Increasingly, the world hears that more wars may be ahead, but we have the strength to stop it – address by the President of Ukraine

19 January 2024 – 19:33

I wish good health to all Ukrainians!

Today, our tradition was continued. It’s a new tradition, but already quite familiar and organic: the tradition of honoring Ukrainian Heroes and presenting apartments to the Heroes of Ukraine, the families of our Heroes. Today, I had the honor of awarding certificates for another 30 apartments. These are our warriors from the Armed Forces, National Guard, State Border Guard Service, and the family of a State Emergency Service of Ukraine employee. All are truly deserved. Absolutely worthy Heroes. Warriors who distinguished themselves in battles in Hostomel and other cities and villages of Kyiv region, in the east of our state, in Chernihiv, Sumy, Kharkiv regions. In Donetsk, Luhansk regions. In the country’s south – defending Kherson. Heroes of Ukraine – pilots, helicopter pilots who, in extremely risky and challenging missions, delivered necessary weapons, ammunition, and rescued the wounded in the besieged Mariupol. Thanks to them, Mariupol fought. Today, I honored the pilots of army aviation of the Ground Forces who carried out this mission alongside the warriors of the Defense Intelligence. Each of the Heroes of Ukraine has a personal history of bravery, personal achievements that Ukraine will always remember and be proud of. I thank every family of our Heroes, all our warriors. It is an honor when a country has such people, and it is the chance of our nation – everyone who fights for Ukraine, helps, strengthens our defense and security forces. Everyone is saving Ukraine and Ukrainians.

Today, I had two phone calls. Albania, Prime Minister Edi Rama. I thanked him for the continued and fundamental support of Ukraine, for a very clear and always noticeable political position on each of the current challenges. We discussed our cooperation in international institutions. In particular, Albania’s presidency in the UN Security Council was very useful for defending international law, maintaining sanity in international institutions. Albania always morally and honestly responded to a flood of Russian lies at the UN. It’s important for an honest voice to always respond to Russian disinformation. Today, with Prime Minister Rama, we also discussed expanding our dialogue at the Ukraine-Balkans level. The second call today was with the President of the United Arab Emirates. Special focus was on our gratitude for mediating the release of prisoners. Our work on this matter never stops – we always seek ways, always seek effective mediation. And this concerns all our captives – both soldiers and civilians, defenders of Azovstal, and all other Ukrainian military personnel. The process is very complex and delicate. But the task is unchanged: we must free all our people, bring all prisoners home. In addition to this topic, we naturally talked about bilateral relations and the opportunities for support from the Emirates in various spheres for Ukraine. Last week, we received a shipment of generators, and it is one of the examples of how to help Ukraine’s resilience. It is essential humanitarian work. I informed both the President of the Emirates and the Prime Minister of Albania about our global work on the Peace Formula, preparations for the Global Peace Summit. It is a shared interest worldwide for those who value stability and predictability, so that the Global Peace Summit has results, and international law works fully again.

The current madness of Russian leaders brings a period of uncertainty and danger to every nation in the world. Increasingly, the world hears and realizes that more wars may be ahead. But we have the strength to stop it. We have the strength to defend normal life. The world has this strength. And this strength must work now to stop Russia. I am grateful to everyone who helps. Grateful to everyone who defends Ukraine, who works for Ukraine, who remembers that the major challenge is to give our country every opportunity to drive out the occupiers. We will definitely do this.

Glory to Ukraine!

https://twitter.com/Channel4News/status/1748417224010830073

President Zelenskyy hits the nail on the head here. US support to Ukraine has made sure that Ukraine has not lost, but has not enabled them to win. We have seen over and over and over again that if Ukraine is provided with what they need, when they need it, in sufficient amounts that they will put it to excellent use and achieve their objectives. When they don’t get what they need, don’t get enough of it, or don’t get it when they need it, then they will make do and hold fast, but not make significant headway.

https://twitter.com/nexta_tv/status/1748306631153127703

Foreign Minister Kuleba is also spot on in his remarks at Davos. For pennies on the dollar Russia can be defeated. The question that has to be answered is why the Biden administration does not seem to want Russia to be defeated.

