increasing their financial and military support to Kyiv, both bilaterally and using the EU’s toolbox, their efforts fall short of fully substituting for U.S. military assistance. In fact, the EU’s short-term military support to Ukraine constitutes only 55 percent of what the United States has offered. A scenario in which the United States completely terminates its assistance to Ukraine is not in the realm of fantasy, and it would require Europeans to more quickly and comprehensively support Ukraine.

The critical issue for the Europeans to understand is that the risk posed by a more isolationist United States goes beyond Europe’s eastern border. For decades, Europeans have tolerated significant shortfalls in their defense budgets and capabilities. This explains European countries’ limited capacity to ramp up defense industrial production to arm Ukraine and replenish stocks of ammunition and weaponry. Europeans reasonably assumed that the United States would take the lead in an emergency.

The risks a second Trump presidency poses, however, go well beyond defense and security. Under Trump, the U.S.-Chinese relationship could further deteriorate. This would put European firms that operate in both jurisdictions in a difficult position: by threatening secondary sanctions, Trump could actively force European companies to cease operations in China or pressure Europeans to block Chinese investments in Europe. Trump has promised to impose a ten percent tariff on all imports if he is reelected, and the impact of such a move—were Congress to approve it—would be acutely felt in Europe. Europe could also see its digital sovereignty affected by the reelected U.S. president. For capabilities including geolocation, satellite-based communication, cloud computing, data privacy, and AI, Europe is dependent on the United States and vulnerable to disruption.

For decades, the deepening of democracy in Europe has been tied to U.S. influence. As recently as 2021, the Biden administration stepped up to defend freedom of the press in Poland by convincing the Polish president to veto a controversial media bill that would restrict who could own local broadcasters. If he gets a second term, Trump may well seek to further weaken democratic institutions in the United States, including the Department of Justice, and foment general disdain for the rule of law. This would embolden populists and Euroskeptic parties. The first Trump presidency already taught Europeans how a U.S. president’s political support for populists can practically endanger European unity.

More at the link!

What the congressional GOP caucuses have done since the late summer in terms of making it impossible for Ukraine to get the funding it needs, repeatedly threatening to shut down the government, making non-sensical demands that first Ukraine aid, then Ukraine and Taiwan aid, then Ukraine, Taiwan, and Israel aid be tied to not just more funding to more efficiently deal with asylum seekers, but to also increase funding to to deal with drug smuggling and other border issues, but to enshrining into law policy changes that are part of the GOP’s and the conservative movement’s rapid descent into wishing to make almost all immigration illegal and to remove and revoke birthright citizenship. The events of the past several days have just further compounded the problem.

I know that Senate Republicans are now saying that Schumer should just bring the supplemental aid bill for Ukraine, Taiwan, and Israel that the White House initially sent across last November, and which the Senate Republicans refused to take up unless funding for these states was tied to increased funding and policy changes for the border. They’re not going to vote for that either. The House GOP majority just voted down their own Speaker’s Israel aid bill. And while the vote to impeach Secretary Mayorkas, which has been deemed to be antisemitic, failed today too. The House GOP has already announced they’ll bring it back up tomorrow when Congressman Scalise is back from his medical treatments, however his office has now announced he won’t be back tomorrow, so who knows. It is unclear if the Democrats will be able to bring Congressman Greene in from the hospital two days in a row to vote against it.

As of now, and for the foreseeable future, the ability of the US to provide aid to its allies and partners, is at a dead stop. It doesn’t help that Congress is getting ready to go on recess for two weeks starting next week. The two continuing resolutions expire in three and four weeks respectively. Finally, the deal to raise the debt ceiling expires on 31 March 2024, though I’m not sure anyone has calculated when it actually has to be raised because of the automatic triggers and cuts built into last year’s legislation.

Our allies and partners are watching, hearing, seeing, and reading all of this, including how Trump called and threatened GOP senators, and are definitely not assured or reassured that if they actually needed our help we would be able to deliver. Not because the Biden administration does not want to help, but because with the GOP having now broken both chambers of Congress, there’s only so much the administration can do unilaterally. Especially when GOP appointed, Federalist Society apparatchik judges are willing to just make up standing and usurp the powers of the executive to achieve their partisan goals. Our adversaries – state and non-state – are absolutely thrilled. I’m sure, should you decide to watch it, that Putin will make hay of some of this during his interview with Tucker Carlson. And remember, Carlson is interviewing Putin because the former believes American journalists won’t interview the latter, all while Putin is holding two American journalists on bogus charges as, essentially, political hostages.

If you’re watching this mess from Beijing you’ve got to be thrilled. Despite all the anti-PRC saber rattling and, frankly, borderline if not actual anti-Chinese bigotry and racism by the GOP’s China hawks, the GOP members of the House and Senate have just made it clear that they really could care less about ensuring Taiwan’s safety and independence.

As for the reason for these nightly updates – Ukraine – they know the score. They know that the US is an untrustworthy ally. Not because President Biden doesn’t want to provide support, but because he can’t. And he can’t because the Republican House and Senate caucuses are dysfunctional, toxic, and slavishly in thrall to Trump, as well as the fact that his legislative strategy assumed far more good faith on the part of Republican senators and representatives than existed. It was easy to predict it would come to this.

All of these state and non-state actors, whether friend or foe, also know that Trump has the same 30% chance of getting elected president as he did in 2016 and 2020. They also know that because of the even more extreme gerrymanders that have been put in place in North Carolina, Texas, and Ohio, as well as Mississippi’s, Georgia’s, Louisiana’s, and Florida’s willingness to flout federal judicial rulings regarding the need for each to create an additional minority-majority district, it is unlikely they will before the 2024 elections. Additionally, NY state has still not fixed its redistricting mess that helped the GOP take their slim minority in the 2022 elections. They all understand that as a result of this extreme manipulation of congressional redistricting, the GOP has a very good chance of not only keeping their slim majority, but adding a couple of seats. They also know that while this isn’t going to be the worst Senate election cycle for the Democrats, that 2024 and 2026 are the last two good ones before the built in malaportionment of the Senate locks in minoritarian control of that chamber for good.

None of that may actually happen, but our allies and partners have to hedge against some or all of it. As for our adversaries, they are going to do everything they can, through weaponizing all the elements of their national power in their ongoing political warfare campaigns, to ensure it does.

All of this makes anything and everything the Biden administration might be trying to do now much, much, much harder.

I’m going to leave it there.

Your daily Patron!

Patron and The Machine

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And while this, as far as I know, has nothing to do with Ukraine, after sitting through all of the above, you deserve something really adorable:

https://twitter.com/Yoda4ever/status/1754998040027656310

The cuteness, it burns!!!

Open thread!