This is Putin’s statement from 2016, which is now on billboards in Moscow and other parts of Russia:

https://twitter.com/BBCSteveR/status/1746784252312891463

Putin and the Russia he has shaped into a revanchist, extremist kleptocratic state cannot be appeased. He cannot be negotiated with or reasoned with or even accommodated. The Ukrainians are offering to defeat him for us by making major investments of blood and treasure if we would just invest pennies on the dollar on their resoluteness and resiliency. It is amazing that we refuse to take that offer.

This is what NATO thinks is coming:

https://twitter.com/KyivIndependent/status/1748305935993385126

From the Kyiv Independent:

Civilians in NATO countries should be prepared for the prospect of an all-out war with Russia in the next 20 years, said Lieutenant Admiral Rob Bauer, Chair of the NATO Military Committee, in comments to reporters on Jan. 18.

NATO militaries have increased their capacity and preparedness since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. While the prospect of the war escalating to an all-out clash between the alliance and Russia has so far been averted, there are concerns that the West has not truly accepted that it may still be a possibility.

Such a conflict would require the large-scale mobilization of civilians and the industrial base across the alliance, Bauer said.

“We have to realize it’s not a given that we are in peace. And that’s why we (NATO) are preparing for a conflict with Russia,” he added.

U.S. General Christopher Cavoli, the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, said on Jan. 18 that NATO will conduct its most extensive military exercise in recent decades, involving about 90,000 troops.

Despite this, there have been indications that the increase in defense production and general military preparedness has not been sufficient to shake off the complacency NATO has exhibited since the end of the Cold War.

As Russia has increasingly put its economy on a wartime footing, Europe has fallen short of even its pledges to deliver weapons to Ukraine, let alone prepare its own armies for war. Europe’s supply of military equipment to Ukraine has already strained its capacity and stockpiles, creating concerns that it may take years to refill reserves, barring a full mobilization of industrial output.

German Chancellor Olaf Scholz cautioned in January that Germany’s military support for Ukraine is insufficient to compensate for the deficit from other EU countries.

Despite sanctions, Russia has also taken advantage of its alliances with Iran and North Korea, which have delivered large quantities of shells, drones, and other military equipment.

North Korea has allegedly provided Russia with more than one million shells, more than the EU has delivered to Ukraine.

“We need to be readier across the whole spectrum,” Bauer said. “You have to have a system in place to find more people if it comes to war, whether it does or not. Then you talk mobilization, reservists, or conscription.”

Some leaders have acknowledged the potential for danger, drawing historical parallels to the leadup to WWII, in which Europe was so hesitant to repeat the horrors of WWI that it appeased Nazi Germany, resulting in an even more destructive war.

U.K. Foreign Secretary David Cameron said on Jan. 18 that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has meant that the current reality is “like being a Foreign Minister or a leader in Europe in the 1930s.”

Recent comments by Swedish officials about the prospect of a future war sparked concern around the country, but Bauer said it was the right move.

It is important to realize that “not everything is plannable and not everything is going to be hunky dory in the next 20 years,” Bauer said.

This is one of the effects of failing to do so:

https://twitter.com/RpsAgainstTrump/status/1748042124472246746

Here is another:

https://twitter.com/mdyczok/status/1748190932518760945

From Foreign Affairs:

While the West continues to squabble over providing further aid to Ukraine, Russia has been quietly consolidating its control over the territories it occupies in southeastern Ukraine. As the frontline stabilized in 2023, Russia remained in control of almost 18 percent of Ukrainian territory, including about 25,000 square miles of land seized since February 2022. All branches of the Russian government are involved in a costly and ambitious program to integrate these newly occupied territories into the Russian Federation—as Russia did with Crimea after it seized the peninsula in 2014. The Kremlin hopes to create facts on the ground that will be difficult for Ukraine to challenge, either by military force or in future peace talks.

Russia ceremonially annexed four Ukrainian oblasts—Donetsk and Luhansk in the east of the country and Zaporizhzhia and Kherson in the south—in September 2022, although its military is not in full control of any of these provinces. Since then, Russian officials have transformed the governance of the areas under its control, holding sham elections last September and appointing pro-Moscow officials at every level. An army of technocrats is overseeing the complete absorption of these territories, aligning their laws, regulations, and tax and banking systems with Russia, and getting rid of any traces of institutional ties to Ukraine. A nominal transition period runs until January 2026, by which time the Kremlin expects Russian legal, judicial, and political systems to be fully in force in what it calls the “New Regions.”

This administrative occupation is less well known than the violence and human rights abuses that accompany it. But Russia’s war in Ukraine extends well beyond its ruthless missile and drone strikes, its legions of soldiers, and its bellicose rhetoric. In occupied Ukraine, bureaucrats have been effective at enforcing the compliance of locals. Even as some people resist, authorities impose Russian education, cultural indoctrination, and economic and legal systems to rope these lands ever more tightly to Russia. The longer Russia occupies these territories, the harder it will be for Ukraine to get them back.

Probably more than half the prewar population of newly occupied regions fled after Russia invaded in 2022. But for those people who remained, the Russian system has forced almost everybody into some level of cooperation. According to Russian figures, almost 90 percent of the remaining residents in the four annexed oblasts—around three million people—have now been issued Russian passports. They have little choice: you need a Russian passport to open a bank account, run a business, or receive welfare payments.

Assessing the attitudes and loyalties of those living under Russian occupation is extremely difficult. There are no independent media or civil society groups, and the security services carefully monitor social media. But society in the newly occupied areas is clearly divided. A minority of people have served in the occupation regime or publicly adopted pro-Russian positions, often in line with their prewar sentiments. But Russian visitors to newly occupied regions report quiet hostility from locals. The Ukrainian military has maintained an armed resistance behind the frontlines in all four oblasts, with reports every few weeks of car bombs targeting Russian officers or local collaborators. Nevertheless, the Russians’ brutal but effective filtration mechanisms—procedures that screen every individual’s background, record of military service, and political views—have suppressed popular resistance. Most people simply try to get by without ending up “in the basement,” as locals term the grim brutality of Russian detention. Russia is happy to see potential opponents leave: there is still an exit route available to those with the money to buy a ticket on regular charter buses from the occupied territories to Europe via Russia.

Those who remain must endure endless pro-Russian messaging and indoctrination. Whenever Russian forces reached a new town in Ukraine, they swiftly seized the television tower. They took Ukrainian broadcasts off air and switched to the Kremlin’s propaganda. The Russian journalist Alexander Malkevich—sanctioned by the United States for his attempts to interfere in U.S. politics in 2018—turned up in June 2022 in Russian-occupied Kherson and Zaporizhzhia to set up new local television stations and a school for young journalists. His local radio station in the occupied areas broadcasts patriotic music shows to Russian troops.

Few locals can stomach this blatant Russian propaganda, so they look for alternatives. Most people scroll through endless Telegram channels in search of news. This messaging app is used by everybody in the occupied territories, including pro-Russian officials and members of the Ukrainian resistance. It is a key battleground in the propaganda wars but also a survival mechanism for people stuck under Russian rule. On local channels on Telegram, users can get warnings of impending missile attacks, find out when the banks are open, discuss how to get a better Internet connection, or discover the best place to get a manicure. Russia now runs all the telecommunications and Internet networks in the annexed oblasts, so many Ukrainian news sites are blocked. People do use virtual private networks to get around Russian barriers and access Ukrainian sources, but as time passes, some locals say they no longer bother. Some complain that Ukrainian news is out of touch with the realities of life under occupation.

At schools in the Russian occupied areas, children cannot avoid the propaganda. They are forced to sing the Russian national anthem every week. Schools have completely switched over to using Russian curriculum, with Ukrainian reduced to an optional second language. Senior pupils are taught from a new Russian history textbook that tells them that Ukraine is run by neo-Nazis and that Russia’s so-called special military operation in Ukraine was a justified response to Western aggression. Some parents manage to keep their children studying in online Ukrainian schools, but that is risky—according to a report by Amnesty International, parents are afraid that their children will be taken away if they are discovered to be enrolled in remote Ukrainian schools.

Some teachers refused to use the new Russian curriculum in the face of detention and threats. But many continue to work under the new regime—thousands of Ukrainian teachers are reported to have undergone compulsory retraining courses in Crimea and in Russia. Their motivations vary. A few may be irredentists who want to be part of a greater Russian polity. Others perhaps had always disliked the shift to Ukrainian-language education that occurred in recent years and welcomed the switch back to Russian-language schooling. Some teachers probably believed they could mitigate the worst aspects of Russian education, working within the system to protect their students. Others saw the Russian occupation as an opportunity for better salaries and promotion. Many people have remained in these areas because they had elderly relatives who would not move or because they could not face living in exile.

Russia is betting that in the long term, Ukrainian children in these areas will become socialized as patriotic Russians. Ukrainian schoolchildren have been taken on lavish study tours of Russia, visiting tourist sites and university summer schools. Russian television programs regularly show children from the Donbas or southern Ukraine being welcomed at festivals inside Russia. This is unpleasant propaganda, but these visits at least appear to be mostly voluntary. There are also much grimmer cases in which thousands of children from Ukraine were illegally deported to Crimea or Russia during the fighting. Some were illegally adopted by Russian families. Many Ukrainian families are struggling to locate their children and get them back.

In conquered Ukrainian towns such as Melitopol or Mariupol, Russia is slowly obliterating every visual reminder of Ukraine. In the first weeks of the war, Russian troops pulled down Ukrainian tridents and destroyed monuments that commemorated the Soviet-induced famine—known as the Holodomor—that killed millions of Ukrainians in the 1930s. They have painted over Ukrainian colors—blue and yellow—everywhere with Russia’s red and blue. Russia aims to reverse completely the Ukrainianization and “decommunization” campaigns that swept through the region after 2014. A May 2015 law ordered the removal of all Soviet and communist symbols and statues and replaced tens of thousands of Soviet-era names of towns and streets. During the campaign, the Ukrainian authorities knocked down over 1,000 statues of Lenin across the country. Now, the Russians are putting them back up.

Streets have been obsessively renamed. In Mariupol, Freedom Square has once again become Lenin Square. Meotida Boulevard, a devastated street in the heart of the city’s Greek community, has returned to its previous awkward Soviet-era name, 50th Anniversary of the October Revolution Street. University Street in Melitopol was changed to Darya Dugina Street, named for the far-right Russian activist and pundit who was killed by a car bomb in Moscow in August 2022. Street names also reflect the legacy of twentieth-century ideological battles. In Melitopol, Dmytro Dontsov Street, named for a Ukrainian political thinker of the 1930s with fascist views, now bears the name of Pavel Sudoplatov, an infamous Stalinist secret agent who helped murder Leo Trotsky.

The war spills over into culture, where Russia has pursued an all-out program of Russification that plays on preexisting tensions over language and politics. The main theater in Mariupol was destroyed in one of the most infamous atrocities of the war when a suspected Russian airstrike in March 2022 killed hundreds of civilians. The theater is being rebuilt, but its troupe is now divided. One group has relocated to western Ukraine, where it stages contemporary political plays in Ukrainian. Those who remain in Mariupol perform undemanding Chekhovian comedies in Russian in the local youth center. Russia is expanding the network of movie theaters in the region—not to screen overt propaganda but to draw people back into everyday Russian popular culture. Moviegoers in Mariupol over the New Year weekend flocked to see Russia’s latest hit comedy, Serf 2. Propaganda films about the war, such as Russia’s 2023 box office disaster, Witness, are nowhere to be seen. People want distraction, not indoctrination, but even that distraction can serve to tie locals closer to Russia.

Beyond culture, economic policy is Russia’s most powerful means to co-opt society and effect long-term demographic change in occupied parts of Ukraine. Russia’s welfare system and state salaries are often more generous than Ukraine’s and are aimed at winning over poorer parts of the population and pensioners. In December, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that Russia would spend more than one trillion rubles (about $11 billion) a year in the four annexed regions. This includes billions of dollars for a huge reconstruction program in the hope of creating a “New Russia” on the northern shores of the Sea of Azov, recalling Catherine the Great’s eighteenth-century idea of Novorossiya (New Russia). Glossy brochures portray the future of Mariupol as an ersatz Russia-by-the-sea, where any memory of Ukraine has been razed and replaced by Russian apartment blocks, parks, and boulevards. The city was devastated during fighting in 2022, and authorities have rehoused some locals. Many complain, however, that the best new homes are reserved for Russian newcomers. It seems Moscow wants to encourage Russian immigrants to replace those Ukrainian residents who have been dispossessed and forced into exile. Not for the first time in this conflict, Russian actions would violate international law, which explicitly prohibits such population transfers in and out of occupied territories.

The prospects for the occupied territories are bleak. Ukraine lacks a political and diplomatic strategy to challenge Russia’s occupation over the longer term. Ukrainian policymakers had hoped that a quick and successful military counteroffensive last year would free these territories and roll back Russian forces. That did not come to pass. With the frontline at a territorial stalemate, Ukraine’s chances of regaining full control of the occupied territories by force of arms in 2024 appear slim. Any armistice or freezing of the conflict would draw a line through southern and eastern Ukraine, leaving millions of Ukrainians under Russian rule. As the war grinds on, Russia has time to further consolidate its political, economic, and administrative occupation, making the eventual reintegration of these territories back into Ukraine increasingly difficult.

There is much more at the link if you can stomach any more recounting of Russia’s genocidal activities in the parts of Ukraine they are occupying.

And another:

https://twitter.com/ChristopherJM/status/1748238323376636143

From Christopher Miller at The Financial Times: (emphasis mine)

“I’m going to tell you the truth,” says Vanya, a Ukrainian soldier serving in a reconnaissance unit fighting alongside marines on the east bank of the Dnipro river in southern Ukraine. “The situation is deplorable.”

His damning assessment follows months of daring raids into enemy territory by Ukrainian forces last autumn to establish a tenuous bridgehead deep in the southern Kherson region. Under the cover of darkness, troops zipped across the river to inflict damage on Russian units and provide one of few bright spots since Ukraine’s much-vaunted summer counteroffensive ended in failure.

But the unit’s grip on the Dnipro foothold, near the village of Krynky, is slipping. Their positions on marshy terrain and in old enemy trenches are shallow and prone to flooding or filled with the rotting corpses of Russian fighters. Freezing cold temperatures also bite, slowing down operations and making it impossible to rest.

Ukrainian troops are suffering heavy casualties here, laments Vanya, declining to give specifics, citing military secrecy. The Russians, he adds, have an advantage of at least four or five soldiers to every one Ukrainian.

Part of the problem is logistical. Because the Ukrainians must cross the river in small vessels to remain undetected and more nimble, they are not able to transport larger, more deadly weapons. “Everything we take is what we can carry ourselves,” Vanya says. “There are at most some types of grenade launchers. In a very rare case, I saw one heavy machine gun brought across.”

The end goal was to create a position from which the Ukrainian army could launch new attacks deeper into Russian-controlled territory. That is looking less likely by the day, Vanya says. In recent weeks, Russian military bloggers and western analysts say that Russian forces have retaken some of the positions on the eastern bank.

Asked whether Ukraine can hold its base there long-term, Vanya was blunt. “Of course not,” he says. “The fact is that the Marine Corps was unable to maintain the pace of the offensive and for sure lost the initiative a long time ago.”

Vanya now expects the troops to fall back to defensive positions on the Dnipro’s west bank — or risk suffering heavy losses among its strongest units.

But to what extent it should adopt a more secure defensive position in anticipation of a difficult third year of war is no longer a question just for those stationed on the Dnipro river, but for Ukraine’s entire military and its commander-in-chief.

As the second anniversary of Russia’s all-out invasion nears on February 24, Ukraine’s military prospects appear to be dimming. It has abandoned hopes of a swift victory and is instead girding itself for a drawn-out war. One western official working on Ukraine policy believes there is “little prospect of an operational breakthrough by either side in 2024” let alone in the next few months.

This reality has been acknowledged in Kyiv, where President Volodymyr Zelenskyy declared in early December that “a new phase” has set in. After his troops failed to recapture large areas of the south as planned, he ordered the army to build new fortifications along key segments of its 1,000km front line, signalling a shift from an offensive to a defensive posture.

The western official says that a strategy of “active defence” — holding defensive lines but probing for weak spots to exploit coupled with long-range air strikes — would allow Ukraine to “build out its forces” this year and prepare for 2025, when a counteroffensive would have a better chance.

But several factors are likely to determine Ukraine’s fortunes. Chief among them is the uncertainty surrounding western military assistance, including munitions, which Ukraine is burning through. There are open questions about the west’s resolve and whether it can and will continue backing Ukraine in its fight — and, if it does, to what extent.

The biggest concern lies with Washington, where the White House announced the final drawdown of weapons and military equipment for Ukraine on December 27. Though European nations, including the UK and Germany, are providing some financial support, the US is Ukraine’s biggest supplier of military aid. But right-wing Republicans in the US Congress are holding up tens of billions of dollars in future military funding for Kyiv. Until Congress acts, there will be no more support.

Fiona Hill, a foremost expert on Russia who served as a national security adviser in the White House, told Politico in December that Ukraine has succeeded so far “because of massive military support from European allies and other partners”.

“So in that regard, we’ve now reached a tipping point between whether Ukraine continues to win in terms of having sufficient fighting power to stave Russia off, or whether it actually starts to lose because it doesn’t have the equipment, the heavy weaponry, the ammunition. That external support is going to be determinative.”

Even if the White House strikes a deal with Congress to extend aid to Ukraine, it seems unlikely to be able to offer the leap in capabilities and technologies that would allow Ukraine to decisively regain the advantage this year.

Asked when the cessation of US aid to Ukraine would start to affect the battlefield, another western official working on Ukraine policy says: “We’re confident the Ukrainians have what they need [to hold their positions].”

During his high-stakes visit to Washington in December, Zelenskyy struck an urgent tone, pleading with congressional Republicans to approve without delay $60bn in new military assistance for his country. More air defences, in particular, are of immediate importance, Zelenskyy said, in order to safeguard Ukraine’s critical infrastructure. That need was evident earlier this month, when Kyiv’s nearly 4mn residents awoke to the roar of explosions from Russian attack drones as well as ballistic and cruise missiles.

All the signs suggest there is more to come. Jens Stoltenberg, Nato’s secretary-general, warned in November that Russia had stockpiled missiles for winter and was planning to launch them in massive waves over the coming weeks in an attempt to plunge Ukraine into darkness.

This bleak prediction arrives as the Kremlin’s unprovoked war against its neighbour goes into its third year, and 12 months after Ukraine appeared to have the upper hand in the fight.

It is a marked contrast from Zelenskyy’s visit to the US capital in early 2023, when he received several standing ovations from American lawmakers as he told them that “you can speed up our victory.”

Ukraine appeared to have the upper hand on the battlefield after counteroffensives in eastern Kharkiv and southern Kherson resulted in the liberation of the largest swaths of territory from Russian forces since they were pushed out of Kyiv and Chernihiv in the spring of 2022.

The sweeping advances gave troops a big morale boost and a weary Ukrainian society confidence that the war could end in victory.

“At that time, the country was living with the feeling that the only thing preventing the end of the war was the weather,” Ukrainian journalist Pavlo Kazarin wrote recently for the independent Ukrainian Truth news outlet.

Much more at the link, if you can stomach it.

And this from Ukrainska Pravda:

An article in the Financial Times (FT) points out that Ukraine has switched to “active defence” tactics, which was recently reaffirmed by Oleksandr Syrskyi, Commander of the Ground Forces of Ukraine, who said that the Ukrainian army’s goals remain to hold its positions and to exhaust the Russians. 

The authors cite the assumption of Ukrainian security officials that “Russia may be planning a large-scale offensive as early as summer”.

Quote: “Its [the offensive’s – ed.] goal would be to capture the remainder of four regions – Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia – Putin claimed to have annexed in September 2022. In addition, the officials say, another attempt at Kharkiv or even Kyiv was not out of the question.

A newly declassified US intelligence assessment reviewed by the FT in December also notes that Putin’s ultimate goal in Ukraine of conquering the country and subjugating its people remains unchanged.”

Details: The authors emphasise that whether Russia will be able to achieve these goals remains in question. “Whether the Russians will be successful is another question. [Kyrylo] Budanov [the head of Ukraine’s Defence Intelligence – ed.] is not convinced that his enemies can produce as many shells and troops as they are losing, even with North Korea’s support. On top of that, Ukrainians have proven adept at defending their territory,” the article says.

Here’s more evidence of the effects of the strategic failure in DC, EU member state, and NATO capitols:

Avdiivka:

https://twitter.com/ChristopherJM/status/1748440993584534015

https://twitter.com/ralee85/status/1748429465942704251?s=46&t=TUBPHx8mOIq5hS31kSfSvQ

Here’s the screen grabs of the translations from Rob Lee’s tweet:

 

https://twitter.com/khpg/status/1748437557753348401

LTG Budanov, the Director of Ukraine’s Main Directorate of Intelligence, the HUR, provided his thoughts on where things stand.

https://twitter.com/DI_Ukraine/status/1748357925825908995

💥 The head of the Main Directorate of Intelligence of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, Lieutenant General
@ChiefDI_Ukraine
in a comment for the Financial Times, spoke about the current situation of the aggressor state and the immediate priorities in the Russian-Ukrainian war.

🔗 https://gur.gov.ua/content/ataky-po-okupantakh-v-krymu-budut-prodovzhuvatys-kyrylo-budanov.html

From the HUR:

Attacks on occupiers in the Crimea will continue, ― Kirill Budanov

January 19, 2024

Chief of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine Lieutenant General Kirill Budanov in a comment for the publication Financial Times spoke about the current situation of the aggressor state and the immediate priorities in the Russo-Ukrainian war.

According to him, the attempts of the Russians to step on the eastern front, which have been going on since the fall of 2023, have not yet made any breakthrough.

“ Their last attempt [to step] has been going on for two months. In fact, to no avail ”, ― said the head of GUR MO of Ukraine.

He also said that the number of Russian losses at the front near Avdiivka has increased significantly in the last few weeks.

Kirill Budanov questioned the ability of terrorist Moscow to cover the losses of its troops and shells, even with the support of the northern korea.

The head of the Ukrainian secret service stressed the need to continue the pressure on Russia, in particular in the Crimea ― to attack from the air, use naval drones and conduct secret special operations.

“Our units [last year] were repeatedly part of the Crimea”, ― Kirill Budanov reminded, adding that the active actions of special forces will continue.

As the head of the GUR of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine explained, one of the priorities of the respective missions is to destroy the logistics of the Russian occupation army on the temporarily occupied peninsula.

Tatarigami’s Frontintelligence Insight Team has details on the North Korean munitions being supplied to Russia:

https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1748350390226063653

Here are the details published by EuroMaidan Press:

Both Russia and Ukraine are reliant on artillery on the battlefield, and both faced shortages of artillery ammunition after heavy use, fueling a race for rounds.

In 2022 and the first half of 2023, Ukraine seemed to be winning: the West provided more artillery ammunition to Ukraine than Russia received from its partners.

However, by January 2024, the dynamics shifted: Russia is now getting more rounds than the West sends to Ukraine, thanks to continuous ammunition shipments from North Korea that went into full swing in the fall of 2023.

This poses great danger to the Ukrainian forces, as in a battlefield where neither side can achieve air dominance, artillery is a key factor that shapes the outcome of offensive or defensive operations.

After identifying this key factor in the war, the OSINT group Frontelligence Insight monitored ammo shipments from North Korea to Russia, aiming to track logistical routes, calculate delivery numbers, and identify storage points. Today, we are disclosing North Korea’s ammo transport ecosystem – and revealing some of its crucial nodes for the first time.

How much ammo?

According to recent statements by Vadym Skibitskyi, a representative of Ukraine’s Military Intelligence (HUR), in 2023, North Korea supplied Russia with approximately one million rounds of ammunition, predominantly consisting of 122 mm and 152 mm artillery shells. In October 2023, my OSINT group Frontelligence Insight tracked and estimated that, from September to the end of October, Russia received approximately 2,000 cargo containers from North Korea, containing around 500,000 rounds of 152mm and 122mm ammunition.

On 11 January, in an exclusive interview with Yonhap, a major South Korean news agency, South Korean Defense Minister Shin Won-sik stated that North Korea is estimated to have provided around 5,000 containers of weapons to Russia as of the end of December. These containers can accommodate some 2.3 million rounds of 152mm shells or around 400,000 rounds of 122mm artillery shells.

Given that Russia consistently received ammunition without disruptions, as we in Frontelligence Insight have visually observed, we believe that the number provided by South Korean officials of 5,000 cargo containers between September and January is likely accurate.

Applying our methodology, which has been consistent in past estimations of ammunition deliveries from North Korea, assuming the accuracy of the information about 5,000 containers, the estimated number of ammunition deliveries between September and the end of December would be approximately 1.57 million shells, combining 152mm and 122mm (see footnote for the calculations). This figure falls in the middle between the estimates provided by HUR and the South Korean Defense Minister.

Gap in production and alternative resolutions

Given that Russia produced approximately 2 million 122mm and 152mm artillery rounds in 2023 and received approximately 1.57 million rounds from North Korea, it’s likely that Russia will continue to increase its domestic production while covering current needs through foreign deliveries from Iran and North Korea.

While these numbers may not enable Russia to use artillery as extensively as in 2022, they still provide Russia with an artillery firepower advantage when considering the Ukrainian ammo situation. According to the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), Russia currently fires 10,000 shells a day – five times more than Ukraine. In the summer of 2023, Ukraine had the upper hand, firing 7,000 a day, compared to Russia’s 5,000.

Although the European Union admitted it is having trouble fulfilling its pledge of 1 million rounds of artillery ammunition by March 2024, the goal could still be achieved if the EU redirects its exports and increases pressure on producers, EU officials say.

Concurrently, the USA, Ukraine’s primary source of artillery ammunition, doubled its production to 28,000 rounds per month in October 2023. As well, Ukraine has increased its ammunition production tenfold in 2023.

However, this all still falls short of meeting current frontline needs and lags behind Russia’s capacities, boosted by North Korea.

While the straightforward solution is to boost production, scaling up artillery ammunition production takes time. In the meantime, what other measures can the West and Ukraine implement to alleviate the effects of artillery ammo shortages?

• FPV Drones: While not a direct replacement for artillery, FPV drones prove effective in both offensive and defensive actions. They can deliver precise strikes on enemy vehicles and soldiers, bridging the gap in situations where ammunition is scarce or severely limited.
• Counter-Battery Systems: Increased delivery of counter-battery radars and GMLRS weaponry may not boost artillery fire rates for Ukraine, but it can significantly diminish enemy artillery fire. This reduction allows forces to achieve parity or even gain an advantage in artillery fire ratio, enhancing the overall tactical situation.
• Mortars: Similar to FPV drones, mortars cannot fully substitute for artillery. However, their mobility and effectiveness make them valuable in both offensive and defensive operations, providing a short-range alternative on a smaller, tactical scale. Increased mortar and its ammo deliveries in 2024 can alleviate the pressure on Ukrainian troops.
• Deep-striking capabilities: Europe and the US should also explore the possibility of providing Ukraine with missiles and permission to strike Russian ammo depots inside Russian territory. Escalatory rhetoric is unlikely to be effective, especially after North Korea supplied Russia with ballistic missiles, which were subsequently used to strike Ukrainian cities.
• Soft power: Finally, the decision by the North Korean dictatorial regime to supply ammunition to Russia for an invasion of a sovereign European country demands a robust response from the West. Despite North Korea’s existing heavy sanctions, its dependence on China opens avenues for influence through diplomatic and economic soft power. Coordinated efforts by Western nations and their Asian partners can be instrumental in addressing this problem.

There is much more at the link!

Stepove, Avdiivka front:

https://twitter.com/wartranslated/status/1748480087471608160

Krynky, left bank of the Dnipro, Russian occupied Kherson Oblast:

https://twitter.com/wartranslated/status/1748313839441949108

Ukrainian defence forces liquidated one of the most effective Russian FPV drone operators with call sign Moisey [Moses] in Krynky.

This was reported by several pro-Russian channels referencing a message that appeared in Moses’ channel posted by his wife.

He was apparently the most successful FPV operator who destroyed, according to varying reports, between 400 and over 9000 personnel and dozens of Ukrainian boats.

His last message from a few days ago was “It’s hell in Krynky…”.

He was a receiver of many drone fundraiser campaigns.

The Baltic states:

https://twitter.com/Lithuanian_MoD/status/1748369649035554976

Klintsy, Bryansk Oblast, Russia:

https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1748258009686376579

https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1748383836717617340

That’s more than enough for tonight.

Your daily Patron.

A new video from Patron’s official TikTok!

@patron__dsns

Хто взагалі придумав гуляти в такий мороз?🫣

♬ Рішення не прийнято – Trixie Little Cat

Here’s the machine translation of the caption:

Who even came up with the idea of walking in such a cold weather? 🫣

Open thread!